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There are many networks of transport and communication that cross national borders, but the Internet’s
infrastructure has been designed to do so with unusual subtlety. As a result, public policy issues raised
in governance of the Internet tend to be inherently transnational in nature. This makes the legitimacy of
a purely domestic legal approach to Internet governance questionable. The fact that conﬂicting domestic
regimes may interfere with each other, and may clash with the transnational cultural and technical
architecture of the Internet, further complicates an approach to governance based around legal rules.
But on the other hand more traditional and decentralised mechanisms of Internet governance such as
norms, markets and architecture suﬀer their own deﬁcits of both legitimacy and eﬀectiveness.
Governance by multi-stakeholder network conceptually provides a solution in that it brings together each
of the other mechanisms of governance and the stakeholders by whom they are commonly employed. Such
a multi-stakeholder approach has begun to permeate (and in some issue areas even to supersede) the
existing international system, as partially evidenced in the Internet governance regime by reforms that
took root at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and have begun to ﬁnd expression
in its product, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
Governance by network does not however emerge spontaneously, but requires supportive institutional
structures and processes. To maximise the legitimacy and eﬀectiveness of these, and to ensure their
interoperability both with the international system and with the architecture of the Internet, requires a
balance to be struck between the anarchistic and consensual organisational models typiﬁed by “native”
Internet governance institutions such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and hierarchical
and democratic models drawn from governmental and private sector examples and from the study of
deliberative democracy.
As an early experiment in multi-stakeholder governance by network, the Internet Governance Forum
does not quite strike the correct balance: its hierarchical structure under the leadership of the United
Nations is incompatible with its multi-stakeholder democratic ambitions, and more importantly it lacks
the institutional capacity to fulﬁl its mandate to contribute to public policy development.
This can largely be redressed by reforming the IGF’s plenary body, and its online analogue, as venues
for democratic deliberation, subject to the oversight of an executive body or bureau to which each
stakeholder group appoints its own representatives, and which is responsible for ratifying any decisions
of the larger group by consensus. In particular, requiring this bureau to broker consensus betweenstakeholder groups (as in a consociation), rather than just amongst its members at large, can assist to
diminish the power games that have limited the IGF to date.
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lPreface
Like many watershed moments, the establishment of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
in 2006 went unnoticed by most Internet users. But by providing an integrated forum for
considered deliberation on Internet public policy issues, the IGF has the potential to begin to
legitimately address some of the Internet’s biggest challenges—such as spam, cybercrime, and
freedom of expression online that have proved intractable for its current governance regime
(an odd patchwork of United States government ﬁat, decentralised private action and ad hoc
national and international regulation).
This thesis explores the potential for the IGF to act as a democratically legitimate and eﬀec-
tive body within which for all concerned stakeholders—including those largely excluded from
the Internet governance regime until now—to collaborate on the development of public policy
concerning the Internet, following a model that draws from the decentralised governance exer-
cised by organisations involved in the development of the Internet’s technical standards, but
which also recognises the need to interoperate with other sources and subjects of international
and transnational (non-state) law.
Chapter 1 introduces the Internet, the freewheeling community of computing enthusiasts
who developed it, and the imprint that their ethos has left on its technical architecture and
culture. Five diﬀerent mechanisms for governing the Internet are then described: rules, norms,
markets, architecture and the hybrid mechanism of governance by network, and some thoughts
are oﬀered as to how well the Internet’s culture accommodates the use of each of these
mechanisms. In particular it is found that the hierarchical mechanism of rules suﬀers from
problems both of legitimacy and eﬀectiveness when applied to the transnational governance
of the Internet, and that governance by network may be a more balanced mechanism for use
in this context.
Chapter 2 describes the Internet governance regime that preceded the formation of the IGF,
in each of three spheres: technical coordination (management of the Internet’s technical archi-
tecture and resources), standards development, and public policy governance (development
of Internet-related public policy). This involves consideration of the structure and activities
of the existing institutions active in each sphere, such as ICANN in technical coordination,
the IETF in standards development, and various intergovernmental organisations in public
policy governance. It is concluded that the decentralised mechanisms of governance upon
which the Internet’s technical coordination and standards development have relied are no
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more legitimate or eﬀective in their own right than the use of hierarchical rules, reinforcing
the nomination of network governance as the most appropriate foundation for governing the
Internet.
Chapter 3 examines how the Internet governance regime ﬁts with the present international
system, and outlines how that system has attempted to grapple with the intractable task
of legitimately developing transnational public policy principles. A survey is made of three
existing forms of international law; hard (that is, binding), soft (including various forms of
non-binding or customary law) and private (including cross-border“transnational law”). The
increasing role of non-state actors in international arena, and problems they are likely to
face, are noted. It is concluded that there is greater scope than previously recognised for the
development of the private ordering of stakeholders in Internet governance into international
or transnational law in its own right.
Chapter 4 starts from the position already developed that the legitimacy of any organisation
involved in public policy governance of the Internet requires the involvement of a network of
aﬀected stakeholders. How this general principle translates into a speciﬁc model for collabo-
rative decision-making is then addressed. Insights are drawn both from the anarchistic and
consensual organisational models familiar to“native”Internet governance institutions such as
the IETF, and the hierarchical and democratic models more common in governmental and
intergovernmental circles. An overarching principle to be observed is found in the need for
any governance institution to operate with the consent of those it governs. The best way
to ensure this in a transnational, multi-stakeholder context is found to be by designing the
institution to bring in all aﬀected viewpoints and subject them to reasoned deliberation.
Chapter 5 surveys the reforms to Internet governance that have actually been made in recent
years with the establishment of the Internet Governance Forum by the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS). Political forces are found to have limited the IGF in fulﬁlling
its mandate from WSIS, and this is found to have been reﬂected in its present structure
and processes. Various alternative proposals predating the discussions that led to the IGF,
and at a greater or lesser remove from the existing international system, are also examined,
but a reformed IGF is found to oﬀer the best prospect of forming a legitimate and eﬀective
multi-stakeholder network for developing public policy for the Internet governance regime.
Chapter 6 therefore draws together the conclusions of the preceding chapters and examines
exactly what reforms are necessary to accomplish this. The chapter begins by comparing
the IGF against various other governance institutions that had been discussed in previous
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chapters, and goes on to develop recommendations as to how the role, structure and processes
of the IGF should be reformed in order to improve its legitimacy and eﬀectiveness as a multi-
stakeholder governance network. Amongst the recommendations made is the establishment
of a new multi-stakeholder bureau of the IGF, which would make formal decisions only by
the consensus of all stakeholder groups. It in turn would draw from the ultimate authority
of a reformed plenary body which would be empowered to deliberate democratically, both in
person and online.
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I don’t wish to oﬀer an opinion
about how the net should be run;
that’s like oﬀering an opinion about
how salamanders should grow: no-
body has any control over it, re-
gardless of what opinions they might
have.
Brian Reid, DEC
Innumerable colourful metaphors have been used to describe the Internet. On one judicial ac-
count, it is a “never-ending worldwide conversation.”
1 If so, then the concept of “governing”
the Internet seems inappropriate, as how is a conversation governed, other than by the par-
ticipants themselves and the social norms to which they subscribe?
Other descriptions of the Internet focus on its technical attributes, deﬁning it as“the publicly
accessible global packet switched network of networks that are interconnected through the use
of the common network protocol IP,”
2 or to use a more succinct and celebrated metaphor,“the
information superhighway.” Following that characterisation, governance of such a highway is
arguably the right and responsibility of those whose sovereign jurisdiction it passes through
or aﬀects.
Other descriptions again focus on the Internet’s unique sociological attributes, calling it“cy-
berspace” or “a civilisation of the Mind,”
3 as for them the technology that underlies the
Internet is far less important than the social interactions that take place upon it. Consid-
ered in this way, as a “virtual nation state” if you will, the question of who should exercise
governance over it presupposes that it should not govern itself.
Clearly, each of the characterisations exempliﬁed above has quite diﬀerent repercussions for
the way in which the Internet is to be governed, if at all. This goes some way to explaining the
gulf that separates regulators who claim the right to exercise governance over the Internet, and
those who decry such incursions of the oﬄine world into online territory as being illegitimate.
As a socially constructed artifact, the Internet is whatever we think it is. For a ﬂag-waving
Internet pioneer such as John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFF),
who thinks of the Internet as the last bastion of personal liberty and independence in an
1. ACLU v Reno (1996) 929 F Supp 824, 883 per Dalzell J, aﬀ’d, (1997) 21 US 844.
2. Zhao, Houlin, ITU and Internet Governance (2004), 7
3. Barlow, John P, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996)
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increasingly intrusive and corporatised world, that is what it is, and no external governance
of that outpost is morally acceptable.
For a bureaucrat such as Haolin Zhou, former Director of the Telecommunications Stan-
dardization Bureau of the International Telecommunications Union, the Internet is directly
analogous to the telephone network, and hence the historical exclusion of governments from
Internet governance has been nothing more than a historical accident, to be rectiﬁed without
delay.
4
It is in this context, with much polarisation on both sides of the debate, that the Internet
Governance Forum was established in 2005. The Internet Governance Forum, or IGF, is a
forum formed under the auspices of the United Nations, to provide “a transparent, demo-
cratic, and multilateral process, with the participation of governments, private sector, civil
society and international organisations, in their respective roles,”
5 for dialogue on Internet
Governance policy.
But what are“their respective roles”? The agreement calling for the IGF’s inception (the“Tu-
nis Agenda”) draws a distinction between“international public policy issues pertaining to the
Internet,” which are to be developed “by governments in consultation with all stakeholders,”
and “the day-to-day technical and operational matters, that do not impact on international
public policy issues,”which are to be dealt with by“relevant international organisations”with
“no involvement” by government.
6
The distinction is, however, a simplistic one, as technical and policy issues are not so cleanly
separated. For example, the decision of ICANN (which, as will be explained below, is the au-
thority responsible for the administration of the root of the Internet’s Domain Name System)
to approve in principle a new top-level domain .xxx to be used for hosting sexually explicit
Web sites, was seen by governments as a public policy issue, to the extent that they called
for the decision to be reversed.
7
Say that the domain coca-cola.xxx were to be registered and that The Coca-Cola Company
were to object; immediately more public policy issues, relating to trademark protection, would
arise. Thus, there is a web of interrelation between technical and public policy issues, that
makes it diﬃcult for any stakeholder included in technical a forum such as ICANN or a policy
forum such as the IGF to be disengaged from involvement in their governance.
4. McCullagh, Declan, The UN Thinks About Tomorrow’s Cyberspace (2005); Zhao, Houlin, ITU and Internet
Governance (2004) , 2–3
5. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paragraph 61
6. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 68, 69, 77
7. McCullagh, Declan, Bush Administration Objects to .xxx Domains (2005)
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The IGF’s output is explicitly“non-binding,”which means that the participation of states in
the IGF process does not involve the use of coercive power as is a typical feature of govern-
ment regulation. In fact since the process is to be“multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic
and transparent” with “full involvement” of “all stakeholders involved in this process,” gov-
ernments do not, at least in principle, enjoy any position of preeminence in policy formation
through the IGF.
8 Neither should they, if the IGF’s legitimacy and eﬀectiveness are to be
assured.
1.1. The hacker ethos
This last statement may seem bold, in that it could be asked what greater legitimacy the IGF
could require than its aﬃliation with the United Nations. But the United Nations is composed
of states. The Internet, on one construction, owes nothing to and indeed is antithetical to the
“old”state system—which is why it was so important for the IGF to be constituted as a multi-
stakeholder rather than an intergovernmental body. John Perry Barlow, in his Declaration of
the Independence of Cyberspace—note the metaphor—wrote with characteristic hubris over
a decade ago:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of ﬂesh and steel, I come from Cy-
berspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone.
You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. ...
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim as an excuse
to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don’t exist. Where there are real conﬂicts,
where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming
our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world,
not yours. Our world is diﬀerent.
9
But why is it so diﬀerent, and how? On one view, the distinctive culture of the Inter-
net is an historical artifact arising from its development amongst engineers and enthusi-
asts—colloquially, hackers. Much has been written about the psychology of hackers, but they
have been self-described in an Internet standards document identiﬁed as RFC 1983, the “In-
ternet Users’ Glossary,”
10 as:
Hacker
A person who delights in having an intimate understanding of the internal workings of
a system, computers and computer networks in particular. The term is often misused in
a pejorative context, where “cracker” would be the correct term. See also: cracker.
8. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 29, 73, 77
9. Barlow, John P, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996); however compare Jayakar, Roshni,
What Stops Free Flow of Information is Dangerous (2000) .
10. IETF, Internet Users’ Glossary (1996)
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This deﬁnition alone however does not convey a full understanding of the ethos of a hacker and
of the culture of his community.
11 A hacker’s delight in tinkering with the internal workings of
computer systems is realised most fully in an environment where access to computing resources
and information is unrestricted. Thus, most hackers believe “that information-sharing is a
powerful positive good, and that it is an ethical duty of hackers to share their expertise by
writing open-source code and facilitating access to information and to computing resources
wherever possible”: this is the ﬁrst principle of one formulation of the so-called Hacker Ethic.
12
(The reference to “open-source code” refers to software for which the source code is made
freely available, and which can be distributed and modiﬁed without limitation;
13 modern-day
hacker culture is in fact largely coincident with open source culture.
14)
Some of the early hackers who were fortunate enough to work in environments that fostered
(wittingly or otherwise) such open use of computing resources are now amongst the folk heroes
of hacker culture. These include Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie, who began development
of the operating system Unix at AT&T Bell Labs in 1969, originally because they wanted
a faster system on which to run their computer game, “Space Travel,”
15 and Richard M
Stallman, President of the Free Software Foundation (FSF), at MIT’s Artiﬁcial Intelligence
Laboratory.
Hackers who were not as fortunate as Thompson, Ritchie or Stallman had two choices: to
gain access to third party computer systems or data by stealth, or to create communities
of their own such as ham radio, phreaking (telephone hacking), model railroad or amateur
rocket groups, in which their freedom to hack would be unimpeded.
16
1.2. Genesis of the Internet
Amongst such hackers were the architects of the Internet.
17 This is not to say, however, that
the Internet began as a hacker project. On the contrary; it grew out of the ARPANET, a
network that began its development in 1969 by DARPA, the Defence Advanced Research
11. In this instance, the use of the male pronoun is not simple sexism; anecdotal observation suggests that hackers
are overwhelmingly male.
12. Raymond, Eric S, The Jargon File (2003)
13. For a fuller deﬁnition, see Perens, Bruce, The Open Source Deﬁnition (2005).
14. Engel, Christoph, Governing the Egalitarian Core of the Internet (2005), 10
15. Ritchie, Dennis M, The Evolution of the Unix Time-sharing System (1984)
16. See generally Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001).
17. References for this section are Zakon, Robert H, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline (2006), Moschovitis, Christos J
P, History of the Internet: A Chronology, 1843 to the Present (1999) , Leiner, Barry M, Cerf, Vinton G, Clark,
David D, Kahn, Robert E, Kleinrock, Leonard, Lynch, Daniel C, Postel, Jon, Roberts, Larry G, & Wolﬀ, Stephen,
A Brief History of the Internet (2003), IETF, FYI on “What is the Internet?” (1993) and IETF, The Internet
Activities Board (1990).
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Projects Agency, of the US Department of Defense. Nodes of this nascent network were
progressively installed at university campuses around the United States, with the size of the
network numbering four nodes (or “hosts”) in 1969, 13 by 1970, and 23 by 1971. In 1972,
email was developed, and became the ﬁrst “killer application” of the Internet; one that was
more than just a cool hack, but was a unique practical application of the new network. During
the following year the network expanded overseas, with new nodes in Hawaii, Norway and
England.
Over the succeeding years ARPANET expanded further by interconnecting with other wide
area computer networks such as Usenet, BITNET and CSNET, a network of the National
Science Foundation (NSF). It 1983 the DARPA split the military nodes of ARPANET into
a separate network known as MILNET, with the balance eventually connecting into a new
network NSFNET, established in 1986 by the NSF, who essentially took the place of DARPA.
The Australian Academic Research Network AARNET connected with NSFNET in 1989, by
which time there were over 100 000 hosts on the network. In March 1991 NSFNET and its
connected networks, together known as the Internet, were opened by the NSF to commercial
usage for the ﬁrst time. The following year there were over a million hosts on the Internet.
Today there over 350 million.
One of the innovations of the ARPANET was that its switching technology—that is, the way
in which communications were directed from sender to recipient—utilised “packets” of data,
rather than a dedicated circuit established between sender and recipient, as for example in
the case of the telephone network.
Packet switching had several advantages, including greater eﬃciency, and greater robustness
in the event of a network failure, as packets could take several alternate routes to the same
destination. The architecture of a packet-switched network is also less hierarchical than that
of a circuit-switched network, in that every node in the network is a peer to every other
node, with potentially as critical a role in passing a packet towards its destination. By the
same token, a packet-switched network is also intrinsically less secure than one that is circuit-
switched.
The network protocols that respectively control the division of information into packets and
their transmission from sender to recipient are known as TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)
and IP (Internet Protocol). The TCP/IP protocol pair has comprised the basic network
communications standard for the Internet since 1983, and laid the foundation for various
other network protocols that were to follow.
5Chapter 1. Introduction
Another important foundation of today’s network services on the Internet is the Domain
Name System (DNS), which was introduced in 1984. The DNS enabled Internet servers to
be accessed by means of easily-memorable names rather than numbers, and for the names to
be stored in a distributed database to which all Internet hosts had access. The names were
arranged in reverse-hierarchical order separated by dots, usually with the name of the server
ﬁrst (such as “remus” or “www”), followed by the name of the institution (such as “rutgers”
or“ibm”), followed by the institution’s type (such as“edu”for an educational institution and
“com” for a company).
A further important foundation of today’s Internet is BGP, the Border Gateway Protocol.
Until BGP was introduced in 1994, NFSNET provided a backbone or central network that
linked the various smaller networks of the Internet together. Although IP packets might have
traversed several networks en route from source to destination, they always did so via NFS-
NET at at least one point. BGP rendered this redundant and allowed Internet routing (that
is, the process by which IP packets are directed from sender to recipient across potentially
numerous autonomous networks) to be decentralised. This allowed for the decommissioning of
NFSNET in 1995. From that point, realising the vision of the Internet pioneers from DARPA,
whilst there were a number of important constituent backbone networks, there was no single
“core” of the networks of the Internet.
On top of the ﬂexible TCP/IP network protocols, utilising the DNS for addressing and
BGP for routing between autonomous systems, numerous Internet services were, and in-
deed continue to be, added. These so-called application layer protocols (in contrast to the
lower-level transport and network layer protocols TCP/IP)
18 include the Internet email pro-
tocol called SMTP, a ﬁle transfer protocol FTP, the protocol that supports the World Wide
Web, known as HTTP, and hundreds of others. The most widely used of these services have
become Internet standards, and may be identiﬁed as such by the use of the number of the
“Request for Comment” document (or “RFC”) assigned when their speciﬁcation was ﬁrst
proposed to the Internet community.
The detail of the RFC process will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter, but key
is the fact that a document proposed for an RFC may in principle be drafted by anyone, re-
gardless of their aﬃliation. In this there are echoes of another precept of the Hacker Ethic that
one author has identiﬁed;“Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such
18. This terminology derives from the OSI networking model discussed at Section 2.2.1.3, under which seven
layers of a network were deﬁned—though TCP/IP networking has no equivalent to two of these seven theoretical
layers (the session and presentation layers).
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as degrees, age, race, or position.”
19 The acceptance of a new Internet standard proposed
in an RFC is predicated upon the achievement of consensus that it should be so accepted,
from members of the Internet community who participate (freely) in an unincorporated forum
known as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
1.3. Technical and social architecture
Although it has already been observed that the Internet is more than a technical artifact,
but also (and perhaps more importantly) a social phenomenon, the reason for the technical
focus of the preceding introduction to the Internet’s early structure and protocols is that the
technical and social are closely interrelated. After all, the architecture of the Internet—the
physical design of the network and the manner in which communications traverse it—was
shaped by the ethos of the hackers who developed it. They created an Internet that featured:
￿ decentralisation (a ﬂat, peer-to-peer network topology that distributed network intelligence,
and resisted centralised monitoring and intervention—reﬂecting its designers’ preference for
decentralisation and autonomy over hierarchy and control);
￿ interactivity (a default policy of unrestricted bidirectional access between hosts through
design principles such as “end-to-end connectivity,” thus maximising its capacity for the
exchange of information, in line with the Hacker Ethic);
20
￿ openness (the use of freely available tools and protocols that empowered the individual
Internet user to communicate and publish information without the intermediation of third
parties such as media outlets or governments);
21
￿ anonymity (the absence of built-in authentication mechanisms either in the transport or
network layer (eg. in TCP/IP) or the application layer (eg. in SMTP, the email protocol),
which were not only unnecessary within a mutually trusting community, but also fostered
anonymity and privacy);
￿ cosmopolitanism (addressing and routing protocols that cut across boundaries of geogra-
phy and politics, as its founders collaborated across state and later national boundaries
when designing the network);
19. Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001), 43.
20. This can also be, but is not universally, conveyed by the term“net neutrality”: Mueller, Milton, Net Neutrality
as Global Principal for Internet Governance (2007).
21. See further Section 4.2.4.4 for a disambiguation of the meaning of “free” in this context.
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￿ egalitarianism (the absence of any framework for certain users to be assigned elevated rights
or privileges on the network); and
￿ resilience (routing intelligence built into the network that impeded attempts at censorship,
in accordance with its designers’ iconoclasticism and distrust of authority). As John Gilmore
of the EFF is attributed as saying, “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it.”
22
The Internet promoted these values not merely through its culture, but through its very
design, which embedded engineering principles that reﬂected the values of its designers, who
had “hardwired their way of life in the Internet architecture.”
23 This produced an innate
congruence between the technical and the social architecture (or culture) of the Internet.
24
1.3.1. Shaking the architecture’s foundations
However, in the forty years since the Internet’s earliest years, the Internet’s architecture has
not proved unmalleable. Laurence Lessig famously made this point in describing the archi-
tecture of the Internet as “West Coast Code,” and claiming that it could enable the inherent
freedoms of the Internet to be subverted at the behest of commercial interests just as could
“East Coast Code”—legislation—at the behest of governments.
25
It is true that the design features noted above have been aﬀected by a variety of factors,
including not only commercial interests, but also technical limitations and political or public
policy pressures (since after all, it has been noted above that technical and public policy
management of the Internet are inextricably linked). Examples of how such forces have been
pitted against the architectural features of the Internet will be given in respect of three such
features in turn; decentralisation, anonymity and egalitarianism:
￿ Despite the intentions of its designers, the Internet was never fully decentralised, and the
respect in which it currently most falls short of decentralisation is the DNS. In contrast
to the network topology of the Internet, the domain name system is hierarchical. Thus,
only the administrator of the“murdoch.edu.au”domain may add sub-domains underneath
it such as “www,” only the administrator of “edu.au” may add new domains at that level
for new universities, and only ICANN as the administrator of the root of the DNS may
22. See http://www.toad.com/gnu.
23. Engel, Christoph, Governing the Egalitarian Core of the Internet (2005), 9
24. For a more comprehensive list of the architectural features of the Internet, see IETF, Architectural Principles
of the Internet (1996).
25. Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), 43–44
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(with the approval of the United States government, at present) add new domains at the
top level.
26
Whilst this arrangement for most purposes creates an eﬃcient division of authority, and
sensibly reﬂects the principle of subsidiarity (that governance should be exercised at the
lowest practical level), its does also concentrate authority at its apex. It is therefore no
coincidence that it is through ICANN that regulators have most commonly sought to gain
a purchase upon Internet governance, nor that control over administration of the DNS root
was one of the main bones of contention that gave rise to the establishment of the IGF.
In other contexts, the Internet’s decentralisation has tended to prevail against opposing
forces. An example is found in the case of the original Napster software, which provided
access to a peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle sharing network over which MP3 music ﬁles could be
exchanged by its users. When downloading an MP3 ﬁle using this service, a user’s copy of
the Napster software would look up the ﬁle’s location in a central directory maintained by
Napster Inc. By maintaining this central directory, Napster Inc was found to be complicit in
breaches of copyright held in music that was transferred using the service. The same charge
failed against the publishers of the Kazaa, Grokster and Morpheus ﬁle sharing software that
used a decentralised directory of ﬁles (although they were found liable on the alternate
ground that they actively induced acts of infringement by users of the software).
27
￿ Anonymity and privacy on the Internet are being challenged on several fronts. Lessig iden-
tiﬁes three: the increasing requirement that unique identiﬁers and passwords be used to
access Web resources, the use of “cookies”—small text ﬁles that Web sites can create on
a user’s computer to track their activities on that Web site and which can be accessed
on the user’s subsequent visits, and digital signatures, with which users can be required
to identify themselves before using certain services;
28 an Australian example is that the
Australian Taxation Oﬃce requires Australian businesses to authenticate their assertions
of identity using a digital signature when submitting their Business Activity Statements
online.
Since Lessig wrote, another prominent limitation on the privacy and anonymity of Internet
users has been the use of records of IP addresses allocated to users as evidence of ille-
gal conduct alleged against them. Such records are maintained by ISPs (Internet Service
26. But see Section 4.1.2.
27. See MGM v Grokster (2004) 380 F 3d 1154 for the decision in the defendants’ favour, MGM v Grokster (2005)
545 US 913 for the decision on appeal which succeeded on diﬀerent grounds, and Samuelson, Pamela, Legally
Speaking: Did MGM Really Win the Grokster Case? (2005) for commentary.
28. Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), 34-35
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Providers) and have in numerous instances been the subject of discovery orders and subpoe-
nas against those ISPs by copyright owners who allege that a user allocated a particular IP
address by the ISP has downloaded copyright material, or made it available for download,
without authority of the copyright owner.
29
On the other hand, although there are methods by which Internet users can be made to
identify themselves, the fact that these methods must be grafted onto the Internet’s basic
architecture makes them expensive and diﬃcult to enforce. In response to lawsuits against
users alleged to have infringed copyright through the use of P2P ﬁle sharing software, many
users have simply switched their P2P software of choice to one of the newer applications
that better protects their privacy, such as BitTorrent, which divides the shared ﬁles across
multiple hosts on the network, so that seldom does any user upload or download a complete
ﬁle to or from a single host.
30 This has made it much more diﬃcult for copyright owners
to allege large-scale infringement of copyright against those using BitTorrent to exchange
ﬁles.
For anonymity in conducting other activities on the Internet, the Tor project is an one
of a number of services that facilitates anonymous Web browsing and publishing, instant
messaging and other activities.
31 One of the techniques used by the Tor project is digital
cryptography, which ironically is also the cornerstone of many of the techniques used to
authenticate users’ identities on the Internet. Tor also draws inspiration from the technique
of anonymous remailing, which has been used for many years to disguise the origin of
Internet email.
32
￿ Whilst the protocols on which the Internet is constructed may be intrinsically egalitarian,
the means by which a user gains access to the Internet in practice may entail limitations
being imposed upon her access to the network by her ISP, the nature of which limitations
she may not even know about. If the ISP is subject to the laws of a country such as China,
Vietnam or Saudi Arabia that has an Internet content regulation regime in place requiring
the ISP to ﬁlter Internet content before it reaches the user, it may be eﬀectively impossible
for the user to participate on the network on the same level as a citizen of a country without
such laws.
29. The ﬁrst round of 261 lawsuits against individual Internet users at the suit of the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) were ﬁled in 2003: Cassavoy, Liane, Music Labels Declare War on File Swappers
(2003).
30. Interestingly this is done for reasons of technical eﬃciency, not to frustrate the attentions of copyright owners,
which is merely a side-eﬀect.
31. See http://www.torproject.org/.
32. See also Section 4.1.
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Such ﬁltering techniques also limit the Internet’s resilience in being able to“route around”
censorship. The hardware used by ISPs to route Internet traﬃc is now being speciﬁcally
designed to facilitate the imposition of such restrictions on users.
33 As the techniques by
which ISPs transparently ﬁlter their users’ access to the network are not speciﬁed in any
Internet standard, these decision decisions are not subject to broad community review.
On the other hand, once again because ﬁltering of Internet access, works against the grain
of the Internet’s design, it tends to be either costly, ineﬀective, or both. For example
whilst China has perhaps the most sophisticated content ﬁltering regime in the world,
there are products that allows China’s citizens to very easily bypass their government’s
ﬁltering.
34 Other methods by which ﬁltering may be evaded include the use of international
telephone calls to dial up to foreign Internet providers, or less expensively, the use of
“proxy servers” located outside the jurisdiction. Access to known proxy servers is blocked
by countries such as China, but it is still possible (if not legal) for knowledgeable users to
gain access to them through an encrypted tunnel, using freely-available software such as
Tor.
The above examples illusrate that whilst the Internet no longer quite so closely reﬂects the
values of its founders as it once did, endeavours by commercial interests, governments or even
the Internet technologists themselves to work against the values implicit in its design meet
with resistance or expense that work against change, and reinforce the status quo. To make
this point is not necessarily to assert that it is a positive feature of the Internet; indeed,
it poses considerable diﬃculties to those who, in accordance with near-universally-accepted
public policy norms, seek to battle such evils as cybercrime, spam (unsolicited commercial
email) and traﬃcking in child pornography and copyright material. On one view, Internet
governance as it stands is out of balance in favour of egalitarian hacker values.
35
1.4. Governance mechanisms
The fact that the Internet does not respect geopolitical boundaries would on the face of it seem
to pose a serious obstacle to those who would seek to regulate the Internet, as legal systems as
we know them are innately bound to such boundaries. In this way, regulation of the Internet is
33. Cherry, Steven, The Net Eﬀect (2005)
34. The CustomizeGoogle extension for the Firefox Web browser is one example: see http://www.
customizegoogle.com/zh-CN/ for the extension itself, and http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/10/
31/1414203&tid=217&tid=17 for some discussion on it.
35. Engel, Christoph, Governing the Egalitarian Core of the Internet (2005), 23
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quite diﬀerent to regulation of the public switched telephone network (PSTN). The PSTN has
both a logically, and also a physically, hierarchical design, in which calls are routed between
parties using centralised signalling intelligence. It is possible to predict how a call will travel
physically across the PSTN and therefore what governments will have jurisdiction over the
terms of its carriage. In contrast, Internet services operate on top of telephony networks (but
also other networks), and their geography is dynamic and unpredictable.
Yet it is clear that some form of governance of the Internet—even if only self-governance—is
necessary if we are to manage those public policy issues that are left unaddressed by, or even
run counter to, the constraints of the Internet’s architecture. As Biegel puts it:
The question is no longer whether cyberspace as a whole can or should be regulated, but whether
and to what extent individual problem areas within particular cyber spaces can or should be
addressed via regulation.
36
The purpose of the IGF as stated in the Tunis Agenda is to address such issues:“We further
recognise that there are many cross-cutting international public policy issues that require
attention and are not adequately addressed by the current mechanisms.”
37
Accepting the jurisdictional constraints that will impede governance of the Internet by con-
ventional legal means, there are nonetheless various other ways in which human aﬀairs are gov-
erned. The principles that we have above been describing individually as“values”or“ethics,”
and collectively as “ethos” or “culture,” are clearly not of the same status as legal rules, and
yet they have a powerful eﬀect on the behaviour of Internet users.
38 Neither does the Tunis
Agenda seem to be speaking only of legal rules when it describes the IGF as a forum for the
“development of public policy,”
39 yet surely it is intended that the IGF’s output will have
some practical impact on Internet governance, or the forum would service only a symbolic
purpose.
This illustrates the fact that governance is a broader term than government,
40 and that it can
be accomplished through a broader variety of mechanisms than the legislative, executive and
judicial acts that government performs. A closer synonym for governance is “management,”
and in the literature of public administration Rhodes has isolated three mechanisms by which
governance may be exercised: hierarchies, markets and networks.
41
36. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 119
37. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paragraph 60.
38. Marshall, Garry, Internet and Memetics (1998).
39. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paragraph 68.
40. Rosenau, James N, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics (1992), 4
41. Rhodes, R A W, The New Governance: Governing Without Government (1996)
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The reference to hierarchies as a form of governance includes the use of laws and bureaucratic
regulation to control behaviour. Markets are a mechanism of governance in that the behaviour
of consumers can be regulated by the basic economic laws of supply and demand. Networks
are a more complex hybrid form of governance which involves partnerships of trust between
governments, the private sector and the community, and collaborative decision-making pro-
cedures such as will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. Pal has suggested that governance
by network is epitomised by the emergent forms of governance found on the Internet.
42 But
more particularly for our purposes, the template for the IGF in the Tunis Agenda embodies
the concept of governance by network well.
From a parallel but slightly broader perspective, Lessig has identiﬁed four mechanisms by
which governance can be exercised: laws, markets, social norms and code (the last of which
he also describes as architecture or technology,
43 and which Reidenberg described as the lex
informatica
44). The ﬁrst two of these are largely synonymous with Rhodes’ hierarchies and
markets, and the eﬀect of the third and fourth are respectively the social and architectural
forces of the Internet that guide users’ behaviour online.
There are a number of other models of governance that have been speciﬁcally developed in
relation to the Internet. Biegel, for example, in writing on the governance of Cyberspace,
considered three regulatory mechanisms: legal frameworks within individual countries, in-
ternational cooperation, and changes in the architecture of the Internet itself.
45 The ﬁrst
is clearly a type of governance by rules, the second could also be a type of governance by
network, and the third is equivalent to Lessig’s code and Reidenberg’s lex informatica.
Norms appear to be missing from Biegel’s model, but they are added in the very similar model
of Weber, in the form of governance through self-regulation
46 (which Biegel had excluded on
the grounds that it is simply the “default position”).
47
Expanded further into ﬁve regulatory models (one of which, again is the status quo), Caslon
Analytics subdivides governance by rules into national law or the“digital ring fence”approach,
international law or the lex informatica (not to be confused with Reidenberg’s usage of that
42. Pal, Leslie A, Virtual Policy Networks: The Internet as a Model of Contemporary Governance? (1997)
43. Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), 87
44. Reidenberg, Joel R, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology
(1998)
45. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 124
46. Weber, Rolf H, Regulatory Models for the Online World (2002), 80
47. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 221
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phrase, which Caslon Analytics terms“code as law”), and the creation of a new global body.
48
Similar too are Vedel’s four models of Internet governance: community governance (which is
largely governance through norms within a relatively culturally homogeneous community),
market governance, hierarchical or state regulation, and associative regulation. Associative
regulation is Vedel’s closest equivalent to governance by network, being based upon vol-
untary agreements between stakeholder groups (though Vedel asserts that “it rarely exists
autonomously, and generally requires state intervention either in its design, or its applica-
tion”).
49
A slightly modiﬁed synthesis of all these typologies of control would then suggest that gov-
ernance can be exercised by means of rules (that is, laws or hierarchies), norms, markets,
architecture (that is, the broadest sense of code) and networks. Each of these will be exam-
ined again in turn with reference to their suitability as tools for governance of the Internet.
1.4.1. Rules
The most common typology of rules divides them into moral rules and legal rules. To the
legal positivist, legal rules have no necessary or inevitable relationship with moral rules. A
legal rule is simply a binding and enforceable obligation, regarded as law, that has been
posited through a political process by a body politic, to whom obedience to the legal rule
is owed.
50 This position is too stark for the natural lawyer, who argues that there are also
certain rights and duties that exist as legal rules whether or not they are recognised by the
state (for example, fundamental human rights); and similarly that there may be purported
legal rules that contravene natural law on substantive or procedural grounds, and thus do not
qualify as law at all.
The relevance of this is that there is some debate as to whether rules of international law ac-
tually constitute legal rules, or whether they are simply principles of positive morality. This
question is raised largely because international society lacks the means to enforce the rules
that it makes.
51 One way of accommodating this fact, without granting the status of law to
the natural lawyer’s supra-legal moral rules, is to accept a division between “hard law” and
“soft law,” whereby hard law is binding, and soft law is not strictly binding but is generally
48. Caslon Analytics, Cyberspace Governance (2005)
49. Vedel, Thierry, Four Models for Internet Governance (2005), 65
50. Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 22. The author adds three other types—rules
of etiquette, rules of the game (essentially informal, tacit agreements), and descriptive rules—but for present
purposes these will be treated as norms, and discussed below.
51. D’Amato, Anthony, The Neo-Positivist Concept of International Law (1965); Cutler, A C, Private Power
and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (2003) , 75
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complied with in practice.
52 But without needing to impugn the status of unenforceable inter-
national legal rules as law, the question remains that if they are not enforced, are they of any
use in exercising governance over the Internet? What good is an international law proscribing
traﬃc in child pornography, if the law hangs in space as it were, unsupported by either police
or judiciary?
53
Domestic regulation is not a suﬃcient mechanism of governance for the Internet either, be-
cause as alluded to above, the Internet’s cosmopolitanism works against it. When the Aus-
tralian Broadcasting Services Amendment Act 1999 was passed, with the eﬀect that it became
illegal to host X-rated pornography in Australia, and became necessary to provide an age ver-
iﬁcation system when hosting material that would have been rated R or MA if it were a ﬁlm,
the outcome was that some Web sites were simply relocated oﬀ-shore.
54
Similarly, following passage of the Federal Government’s Interactive Gambling Act 2001 which
prohibited online gambling services being oﬀered to Australians, Australian online casino op-
erators have continued to oﬀer the same services to foreigners, and foreigners to Australians.
55
Such legislation eﬀectively has no more than rhetorical value, and even if replicated in a hand-
ful of like-minded countries, hardly makes for a global Internet governance regime.
Another problem associated with the use of legal rules, if another is needed, is that the
imposition of hierarchical control sits poorly with the Internet’s decentralised and egalitari-
an culture, generating such resistance as has widely emerged online over issues such as the
US Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
56 For this reason and those expressed previously, legal
rules alone will rarely be the most appropriate mechanism for exercising governance over
Internet public policy issues.
1.4.2. Norms
One way in which norms can be distinguished from rules is that norms are “standards of
behavior deﬁned in terms of rights and obligations,” whereas rules are “speciﬁc prescriptions
for action.”
57 Many of the norms of behaviour on the Internet are those that fall into the
52. Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 24. See Section 3.3.2.
53. In answer, it might still have normative eﬀect, but this is the subject of the next mechanism of governance
to be discussed below.
54. For both an example of such a site, and an explanation of why it was moved, see http://www.efa.org.au/
Publish/PR991221.html.
55. See http://www.lasseters.com.au/help/lassfaq.jsp and http://www.australia-casino.com
respectively.
56. See for example the resources of the EFF at http://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA.
57. Krasner, Stephen D, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables (1982)
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category of “netiquette.” The principles of netiquette are the subject of RFC 1855,
58 which
explains that it is considered rude in online communications to TYPE IN ALL CAPITALS
(as this is equivalent to shouting), that one should not send chain letters by email, and that
messages posted to a newsgroup or mailing list should be restricted to the topic of that
forum.
59
When Internet norms are disregarded, the consequences can extend oﬄine. The ﬁrst large-
scale commercial senders of spam, a law ﬁrm, Canter and Siegel, found their telephone and fax
numbers being tied up day and night by automated junk messages from disgruntled Internet
users.
60 More recently, one unfortunate spammer is even alleged to have been murdered by by
angry spam recipients.
61 Whether or not this is true, it illustrates a danger with reliance on
norms as a mechanism of governance: that there is no rule of law to guide their enforcement,
with the result that unrestrained vigilantism can take over.
62
Another problem is that the norms of Internet culture do not always coincide with public
policy norms, as for example in the case of intellectual property protection, and that reliance
on norms as a mechanism of governance of such issues will therefore be palpably ineﬀective.
Even in cases where the two sets of norms do coincide, the social mechanisms by which norms
tend to be enforced may be too weak to make it an eﬀective mechanism of governance of
antisocial conduct.
63
1.4.3. Markets
The free market is an important feature of the modern liberal democratic state. In general the
free market is a far more eﬃcient mechanism of regulating an economy than central planning,
because the market processes information more eﬃciently. The closer a market is to the
classical model of a“perfect market,”the more eﬃciently it functions in balancing supply and
demand, ensuring that prices are set at the optimum level for both suppliers and consumers.
58. IETF, Netiquette Guidelines (1995). This is an informational rather than a standards-track RFC, and is now
somewhat technologically dated.
59. Interestingly, this particular codiﬁcation of the principles of netiquette also speciﬁes that copyright should
be respected, which is a principle inherited from the wider norms of international society rather than from those
of Internet culture. See also Barquin, Ramon, The Ten Commandments of Computer Ethics (1992).
60. What is commonly regarded as the ﬁrst ever Usenet (Internet newsgroup) spam was sent in 1993 by an
immigration law ﬁrm; see Campbell, K, A Net Conspiracy So Immense (1994).
61. Utter, David A, Did Anti-Spam Gang Kill Russian Spammer? (2005)
62. See McAdams, Richard H, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms (1997), 412; Lemley, Mark,
The Law and Economics of Internet Norms (1998) ; Froomkin, A M, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical
Theory of Cyberspace (2003), 825–830
63. For other problems with the reliance on Internet norms as a mechanism of governance, including the potential
volatility and the heterogeneity of such norms, see Lemley, Mark, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms
(1998).
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The assumptions made in the model of a perfect market are numerous, but amongst the
most important are that consumers are rational and seek to maximise their utility (roughly,
their happiness), that producers are numerous and seek to maximise their proﬁt, that the
product sold in a particular market is uniform and has no substitutes, that all participants
are perfectly well-informed, and that no transaction costs are incurred in shopping around.
Remarkably, e-commerce conducted over the Internet allows for many of these usually un-
realistic assumptions to be satisﬁed: producers are indeed numerous, search engines such as
Google and online discussion fora such as newsgroups provide consumers with near-perfect
knowledge, and transaction costs are low—even approaching zero in the case of markets for
intangible goods such as Internet domain names, sold using online shopping cart technology.
Thus it has been said that e-commerce over the Internet is one of the closest approxima-
tions our society has to a perfect market.
64 For this reason the free market can be a useful
mechanism for exercising governance over such things such as the allocation of domain names.
However there are other areas in which markets are manifestly insuﬃcient as a mechanism of
governance, for any of three reasons. Firstly, the market is often less eﬃcient than it should
be due to the presence of externalities (that is, costs or beneﬁts of a party’s consumption
or production decision that accrue not to that party, but to others).
65 A good example is
in the case of spam. More spam email is sent than would be economically eﬃcient, because
its cost is borne largely by the recipient rather than the sender, in the form of negative
utility—annoyance—as well as the pecuniary cost of the Internet bandwidth taken up by
receiving spam, that is eventually passed on to consumers by their ISPs. Unless there was
a market mechanism to pass these costs back onto spammers, other methods of governance
would be required to tackle this problem.
Secondly, eﬃciency is not the only criterion of the eﬀectiveness of a market. There are also
social considerations to be borne in mind, as was noted in the Tunis Agenda, which observes
“that market forces alone cannot guarantee the full participation of developing countries in
the global market for ICT-enabled services”
66 (ICT being Information and Communications
Technologies, including Internet networks).
Third, there are some problems of Internet governance in which markets are not really involved
at all. For example, the protection of users’ privacy on the Internet is not an issue which it
64. Hasenpusch, Tina, Does an Economist’s Dream Come True—The Internet as a Perfect Market? (2000)
65. Coase, R, The Problem of Social Cost (1960)
66. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paragraph 18.
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is particularly useful to analyse in terms of market forces.
67 Other mechanisms of governance
are required to manage such issues.
1.4.4. Architecture
As discussed above at Section 1.3.1, the architecture of the Internet is a powerful constraint
on how Internet users behave, and even plays a role in shaping and reinforcing the norms of
Internet culture. As a method of governance, it is most eﬀective when the public policy goals
that are desired to be furthered are in alignment with the Internet’s architecture.
To take privacy as a public policy issue, the architecture of the Internet is quite supportive
of users who wish to conceal their identity from the owners of Web sites, because it allows
them to surf the Web with a fair degree of anonymity; this is both a technical and social
feature of the Internet’s architecture. In comparison, the owner of a shared resource on an
oﬃce network is likely to have greater capacity to determine the identity of any particular
user who has accessed that resource, because the architecture of an oﬃce computer network
is designed to place a much higher premium on security, and less on privacy.
By the same token however, the Internet’s architecture is a very poor governance mechanism
indeed when it comes to the furtherance of public policy that is at odds with the Internet’s
implicit values. The Internet’s characteristic resilience against censorship is of no assistance at
all to those who would seek to impose content regulation on Internet users, and neither is its
architectural inclination towards anonymity of beneﬁt to those who wish to enforce intellectual
property rights online. Architecture is of its very nature, therefore, only an eﬀective tool of
governance in those areas in which governance is least needed.
1.4.5. Networks
In a way, networks are an amalgam of all of the other methods of governance. This mech-
anism can be employed either within a single stakeholder group, or across groups. As an
example of the former case, so-called “government networks” are often formed between na-
tional regulators.
68 Compared to formal intergovernmental organisations that are formed by
67. Agrawal, Ruchika, Why is P3P Not a PET? (2002)
68. See Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks (2000) and
Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Government Networks: the Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order (2000) . Examples
include the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (see http://www.iosco.org/), the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (see http://www.iaisweb.org/), and the Joint Forum
(see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jointforum.htm).
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treaty, such networks provide more a ﬂexible and inclusive mechanism through which for
governments to coordinate their regulatory activities.
69 Similarly within the private sector,
the“network organisation”
70 is one that replaces hierarchical authority with a geographically
dispersed collection of business units, horizontally coordinated through information technol-
ogy.
71
However this thesis will focus on multi-stakeholder networks, involving governments, within
whose power it is to create domestic and international legal rules, the private sector whose
involvement is key to the operation of markets, and civil society which has a role in articulating
and developing norms. Networks that include governments and at least one of civil society and
the private sector are also known as public–private partnerships or PPPs,
72 and networks of
three or more stakeholder groups can also be known as multi-stakeholder partnerships or
MSPs,
73 although in this thesis the term “network” will encompass both variants.
Even prior to the IGF’s formation, multi-stakeholder networks had proved one of the most
promising mechanisms for bridging the gap between cyberspace and national legal systems. On
the issue of spam, for example the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)
has entered into a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with its counterparts
in other countries, in which the signatories undertake to coordinate their eﬀorts to combat
the spam problem.
74 One of these MOUs, the London Action Plan, includes signatories from
executive agencies of 38 countries, and 25 private sector signatories.
75
Another example is the Global Knowledge Partnership (GKP),
76 which contains amongst its
over 100 organisational members, stakeholders from all three main groups: governments, the
private sector and civil society, from over 40 countries.
77 The GKP’s activities include the
development of materials and the hosting of events for ICT capacity building and knowledge
sharing, the facilitation of partnerships between its members and investment in ICT for
69. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Government Networks: the Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order (2000), 215–217
70. Also variously known as the boundaryless, virtual or post-bureaucratic organisation, and described by being
organised by principles of adhocracy, technocracy or heterarchy: Fulk, Janet & DeSanctis, Gerardine, Electronic
Communication and Changing Organizational Forms (1995), 338–339.
71. Parker, Martin, Post-modern Organizations or Postmodern Theory? (1992)
72. Skelcher, Chris, Mathur, Navdeep, & Smith, Mike, The Public Governance of Collaborative Spaces: Discourse,
Design and Democracy (2005)
73. See Section 5.4.4.
74. See http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310313.
75. See Section 2.3.1.2.
76. See http://www.globalknowledge.org/.
77. Along with the OECD and WGIG (which are to be discussed below at Section 2.3.1.1 and Section 5.1.3.1
respectively), the GKP was suggested as a possible model for the future IGF at a conference in Malta held by
Diplo Foundation in February 2006: DiploFoundation, The Malta Discussions on Internet Governance (2006),
1–2.
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Development (ICT4D) and K4D (Knowledge for Development) initiatives, and involvement
in public policy development.
Like the other mechanisms of governance, the use of networks comes with its own limitations.
One of these is that their legitimacy and eﬀectiveness may be prejudiced by the imbalance
that very often exists between the power of one stakeholder group within the network, such
as governments or the private sector, as against that of the other groups.
78 Regrettably, this
is an error that the Tunis Agenda has perpetuated, in asserting that “[p]olicy authority for
Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and
responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.”
79
As will be further demonstrated in following chapters, to so restrict authority for the develop-
ment of international public policy, particularly where related to the Internet, is short-sighted
and fallacious.
80
It so happens that the network model of governance quite faithfully mirrors the manner in
which the Internet has been governed from the beginning. The IETF, W3C and ICANN are
amongst those institutions of Internet governance that describe their processes as being based
around“consensus”between all interested stakeholders. We will examine these existing Inter-
net governance processes in more detail in the next chapter.
78. Martens, Jens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of Multilateralism? (2007)
79. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005) para 35, derived from the earlier WSIS, Geneva
Declaration of Principles (2003) , para 49.
80. Rhodes, R A W, The New Governance: Governing Without Government (1996), 657.
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Trying to make the [gTLD-]MoU
democratic is like trying to teach a
goat to sing. It wastes your time and
it annoys the goat.
Ken Freed
As noted in the Introduction, governance is a broader term than government, and non-
hierarchical mechanisms and institutions, such as norms and markets, can be involved in
the governance of social systems. But what speciﬁcally is Internet governance? The Working
Group on Internet Governance (WGIG),
1 which was established by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to report to WSIS on this question, oﬀers the following deﬁnition:
Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and
civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making proce-
dures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.
2
This deﬁnition is broad enough to encompass every type of governance from the rule-making of
nation states, to the market forces of e-commerce, and the standards activities of the IETF.
In fact, the deﬁnition is perhaps too broad to be particularly useful. It can be narrowed by
drawing a distinction between what I will call technical coordination, standards development,
and public policy governance.
3
In essence, technical coordination is conducted by the institutions that manage the Inter-
net’s technical architecture and resources. Some of these institutions have been alluded to
above, but their history and structure will be described below in greater detail. The principal
mechanisms of technical coordination tend to be the use of norms and markets.
Standards development will be deﬁned as the processes by which technical standards are
developed for the operation of the Internet. This chapter’s overview of standards develop-
ment will focus on the work of the IETF, but will also make comparisons and draw contrasts
1. See http://www.wgig.org/.
2. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 4
3. The Internet Governance Project also divides Internet governance into three distinct functions that are sim-
ilar to those isolated here; technical standardization (which corresponds to standards development), resource
allocation and assignment (technical coordination), and policy formulation, policy enforcement, and dispute res-
olution (legal governance): Mathiason, John, Mueller, Milton, Klein, Hans, Holitscher, Marc, & McKnight, Lee,
Internet Governance: The State of Play (2004), 9. Sadowsky, Zambrano and Dandjinou identify two functions;
Internet administration (incorporating technical coordination and standards development) and Internet gover-
nance: Sadowsky, G, Zambrano, R, & Dandijinou, R, Internet Governance: a Discussion Document (2005) ,
11.
A third, slightly diﬀerent approach adopts a layered model akin to that of the OSI networking stack, in which
the lowest or “infrastructure” layer would largely cover issues such as interconnection and universal access, the
intermediate “logical” layer most other issues of technical coordination and standards development, and the
highest, “content” layer, public policy governance: Kapur, Akash, Internet Governance: A Primer (2005), 4.
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with other standards bodies. In standards development, the dominant mechanisms of gover-
nance are norms and architecture.
Public policy governance is potentially the broadest category of all, and yet until recently
the most overlooked. It relates to the development of international public policy for the
Internet. One way in which to usefully distinguish it from technical coordination and standards
development is that the problems engaged by public policy governance are more likely to be
problems of regulation, rather than coordination.
4
To date the mechanism of governance that has predominated in the public policy sphere has
been that of rules at the domestic level, however the establishment of the IGF heralds the
possibility of a more consistent, network-based model of governance being applied to manage
international public policy issues on the Internet.
As both the focus of this thesis and the mandate of the IGF are limited to public policy
governance, discussion of the other two spheres of Internet governance will serve mainly
to exemplify processes that may be adapted for use in public policy governance or which
illustrate pitfalls to avoid. But since there is not always a clear division between the practice
of technical coordination or standards development on the one hand, and the development of
public policy on the other, the formation of the IGF also provides those practising technical
coordination and standards development with a venue in which to engage in the explication
of international public policy norms that impact their activities.
After surveying each of the three spheres of Internet governance in turn, this chapter will
conclude by explaining in more detail why governance by network is a more appropriate
mechanism by which for public policy governance to be conducted than any of the other
mechanisms alone, which will in turn set the scene for the following chapter’s examination of
how governance by network ﬁts in with the existing international system.
2.1. Technical coordination
It was noted above that the principal mechanisms for technical coordination of the Internet are
norms and markets, and historically it has indeed proved to be in that sequence that reliance
on those mechanisms has emerged. Whilst originally the administration of the Internet’s
architecture was carried out on the basis of informal arrangements and voluntary service,
increasingly it is the subject of contracts between bodies such as ICANN and those such as
4. Holitscher, Marc, Internet Governance Revisited: Think Decentralization! (2004), 1
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TLD registries with whom it deals. It is again necessary to go back in history to paint a clear
picture of how this trend has come about.
2.1.1. Historical development
When the ﬁrst node of the ARPANET was brought online at UCLA in September 1969,
shortly followed by three others by the end of the year, the administration of its technical
architecture was shared between the researchers who maintained each of its nodes.
5 These
researchers styled themselves the “Network Working Group.” They communicated with each
other, not by email—because that was not to be invented until 1972—but by the exchange of
printed memoranda which they titled “Requests for Comment.” The earliest of these RFCs,
published in 1969, was a memorandum of the design of the ARPANET’s “HOST” software.
6
RFC-3 states:
The Network Working Group seems to consist of Steve Carr of Utah, Jeﬀ Rulifson and Bill
Duvall at SRI, and Steve Crocker and Gerard Delocheat UCLA. Membership is not closed.
The Network Working Group (NWG) is concerned with the HOST software, the strategies for
using the network, and initial experiments with the network.
Documentation of the NWG’s eﬀort is through notes such as this. Notes may be produced at
any site by anybody and included in this series.
7
It was not until ten years later that DARPA established the Internet Conﬁguration Control
Board (ICCB) under the leadership of Vinton Cerf to guide the evolution of the network’s
protocols. Coinciding with the introduction of TCP/IP as the network’s core protocol pair
in 1983, the ICCB became the IAB (Internet Activities Board, subsequently renamed the
Internet Architecture Board) and still later in 1989 it spawned two main task forces; the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). The
IETF will be discussed in greater detail below, whereas the IRTF does not directly take part
in Internet standards development and can be left aside.
Having formed a body to guide the development of the Internet’s standards, DARPA was
still left to delegate the responsibility of assigning Internet resources. The best known such
resources are IP addresses and domain names, but there are also various other parameters
that may be required for use by Internet protocols, and these too are required to be uniquely
assigned.
5. References for this section are Par´ e, Daniel J, Internet Governance in Transition: Who is Master of this
Domain? (2003), IETF, The Internet Activities Board (1990) , IETF, The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to
the Internet Engineering Task Force (1991) and IETF, The Internet Standards Process—Revision 3 (1996) .
6. IETF, Host Software (1969)
7. IETF, Documentation Conventions (1969)
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For this purpose DARPA (through an interagency committee, the Federal Network Council
or FNC) contracted the University of Southern California’s Information Sciences Institute
(ISI). The individual at the ISI who handled this task was Jon Postel, a research scientist
and manager in the Networking Division of the USC Information Sciences Institute. Although
DARPA did not specify a title for the oﬃce that Jon held, it soon became known by the name
that Postel came to use to describe it; the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
8
The holder of the IANA oﬃce operated under the oversight of the IAB, which claimed the
authority to approve its appointment.
9
In 1992 a third organisation was formed as an umbrella body having oversight of both the
IAB and IANA. This was the Internet Society (ISOC). ISOC is chartered as a professional
society concerned with the growth and evolution of the Internet. Its dual purposes are to
provide corporate support for the IETF (for example, legal and insurance coverage, and
funding for the RFC Editor), and to promote the responsible and eﬀective use of the Internet
through education, discussion, and contributions to public policy.
10
2.1.1.1. The inception of ICANN
Although IANA retained oversight of the allocation of IP addresses and domain names, the
daily conduct of these tasks was soon delegated to the Stanford Research Institute Network
Information Centre (SRI-NIC), which had also managed the centralised database that was
the technological predecessor of the DNS.
In 1993, on the recommendation of the FNC, the IP address allocation function was redele-
gated by IANA to a number of non-proﬁt regional Internet registries or RIRs, which although
now expanded in number, continue to operate today.
11
The DNS registration function on the other hand was transferred in 1992 to a private company
Network Solutions Inc (NSI). At this point, the function performed by NSI had acquired a
name—it was known as the InterNIC—and it was no longer being performed under contract
to DARPA, but to the NSF which by then was the core Internet backbone operator. The
contract between NSI and NSF, which was to expire in September 1998, explicitly provided
that domain registration services were to continue to be provided pursuant to RFC 1174,
12
the terms of which conﬁrmed IANA’s oversight role.
8. IETF, IAB Oﬃcial Protocol Standards (1988)
9. IETF, Charter of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) (2000)
10. ISOC, Annual Report (2004)
11. IETF, Guidelines for Management of IP Address Space (1993)
12. IETF, IAB Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identiﬁer Assignment (1990)
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By 1995, the Internet had well and truly exploded into public awareness, with the number of
connected hosts having more than doubled to nearly 5 million since the previous year—and
before the year was out, it was destined to double again. The demand for registration of do-
main names had undergone a similar spike, with the number of Web sites increasing tenfold
during the year, mostly within the com gTLD. As if that were not enough, NSI for the ﬁrst
time found itself caught in the crossﬁre between domain name registrants and trademark own-
ers who claimed that domains were being registered in breach of their trademark rights—quite
a novel proposition in the light of the received wisdom that domain names were merely an
addressing mechanism.
In the wake of these developments, NSI negotiated an amendment to its agreement with
the NSF allowing it to charge $100 for domain registrations and $50 for annual re-
newals—previously, no fees had been charged. It also newly required registrants to warrant
that the registration of their domain name would not infringe any third party intellectual
property rights, and to indemnify NSI, the NSF and IANA against any claims alleging other-
wise. In the event of a third party bringing a claim, NSI had power to suspend the registration
of the domain, and to require registrants to submit to an arbitration process.
Predictably, these changes sparked an immediate furore. In the ensuing debate, perhaps only
one point was in wide consensus: that the introduction of competition into the market for
registration of domain names was essential. Accordingly, a number of reforms to this end
were debated the following year, with leadership from ISOC. At ﬁrst, ISOC backed an early
proposal of Jon Postel’s in June 1996 (“draft-postel”) which would have seen 150 new top-level
domains managed by a number of new registrars in competition.
13
Other proposals continued to circulate however, and so in November ISOC convened a panel
called the Internet International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC)
14 to discuss these in depth. In-
cluded on the committee were representatives of ISOC, IANA, IAB, the FNC, the ITU, the
International Trademark Association (INTA) and the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO).
The IAHC eventually produced a series of recommendations that would have seen only
seven new domains created, but with the separation of the function of registry and regis-
trar—allowing multiple registrars to compete at the retail level underneath a monopoly non-
proﬁt registry. Key to this proposal was the development of an MOU on gTLDs, which would
13. Postel, Jon, New Registries and the Delegation of International Top Level Domains (1996)—this is a later
revision; the earlier one is no longer available.
14. See http://www.iahc.org/.
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represent the consensus of a broad group of stakeholders on the administrative arrangements
to apply to the new regime.
This uncreatively-named gTLD-MoU
15 expanded upon the ﬁnal report of the IAHC by pro-
viding for a new Council of Registrars (CORE) (which still exists today
16), a non-proﬁt Shared
Registry System (SRS) to administer the gTLDs in which those registrars would oﬀer domain
names for registration, a Policy Oversight Committee (POC) to administer the new regime,
and a Policy Advisory Body (PAB) to provide a representative policy development organ
open to participation by all interested stakeholders.
The gTLD-MoU was signed by Jon Postel of IANA and by Donald Heath of ISOC in March
1997, and subsequently by 224 others including signatories from the private sector such as
Australia’s Telstra and Melbourne IT, from civil society such as APNIC (Asia Paciﬁc Network
Information Centre) and INTA, and from intergovernmental organisations such as the ITU,
the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and WIPO.
However whilst its promoters had taken care to foster a consensus not only from within but
also from outside the traditional“Internet community,”the gTLD-MoU was still criticised in
various circles.
17 Perhaps most notably, it was observed in the United States Congress that
the gTLD-MoU lacked any signiﬁcant government participation; which was correct in that
the ITU had not formally consulted its member governments before signing the gTLD-MoU,
and that Albania was the only individual government that had signed it.
18
Of all the critics, it was the United States Government that ultimately held the power to
undermine the gTLD-MoU process, as NSI’s client for the operation of the registry function.
This it comprehensively did in August 1997,
19 when the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) of the United States Department of Commerce (as the
successor to the NSF) released a Green Paper soliciting comments from the public on the issue
of administration and management of the DNS,
20 which did not even so much as acknowledge
the gTLD-MoU or the work of the IAHC.
The Green Paper was followed in January 1998 by a White Paper incorporating the com-
15. See http://www.gtld-mou.org/.
16. See http://www.corenic.org/.
17. Rony, Ellan & Rony, Peter, The Domain Name Handbook: High Stakes and Strategies in Cyberspace (1998),
534–543; Patience, Nick, Internet Stumbles Towards Domain Name Consensus (1997)
18. Fingerhut, Eric T & Singleton, P L S, The gTLD-MoU: a Yellow Flag for Trademark Owners on the Infor-
mation Superhighway (1998), n33
19. After having earlier signalled its disapproval of the process in May: Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet
Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 157.
20. NTIA, A Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses (1998)
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ments received,
21 amongst which were those of Australia’s National Oﬃce of the Information
Economy (NOIE) which were critical of the US bias of the Green Paper.
22 The White Pa-
per proposed the formation of a new private non-proﬁt corporation incorporated under United
States law to carry out the IANA function, including the DNS administration role IANA had
delegated to NSI. In common with the gTLD-MoU proposal, the White Paper recommend-
ed the separation of registry and registrar functions, but with each gTLD (and any new
gTLDs that the new corporation might form) to be operated by a separate registry.
Otherwise, the White Paper was not prescriptive about the operations of the new organisa-
tion: for example, it did not specify a list of new gTLDs that the organisation should oversee,
as both the Green Paper and the gTLD-MoU had done, and neither did it prescribe a partic-
ular process for resolving disputes between domain name registrants and trademark owners
(though it did call upon WIPO to recommend such a process). It stressed however that any
new system would have to be constructed in accordance with four guiding principles:
￿ stability;
￿ competition;
￿ private, bottom–up coordination; and
￿ representation.
Out of the ashes of the gTLD-MoU, a loose group known as the International Forum on the
White Paper (IFWP) arose, to develop an organisation based on these four principles.
23 It
sponsored a series of international meetings and electronic mailing lists through which all
interested stakeholders were encouraged to develop a new consensus on the formation of the
corporation described by the White Paper.
IANA interceded early in this process by presenting to IFWP attendees in July 1998 a draft
set of bylaws, and inviting IFWP participants to use these as the basis for their discussions.
In so doing, it followed much the same process as that of its sibling the IETF in developing
Internet standards by RFC. The IFWP participants, however, were not the same body of
broadly like-minded engineers with which the IETF was accustomed to deal, and they proved
not nearly so compliant. They rejected IANA’s invitation to use its draft bylaws as a basis for
21. NTIA, Management of Internet Names and Addresses (1998)
22. See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/130dftmail/Australia.htm.
23. See http://www.ifwp.org/, though the version archived at http://web.archive.org/web/19981206105122/
http://www.ifwp.org/ presents a better historical account of the organisation.
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discussion, on the ground that it pre-empted the achievement of consensus that the discussion
was designed to forge.
Unperturbed, IANA continued to develop its draft bylaws, amending them to accord with its
perception of the broad consensus that had taken shape within the IFWP by about September
1998.
24 Just prior to a scheduled ﬁnal meeting of IFWP at which the members had intended
to reduce their points of consensus into a set of bylaws equivalent to those of IANA, IANA
announced its intention to boycott that meeting, as it had already obtained the agreement
of NSI to its own revised bylaws purporting to reﬂect the IFWP consensus. IFWP’s ﬁnal
meeting was cancelled, and IANA submitted a further revised version of those bylaws to the
NTIA in October 1998.
IANA’s high-handed circumvention of the IFWP process caused signiﬁcant dissent, not least
from a hastily-formed group of core IFWP participants styling themselves the Boston Group,
who submitted their own proposal to the NTIA.
25 Even so, it was the IANA proposal, recom-
mending the establishment of a corporation to be called ICANN, that was accepted. However,
the NTIA required revisions to be made to the bylaws mandating the new organisation to
establish a membership structure to elect nine of its directors.
The DNS root management functions of NSI under the oversight of IANA (together
with IANA’s other lower-proﬁle resource assignment functions)
26 were thus transferred to
ICANN,
27 formally under the oversight of the IAB.
28 This accomplished, IANA was sub-
sumed into the new corporation,
29 and NSI became its ﬁrst registry operator.
NSI still remains the registry for the com and net gTLDs following its purchase by Verisign Inc
in 2000. The org gTLD has since been transferred to the Public Interest Registry (PIR)
24. See http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ifwp/consensuslist.asp.
25. See http://www.cavebear.com/bwg/, and for further criticism http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/proposals/orsc/ORSC_PRO.htm.
26. But not disturbing the delegation of the role of IP address assignment to the RIRs.
27. See its Memorandum of Understanding/Joint Project Agreement with U.S. Department of Commerce at
http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm.
28. Historically see IETF, IAB Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identiﬁer Assignment (1990). Al-
though contemporary references to the IAB’s continuing oversight are fewer, the Department of Commerce
noted in the appendix to IETF, Management Guidelines & Operational Requirements for the Address and Rout-
ing Parameter Area Domain (“arpa”) (2001) that ICANN was to perform the IANA function “in cooperation
with the Internet technical community under the guidance of the IAB.” Further, in recent correspondence to
the NTIA the IAB has stated its own position that at least the protocol parameter assignment functions of
IANA are performed for the IETF pursuant to an agreement with ICANN that the IAB is entitled to terminate
irrespective of ICANN’s arrangments with the NTIA (see http://www.iab.org/documents/correspondence/
2006-07-09-IAB-NTIA-NOI-Response.pdf). Therefore, although neither of ICANN’s current agreements with
the NTIA for the performance of the DNS administration and other IANA functions make mention of the IAB’s
oversight role, the preferable view is that this continues at least in respect of the protocol parameter assignment
functions.
29. See IETF, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Technical Work of the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (2000).
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hosted by ISOC, and ICANN has, through an at times ad hoc discretionary approval process,
introduced various new gTLDs (aero, asia, biz, cat, coop, info, jobs, mobi, museum, name,
pro, tel and travel) now operated by a variety of other registries.
30
2.1.2. Current arrangements
Between the inception of ISOC in 1992 and the resolution of the Tunis Agenda in 2005, the
Internet changed immeasurably: it grew more than four hundred times larger, and entire
industries rose and fell around it. Yet formally, comparatively little changed over that period
in the institutions by which it was governed. For example its peak body was still the non-
governmental, non-proﬁt civil society association, ISOC, and its technical standards were
still primarily developed by one unincorporated technical body, the IETF, subject to the
oversight of another, the IAB.
In general, the interrelationships between these organisations were not lines of authority but
merely of informal oversight or “guidance,” mostly as posited in RFCs rather than in agree-
ments or international instruments. The exceptions are the more recently-formed arrange-
ments: ICANN’s with the NTIA, with its gTLD registries, and most recently—only since
2008
31—with the largest of the root server operators (whose role will be explained below).
The concentration of eﬀective power within the network of organisations, and its ﬂuidity, may
therefore be very diﬀerent from what their formal arrangement suggests. With that proviso,
a diagram summarising the various organisations and their relationships appears in Figure
2-1.
30. See http://www.icann.org/registries/listing.html.
31. ICANN, Milestone Agreement Reached Between ICANN, and F Root Server Operator, Internet Systems
Consortium (2008)
29Chapter 2. Internet governance as it was
Figure 2-1. Internet governance organisations
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Whilst most of the organisations illustrated have been described above, a few more words
must be said about ISOC, the IAB and ICANN—all of which operate on an international lev-
el—before the organisations exercising governance of the Internet’s technical coordination on
a regional and a national level are examined.
2.1.2.1. International
ISOC is a non-proﬁt organisation incorporated in the United States with oﬃces in Wash-
ington, DC and Geneva. It has members in over 180 countries, divided into individual and
organisational constituencies, and Chapters which are regional ISOC groups such as ISOC-
AU, the Internet Society of Australia. ISOC is governed by a Board of up to twenty Trustees
holding oﬃce for three years, most of whom are elected by ISOC’s members, but with three
nominated by the IETF and up to ﬁve by the incumbent Board. The panel of candidates for
election by members includes those nominated by a seven-member Nominating Committee,
and those who are petitioned for candidacy by at least seven percent of the members in a
given constituency. ISOC is the “organisational home” of the otherwise unincorporated IAB,
IETF and IRTF.
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The IAB is constituted both as a technical advisory group of ISOC, and as a subcommittee of
the IETF. The members of the IAB, and its Chair, are nominated by a voluntarily-convened
nominating committee of the IETF (the Nomcom),
32 and these nominations are approved
by ISOC’s Board of Trustees. The IETF Chair also sits as an ex oﬃcio member of the IAB.
The Chairs of both the IETF and IRTF and their Steering Groups (respectively the Internet
Engineering Steering Group or IESG, and the Internet Research Steering Group or IRSG)
are appointed by the IAB. Membership of the Steering Groups is by nomination of Nomcom,
subject to the approval of the IAB. The IAB also acts as an appeal board for complaints of
improper execution of the standards process by the Steering Groups. The IAB’s own decisions
are published by RFC.
The third and best known international body involved in technical coordination of the Internet
is ICANN. ICANN is a non-proﬁt California corporation currently contracted to the NTIA to
manage the DNS root and to perform related functions of the formerly-independent IANA.
The MOU pursuant to which these services are performed (described in its latest revision
as a “Joint Project Agreement” or JPA) is due to expire in September 2009.
33 Following its
expiry, it is planned that the Department of Commerce will pass most of those functions on to
ICANN for it to perform on a fully privatised basis, though in November 2005—just prior to
the second session of WSIS—the NTIA matter-of-factly noted that the United States intended
to“maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modiﬁcations to the authoritative root
zone ﬁle.”
34
The board of ICANN is composed of ﬁfteen voting members: eight selected by a Nominating
Committee (also known as NomCom, but distinct from the IETF committee of the same
name), two each by ICANN’s three Supporting Organisations, and the President who sits ex
oﬃcio. The ICANN NomCom is required to ensure that the directors it nominates display
diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience, and perspective, which includes ensuring
that the board contains at least one director, but no more than ﬁve, from each geographical
region as deﬁned in ICANN’s bylaws.
35 Oﬃcials of national governments or intergovernmental
organisations are disqualiﬁed from serving as directors.
The ICANN NomCom itself comprises seventeen voting members, plus a chair and up to ﬁve
other non-voting associates, advisers and liaisons. Nine of the NomCom’s voting members
32. See IETF, IAB and IESG Selection, Conﬁrmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and
Recall Committees (2004).
33. See http://www.icann.org/general/JPA-29sep06.pdf.
34. NTIA, US Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (2005)
35. ICANN, Bylaws (2006), article VI, section 5.
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are selected by ICANN’s Supporting Organisations by reference to various criteria, with ﬁve
others being nominated by ICANN’s At-Large Advisory Committee described below, and one
each of the remainder being designated by the Board to represent academia, by the IETF,
and by the Technical Liaison Group also referred to below.
ICANN’s three Supporting Organisations (SOs), along with ﬁve self-organised Advisory Com-
mittees (ACs), serve to advise the ICANN board. Each of the Advisory Committees, and the
IETF, appoint a non-voting liaison to the board. An Ombudsman is also appointed to carry
out internal review of contested decisions of the board.
The three Supporting Organisations are the Address Supporting Organization (ASO), the
Generic Names Support Organization (GNSO), and the Country Code Names Support Or-
ganization (CCNSO), which respectively provide policy support to ICANN in the areas of IP
addressing, gTLDs and ccTLDs.
The ﬁve Advisory Committees are the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), the Root
Server System Advisory Committee, the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC), the Security
and Stability Advisory Committee and the Technical Liaison Group. Of these, the ﬁrst three
are of particular note. They are ICANN’s liaisons respectively with DNS root server operators,
governments and the Internet community at large. Being Advisory Committees, they have
no direct vote on ICANN’s board, though as noted above ALAC does appoint ﬁve voting
members to the ICANN NomCom.
The DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee, ﬁrstly, is formed of the operators of the
DNS root servers. ICANN itself does not actually control these root servers, and never did. The
root servers act as the authoritative source of DNS data for the TLDs. When ICANN makes
a policy decision to add a new TLD to the root, and this decision is authorised by the NTIA,
it is an entry in the DNS conﬁguration ﬁles of one of the root servers that actually eﬀects the
change. There are thirteen classes of root server distributed throughout the world, under the
control of a number of independent operators.
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As for the GAC, its mission is to
consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of govern-
ments ... including matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN’s policies and
various laws and international agreements and public policy objectives.
37
Membership of the GAC is open to representatives of any national government. Unlike
36. See http://www.root-servers.org/.
37. ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee, GAC Operating Principles (2005)
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ICANN’s board, some of whose meetings are open to the public and all of which are min-
uted online, the GAC has resolved to meet behind closed doors. As well as advising the
ICANN board directly, the GAC may recommend that the board seek external expert advice,
including reference of“issues of public policy pertinent to matters within ICANN’s mission to
a multinational governmental or treaty organization.”
38 Since 2002, the GAC has also been the
only Advisory Committee whose advice may not be rejected by the Board without providing
written reasons.
Finally, and at the other end of the spectrum from the GAC, ALAC’s mission is to represent
the interests of individual Internet users at large to the ICANN board. It is comprised of
ﬁfteen members; ﬁve selected by the ICANN NomCom, and two by each of ﬁve Regional
At-Large Organizations (RALOs). The RALOs are umbrella organisations of Internet user
groups, one in each geographic region as deﬁned in the ICANN bylaws. APRALO is the
RALO for the Asia-Paciﬁc region including Australia, and ISOC-AU is one of its constituent
sub-groups.
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2.1.2.2. Regional
Apart from the RALOs, the other organisations involved in technical coordination of the
Internet on a regional level are the RIRs such as APNIC. These are non-proﬁt organisations
responsible for the administration of IP address allocations to ISPs or sub-regional Internet
registries, under the coordination of ICANN. Although the RIRs set their own policies, in
2003 they formed a Number Resources Organization (NRO)
40 to deal with issues of joint
concern, from which membership of ICANN’s ASO is drawn.
The RIRs presently in operation are ARIN (American Registry for Internet Numbers) serv-
ing North America, RIPE NCC (R´ eseaux IP Europe´ ens Network Coordination Centre) which
covers Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, APNIC which covers most of Asia, plus
Oceania, LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry) whose cover-
age is as its name suggests, and AFRINIC, which covers Africa.
APNIC
41, much like the other RIRs, is constituted as a non-proﬁt membership organisation.
Since 1998 it has been registered as a corporation in Queensland, Australia. The majority of
members are ISPs and large corporations from the Asia-Paciﬁc region who receive resources
38. ICANN, Bylaws (2006), Article XI-A.
39. See http://www.apralo.org/.
40. See http://www.nro.net/.
41. See http://www.apnic.org/.
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from APNIC, such as allocations of IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers. The
members elect APNIC’s seven-member Executive Council from an open panel of nominees.
The Executive Council elects APNIC’s Director General who heads its General Secretariat.
Much like the Areas of the IETF (to be discussed in greater detail below), APNIC has a num-
ber of Special Interest Groups (SIGs) which specialise in particular policy areas. SIGs devise
their own charters and procedures for reaching and recording consensus. Each SIG’s work
takes place on public electronic mailing lists which are open to all interested participants,
not only to APNIC members. A SIG may also create short-term Working Groups to tackle
speciﬁc projects on the SIG’s behalf.
Two Open Policy Meetings per year are held by APNIC at which the members present ratify
any policy proposals developed by the SIGs since the preceding meeting. The proposals are
then subjected to a ﬁnal period of public comment on the SIG mailing list before they are
endorsed by the Executive Council.
42 BOF (Birds of a Feather) sessions are also held at Open
Policy Meetings, and it is at these sessions that new SIGs may be formed if suﬃcient interest
exists from within the membership.
2.1.2.3. National
On a national level, the most prominent organisations involved in technical coordination of
the Internet are ISOC chapters such as ISOC-AU, and ccTLD registries such as auDA, which
administers the au ccTLD.
auDA is a non-governmental organisation established in 1999 to take over administration
of the au ccTLD from an individual, Robert Elz.
43 There are a startling number of histor-
ical parallels between the transfer of administration from Elz to auDA and the transfer of
administration of the DNS root from IANA and NSI to ICANN.
Most obviously, both transfers were the product of the explosion in popularity of the Internet
during the mid 1990s, which overwhelmed the resources of the incumbent administrators. In
Elz’s case, his initial response was to sub-delegate control of the edu.au and gov.au second-
level domains (2LDs) in 1990, then net.au and asn.au in 1994. Finally in October 1996 Elz
awarded Melbourne IT Ltd a ﬁve year contract to administer com.au. Much like NSI, the new
monopolist immediately began charging for registration of com.au names amidst widespread
dissent from the Australian Internet community.
42. For more detail on the APNIC policy development process, see Section 4.4.3.2.
43. See generally Caslon Analytics, auDA Proﬁle (2005).
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Echoing the eﬀorts of the gTLD-MoU, there were attempts to regulate Melbourne IT’s lucra-
tive monopoly over the most popular Australian 2LD by establishing a ground-up organisation
to be called the Australian Domain Name Administration (ADNA), which was incorporated
in May 1997. However mirroring the opposition to the gTLD-MoU mounted by incumbents
such as NSI, ADNA’s position became untenable when it failed to win support from most of
the 2LD administrators.
To resolve this impasse, ADNA’s board requested NOIE (now AGIMO—essentially the
NTIA’s counterpart in Australia) to hold a summit on the future of administration of the au
ccTLD. The result of this was the formation of Australia’s equivalent to the IFWP: a dot-AU
Working Group (auWG) containing public sector, private sector and civil society represen-
tatives. Following community consultation, the auWG recommended the creation of auDA,
a non-proﬁt corporation, to act as the new ccTLD administrator. Reﬂecting the view of
ICANN’s GAC (whose secretariat at the time was NOIE), auDA’s constitution accepted
“that the Internet Domain Name System is a public asset, and that the .au ccTLD is under
the sovereign control of the Commonwealth of Australia.”
In November 1999 Elz transferred control of the com.au 2LD to auDA, but retained control
over the au root and its other 2LDs. Once again recalling international events, the nascent
auDA was criticised by Elz and the incumbent com.au monopolist Melbourne IT, as not having
demonstrated its capacity and representativeness suﬃciently to justify receiving control of the
ccTLD. ICANN proceeded to redelegate the au ccTLD to auDA regardless of these objections
in 2001.
44
Much as the NTIA has retained ultimate authority of the DNS root, the Commonwealth was
careful to assert ultimate control over the ccTLD management function through Division 3
of Part 22 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), which provides for the regulation of
“electronic addressing” by ACMA and the ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission). This provision was passed as a precursor to the request of the Australian
Government through the Minister for Communications, Information Technology, and the
Arts, to ICANN to eﬀect the transfer of control over the au ccTLD to auDA,
45 and reserves
to ACMA and the ACCC the power to take over management of the au ccTLD.
In July 2002 AusRegistry Ltd was appointed by auDA as wholesale registry operator for
all of the 2LDs that were open for registrations by the general public (then com.au, net.au,
44. See IANA, IANA Report on Request for Redelegation of the .au Top-Level Domain (2001).
45. See http://www.iana.org/cctld/au/alston-to-lynn-04jul01.htm.
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org.au, asn.au and id.au), a role akin to that of Verisign in respect of the com and net gTLDs.
Melbourne IT was thereby relegated to the status of one of numerous registrars accredited
by auDA to accept such registrations.
auDA is a corporation limited by guarantee, containing two classes of members: supply-side
(that is, those who supply domain names to the public) and demand-side (that is, consumers
of domain names). Each class of member elects four directors to auDA’s board from a panel
nominated by that class. The CEO is an additional non-voting member, and the board itself
may appoint an additional two independent directors, a prerogative ﬁrst exercised in 2000.
46
auDA draws upon the work of a number of ad hoc advisory and review panels and committees
staﬀed by volunteers drawn from within and outside auDA’s membership. Nominations for
membership of a panel or committee are approved by auDA’s Chief Policy Oﬃcer, an unelect-
ed staﬀ position. There have to date been nine such panels and committees, the last of which
to sit was the 2007 Names Policy Panel. The panels and committees generate proposals and
recommendations which are released for public comment on auDA’s Web site before being
submitted to the board for its approval.
auDA’s public policies are reviewed on a cyclical basis. During policy reviews, public sub-
missions are received and published on auDA’s Web site. auDA also had an active mailing
list, open to non-members, on which issues of policy were (often very robustly) publicly dis-
cussed and debated, but in 2003 it disassociated itself from that list which is now hosted
independently.
47
2.1.3. Criticisms
ICANN has been the most-criticised of all institutions of Internet governance from the moment
of its inception. Those criticisms may be grouped into four common categories, all of which,
bar perhaps the ﬁrst, are instructive in their broader application for other entities engaged
in Internet governance:
￿ criticisms of the manner of ICANN’s formation;
￿ objections to the legitimacy of its assumption of public policy authority;
￿ disputes as to its ability to operate by consensus; and
46. See http://www.dotau.org/archive/2000-12/0014.html.
47. See http://www.dotau.org/.
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￿ criticisms of its failure to act in accordance with the consensus principles by it claims to
operate.
The Machiavellian circumstances surrounding its incorporation, as described above at Section
2.1.1.1, sowed the seeds for the ﬁrst barrage of criticism ICANN received, particularly over the
opaque process by which its initial board was appointed. IANA’s pedigree notwithstanding,
the IFWP process more closely adhered to the Internet’s values of openness and egalitarianism
than the IANA process that trumped it by presenting the ICANN bylaws and board of
directors as a fait accompli.
48
The second common criticism of ICANN is that it has exceeded its mandate by straying into
areas of national and international public policy. A good example of this is found in ICANN’s
UDRP or Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, which was established in 1999 in
response to the report that the US Government’s White Paper solicited from WIPO setting
out a procedure for the resolution of claims by trademark owners that a registered gTLD in-
fringed their rights.
49
Complainants in UDRP proceedings who seek to have a registered domain name cancelled or
transferred to them must prove that the disputed “domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights,” that the reg-
istrant has “no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name,” and that the
domain name “has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”
50
Academic response to the UDRP has ranged from describing it as“a tremendous achievement
in a key aspect of Internet governance”
51 to a “signiﬁcant threat to free and robust expres-
sion on the Internet.”
52 Those critical of the UDRP have been so on both substantive and
procedural grounds.
Substantively, it is undeniable that domain names, once a simple semantic identiﬁer for IP
addresses, have become a strongly-protected form of expression of trademarks and personal
names of their proprietors.
53 The opposing interests of the public in free expression have been
accorded comparatively less weight. This has been attributed to the fact that UDRP panellists
are overwhelmingly intellectual property law practitioners whose practices are predominantly
48. See Mueller, Milton, ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting through the Debris of Self-Regulation (1999).
49. See http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/.
50. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (1999)
51. Hancock, Douglas, An Assessment of ICANN’s Mandatory Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy in Resolving
Disputes Over Domain Names (2001)
52. Mueller, Milton, Success by Default: Domain Name Trademark Disputes Under ICANN’s UDRP (2002), 27.
53. Mueller, Milton, Success by Default: Domain Name Trademark Disputes Under ICANN’s UDRP (2002), 18
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in the service of trademark owners.
54
One of the most cogent procedural criticisms of the UDRP is that complainants are granted
the right to choose which dispute resolution provider should hear their complaint, which
generates inappropriate incentives for providers to ﬁnd in favour of complainants. Sure
enough, of the original four accredited providers, those with the greatest propensity to ﬁnd in
favour of complainants, apparently because they steered their caseloads towards their most
complainant-friendly adjudicators,
55 gained the majority of case references.
56
There are numerous other areas of public policy outside the UDRP into which ICANN has
also been criticised for stepping. For example its agreements with new registries
57 contain
non-technical speciﬁcations relating to intellectual property infringement, privacy of regis-
trant data, fees the registries may charge, competition policy (prohibiting them from acting
as registrars) and so on. As ICANN is performing these policy functions under contract to the
US Commerce Department, Froomkin has argued that this amounts to a private delegation
of power to ICANN that is unconstitutional and contrary to United States federal law.
58
But ICANN’s assumption of policy authority outside of US borders has been even more
conspicuous, particularly for those who would characterise ccTLDs as a national resource, as
advanced by the GAC and subsequently accepted by the NTIA and WSIS.
59 In that context,
ICANN has taken on a role akin to that of an intergovernmental organisation in transferring
control of ccTLDs to governments or governmental nominees such as auDA. auDA’s is not
the only case in which such a transfer was made in disregard of the wishes of the domain’s
incumbent non-governmental administrator, even—as in the recent case of Kazakhstan—when
that administrator was formed from the local Internet community.
60
That ICANN in fact makes national and international public policy decisions is no longer
seriously disputed. Indeed, at least until the formation of the IGF, it was probably the best-
placed body to do so, sitting at one of the Internet’s only chokepoints, the root of the DNS. As
much as the existence of such a centralised point of authority may be an aberration from the
Internet’s culture, the fact is that the issues that ICANN addressed (for example, balancing
54. See eg Mueller, Milton, Success by Default: Domain Name Trademark Disputes Under ICANN’s UDRP
(2002), 23.
55. Geist, Michael, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP
(2002)
56. Mueller, Milton, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN’s Dispute Resolution Policy (Version 2.1) (2000)
57. See http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/.
58. Froomkin, A M, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution
(2000)
59. See Section 2.1.2.1.
60. McCarthy, Kieren, 2005: The Year the US Government Undermined the Internet (2005)
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the interests of domain name registrants against those of trademark owners) were issues that
needed addressing, and that it was well placed to address. The reason why it ICANN is
criticised for doing so however is that it lacked the legitimacy, democratic or otherwise, that
an organ of public policy ought to have.
Weinberg analyses ICANN’s response to this charge as at 2000 in the following terms:
First, it has invoked what one might call the techniques of administrative law: it has, in important
respects, structured itself so that it looks like a classic U.S. administrative agency using, and
bound by, the tools of bureaucratic rationality. Second, ICANN has invoked the techniques of
representation: it has adopted structures and procedures that make it look more nearly like a
representative (that is to say, an elective) government body. Finally, it has invoked the techniques
of consensus: it has asserted that it derives its authority from its ability to manifest the consensus
of the larger community through discussion.
61
However in dismissing each of these responses,
62 Weinberg goes on to make what is the third
main criticism of ICANN, which is as to its capacity to operate by consensus (which as noted
above is more than a mechanism of governance for ICANN,
63 but a plank of its legitimacy). He
claims that because the decisions that ICANN makes often involve competing claims of right
(such as between competitive applicants for a registry tender), they are not susceptible to
resolution by consensus;
64 and that even for those issues which can be resolved by consensus,
ICANN lacks the means to determine that a consensus exists.
A more apt criticism is that ICANN lacks not so much the means (which its SOs and ACs are
designed to provide),
65 but rather the will to survey and interpret the community’s consensus.
In other words, even given that ICANN would gain legitimacy in its policy-making functions
if it acted by consensus, and assuming that it has the means to do so, it does not in fact use
them. This is the fourth and most persistent criticism of ICANN, for which there is a litany
of documented wrongs to convict it.
66
To take just one example, it is unclear that the board of ICANN acted upon the consensus
of the community in adopting the WIPO report that recommended the establishment of the
UDRP, particularly since in doing so it did not even comply with its own procedures set
down for the development of a so-called“consensus policy.”
67 It is all the more ironic that one
of ICANN’s grounds for declining to review the UDRP in 2003 was that this was “likely to
61. Weinberg, Jonathan, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy (2000), 224–225 (footnotes omitted).
62. For reasons some of which will be examined further at Section 4.4.3.
63. By this thesis’s typology, it is a consensual form of governance by network: see Section 4.4.2.
64. Weinberg, Jonathan, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy (2000), 252. This criticism is addressed at
Section 4.4.
65. Though they are an excessively blunt instrument for this purpose: see Section 6.3.1.1.
66. David Post, Michael F & Farber, David, Elusive Consensus (1999)
67. Froomkin, A M, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes and (Partial) Cures (2002), 652,
n139; and see http://www.icann.org/general/consensus-policies.htm for the list of consensus policies.
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be contentious; there are not many (if any) areas that are obviously amenable to achieving
consensus.”
68
In comparison to the pillorying that ICANN has received from numerous quarters, criticism
of other institutions involved in technical coordination of the Internet has been considerably
more muted. On a regional level, criticism of APNIC has mostly been limited to the sug-
gestion that its regional monopoly on the allocation of IP addresses should be opened to
competition.
69
On a national level, criticism of auDA’s transparency and accountability has only ﬂared out-
side the bounds of its discussion mailing list in respect of one issue; its handling of the transfer
of the au ccTLD from Robert Elz.
70 However, an echo of the disingenuous claims of the early
ICANN that“ICANN is nothing more than the reﬂection of community consensus”
71 is heard
in auDA’s Chief Executive Oﬃcer’s claim that “auDA and its ‘incumbent administration’
does not create policy, it implements policy.”
72
In fact, auDA’s Board has considered actions such as the introduction of renewal fees and
periods for domain registrations, and even the introduction of the auDRP—its equivalent
to the UDRP
73—as “an administrative change, not a policy change.”
74 Whilst some public
input was, nevertheless, received on the broad outline for these“administrative changes,”the
underlying issue that remains is that technical coordination of the Internet inherently engages
issues of public policy, and that unless the governing board of a body engaged in technical
coordination reﬂects the consensus of its constituents in an accountable and transparent
fashion, the board cannot wash its hands of responsibility for the policy development it
undertakes.
2.2. Standards development
Governments have tended to take a back seat in the development and promulgation of tech-
nical standards in general, and ICT standards in particular.
75 Thus the Internet’s technical
standards are not, in general, mandated by law. In this they contrast with the technical stan-
68. ICANN, Staﬀ Manager’s Issues Report on UDRP Review (1993)
69. Mueller, Milton, Competition in IPv6 Addressing: A Review of the Debate (2005)
70. Malcolm, Jeremy M, Who Owns .org.au?: Where Domain Name Policy and Law Collide (2001)
71. See David Post, Michael F & Farber, David, Elusive Consensus (1999)
72. See http://www.dotau.org/archive/2001-11/0068.html, and the author’s response at http://www.dotau.
org/archive/2001-11/0082.html.
73. auDA, .au Dispute Resolution Policy (2002)
74. See http://www.auda.org.au/minutes/minutes-08052001/.
75. Updegrove, Andrew, The Role of Government in ICT Standardization (2007)
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dards for international telephony, which are set out in the International Telecommunications
Regulations (ITRs), a binding treaty instrument which is developed and periodically updated
by the ITU’s World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT).
Internet standards are complied with not because Internet users are compelled by hierar-
chically-imposed authority to do so, but because they are of high quality, are timely, widely
supported, and represent a high level of technical consensus amongst a broad group of experts
and users. Thus, the de facto standards of the Internet are a form of governance by norms,
whereas the de jure standards of international telephony are a form of governance by rules.
The term “Internet standard” is used in two senses. The narrower sense is a speciﬁcation
produced by the IETF that has progressed through its standards development process to the
ﬁnal stage. Whilst the importance of the IETF to Internet standards development can hardly
be overstated, the term will be used here more broadly to encompass speciﬁcations developed
by any standards body that are intended for deployment on the Internet.
2.2.1. Standards bodies
Although Internet standards may not be the sole province of the IETF, as the body responsible
for the development of a large majority of such standards, it is unquestionably the Internet’s
pre-eminent standards development body, and will be the focus of this section. Although it
will not be possible to describe all of the dozens of other standards organisations that have
played a part in Internet standards development, a discussion will also be made of two other
particularly signiﬁcant bodies: the W3C and the ITU.
Amongst the standards groups that will not be described in detail, but should be brieﬂy
mentioned here, are the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
76 the IEEE (the
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) and ETSI (the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute).
The ISO, formed in 1947, is a network of generalised national standards institutes, such as
Standards Australia,
77 the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), and the Amer-
ican National Standards Institute (ANSI),
78 coordinated by a Central Secretariat in Geneva.
Some of its members are governmental organisations, but ISO membership is equally open
to private sector national standards groups that are the most representative of standardisa-
tion eﬀorts in their country.
76. See http://www.iso.org/.
77. See http://www.standards.org.au/.
78. See http://www.ansi.org/.
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The ISO does not usually initiate the development of speciﬁcations, but rather receives those
that have already been approved as standards by one or more of its members or by other
international standards organisations. From this point, a speciﬁcation progresses towards
recognition as an ISO standard within a Technical Committee, of which there are presently
192 (some of which are inactive).
As far as Internet standards development is concerned, the relevant Technical Committee
is the JTC 1, which is unique in that it is the only joint committee, convened with the
IEC or International Electrotechnical Commission
79 which in fact predates the ISO. It has
18 SubCommittees grouped into 11 “Technical Directions,” each SubCommittee potentially
having a number of Working Groups. For example, the Motion Picture Experts Group which
is responsible for the MPEG family of video and audio compression standards are Working
Group 11 within SubCommittee 29 of JTC 1.
Examples of Internet standards developed by the ISO/IEC are SGML (Standard General-
ized Markup Language), which formed the inspiration for the W3C’s simpler HTML and
later XML, and the image format commonly known as JPEG,
80 whose namesake the Joint
Photographic Experts Group is a joint ISO/IEC and ITU-T committee.
The contributions of the IEEE and ETSI to standards development include the IEEE 802.11
wireless networking standard, and the ETSI GSM (Global System for Mobile Communi-
cations) standard for digital mobile telephony networks. The Technical Liaison Group of
ICANN (TLG) includes ETSI amongst its members, along with the IAB, W3C and ITU.
2.2.1.1. IETF
There is no formal membership of the IETF. It provides an inclusive technical forum for
anyone who wishes to participate in Internet standards development. At each stage in the
development of a proposed standard, it is discussed and debated on public electronic mailing
lists and at three open meetings held each year. Whilst fees are payable for those who attend
meetings, none are required to participate on the public mailing lists where most of the IETF’s
work takes place. Those participating in the IETF do so in their capacity as individuals, not
as representatives of their employers.
A macroscopic view of the unique structure of the IETF has already been given above.
81 Here
the internal operations of the organisation will be described in more detail.
79. See http://www.iec.ch/.
80. More formally known as IS 10918-1 | T.81; see http://www.jpeg.org/.
81. At Section 2.1.2.
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The IETF is currently divided into eight technical Areas. Work in each of these Areas is
managed by an Area Director who is appointed by IETF’s Nomcom to the position for two
years. The Area Directors and the Chair of the IETF make up the IESG, which bears overall
responsibility for the technical management of the IETF’s activities.
Within each of the Areas are numerous short-term Working Groups established to work on
speciﬁc projects, usually the development of speciﬁcations for a proposed Internet standard.
Each Working Group has a Chair, and may have a number of subcommittees known as“design
teams” which often perform the bulk of the work in drawing up the speciﬁcation.
The charter of a Working Group, detailing its preliminary goals and schedules, is developed
before its formation at a BOF (“Birds of a Feather”) meeting, which is called upon application
by interested parties to the relevant Area Director. If the BOF so resolves, the Area Director
will be requested to recommend the IESG to formally establish the Working Group. Each
Working Group establishes its own operating procedures, which are generally not legalistic,
and may vary its own charter as circumstances require.
The outcome of a Working Group’s deliberations are usually eventually published in the form
of one or more RFCs. However, this is not to say that all RFCs are destined to become
Internet standards. In part this is because the position of RFC Editor is not exclusively an
IETF function, being overseen by the IAB and predating the IETF by two decades. Most
RFCs in fact are simply informational, and are identiﬁed as such in their document header and
by the use of an identifying “FYI” code.
82 Amongst the informational RFCs are documents
on the IETF itself, such as RFC 3233 which provides a deﬁnition of the IETF, and RFC 3716
which is a report on its recent administrative restructuring.
83
RFCs that are intended to become Internet standards develop out of documents known as
Internet drafts that are normally generated by the relevant Working Group (although an
individual outside of a Working Group could also submit one). To progress an Internet draft
towards promotion as a standard, the Working Group, through its Area Director, may make
a recommendation to IESG that it be accepted as a “Proposed Standard.” The IESG will
82. Other document codes are“BCP”which is assigned to policy documents intended to represent“Best Current
Practice,” and “STD” for speciﬁcations which have reached the ﬁnal stage of standardisation. Experimental and
Historical RFCs are also categorised separately.
83. The references for this section of the thesis are those RFCs IETF, Deﬁning the IETF (2002) and IETF,
The IETF in the Large: Administration and Execution (2004) , along with IETF, The Internet Activities Board
(1990), IETF, The Internet Standards Process—Revision 3 (1996) , IETF, The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide
to the Internet Engineering Task Force (1991) and IETF, The Organizations Involved in the IETF Standards
Process (1996) .
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do so if it considers the speciﬁcation has undergone the requisite community review, and is
generally stable, well understood and considered useful.
A six month discussion period on the new Proposed Standard follows, at the conclusion of
which it may be reconsidered by the IESG to determine whether it should be promoted to
the status of a “Draft Standard.” A Draft Standard must be suﬃciently stable and unam-
biguous that applications can be developed by reference to it. At this point, the speciﬁcation
is expected to undergo only minimal revision, and there should also be at least two complete
and independent implementations of the standard in software.
In practice, few speciﬁcations progress further than this. However the IETF standards process
does allow for those that have become very stable and widely used to be promoted by the
IESG from a Draft Standard to a full Internet Standard after four more months of discussion.
The general criteria for acceptance of an RFC as an Internet Standard have been described
as “competence, constituency, coherence and consensus.”
84 Consensus is required not only
from within the Working Group, nor even the technical area from which the speciﬁcation
originated, but from the IETF as a whole, which includes anyone who subscribes to its public
mailing lists.
85
The IESG can decline to progress an otherwise technically competent and useful speciﬁcation
towards Internet Standard status if it determines that it has not gained the requisite degree of
consensus. A recent example is provided by the SPF
86 and the competing Sender ID
87 Internet
Drafts, both intended to address the problem of spam emanating from forged addresses.
Both speciﬁcations, the ﬁrst a community-developed document and the second based on a
Microsoft proposal, provide a facility for recipients to verify that email bearing a certain
domain name came from a source that was authorised to send that domain’s email.
The IETF formed a Working Group intended to reconcile the two drafts and produce a
standards-track speciﬁcation. However due to each side’s intransigence, the compromises re-
quired to enable either draft to be reconciled with the other could not be made, and the
Working Group was eventually disbanded without reaching consensus. The result is that
each speciﬁcation has been approved only to proceed as an Experimental RFC, and that
neither is likely to gain Internet Standard status.
A more successful recent example of the practical operation of the Internet standards devel-
84. Crocker, D, Making Standards the IETF Way (1993)
85. See also Section 4.4.3.3.
86. IETF, Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-MAIL (2005)
87. IETF, Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail (2005)
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opment process in the IETF is that of DNSSEC.
88 DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) adds
the facility for DNS information to be authenticated through the use of digital signatures.
The importance of this is that the DNS as originally speciﬁed does not certify the authenticity
of responses received to DNS queries. In practical terms, this means that an Internet user
who accesses a certain domain cannot be certain that the Web site that appears in response
actually belongs to the registered owner of that domain, rather than an imposter.
The applicable technical area of the IETF dealing with DNS is the Internet Area. A
DNS Working Group already existed within that Area when DNSSEC was ﬁrst proposed
in 1995, so in this instance it was not necessary to go through the process of forming one. It
took two years until the ﬁrst Internet Draft developed by the Working Group was published
as an RFC, the IESG allotting it the status of a Proposed Standard.
89
Two years later again in 1999, the speciﬁcation was reﬁned into what became a new RFC
90
which obsoleted the earlier one, retaining its Proposed Standard status. A new version of the
most popular DNS software called BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Daemon)
91 supporting the
new DNSSEC speciﬁcation was released that same year. This implementation of DNSSEC
revealed practical problems that required an addition to the speciﬁcation.
For the publication of this addition, the speciﬁcation was divided into three Internet drafts.
These became RFCs in March 2005,
92 still retaining the Proposed Standard status. By May
2005 there was a second implementation of the latest speciﬁcation,
93 bringing the RFCs closer
to progression to Draft Standards, though this is yet to occur. The ﬁrst ccTLD to employ
DNSSEC for its operations using the latest version of BIND was se (Sweden), in October
2005.
The deployment of DNSSEC within the global DNS root is likely to take somewhat longer,
since it raises the political question of whether ICANN, the NTIA, or some more broadly-
based body, ought to possess signing authority.
94 If DNSSEC is to be eventually accepted as
a full Internet Standard, this will likely occur only once this political issue has been resolved
and the DNS-signed root zone has been in successful operation for a number of years.
88. See http://www.dnssec.net/.
89. IETF, Domain Name System Security Extensions (1997)
90. IETF, Domain Name System Security Extensions (1999)
91. See http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/.
92. IETF, DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (2005), IETF, Resource Records for the DNS Security
Extensions (2005) and IETF, Protocol Modiﬁcations for the DNS Security Extensions (2005).
93. See http://www.ninetlabs.nl/nsd/.
94. Kuerbis, Brenden & Mueller, Milton, Securing the Root: A Proposal for Distributing Signing Authority (2007)
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2.2.1.2. W3C
The World Wide Web Consortium,
95 or W3C, is an unincorporated body formed in 1994 by
the software engineer who designed the protocols that deﬁne the Web, Tim Berners-Lee. The
W3C develops standards for the World Wide Web that are known as W3C Recommendations.
The IETF’s relationship with the W3C is a cooperative one, in which the IETF has formally
ceded control over standards development in the Web space to the W3C.
96
The main distinction between the W3C and the IETF is that the W3C was from its inception
a paid membership-based organisation, with a sliding membership fee which as at 2008 ranges
from USD$953 for small corporate, non-proﬁt or governmental members in developing coun-
tries, up to USD$65 000 for full corporate membership in developed countries. This funding
is used to support a full-time staﬀ to assist in administration, research, and in the design and
development of software conforming to the speciﬁcations developed by the organisation.
97
This diﬀerence aside—and it is not a small diﬀerence—the organisation operates in a similar
manner to the IETF in that members are expected to collaborate, through a variety of
Working Groups, on the development of open technical speciﬁcations to support and enhance
the infrastructure and features of the World Wide Web.
98
As the IETF’s Working Groups work within a number of Areas, so the W3C’s Working
Groups work within deﬁned Activities, of which there are presently 24. The usual manner in
which a new Activity or Working Group is formed is following the successful conclusion of
a Workshop on the topic (similar in principle to an IETF BOF), typically arranged by the
W3C’s staﬀ (its “Team”) in response to a member’s submission.
Working Group membership is not open to the public as in the IETF, save that invited
experts, not aﬃliated with any W3C member, may be co-opted to the group by its Chair.
The ﬁrst release of a proposed Web standard by a Working Group is known as a “Working
Draft” (though like RFCs, there are also some Working Drafts that are not intended to
become Recommendations). Comments on the Working Draft are solicited from both within
and outside the W3C for a minimum period of three weeks. Once these comments have
been addressed in writing, the speciﬁcation may be progressed to the stage of a Candidate
Recommendation.
95. See http://www.w3c.org/.
96. IETF, The “text/html” Media Type (2000)
97. See generally Berners-Lee, Tim & Fischetti, Mark, Weaving the Web (1999), especially at 100–101.
98. See generally W3C, Process Document (2005).
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A Candidate Recommendation is required to be implemented in software, preferably in two
interoperable forms, before it may progress to a Proposed Recommendation. Comments on
a Proposed Recommendation are received for a minimum period of four weeks. The speci-
ﬁcation ﬁnally reaches the status of a W3C Recommendation once it has been endorsed by
the W3C Director and the members at large, through an Advisory Committee to which each
W3C member appoints a representative and which meets in person biannually.
The W3C’s Working Groups are guided by an Advisory Board on issues of strategy, manage-
ment, legal matters, process, and conﬂict resolution. The Board’s nine ordinary members are
elected for two-year terms by the Advisory Committee. The Board’s Chair is appointed by
the Team.
The Working Groups are also guided in technical issues related to Web architecture by a
Technical Advisory Group (TAG). Five of the TAG’s eight ordinary members are elected by
the Advisory Committee for two year terms, with the balance of its members, and the Chair,
being appointed by the W3C Director.
The Director, Tim Berners-Lee, hears appeals from the decisions of Working Group Chairs.
He is also responsible for assessing the consensus of the Advisory Committee, for example
as to a proposal for the creation of a new Activity. The role of Director is not an elected
one, with Berners-Lee essentially holding the position in perpetuity as the W3C’s benevolent
dictator.
2.2.1.3. ITU
The International Telecommunications Union
99 was established in 1865 originally as the In-
ternational Telegraph Union to regulate international telegraph transmissions. It became an
agency of the United Nations in 1947. The ITU is now divided into three sectors, the Radio-
communication Sector or ITU-R, the Standardization Sector or ITU-T, and the Development
Sector or ITU-D. Unless otherwise noted, references to the ITU in this thesis are to the
ITU-T.
Broadly, the ITU’s equivalent to Areas or Activities are Study Groups, of which there are
presently thirteen, and its equivalent to ad-hoc Working Groups are Working Parties (who
delegate the actual technical work still further, to so-called Rapporteur Groups). Both Study
Groups and Working Parties meet face-to-face on a variable schedule, and are not open to
99. See http://www.itu.int/, and speciﬁcally ITU, ITU-T Guide for Beginners (2005).
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the public. A World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA), held at least
every four years, approves the structure and work programme of Study Groups and the draft
Recommendations that they produce.
Until quite recently this meant that a telecommunications standard could not be developed
in fewer than four years, but since 2000 a faster Alternative Approval Process (AAP), and the
introduction of self-organised Focus Groups as an alternative to Working Parties established
by Study Groups, have been introduced enabling some Recommendations to be ﬁnalised more
quickly. The use of the AAP is restricted to Recommendations which do not have policy or
regulatory implications, and therefore do not require formal consultation with Member States.
A Telecommunication Standardization Advisory Group, constituted by representatives from
the ITU membership and convening between WTSA meetings, oﬀers a role akin to that of
the W3C’s Advisory Board in reviewing and coordinating the activities of the Study Groups.
The General Secretariat is the staﬀ of the ITU which manages its administrative and ﬁnancial
aﬀairs, headed by a Secretary-General and his Deputy. Within the General Secretariat is the
Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) which exercises oversight over the ITU-T
process at large, and whose Director is elected by the members.
The ITU’s membership includes governments who join as Member States, and since 1994
private organisations who join as Sector Members. In 2007–2008, full membership fees ranged
from CHF 19,875 for developing Member States or CHF 31,800 for Sector Members, up to
CHF 12.72m and CHF 2.54m respectively. Up to 25% of the Member States form the Council
of the ITU, which spans all three sectors and guides the policy of the Union in between
four-yearly Plenipotentiary Conferences at which all members meet.
Until they are released, ITU Recommendations are not open for public comment (though
a Study Group may request permission to open its email mailing lists or FTP area to out-
siders). In fact, even when they have been released, copies of ITU Recommendations must
be purchased. In response to criticism of this policy, since 2001 three free electronic copies of
Recommendations have been oﬀered to registered users per year. The ITU’s deﬁnition of an
“open standard” does not preclude the practice of charging to provide the speciﬁcation, nor
for the use of intellectual property comprised in the speciﬁcation.
100
Historically, the ITU has had little involvement in Internet standards development. Its expe-
rience lies in the tightly-regulated, hierarchically managed world of circuit switched telecom-
munications. But being well aware of the advance of packet switched technology as pioneered
100. See ITU, TSB Director’s Ad Hoc IPR Group Deﬁnition of “Open Standards” (2005)
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by the IETF’s TCP/IP protocol pair, and of the incipient convergence of IP and traditional
telephony, the ITU has lately attempted to enter the Internet standards space, relying on the
breadth of the deﬁnition of “telecommunications” in its Constitution for its mandate to do
so.
101
Its ﬁrst signiﬁcant entree to the world of data networking was as early as 1982, when the
ITU introduced the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) suite of network protocols, building
on its earlier X.25 suite, which it intended as computer networking standards.
102 OSI had
much going for it, not least the backing of the ISO which approved the OSI speciﬁcations as
oﬃcial standards. The IETF even established an Area devoted to the integration of OSI with
the Internet’s protocols.
103 Yet OSI has been a resounding failure.
104
The poor reception of the ITU’s networking standards is often attributed to the fact that
they are complex, generally hierarchical in design, and, compared to Internet standards,
over-engineered. For example, like their predecessor X.25, the OSI protocols placed Postal
Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) authorities ﬁrmly at the top of a hierarchy, and assumed that
computer owners would interconnect with those networks rather than directly to each other.
105
In comparison, Internet standards are generally much simpler, more likely to be decentralised
in design, and more amenable to implementation in multiple interoperable forms.
For example, the ITU’s X.400 standard for email is broadly equivalent to the IETF Internet
standard SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol),
106 though the speciﬁcation is very much
larger and more complex.
107 It was assumed that X.400 mail servers would be operated
by centralised PTTs, for example in that the standard speciﬁed automated procedures for
X.400 messages to be transferred to facsimile, telex and postal mail services. An individual
or business wishing to send X.400 email to a third party had to pay, in Australia’s case,
Telstra $20 per hour for access to its X.400 network.
108
As the ITU’s standards are complex, hierarchical and over-engineered, so too the organisation
that produced them is complex, hierarchical and highly bureaucratised. In the same way that
101. “Any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of
any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means”: International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) Constitution; Convention; Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes relating to the
ITU Constitution, to the ITU Convention and the Administrative Regulations, 22 Dec 1992, 1994 ATS No 28
(entry into force for Australia 29 Sep 1994), Annex para 1012.
102. See generally Larmouth, John, Understanding OSI (1996).
103. See http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/OLD/oim-charter.html.
104. Huston, Geoﬀ, ICANN, the ITU, WSIS, and Internet Governance (2005)
105. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 26
106. IETF, Simple Mail Transport Protocol (1982)
107. It runs to the size of several large books, whereas the basic SMTP protocol is speciﬁed in an RFC of 68
pages.
108. Known as Keylink: Garrett, Paula, What Can the Internet Do for You?: Join the Revolution (1997).
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the open, transparent architecture of the Internet reﬂects the culture of its founders, so too
elements of the ITU’s more closed, opaque culture can be discerned in the standards that the
ITU develops. It should therefore come as no surprise that the ITU’s Recommendations have
failed to gain purchase on the Internet, since they are technically, and the processes by which
they are developed are culturally, antithetical to the Internet’s architecture.
There are nevertheless a few instances in which ITU Recommendations have been deployed on
the Internet; mostly where it borders the telephone network, for example in the technologies by
which users connect to their ISPs. Four other examples can be given:
￿ ENUM is an IETF standard for mapping telephone numbers into the DNS.
109 The tele-
phone numbers themselves, though, are of course deﬁned by an ITU speciﬁcation, E.164.
￿ The SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) used by some Internet routers and
hosts is another IETF Internet standard based in part around ITU protocols.
110
￿ The ITU’s H.323 voice over IP protocol and related speciﬁcations enjoyed some early pop-
ularity in proprietary software such as Microsoft Netmeeting, but are now being overtaken
by simpler community-developed standards such as SIP.
111
￿ Finally, ITU-speciﬁed X.509 digital cryptography is still widely used in securing otherwise
unencrypted Internet protocols such as those used for email (using a speciﬁcation called
S/MIME) and the Web (through a protocol called TLS). The success of the strongly hi-
erarchical X.509 speciﬁcation
112 over alternative community-developed cryptography stan-
dards
113 is explained by the strong backing the speciﬁcation received from the private
sector; most notably Microsoft Corporation and Netscape Communications.
114 The success
of X.509 thus illustrates an instance of the triumph of commercial interests, which favoured
an hierarchical trust model that supported e-commerce,
115 over a decentralised model that
109. IETF, E.164 Number and DNS (2000)
110. IETF, A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) (1990)
111. IETF, SIP: Session Initiation Protocol (2002)
112. X.509 relies on a hierarchy of Certiﬁcation Authorities (or CAs) to certify the identity claimed by an
applicant for the issue of a cryptographic key signed by that CA. The most successful commercial CA happens
to be Verisign, which also operates the com and net gTLD registries.
113. For example, OpenPGP does not rely on a small number of corporate CAs to certify the identities of the
parties to a transaction, but allows those parties to choose any other third parties whom they trust to fulﬁl that
role: see IETF, OpenPGP Message Format (1998).
114. Microsoft and Netscape were then ﬁrmly locked in the “browser wars” in which each company matched the
other feature for feature in a frenzied series of new product releases. Both released new email clients to accompany
their Web browsers, boasting support for S/MIME, within months of each other in 1997. The combined market
share of Microsoft’s and Netscape’s browsers was then as high as 98%: Thompson, Maryann J, Behind the
Numbers: Browser Market Share (1998).
115. See Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), 39.
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empowered end users, in the adoption of a de facto Internet standard.
116
Even so, these remain isolated successes, and in general the ITU has been relegated to a
subsidiary role in standards development by participating in the IETF process (on an equal
footing with all other IETF members).
Having failed to make signiﬁcant inroads into the standards development sphere of Internet
governance, the ITU instead sought a role in technical coordination and public policy gov-
ernance, through its adoption of Resolution 102 at its Plenipotentiary Conference in 2002,
by which it undertook to “contribute to policy development related to the management of
Internet domain names and addresses.”
117 The resolution also directs the ITU-D:
to organize international and regional forums, in conjunction with appropriate entities, for the
period 2002–2006, to discuss policy, operational and technical issues on the Internet in general
and the management of Internet domain names and addresses in particular for the beneﬁt of
Member States, especially for least developed countries ...
In pursuit of this directive, the ITU has held several joint workshops with ICANN on
ccTLD management and the int gTLD since 2003, hosted fora on various other Internet
governance issues such as spam and cybersecurity since 2004, and most signiﬁcantly estab-
lished the WSIS.
118
2.2.2. Criticisms
If standards organisations ought to aim, as the IETF does, to achieve technical excellence,
prior implementation and testing, clear, concise and easily understood documentation, open-
ness and fairness, and timeliness in their speciﬁcations,
119 then the grounds upon which such
organisations can be, and frequently are criticised follow naturally: technical mediocrity, lack
of ﬁeld implementation or testing, obscure documentation, closed or partial procedures, and
delay. There are standards organisations and processes that have been accused of all of these
things.
120
116. Lessig’s explanation for this phenomenon is that the architecture of the Internet is vulnerable to being
manipulated by corporations (see Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) at 34 and 52)
and governments (at 43–44) to their own ends. As true as this is, it does not demonstrate an inherent weakness of
the Internet’s architecture, so much as its potential vulnerability against a strong opposing force of architecture,
or a strong alternate mechanism of governance altogether such as that of markets.
117. ITU, Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses (2002)
118. See Section 5.1.
119. IETF, The Internet Standards Process—Revision 3 (1996)
120. Waclawsky, John G, Closed Architectures, Closed Systems And Closed Minds (2004)
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However rather than examining each of these failings, this subsection of the thesis will focus
on three speciﬁc areas of criticism common to the IETF and W3C that are of particular
relevance to the practice of Internet governance. These are criticisms of whether private
standards bodies can make decisions by consensus within their membership, if so whether
they do make decisions by such a process, and if so whether they should make decisions by
such a process—or in short, criticisms of their eﬀectiveness, their inclusiveness, and their
legitimacy.
2.2.2.1. Eﬀectiveness
A weakness of the standards processes of both the IETF and the W3C is the ease with which
they can be disrupted by those who, because they have a proprietary speciﬁcation of their
own to push, or for some other reason, are able to stymie the achievement of consensus on
the acceptance of a competing standard. This has been observed in the case of S/MIME
and OpenPGP, and that of SPF and SenderID, in both of which cases the outcome was to
fragment the standards landscape into two competing segments, neither of which might ever
reach the status of a full Internet standard.
Although this is a criticism of the IETF and W3C processes, in a sense it reveals no fault in
those processes. After all, they produced exactly the outcome they were intended to—that in
the absence of consensus, there should be no standard. It is considered better not to specify
a standard at all, than to release a so-called standard that a segment of the aﬀected Internet
community refuses to implement. To the extent that this policy can be criticised, so too can
that of any other organisation that operates by consensus.
As Chapter 4 will discuss in more detail,
121 the answer to this criticism, such as it is, is
that when consensus fails, another mechanism of governance will determine the dominant
speciﬁcation: typically, this mechanism will be markets (though it could also be rules). Once
this mechanism has run its course, the speciﬁcation most successful in the marketplace (or
that which has been mandated by law) can be returned to the standards body to be formalised
as a standard.
2.2.2.2. Inclusiveness
On the other hand not every failure of the Internet standards development processes of the
IETF or W3C can be attributed to diﬀerences between stakeholders. On other occasions
121. See Section 4.4.4.
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those bodies’ failure to produce a standard can be attributed to deﬁcits in the design or
implementation of their processes, which have prompted the development of competition from
other standards bodies, or in some cases from other mechanisms of governance altogether.
122
At the root of these procedural deﬁciencies is a lack of inclusiveness in the standards devel-
opment process. For example in 2004, a rival to the W3C with no membership fees, the Web
Hypertext Application Technology Working Group (WHATWG),
123 was formed in response
to concerns about“the W3C’s direction with XHTML, lack of interest in HTML and apparent
disregard for the needs of real-world authors.”
124
Similarly in 2006 the W3C was publicly accused of failing to acknowledge or respond to
comments on a speciﬁcation, even from one of its own staﬀ, leading another long-time com-
mentator to allege,“Beholden to its corporate paymasters who alone can aﬀord membership,
the W3C seems increasingly detached from ordinary designers and developers.”
125 In response
to such criticisms, in 2007 the W3C relaunched an HTML working group designed to facilitate
the active participation of some of its critics.
126
As for the IETF, whilst its membership may be more open than that of the W3C in theory, in
practice it is a meritocracy that can be quite impenetrable to non-technical stakeholders.
127
A self-critical RFC from 2004 frankly acknowledged this problem:
The IETF is unsure who its stakeholders are. Consequently, certain groups of stakeholder,
who could otherwise provide important input to the process, have been more or less sidelined
because it has seemed to these stakeholders that the organization does not give due weight to
their input.
128
2.2.2.3. Legitimacy
This leads to the third main criticism (mirroring a similar criticism made of ICANN) that the
IETF and W3C have strayed into areas of public policy without being legitimately entitled
to do so by reason of either carrying a democratic mandate to develop policy, or having
established a broad community consensus. Whilst they do establish a consensus within the
Internet technical community in support of the speciﬁcations they standardise, as noted above
this is in general neither broad nor community-based.
122. This process is also described at Section 4.2.4.4.
123. See http://www.whatwg.org/.
124. WHATWG, The WHATWG and HTML 5 FAQ (2006)
125. Zeldman, Jeﬀrey, An Angry Fix (2006); and another, “The process is stacked in favour of multinationals
with expense accounts who can aﬀord to talk on the phone for two hours a week and jet to world capitals for
meetings”: Clarke, Joe, To Hell with WCAG 2 (2006) .
126. W3C, W3C Relaunches HTML Activity (2007)
127. See Section 4.2.3.1.
128. IETF, IETF Problem Statement (2004)
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For example, in 1995 the W3C developed a speciﬁcation called PICS, or Platform for Internet
Content Selection,
129 that provided Web publishers with the ability to mark their pages with
computer-readable metatags rating the content of the page. It was envisioned that this would
enable parents and teachers to proactively restrict childrens’ access to certain Internet content,
without the need for that content to be censored altogether.
The W3C’s press release about PICS
130 proudly announced that it had received input from
23 companies and organisations, most of which were ISPs, media or software companies, and
only one of which—the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)—claimed to represent
users. It should not therefore have come as a surprise to the W3C to ﬁnd that opposition
to the technology began to mount from quarters it had not consulted when developing the
technology.
131 These critics maintained that just as easily as parents or teachers could utilise
PICS, so too could it be used by a paternalistic ISP or a repressive government to ﬁlter out
PICS-rated content automatically without any input from the end user.
132
A lesson that the W3C might have drawn was that altering the architecture of the Internet
so as to compromise its inherent values such as interactivity, openness, egalitarianism, and
resilience,
133 is to tinker with its fundamental stuﬀ. To do so essentially for public policy
reasons, with input from only one representative of users and none of governments, was brash
to say the least. Lessig states of PICS, “Given that [the consortium] is a pretty powerful
organization, it should be more open. If they want to do policy, they have to accept the
constraints on a policy-making body, such as openness in who can participate.”
134
The IETF placed itself in a similar position to the W3C when making a policy decision not
to include support for wire-tapping in the protocols it develops, despite the fact that national
legislation or policy might require wire-tapping to be conducted on networks utilising those
protocols.
135 This decision was less publicly controversial than the introduction of PICS,
perhaps because it was more congruent with the Internet’s underlying values (or perhaps
because it could be na¨ ıvely characterised as an abstention from action on the public policy
issues in question).
Even so, the decision was one with considerable public policy implications, made without
129. See http://www.w3.org/PICS/.
130. W3C, Industry and Academia Join Forces to Develop Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) (1995)
131. ACLU, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? (2002)
132. Graham, Irene, Will PICS Torch Free Speech on the Internet? (1998)
133. See Section 1.3.1.
134. Attributed to Lessig in Garﬁnkel, Simpson L, The Web’s Unelected Government (2002), 4 (brackets in
original).
135. IETF, IETF Policy on Wiretapping (2000)
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consultation outside the IETF’s membership. This raises questions over the democratic legit-
imacy of the process; questions that will be revisited in the conclusion to this chapter, and
in Chapter 3.
136
For now, it may at least be concluded that in standards development, as in technical coordi-
nation, public policy issues are inherently engaged, and that standards development bodies
cannot abnegate responsibility for policy development by denying or ignoring that this is so.
2.3. Public policy governance
The diﬀerence between the public policy sphere of governance, and the technical coordination
and standards development spheres, is that whereas the latter engage public policy issues in an
indirect and subsidiary manner, public policy governance, by deﬁnition, does so directly and
primarily. Just as the main instruments of technical coordination are norms and markets, and
of standards development norms and architecture, the principal mechanism for the exercise
of public policy governance is through the use of rules.
Although rules are found in other hierarchical power relationships than that between gov-
ernment and governed, it is in that context that they ﬁnd their most common and eﬀective
expression, and are known as law. Law may of course be further subdivided in any number
of ways, for example into that produced by legislative, executive or judicial arms of govern-
ment, but the more relevant distinction for present purposes is between international law,
and national or sub-national law (which together we may call domestic law).
In this section, a brief survey will be made of a range of laws and other rules on a selection of
Internet-related public policy issues at both international and domestic levels, taking the
particular example of Australia where possible, and omitting discussion of WSIS and the IGF
which are the subject of Chapter 5.
137 In doing so, it is hoped that some of the gaps in the
existing governance regimes applied to those public policy issues will be identiﬁed, and the
scope of the IGF’s potential work programme illustrated.
136. See Section 3.4.1.
137. The arrangement below is intended to highlight the relevant issues rather than the relevant actors, however
those involved in technical coordination and standards development have already been surveyed in the ﬁrst two
sections of this chapter, and some of the most prominent intergovernmental organisations are described in chapter
3. A clear and complete tabular overview of all the organisations active in Internet governance is found in table
1 of Mathiason, John, Mueller, Milton, Klein, Hans, Holitscher, Marc, & McKnight, Lee, Internet Governance:
The State of Play (2004).
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2.3.1. Internet-related public policy issues
The Tunis Agenda itself identiﬁes numerous public policy issues for consideration of the IGF,
but nowhere are these itemised in clear terms. The report of WGIG to WSIS had however
earlier identiﬁed thirteen Internet-related public policy issues in more concrete terms,
138 most
of which can be traced forward to one or more paragraphs of the section on Internet gover-
nance in the Tunis Agenda. Figure 2-2 itemises the thirteen public policy issues identiﬁed by
WGIG by paragraph and brief description, and their equivalent paragraphs in the relevant
section of the Tunis Agenda, if any.
Figure 2-2. Public policy issues
WGIG para WGIG description Agenda paras
15 Administration of the root zone ﬁles and system
16 Interconnection costs 49, 50
17 Internet stability, security and cybercrime 40, 43, 44, 45
18 Spam 41
19 Meaningful participation in global policy development 52
20 Capacity-building 51
21 Allocation of domain names 63, 64
22 IP addressing 38
23 Intellectual property rights (IPR)
24 Freedom of expression 42
25 Data protection and privacy rights 39, 46
26 Consumer rights 47
27 Multilingualism 49, 53
The omissions from the Internet governance section of the Tunis Agenda that are present in
the WGIG report call for comment. The subject of paragraph 15 of the WGIG Report, relating
to administration of the DNS root servers, is conspicuous in its absence from the Tunis Agen-
da. As will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 5, this is because the United States had
made it quite clear that it was not willing to divest its control of the DNS root,
139 and dur-
ing the negotiations that preceded the ﬁnal meeting of WSIS, this position was conceded.
Accordingly, save for the observation that “Countries should not be involved in decisions re-
138. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 5
139. See NTIA, US Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (2005).
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garding another country’s country-code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD),”and the vague promise
of“enhanced cooperation”in future,
140 the Tunis Agenda speciﬁed that the IGF“would have
no involvement in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet.”
141
Thus paragraphs 21 and 22 from the WGIG report on domain names and IP addressing were
included in the Tunis Agenda only in respect of their public policy rather than their technical
dimension (namely the assertion that national oversight of these activities was needed). These
items requires no further consideration here as domain name and IP address allocation have
already been considered as functions of technical coordination, rather than of public policy
governance. The policy issue of governmental oversight of these activities will however be
revisited in Chapter 5.
142
The omission of the topic of paragraph 23 of the WGIG report relating to intellectual proper-
ty rights from the Tunis Agenda (save for a ﬂeeting reference to software licensing in paragraph
49), and the omission of trade issues from both the WGIG list and the Tunis Agenda, is more
obscure—or perhaps not. One commentator states:
In the preparatory process of the Geneva phase it soon became clear that developed country
governments (the United States and European Union in particular) would do everything in their
power to avoid broadening out the WSIS agenda to include ... the policies promoted by developed
countries within such bodies as the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO) with respect to international trade or intellectual property rights (IPRs).
143
In less conspiratorial terms, this is conﬁrmed by a background paper released by WGIG along
with its report.
144 Although trade—or in the Internet context, e-commerce—is not included,
e-government forms the subject of paragraph 48 of the Tunis Agenda (though it is absent
from the WGIG list), and it raises many of the same issues.
Finally, there are a number of issues described separately in the Tunis Agenda that can
be usefully combined for present purposes. These are paragraphs 16, 19, 20 and 27 of the
WGIG Report; interconnection costs, meaningful participation in global policy development,
IT capacity building and multilingualism, which can be combined under the heading of “de-
velopment,” in that they all concern the development of Internet architecture to support
uniformity of access to the Internet and participation in Internet public policy governance,
particularly by users from disadvantaged economies.
140. See Section 5.1.4.1.
141. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 63 and 77.
142. But see Section 5.1.4.1.
143. Accuosto, Pablo, WSIS Wraps Up With Mixed Emotions (2005)
144. WGIG, Background Report (2005), 3
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Taking the public policy issues from the WGIG report with the items from paragraphs 16,
19, 20 and 27 combined, removing DNS and IP addressing issues that fall outside the scope of
this section, adding e-government from the Tunis Agenda and combining it with e-commerce,
and adding back the notably omitted issue of intellectual property, leaves the following list
of Internet-related public policy issues for discussion:
￿ Internet stability, security and cybercrime
￿ Spam
￿ Intellectual property rights (IPR)
￿ Freedom of expression
￿ Data protection and privacy rights
￿ Consumer rights
￿ Development
￿ e-commerce and e-government
It is not contended that this is an exhaustive list, and some of the categories are rather
broad (though as will be seen, less so than the four categories upon which the IGF eventually
settled). However the list does provide a useful indication of the topics that might be expected
to ﬁnd a place on the IGF’s work programme.
2.3.1.1. Internet stability, security and cybercrime
The Internet has provided fertile ground for the commission of old crimes in new ways,
such as the use of P2P ﬁle sharing services to distribute child pornography, and the use of
encrypted email to plan terrorist attacks. It has also enabled the commission of new crimes
more peculiar to the Internet, that involve the subversion of its architecture. One example
of the second class of crimes is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, by which
the criminal typically causes a distributed network of home computers to be infected with
a virus that covertly places them under the criminal’s control, and then uses that control
to cause each computer to bombard a victim’s Internet server with data until the server’s
capacity to respond to legitimate requests is overwhelmed.
This second class of new oﬀences is normally termed “cybercrime,” and it has been the main
focus of bodies involved in Internet public policy governance. There are no fully international
instruments addressing this topic, apart from a non-binding UN General Assembly Resolution
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on a Global Culture of Security,
145 which was based on an earlier OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) document.
146 However the most notable regional
activity, which now has global reach, is the Convention on Cybercrime passed by the Council
of Europe in 2001
147 dealing with computer fraud, information security, and the content
regulatory issues of child pornography and copyright. This convention has also been acceded
to by other non-European countries such as South Africa, Canada, the USA and Japan.
Although Australia has not ratiﬁed the convention, its Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) was based
on it in part.
Public policy governance by the executive arms of international, regional and domestic gov-
ernmental bodies in the area of cybercrime has been at least as signiﬁcant as that of their
legislatures. The G8 Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
Germany, Japan and Russia), formed a High-tech Crime Subgroup in 1997 which has estab-
lished a network of cybercrime points of contact in each country.
148 The European Union in
2004 formed an agency of its own, the European Network and Information Security Agen-
cy (ENISA), which aims to provide assistance to the European Commission and Member
States in addressing security issues in hardware and software, and to promote standards and
activities to minimise information security risks.
149
In Australia’s region, the Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL) of
APEC (Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation) has drafted a cybersecurity strategy for its mem-
ber states,
150 and there is an Australian High Tech Crime Centre to provide a nationally
coordinated approach to high tech crime across all Australian jurisdictions.
151
The war against cybercrime is also waged in non-governmental fora. National computer emer-
gency response teams such as the eponymous CERTﬁ
152 and Australia’s AusCERT,
153 some
of which are government-linked and others of which are private sector or civil society organ-
isations, join together in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).
154
They provide services and support, some voluntary and some for-fee, to those whose comput-
er systems or networks are attacked by cyber-criminals and those investigating such attacks.
145. General Assembly of the United Nations, Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity: Resolution (2003)
146. OECD, OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of
Security (2002)
147. Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, 23 Nov 2001, 2003 S Treaty Doc No 108-11
148. See http://www.cybercrime.gov/g82004/g8_background.html.
149. See http://enisa.europa.eu/.
150. APEC, Recommendation by the APEC TELWG to SOM for an APEC Cybersecurity Strategy (2002)
151. See http://www.ahtcc.gov.au/.
152. See http://www.cert.org/, though CERT now disavows the origin of its name.
153. See http://www.auscert.org.au/.
154. See http://www.first.org/.
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The CA/Browser Forum
155 provides another example of a purely private approach to com-
batting cybercrime; speciﬁcally phishing, a “social engineering” attack in which victims are
induced (usually through spam email) to provide conﬁdential details to a bogus Web site
masquerading as that of a legitimate online business such as a bank. The CA/Browser Forum
contains no governmental members, but is simply a consortium of CAs and vendors of Web
browser software. Their approach to the problem is based on architecture: the introduction
of a new type of SSL certiﬁcate that requires more rigorous veriﬁcation by the issuing CA,
and is ﬂagged as such by the user’s Web browser.
As for crimes that are not Internet-speciﬁc but which are committed by use of Internet
services, there are of course a number of relevant but general international instruments such
as conventions on drug traﬃcking and organised crime,
156 and a number of active executive
bodies such as Interpol. These fall outside the scope of this thesis, though some will be alluded
to later at Section 3.4.2.
However mention should at least be made of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography,
157 which
was passed in recognition of “the growing availability of child pornography on the Internet,”
and of the Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT), which is a transnational network of police services
combatting online child exploitation.
158
2.3.1.2. Spam
Of all the public policy issues examined here, spam provides one of the best illustrations of the
necessity of taking an international approach. As the reach of Internet email is international,
spam can eﬀectively be sent from whichever corner of the globe restricts it the least, rendering
domestic prohibitions on the sending of spam next to ineﬀectual.
There is no international instrument on spam; the closest perhaps being the European Union’s
e-Privacy Directive prohibiting the sending of spam,
159 which all member states were required
to implement by 31 October 2003. A Contact Network of Anti-Spam Enforcement Authorities
(CNSA) has been formed by 13 of the EU’s national anti-spam regulatory authorities.
160
155. See http://www.cabforum.org/.
156. See Wyngaert, Christine V d, International Criminal Law: A Collection of International & European In-
struments (2000).
157. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 May 2000, 2007 ATS No 6 (entry into
force for Australia 8 Feb 2007)
158. See http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/.
159. European Commission, Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002)
160. European Commission, European Countries Launch Joint Drive to Combat “Spam” (2005)
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This has however been eclipsed by a broader international network of 38 anti-spam regulators,
and 25 private sector members, in a forum formed in 2004 known as the London Action
Plan (LAP).
161 The activities of the LAP are based around an agreement for cooperation in
international enforcement of domestic anti-spam laws, and education of users and businesses.
Remaining on the international front, the OECD has formed an ad hoc Spam Task Force
which has contributed usefully to international coordination of anti-spam enforcement by
compiling a variety of reports on spam, and an online anti-spam Toolkit.
162 The ITU has also
sought to become involved by releasing a survey of spam legislation and hosting thematic
meetings on spam and network security.
163
Australia’s activities in anti-spam networks include the ACMA’s and the ACC’s member-
ship of the LAP, a multilateral Seoul–Melbourne Multilateral Anti-Spam Agreement signed
by twelve regional agencies, and additional bilateral agreements concluded between the AC-
MA and agencies from Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, the United States and the Unit-
ed Kingdom, by which the respective parties agreed to exchange information about anti-
spam policies and strategies, and security issues.
164
Australia can also boast a strong domestic legislative response to the spam problem. The
Spam Act 2003 (Cth) prohibits the sending of spam (or, in the legislation’s terms, unsolicited
commercial electronic messages) on pain of penalties of up to $220 000 per day, or up to
$1.1 million for repeated infringements. There is no speciﬁc minimum number of messages
that must be sent before they are qualiﬁed as spam; a single message can be caught by the
legislation. The Act also prohibits the use of address harvesting software or harvested address
lists.
Equivalent legislation from Australia’s partners in LAP varies markedly. In contrast to the
Australian and EU legislation which requires users to have opted in before receiving commer-
cial email, the United States CAN-SPAM Act which came into force in 2004
165 allows spam to
be sent in the ﬁrst instance so long as an“opt-out”facility is provided. It does however require
spammers to provide their street address in any communications they send.
Initiatives in the war against spam are also being taken within the private sector and civil
society. The Anti-Spam Technical Alliance, whose founding members include America Online,
161. European Commission, Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002), and see http://www.
londonactionplan.org/. The membership numbers given are as at 2008.
162. See http://www.oecd-antispam.org/.
163. See http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/.
164. See http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310313.
165. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act 2003 117 Stat 2699 Public Law
108-187
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British Telecom, Comcast, EarthLink, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, released a proposal containing
a range of technical recommendations for the control of spam.
166 MAWWG (the Messaging
Anti-Abuse Working Group) is another similar group.
167 Developments within the IETF of
course included SPF and SenderID, and in 2003 the IRTF also chartered an Anti-Spam
Research Group (ASRG) which has an active mailing list.
168
Spam ﬁltering software and services, both open source
169 and proprietary,
170 have proliferated.
Amongst these are services known as DNS blocklists. These are lists of IP addresses known to
have been used by, or to be open to abuse by spammers. Third parties such as ISPs and knowl-
edgeable individual users can use these lists within their mail server or spam ﬁlter software to
automatically refuse the receipt of email emanating from those same IP addresses.
171
Conversely, there are services that will assure receipients of the bona ﬁdes of email sent from
a given domain. The Domain Assurance Council,
172 formed in 2006, is an association of such
assurance providers, which is promoting the use of an IETF standards-track speciﬁcation
called DKIM (Domain Keys Identiﬁed Mail)
173 as a standard protocol for the provision of
domain assurance services.
2.3.1.3. Intellectual property rights (IPR)
As noted above, IPR issues on the Internet were excluded from the Tunis Agenda, on the
grounds that they fall within the purview of other existing international organisations such as
WIPO and the WTO (World Trade Organization). In practice however, it will be seen that
this has not altogether excluded them from consideration by the IGF.
WIPO administers the principal intellectual property conventions, which include the Berne
Convention regarding copyright,
174 the Paris Convention regarding patents, trademarks and
registered designs,
175 and the Rome Convention also regarding copyright.
176 The WIPO Copy-
166. ASTA, Technology and Policy Proposal (2004)
167. See http://www.maawg.org/.
168. See http://www.irtf.org/charter?gtype=rg&group=asrg.
169. The most popular being Spam Assassin, see http://spamassassin.apache.org/.
170. The most popular being Symantec Brightmail, see http://www.symantec.com/business/products/
overview.jsp?pcid=2242&pvid=835_1.
171. For a list, see http://www.spambouncer.org/reference/blocklists.shtml.
172. See http://www.domain-assurance.org/.
173. See http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/dkim-charter.html.
174. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 Sep 1886, as revised 13 Nov 1908,
completed 20 Mar 1914, revised 2 Jun 1928 and revised 26 Jun 1948, 1969 ATS No 13 (entry into force for
Australia 1 Jun 1969)
175. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 Mar 1883, as revised 14 Dec 1900, 2 Jun
1911, 6 Nov 1925, 2 Jun 1934, 31 Oct 1958, and 14 Jul 1967, 1972 ATS No 12 (entry into force for Australia of
substantive provisions 27 Sep 1975)
176. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organisations, 26 Oct 1961, 1992 ATS No 29 (Rome Convention) (entry into force for Australia 30 Sep 1992)
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right Treaty (WCT)
177 and the WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty (WPPT),
178 both
of which came into force in 2002, update these earlier instruments in light of new digital
technologies including the Internet. Australia is not a signatory to these WIPO treaties, but
its Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) amendments to the Copyright
Act 1968 (Cth) are consistent with them.
Amongst the changes introduced by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act most
relevant to the Internet were to bestow on copyright owners a new exclusive right to commu-
nicate works to the public (eg by making electronic copies or uploading them to an online
repository), and allowing temporary reproductions of copyright works made automatically in
the course of accessing them online (for example, when a user’s Web browser caches a copy
of a site it accesses to disk).
WIPO was also of course instrumental in drafting the UDRP by which trademark rights could
more easily be enforced against domain name registrants (this was backed up in the United
States by domestic legislation
179 that enhanced trademark owners’ rights against domain name
registrants still further). It is less commonly known that in 2001 WIPO proposed new rights to
domain names, such as extending protection to the names and acronyms of intergovernmental
organisations and to the oﬃcial long and short names of countries.
180 It is fair to say that
these recommendations were in advance of public or political consensus on the issues raised,
and no country has adopted them into law.
The other intergovernmental organisation referred to above in respect of its contribution to
IPR law is the WTO, whose TRIPS convention
181 covers copyright and industrial property
(eg patents, trademarks and registered designs). It largely incorporates the substantive con-
tent of the WIPO-administered conventions, but with the important diﬀerence that it treats
non-compliance as a barrier to trade, and allows the WTO to impose sanctions on member
countries in breach. It also provides for the resolution of disputes between nations through
the WTO.
Numerous private sector and civil society organisations have played a signiﬁcant role in public
policy governance of IPR on the Internet. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant has been that of the
music industry as often represented by the RIAA (and in Australia by APRA, the Australian
177. WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 Dec 1996
178. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 Dec 1996
179. Anticybersquatting Protection Act 1999 (US) 113 Stat 1501, Public Law 106-113
180. WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in
Signs on the Internet (2001)
181. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr 1994, 1995 ATS No 38 (entry
into force for Australia 19 May 1995)
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Performers Rights Association), and the motion picture industry as often represented by the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).
One of the biggest challenges posed to these IPR owners by the Internet has been the preva-
lence of the exchange of copyright music, software and video, often using P2P technology. The
music and motion picture industries have used the force of domestic law against those involved
at all levels: the authors of ﬁle sharing software,
182 those who publish cracks for DRM (Digi-
tal Rights Management) or copy-protection technologies,
183 Internet Service Providers,
184 and
end users.
185
The same industries were also strong campaigners for the passage of the United States Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
186 which provides a streamlined process for the resolu-
tion of disputes between those who are (or claim to be) copyright owners, and ISPs who
host allegedly infringing content. They also campaigned for the extension of that regime to
Australia through the Australia–United States Fair Trade Agreement (FTA),
187 pursuant to
which further reforms to the Copyright Act 1968 were passed in 2004. In addition to provid-
ing a DMCA-like safe harbour scheme for ISPs, these amendments also extended the term of
copyright protection from 50 years from the date of the author’s death (or from the date of
ﬁrst publication in the case of a corporate author), to at least 70 years.
188
On the other side of the coin, there are bodies which oppose the extension of IPRs over
Internet activities, such as the EFF
189 and its Australian counterpart, the EFA.
190 There are
also organisations such as Creative Commons, and the FSF that seek to subvert the dominance
of the IPR paradigm, through facilitating the release of copyright works on the Internet
under free licences, some of which licences are designed to be “viral” or self-perpetuating in
adaptations of the works.
191
182. MGM v Grokster (2004) 380 F 3d 1154
183. The most celebrated being the DeCSS crack for the Content Scrambling System (CSS) used on DVD (Digital
Versatile Discs): Universal City Studios Inc v Reimerdes (2000) 111 F.Supp.2d 294. Taken to an extreme, in
2007 the licensor of the Advanced Access Content System (AACS) began to issue take-down demands to those
publishing a hexadecimal number—09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0—which with the
appropriate software could be used to circumvent copy protection on high deﬁnition DVDs: see http://www.
chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=3218.
184. RIAA v Verizon Internet Services (2003) 351 F 3d 1229, and for an early perspective see Malcolm, Jeremy
M, Opinion: APRA v Telstra (1998).
185. Cassavoy, Liane, Music Labels Declare War on File Swappers (2003)
186. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US) 112 Stat 2860, Public Law 105-304
187. See eg the submission of ARIA (the Australian Recording Industry Association) submission to the Senate
enquiry on the FTA at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/freetrade_ctte/submissions/sub133.pdf.
188. See Malcolm, Jeremy M, Dark Shadows of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (2004).
189. See http://www.eff.org/.
190. See http://www.efa.org.au/.
191. See Section 4.2.4.4.
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These interests have also sought to build representation within WIPO, through their adoption
in September 2007 of a “Development Agenda” for the organisation, which includes amongst
its recommendations the preservation of the public domain and the exchange of experiences
on open collaborative projects.
192
2.3.1.4. Freedom of expression
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has addressed the issue
of freedom of expression on the Internet by calling on all states to:
refrain from imposing restrictions which are not consistent with the provisions of article 19,
paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including on: ... (c)
Access to or use of modern telecommunications technologies, including radio, television and the
Internet.
193
This resolution is vague and aspirational, but little more can be expected of an intergovern-
mental statement in one of the most naturally contentious areas of public policy governance of
the Internet.
194
The converse of freedom of expression on the Internet is content regulation, and the approach-
es taken domestically on this issue range from the almost laissez faire approach of countries
such as the United States which has established a Global Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT)
to promote online freedom of expression internationally,
195 to the very strict censorship ex-
ercised by countries such as Burma, China, Cuba, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Viet-
nam and Yemen which route all Internet connections through government-controlled ﬁlters.
196
In between are the approaches of countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Canada and
Australia, which prohibit certain types of content online. For example in November 2000
French courts gave US-based Yahoo! Inc three months to prevent French citizens from ac-
cessing Nazi memorabilia available using Yahoo!’s auction service, although the sale of such
material is legal in the United States. Yahoo! in response sought a declaration that Yahoo!’s
French court order could not be enforced in the United States.
This eventually failed on appeal in 2006, partly on the basis that Yahoo! had already in large
measure complied with the French court order by localising the content presented to French
visitors.
197 Even those visitors who did not speciﬁcally access Yahoo!’s French portal could be
192. WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO (2007)
193. OHCHR, The Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2002)
194. See Section 3.4.3.2.
195. See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/78340.htm.
196. Cox, Christopher, Establishing Global Internet Freedom: Tear Down This Firewall (2003)
197. Yahoo! Inc v La Ligue Contre le Racisme (2006) 433 F3d 1199
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identiﬁed as French by tracking the IP addresses from which they accessed the site back to
the networks of French ISPs (a technique known as geolocation which is discussed at Section
3.4.2).
It should be noted that legal guarantees of the freedom of expression, even in the United
States which strongly protects this freedom through the First Amendment to its Constitution,
do not extend to the private sector. Thus Google, one of whose corporate principles is“Don’t
be evil,”also used geolocation technology when it recently bowed to demands of the Chinese
government in applying content restrictions to the Chinese version of its search engine,
198 as
had Yahoo!, Cisco and Microsoft before it.
199
Similarly, the UK’s largest (and former government monopoly) telecommunications provider
and ISP, British Telecom, applies a ﬁlter called Cleanfeed to its wholesale and retail Internet
service. The selection of content to be blocked, currently limited to child pornography, is
undertaken by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), a non-proﬁt self-regulatory Internet
industry body.
200 In 2006 the government put other UK ISPs on notice to expect a regulatory
response if they did not also ﬁlter their Internet services by the following year.
201 Canada’s
ISPs have recently adopted a similar voluntary ﬁltering scheme, with a network called C-
CAICE,
202 that also includes governmental representatives, acting in the place of the IWF.
Australia’s content regulation regime is found in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth).
Since the passage of amendments to that Act in 1999 which commenced the following year,
Australian Internet content is subject to the same rating criteria as motion pictures, save
that content is only rated ex post facto once a complaint is made. If Internet content were to
be rated R if it were a ﬁlm, it may only be hosted on the Web in Australia subject to an age
veriﬁcation system. If it would be rated X or refused classiﬁcation, it may not be hosted in
Australia at all.
The Federal government has also claimed an election mandate to introduce a compulsory
programme of ISP-side ﬁltering of Internet content in 2008, akin to the voluntary programmes
of the UK and Canada, and building upon the previous government’s programme introduced
in 2007 to oﬀer free client-side Internet ﬁltering software to all Australian Internet users.
203
198. Auchard, Eric, Google Agrees to Censor Service to Enter China (2006)
199. Goldsmith, Jack L & Wu, Tim, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (2006), 1–10,
93–96
200. See http://www.iwf.org.uk/.
201. Edwards, Lilian, From Child Porn to China, in one Cleanfeed (2006)
202. Canadian Coalition Against Internet Child Exploitation; see http://www.cybertip.ca/app/en/projects_
overview.
203. See Heywood, Lachlan, Onus on Providers to Clean Up Web Content (2007).
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The PICS content labelling standard developed by the W3C, criticism notwithstanding, is
still in use, though it has to a large degree been supplanted by a newer XML-based W3C stan-
dard called RDF (Resource Description Framework). The most popular RDF-based schema
for rating Internet content, based on its suitability for children, is that of the UK-based Inter-
net Content Rating Association (ICRA).
204 The ICRA is comprised of nine large corporate
members, mostly ISPs and software companies such as America Online (AOL) and Microsoft,
and a much larger number of associate members ranging from the proprietors of adult Web
sites, to regional self-regulatory associations.
Before moving on from the topic of content regulation, brief mention should be made of
defamation law, which also falls within that ﬁeld. Australian defamation law made an inter-
national mark on the Internet with the decision in Dow Jones v Gutnick.
205 This was a case
in which noted Australian businessman Joseph Gutnick sued Dow Jones for publishing an
article, which he alleged to be defamatory of him, in the online version of Barron’s magazine.
Although Dow Jones and its Web site were based in the United States, the High Court
ruled that the case could be heard in Australia, on the ground that a suﬃcient link to the
jurisdiction was established by Gutnick’s residence and established reputation here, and the
availability of the magazine in Australia via the Internet, and in a few printed copies. The
result was that Dow Jones was required to defend itself in a jurisdiction much friendlier to
defamation plaintiﬀs than the United States.
2.3.1.5. Data protection and privacy rights
There is no international standard of privacy in the form of an international legal instrument,
although the right to privacy is recognised in general terms in Article 12 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The United Nations has also recognised the particular importance of maintaining
the privacy of those whose personal information is contained in electronic records, through
guidelines on this topic that were the subject of a General Assembly resolution in 1990.
206
Absent a more formal agreement on privacy, the leading intergovernmental document is a set
of guidelines of the OECD adopted in 1980.
207 These informed the drafting of the APEC Pri-
vacy Framework released by its Electronic Commerce Steering Group (ECSG) in 2004, that
204. See http://www.icra.org/vocabulary/.
205. Dow Jones & Company, Inc v Gutnick (2002) 194 ALR 433
206. General Assembly of the United Nations, Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files
(1990)
207. OECD, Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980)
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is designed to promote consistency in information privacy protection across APEC member
economies. In 2007, Google called for the multi-stakeholder development of a new transna-
tional privacy standard based upon the APEC Framework.
208 The OECD guidelines also
provided the basis for the eleven Information Privacy Principles set out in Australia’s Priva-
cy Act 1988 (Cth), which was extended to apply to the private sector in 2001.
The other regional privacy regime that is of signiﬁcant international importance is the EU Da-
ta Protection Directive.
209 The most controversial provision of the directive provides that
personal data of EU citizens may not be transferred to“third countries”(ie countries outside
the EU) unless those countries have adequate levels of privacy protection of their own. The
United States, which oﬀers no broad protection for the privacy of personal data, did not meet
this criterion, with the result that trade between the US and the EU was in danger of being
signiﬁcantly disrupted when the directive took eﬀect.
The compromise that the two parties reached was to negotiate a special “Safe Harbor” for
US businesses whereby they could individually certify their own compliance with EU data
protection standards as codiﬁed in the Safe Harbor principles, rather than simply adhering
to the lesser privacy standards of US law.
210
Another area of controversy occasioned by the disparity in privacy standards between Eu-
rope and the United States is seen in the case of the ICANN WHOIS database. WHOIS is a
database containing contact information of domain name registrants maintained by TLD reg-
istries. The content of ccTLD WHOIS registries is subject to the policy of the ccTLD in ques-
tion, and in auDA’s case, since 2002 it has omitted the registrant’s address, telephone and
fax number, providing only an email address.
211
However the WHOIS policies for certain of the gTLDs are less stringent. They not only
include personal address, telephone and fax details of the registrant, but also allow bulk
access to WHOIS data to be purchased. Registrants have found themselves in receipt of direct
marketing material directed to their WHOIS contact details, and some have fallen victim
to cyber-stalking and identity theft. In response, many registrants have taken to supplying
false WHOIS data, in breach of their registration agreements. Following much criticism of
this situation, ICANN’s GNSO Council formed a WHOIS Task Force in 2005 to review the
WHOIS policy that should apply to gTLDs in future. Its ﬁnal report of 2007 recommended
208. Fleischer, Peter, Call for Global Privacy Standards (2007)
209. European Commission, Directive on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (1995)
210. See http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/.
211. auDA, WHOIS Policy (2003)
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an overall restriction of publically available WHOIS data, but the GNSO Council rejected
these recommendations in November that year.
212
Two privacy protection initiatives from the private sector and civil society are worthy of note.
The ﬁrst are private sector privacy certiﬁcation schemes, the best known of which is that
of TRUSTe,
213 a private non-proﬁt organisation founded by the EFF and Commerce.Net,
that certiﬁes online business for their adherence to privacy standards. TRUSTe also certi-
ﬁes online businesses for compliance with the EU Safe Harbor scheme. There are over 1500
TRUSTe member Web sites, most of which display a seal as a sign of their compliance with
TRUSTe’s standards. BBBOnline is a similar programme restricted to North American mem-
bers, with almost 700 Web sites bearing its Privacy Seal,
214 and WebTrust is a much smaller
programme with fewer than 30 members whose adherence to privacy standards has been
audited by a Certiﬁed Public Accountant (CPA).
215
The second non-governmental privacy initiative is the P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences)
recommendation of the W3C. P3P is an XML-based language in which a Web site’s priva-
cy policy can be expressed in computer-readable form. This can be automatically read by an
access device that supports P3P (such as a compliant Web browser or mobile phone) in order
to regulate a user’s Internet usage in accordance with their expressed privacy preferences in
an automated way.
P3P was initiated by the Internet Privacy Working Group, established by the CDT in 1996
and counting amongst its members ISPs such as AOL, hardware and software manufacturers
such as IBM and Microsoft, and civil society representatives such as the EFF. P3P was
subsequently taken up by the W3C the following year and became a Recommendation in
2002.
216
P3P has not yet come into wide use and seems unlikely to in the future. One factor in this
may be that P3P software is not simple and transparent enough that users are attracted to
use it, particularly in that only a comparatively small number of Web sites have published
P3P-compatible privacy policies. The limitations of the protocol itself should also not be
overlooked. In particular, there is nothing in the protocol to verify that a Web site actually
complies with the policy it advertises.
212. GNSO Council, Recent GNSO Policy Development Activities on WHOIS (2007)
213. See http://www.truste.org/.
214. See http://www.bbbonline.com/.
215. See http://www.cpawebtrust.org/.
216. Cranor, Lorrie F, The Role of Data Protection Authorities in the Design and Deployment of the Platform
for Privacy Preferences (2001)
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Both P3P
217 and the various private sector privacy certiﬁcation schemes described above
218
have been criticised by privacy advocates for being too solicitous to the interests of business, by
allowing businesses to easily derogate from consumers’ privacy rights so long as the consumers’
consent can be obtained.
2.3.1.6. Consumer rights
There is no international instrument protecting consumer rights. The European Union passed
a Distance Sales Directive in 1997
219 to protect EU consumers in transactions made online, for
example by providing consumers with a cooling oﬀ period and requiring them to be provided
with detailed information about the transaction. This was followed by a similar Directive on
distance marketing of ﬁnancial services in 2002.
220
In the absence of an international agreement on consumer rights, the OECD is again at
the forefront of international governance on this issue through the OECD Guidelines for
Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce
221 developed by its Consumer
Policy Committee and formally adopted by the OECD Council in December 1999.
These formed the basis for the Australian Federal Government’s Building Consumer
Sovereignty in Electronic Commerce: A best practice model for business,
222 a voluntary re-
source designed to foster a self-regulatory approach to consumer protection in e-commerce by
Australian business. The process by which this was drafted incorporated public comment from
the private sector, civil society and academia, as well as member government representatives.
Whilst the best practice model has no force of law, businesses adhering to it are entitled to
display a logo to indicate their compliance.
More recently in 2003 the OECD also released its OECD Guidelines for Protecting Consumers
from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices Across Borders,
223 which focuses on
the issue of cross-border fraud, particularly on the Internet, and is intended to provide a
framework for international cooperation in tackling this problem through coordination of the
activities of national agencies and private sector bodies such as ﬁnancial institutions and
domain name registrars.
217. Agrawal, Ruchika, Why is P3P Not a PET? (2002)
218. Clarke, Roger, Meta-Brands (2001)
219. European Commission, Directive on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts (1997)
220. European Commission, Directive Concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services (2002)
221. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce (2000)
222. See http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=014&ContentID=1083.
223. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices
Across Borders (2003)
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This dovetails with the work of the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement
Network (ICPEN),
224 an organisation that brings together the consumer protection bodies of
33 countries, including the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Australia’s
ACCC.
One example of cooperation between such regional executive agencies is seen in the prosecu-
tion of a stock tout operating through the use of unsolicited email, both in Australia at the
instigation of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
225 and in the
United States through its Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
226
Finally in Australia’s region, APEC drafted Voluntary Consumer Protection Guidelines for
the Online Environment in 2003, though these saw no domestic adoption and now regrettably
appear to have disappeared from the Web.
227 There is however an Australasian Consumer
Fraud Taskforce formed in 2005, which brings together Australian State, Commonwealth and
New Zealand authorities to address consumer fraud both on and oﬄine.
228
2.3.1.7. Development
The “digital divide” between the developed and the developing world (or between “North”
and “South”) is an aspect of a much broader social problem than falls within the scope of
Internet governance. The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are an
umbrella programme for addressing such issues at the broadest level,
229 including the need
for investment in Internet infrastructure and services in regions suﬀering from the digital
divide. Within the broader ﬁeld of ICTs for development, there are a few discrete issues that
more directly raise questions of Internet-related public policy, and hence fall within the ambit
of Internet governance.
The ﬁrst of these isolated by the WGIG Report and Tunis Agenda is that of interconnection
costs. By way of background to this issue, in traditional telephony each country’s telecom-
munications provider raises its own connection charges for initiating or receiving a call, and
the charges are divided between them when ﬁnancial settlements between providers are cal-
culated. This does not occur on Internet networks, where typically a smaller network—such
as that of a developing nation—will pay the whole cost of its connection to a larger back-
224. See http://www.icpen.org/.
225. R v Hourmouzis (unreported Victorian County Court, decided 30 October 2000)
226. SEC v Hourmouzis (unreported, District Court of Colorado, no 00-N-905, decided 1 May 2000)
227. See http://web.archive.org/web/20050204094737/http://www.export.gov/apececommerce/consumer_
protection.html for the former content.
228. See http://www.scamwatch.gov.au/.
229. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
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bone network. The larger network thereby receives access to any Internet content available
on the smaller network eﬀectively for free.
This issue formed the subject of Recommendation D.50 from ITU’s Study Group 3, which
sought to establish a more equitable settlements regime between Internet network opera-
tors, but for commercial reasons this has proved highly controversial and is unlikely to be
implemented in its current form.
230
A second development issue is that of capacity building. This is an ill-deﬁned term which
in the present context refers to the development of institutional and individual capacity for
the governance and application of Internet infrastructure.
231 This is more of an operational
than a governance issue, which ﬁts more comfortably within the existing intergovernmental
structures for international aid and development work.
232
The development agency with particular responsibility for telecommunications networks is
the ITU-D, the development arm of the ITU. However infrastructure development for ICT is
also supported by such bodies as the World Bank,
233 UNESCO (the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization),
234 the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD),
235 and UNDP (the United Nations Development Programme).
236
On a regional level, the G8’s Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOT Force)
237 and the EU’s
eEurope programmes
238 are both notable for having taken a multi-stakeholder approach to
capacity building, foreshadowing the similar approach of WSIS.
239 In the private sector, the
Global Information Infrastructure Comission (GIIC) formed in 1995 is a confederation of ex-
ecutives notable for its work in this area,
240 as in civil society is the Association for Progressive
Communications (APC).
241
A third issue of equity is that of meaningful participation in global policy development.
The prominence of this issue was raised in 2002 by a report of the Panos Institute which
demonstrated how poorly developing countries are represented in global ICT governance.
242
The conclusions of this Louder Voices report were presented to the third meeting of the
230. European Commission, Internet Network Issues (2000)
231. See Section 4.3.5.2.
232. See Section 6.2.3.
233. See http://www.worldbank.org/.
234. See http://www.unesco.org/.
235. See http://www.unctad.org/.
236. See http://www.undp.org/.
237. DOT Force, Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge (2001)
238. See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/.
239. See Section 5.1.
240. See http://www.giic.org/.
241. See http://www.apc.org/.
242. MacLean, Don, Souter, David, Deane, James, & Lilley, Sarah, Louder Voices: Strengthening Developing
Country Participation in International ICT Decision-Making (2002)
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United Nations ICT Task Force (UNICTTF),
243 a multi-stakeholder body formed in 2001 at
the request of UNESCO to play a coordinating role amongst stakeholders working in the area
of ICT for development.
244
The ﬁnal equity issue raised by the WGIG Report and the Tunis Agenda is multinationali-
sation (more commonly known as internationalisation, or I18N
245) of the Internet. The two
principal sub-issues involved here are the support of multilingual content by Internet ser-
vices, and the ability to both access and represent that content using multilingual character
sets. This issue was pressed by UNESCO in 2003 when its member States adopted a Rec-
ommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to
Cyberspace.
246
Although internationalisation is just as much a development issue as interconnection and
capacity building, it can unlike those latter issues be addressed within the technical rather
than the economic arena. Most work in this area has been the province of standards organi-
sations such as the IETF and the Unicode consortium
247 (which deﬁnes a universal character
set capable of displaying typographical symbols from all human languages). International-
isation is also an Activity of the W3C.
248 Additionally, the W3C has produced a related
recommendation on making Web content accessible to those with disabilities.
249
The current focus of multinationalisation eﬀorts is on the support of multilingual domain
names, which allows other character sets such as Arabic and Chinese to be used to access
Internet addresses using the DNS. The IETF and ICANN have been principally responsible
respectively for the development and implementation of this technology, with support from
another civil society organisation, the Multilingual Internet Names Consortium (MINC),
250
in delivering advocacy and education. In recent years slow but steady progress has been made
towards resolving some ﬁnal implementation issues for multilingual domain names, with one
of the most recent developments being the testing of eleven multilingual TLDs in October
2007.
251
243. See http://www.unicttaskforce.org/.
244. See http://www.unicttaskforce.org/thirdmeeting/openpage.html.
245. So called because there are 18 letters between the “i” and the “n” in “internationalisation.”
246. UNESCO, Recommendation Concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to
Cyberspace (2003)
247. See http://www.unicode.org/.
248. See http://www.w3.org/International/.
249. W3C, Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 1.0 (1999)
250. See http://www.minc.org/.
251. ICANN, IDN Status Report (2007)
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For some countries, progress has been too slow; leading China for example to establish its own
DNS root in 2005 to serve the Chinese-character equivalents of the com and net gTLDs.
252
2.3.1.8. e-commerce and e-government
The ﬁnal public policy issue under consideration is that of e-commerce, which is simply the
conduct of business over electronic networks, relevantly the Internet, and is closely related to
e-government, which is the relation of government and its citizens over such networks using
the same sorts of technologies. Here the focus is to be on e-commerce, but e-government will
be discussed again at Section 4.3.4.1.
UNCITRAL, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
253 is the intergov-
ernmental body which regulates international trade in conjunction with the WTO. UNCI-
TRAL’s particular focus is on the modernisation and harmonisation of laws bearing on
international business. To this end, it released in 1996 a Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce,
254 followed in 2001 by a Model Law on Electronic Signatures.
255 Both model laws
prescribe a technology-neutral model for the treatment of electronic contracts and signatures
as legally equivalent to their paper-based equivalents. Australia’s Electronic Transactions Act
2001 (Cth) and its State counterparts were based on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
UNCITRAL has also developed a convention, not yet adopted by Australia,
256 which aims
to clarify for legal purposes such matters as the location of a party to a contract formed
electronically, the time and place that that contract will be taken to have been formed,
the use of automated message systems in forming contracts, and the criteria to be used in
establishing functional equivalence between electronic and paper communications.
This convention, once adopted, will help to resolve the long-obscure question of whether the
“postal acceptance rule” applies to electronic contracts; that is to say, whether a contract
concluded by email, where the oﬀer is emailed say from Australia to a recipient overseas, is
governed by Australian or overseas law, and at what time the contract is formed.
Along similar lines, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, an intergovernmental
organisation of sixty member states, ﬁnalised in 2005 an international convention on choice of
252. i-DNSnet, PRC Government Approves Chinese Character Internet Domain Names (2005). An Arabic root
has also been established by Saudi Arabia, and there have been reports of Russia having similar plans for a
Cyrillic root: Rampell, Catherine, A Script for Every Surfer (2007) .
253. See http://www.uncitral.org/.
254. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996)
255. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001)
256. UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 23 Nov 2005; see
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention.html.
74Chapter 2. Internet governance as it was
law agreements,
257 to establish rules for the enforcement of contracts that specify that the law
of a particular jurisdiction is to apply, and the circumstances in which other countries must
recognize the judgments of courts of that jurisdiction. The convention is not yet in force.
2.3.2. Criticisms
It lies outside the scope of this thesis to investigate the many diﬀerent substantive criticisms
of particular Internet-related public policy initiatives that have been developed by bodies
engaged in public policy governance. Even so, it should already be evident that the main
problem confronting those bodies is the diﬃculty of making rules that are both globally
consistent yet substantive in content.
This diﬃculty arises from the fact that on the Internet, national regimes can be transcended
with a keystroke, potentially both rendering domestic laws ineﬀective against those physically
outside the jurisdiction (as in the case of the hosting of prohibited content, the sending of
spam or the commission of cybercrime by a foreign national), whilst conversely subjecting
Internet users to laws of foreign jurisdictions to which they owe no allegiance as citizens (as
illustrated by the Yahoo! Nazi memorabilia case and the Gutnick defamation case). Such
jurisdictional problems, and related problems with enforcing international law in the absence
of an eﬀective international court system or police force, are discussed at Section 3.4.2.
Regulators recognise these problems. For example, in considering the application of Australia’s
telecommunications regulation regime to VoIP (Voice over IP) telephony, the Privacy Com-
missioner stated in its Review of the Private Sector Provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth),
“The consequences of not having a globally consistent approach is that information may end
up in the country with the lowest privacy protection standards.”
258 It recommended the Aus-
tralian Government initiate discussions through appropriate international fora about how to
deal with major international jurisdictional issues arising from global reach of new technolo-
gies such as VoIP.
259
Whilst these inherent diﬃculties may not in themselves provide grounds for criticism of
bodies engaged in public policy governance by rules, those bodies can be criticised for a
257. Hague Convention on Choice of Law Agreements, 30 Jun 2005; see http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?
act=conventions.pdf&cid=98.
258. Oﬃce of the Privacy Commissioner, Getting in on the Act: The Review of the Private Sector Provisions of
the Privacy Act 1988 (2005), 266. For a more in-depth analysis see Malcolm, Jeremy M, Privacy Issues with
VoIP Telephony (2005) .
259. See also ACA, Regulatory Issues Associated with Provision of Voice Services Using Internet Protocol in
Australia (2004).
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lack of coordination between the rules they develop, and conﬂicting international or domestic
rules. For example, prior to the passage of the CAN-SPAM Act, many American States had
their own spam laws, which more often than not were inconsistent with each other. For
example, when sending unsolicited commercial email with adult content, senders might have
been required to prepend “ADV:ADLT” to the subject line in one state and “ADV-ADULT”
in another. Bizarrely, in Louisiana, there are two separate provisions, one of which requires
the ﬁrst-mentioned subject preﬁx
260 and the other the latter.
261
One of the purposes of the IGF, at least as put forward in this thesis, is to avoid the sorts of
discrepancies that result from an uncoordinated patchwork of regulation and other governance
mechanisms as described in this section, by addressing Internet-related public policy at a
global level through a network of all aﬀected stakeholder groups, using an open, consensual
process analogous to some of those employed in the standards development sphere of Internet
governance.
The closest to such a process that has been encountered in this section is in the cooperative
arrangements of domestic executive agencies within government networks such as the London
Action Plan and the Virtual Global Taskforce. They are not so well illustrated by the har-
monisation activities of domestic lawmakers, which are likely to be more restricted in scope
and less inclusive of all stakeholders; for example as in the bilateral (or unilateral) process by
which Australia was induced to “harmonise” its IPR laws with those of the United States in
the Australia–United States FTA.
As for public policy development within intergovernmental organisations, the position is more
complex. Traditionally, these have not been venues very inclusive of external stakeholders, nor
have they operated at a speed adequate to respond to the development of public policy issues
on the fast-paced Internet. However as Chapter 3 will discuss in detail, certain intergovern-
mental organisations are beginning to reform their processes to become more responsive and
inclusive of non-governmental stakeholders.
262
To remedy the remaining deﬁcits of participation in intergovernmental policy development
fora is another of the purposes put forward in this thesis for the IGF (and, parenthetically, a
good reason why IPR and e-commerce should not be excluded from its mandate).
263
But more signiﬁcantly, the establishment of the IGF opens the door to a more coordinated
260. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 51, Trade and Commerce, Chapter 19-C
261. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 14, Criminal Law, s106
262. See Section 3.4.1.1.
263. See Section 6.2.2.3.
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approach to the development of public policy for the Internet than has characterised the ad
hoc application of various mechanisms of governance to produce the measures described in
this section.
2.4. Governance mechanisms revisited
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe three spheres of Internet gover-
nance—technical coordination, standards development and public policy governance—and
to give examples of how the ﬁve mechanisms of governance outlined in the Introduction have
been brought to play in each sphere.
It was noted in the Introduction that governance can be exercised through any, or a com-
bination, of these mechanisms of rules, norms, markets, architecture and networks. Biegel,
Weber and Vedel, whose models of Internet governance (along with those of Rhodes and
Lessig) contributed to this typology, all agree that since each form has its own advantages
and disadvantages, reliance upon any single mechanism of governance is likely to be insuﬃ-
cient, and that their application in concert may often be the most successful approach.
264
This has been conﬁrmed by this chapter’s survey of some of the most notable Internet gover-
nance institutions and initiatives in each sphere, and can be concisely illustrated by arraying
the ﬁve mechanisms and three spheres in a matrix, as in Figure 2-3 below.
Figure 2-3. Governance types and mechanisms
Technical coordination Standards development Public policy
Rules ICANN/NTIA JPA ITRs Cybercrime Act
Norms IAB oversight RFCs Spam blocklists
Markets gTLD registriesa S/MIMEb Content regulationc
Architecture IPv4 allocationd DNSSECe CA/Browser Forum
Networks ICANN SOs and ACs P3P LAP
264. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 358; Weber, Rolf H, Regulatory Models for the Online World (2002) , 100; Vedel, Thierry, Four Models
for Internet Governance (2005), 67
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Notes:
a. gTLD registries are given as an example of technical coordination through markets
because their operations are governed by contracts negotiated with ICANN on commercial
terms.
b. S/MIME is an example of standards development through markets because of the
inﬂuence that RSA, Microsoft and Netscape had on the development and adoption of the
S/MIME speciﬁcation.
c. This is an example of public policy governance through markets because of the
Australian government’s reliance on a co-regulatory code of practice drafted by industry as
a component of its content regulation regime (and also its spam regime; see Section
4.2.4.1).
d. Because the architecture of IPv4 constituted IP addresses as a limited resource, RIRs
were required to tightly control the allocation of addresses from the pools they
administered. Otherwise, IP addresses might have been allocated in a similar manner to
domain names, without any limit on the number that an applicant could request.
e. The design of the DNSSEC protocol was constrained by the requirement that it be
interoperable with the architecture of the existing DNS.
Accepting the need for balance between each of the mechanisms of governance, it would still
be useful if there were some theoretical or empirical basis upon which to determine which
mechanism or mechanisms, either alone or in combination, are most likely to be eﬀective in
a given issue area. For this purpose, Biegel proposes a ﬁve-step framework in which
we ﬁrst identify the category of allegedly problematic conduct ... and determine through this
identiﬁcation, certain representative characteristics of the problem. Next, we explore the po-
tential for consensus among the various stakeholders regarding both the nature and extent of
the problem and the prospects for any sort of regulatory solution. Then we examine just how
uniquely cyber this problem might be, and analyze the extent to which such a determination
might help answer the question of how we might regulate the problem area. Informed by the
analysis in the ﬁrst three steps, we continue by exploring in detail the potential applicability of
each of the three basic regulatory models identiﬁed in part 2. After going through all these steps,
we seek to identify a synthesis, pointing whenever possible towards a combination of realistic
approaches while trying in general to avoid major changes in the current regulatory structure.
265
265. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 224
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Although the three basic regulatory models of which Biegel speaks have been expanded into
ﬁve mechanisms here, his approach remains capable of application by analogy. However the
approach can be reﬁned in two respects.
First, the sphere of governance in which the mechanism is to be applied should also be con-
sidered, to determine whether the mechanism in question is likely to be adequately legitimate
and eﬀective for application in that sphere. Taking legitimacy ﬁrst, this is the normative
basis upon which the exercise of a mechanism of governance is seen as justiﬁed by those it
addresses.
266 What is legitimate in one sphere of governance may not be in another. For ex-
ample, to be perceived as legitimate, the authority that underlies the exercise of public policy
governance must normally be accepted by the governed through some form of political pro-
cess, such as democratic accountability to a broad range of stakeholders.
267 The same is not
normally required in the sphere of standards development, where provided that public policy
issues are not engaged, technical merit alone is seen as suﬃcient to justify compliance.
It is therefore no coincidence that the predominant mechanism of governance in the public
policy sphere has been rules, since the authority of the rule-maker is normally negotiated
through a political process seen as legitimate within the international and/or domestic legal
systems of its subjects. In contrast, the legitimacy of the other, more decentralised mech-
anisms of governance—norms, markets and architecture—is much weaker in the the public
policy sphere, as they are too often invisible and unamenable to stakeholder input. Such
policy-making may for example be driven, in the case of markets, by the “invisible hand
of commerce,”
268 or in the case of architecture by unexamined accidents of network design
that conﬂict with more fundamental social values, or in the case of norms by prejudice or
vigilantism.
Moving on from legitimacy, the likely eﬀectiveness of a given mechanism within a particular
sphere of governance should also be considered. Whilst it makes sense to favour, by default, the
continued use of the mechanisms of norms and markets for technical coordination, and norms
and architecture for standards development, as these have generally been very successful in
those spheres, they have been less eﬀective as mechanisms of public policy governance. One
reason is that since the type of regulatory issue involved in public policy governance“usually
produces winners and losers and may be heavily contested,” its governance is more likely to
266. See Section 3.4.1.
267. But not limited to this: Chapter 4 will discuss the options in detail.
268. Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), 30
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require some sort of hierarchical force in order to be suﬃciently eﬀective.
269
The mechanism of rules does not suﬀer from the same limitation. However it does suﬀer from
other limitations that have already been observed, such as its incompatibility with the Inter-
net’s cosmopolitanism and culture of decentralisation. Thankfully, the means of addressing
these limitations has already been presented: by the use of rules not in an uncoordinated fash-
ion as has largely occurred to date, but instead through the hybrid governance mechanism of
networks. By exactly the same token, the limitations on the legitimacy of norms, markets and
architecture in public policy governance can also be addressed.
This leads to the second reﬁnement to Biegel’s approach that is needed, which lies in his failure
to identify the “we” whom he refers to in recommending that “we identify a synthesis ... of
realistic approaches.”It is contended here that“we”should be a multi-stakeholder governance
network, which can combine the merits (and overcome the limitations) of both hierarchical and
decentralised modes of governance, by coordinating the application of the most appropriate
mechanisms of governance for a given issue area, and rendering their application accountable
to the stakeholders of which the network is formed.
The purpose of the next chapter will be to bring this ideal down to earth, by considering how
the currently rather abstract concept of a multi-stakeholder governance network might ﬁt
within the existing international system consisting largely of discrete geographically-bounded
states and intergovernmental bodies formed by agreement between them.
A foretaste of the answer can be found in this chapter’s mention of government networks such
as the London Action Plan, and the reforms that have begun to permeate more traditional
intergovernmental bodies. Although such bodies have historically claimed authority to make
rules through the democratic legitimacy they draw from their composition by national gov-
ernments, this does not preclude them from adopting the alternative governance mechanism
of networks, involving other stakeholders outside the governments’ constituencies.
In fact increasingly, even in contexts other than the Internet, international law is being made
through networks rather than through rules as in years past. It can even be said that the
international order itself, in the post-Westphalian age that is to be deﬁned in the next chapter,
has become an archetype of network governance writ large, characterised by multicentric
authority and the use of soft power.
269. Holitscher, Marc, Internet Governance Revisited: Think Decentralization! (2004), 1. Naturally, this will vary
from one issue area to another: see Section 4.2.
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And the reverse may also be true: that public policy governance exercised through networks
can, regardless of whether the organisation leading the process is traditionally intergovern-
mental in character, become a form of international (or, more subtly, transnational) law. This
is another question that the following chapter will address.
81Chapter 2. Internet governance as it was
82Chapter 3. The international system
Globalization operates on Internet
time.
Koﬁ Annan
In the course of the preceding chapter, an overview was given of a number of international
legal instruments bearing on public policy governance of the Internet, and of some of the
institutions responsible for their development. This chapter takes a step back from those
details to look at the underlying issues of what international law is, where it comes from, and
the extent to which civil society in particular—that is, people organised into non-commercial
social groups other than states—has a role to play in developing it, particularly through
governance networks such as the IGF.
The importance of this is that if Internet governance is to be exercised by networks as the
previous chapter has suggested, the status of those networks in the international legal system
will determine whether their actions are likely on the one hand to be accepted, or on the
other to be undermined (or simply ignored) by states. Although the geographical nexus that
characterises governance through rules by states may on some accounts be anachronistic and
largely irrelevant to life in cyberspace,
1 even citizens of cyberspace still hold dual citizenship
with the state in which they are physically located. Those states will be more likely to honour
the actions of networks of Internet governance if those actions can somehow claim legitimacy in
the international legal system.
3.1. International law and international relations
In examining this possibility, the theoretical background to this chapter shifts into the ﬁelds
of international law and international relations. The two are not synonymous. International
law is the largely normative study of the legal relations that exist (or should exist) between
international legal actors—generally states. International relations, on the other hand, is a
branch of political science with a more descriptive programme and a more empirical method,
which examines how international legal actors actually relate.
3.1.1. International law
The distinction between the “legal relations” of states and their other modes of interaction
1. See Section 4.3.4.2.
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can be a ﬁne one, but the positivist deﬁnition discussed earlier at Section 1.4.1 would have
it that a legal rule is a binding and enforceable obligation, regarded as law, that has been
posited through a political process by a body politic, to whom obedience to the legal rule is
owed.
Traditionally, international lawyers would explicitly or implicitly qualify this deﬁnition by
requiring that the bodies by whom international law is posited be states,
2 consigning the
activities of other actors in the international arena to “political” rather than “legal” status.
The extent to which this constriction is problematic depends on whether it is intended to be
semantic or empirical. That is to say, if international law is deﬁned by the fact that it is the
result of agreements between states, then that may be a useful way to narrow the ﬁeld of
study, but may at the same time consign the ﬁeld of international law to irrelevance if as a
matter of fact, bodies other than states have an equally important role to play in international
governance.
3
There are however schools of international lawyers who have adopted a broader treatment
of their subject, which incorporates the activities of bodies other than states, recognising
international law as a supranational regime of governance—that is, a regime which in certain
circumstances can prevail over the sovereignty of states, and in which states are therefore by
deﬁnition not the ultimate authorities. As a corollary of this, non-state actors are not, or at
least not by deﬁnition, precluded from participating in such a regime in their own right.
This is already uncontroversial in some contexts, for example in that individuals are the
subject of international human rights instruments, even possessing direct rights of audience
before the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations in respect of alleged infringements
of their rights
4 (and conversely, facing their international obligations at war crime tribunals
such as those of Nuremberg and the International Criminal Court). The more controversial
question is as to the extent that non-state actors can be involved not only as subjects of
international law, but as its authors.
The New Haven school of international law, whilst not in the mainstream, does accommodate
this possibility. New Haven scholars contend that international law is characterised by the
conjunction of authority and control; that is, the authority of a decision-maker to posit an
2. For example, Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law (1970), deﬁning international
law at page 9 as “the system of law which governs relations between states.”
3. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States (1995), 2
4. Optional Protocol 1 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec 1966, 1980 ATS
No 23 (entry into force for Australia (except Article 41) 13 November 1980); see Shearer, Ivan, United Nations:
Human Rights Committee: The Toonen Case (1995).
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obligation, as perceived by those to whom it is directed, and the control of their actual be-
haviour by the posited obligation.
5 Put more simply, international law can be found wherever
a lawmaker’s claim to exercise authority is accompanied by submission to it in practice. Ac-
cordingly for the New Haven scholar, expectations of authority can be drawn not only from
states, but from members of the international community at large.
6
Another school of international legal scholarship more receptive to the inclusion of non-
state actors as sources of authority, and which also seeks to unify the study of domestic
and international, public and private law, is described as the study of “transnational legal
process,”
7 “transnational law”
8 or “global law.”
9
As radical as these schools of international law may be to the mainstream scholar, in many
ways they are commonplace to the liberal student of international relations.
3.1.2. International relations
The theoretical divergence between the studies of international relations and international
law that began early in the 20th century became a schism with the collapse of international
order in the second World War, which exposed notions of an international “rule of law” as
idealistic. While international lawyers retreated to the United Nations, international rela-
tions theorists developed what became the ﬁrst dominant paradigm of post-war international
relations theory to succeed the former “idealism” that they had inherited from their legal
colleagues; that of realism.
10
The realist (or neo-realist, though the distinction is not presently relevant) believes that
rules of international law do not have any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on state behaviour. Rather, a
state’s behaviour is determined by a range of political and sociological factors; predominantly
concern for its own internal and external security, and to a lesser extent its economic welfare.
11
The four assumptions central to the position of the realist, according to one author, may be
paraphrased as follows:
5. Suzuki, Eisuke, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurispru-
dence (1974), 36; Lasswell, Harold D & McDougal, Myres S, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law,
Science, and Policy (1992)
6. See Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 76–85.
7. Koh, Harold H, Transnational Legal Process (1996); Koh, Harold H, Opening Remarks: Transnational Legal
Process Illuminated (2002)
8. Jessup, Philip, Transnational Law (1956); Zumbansen, Peer, Globalization and the Law: Deciphering the
Message of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (2004)
9. Teubner, Gunther, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society (1997)
10. Muldoon Jr, James P, The Architecture of Global Governance: An Introduction to the Study of International
Organizations (2004), 66–80.
11. See Morgenthau, Hans J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1978), 4-15.
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￿ The most important actors in international politics are nation states.
￿ The international system is a natural anarchy in which nation states compete with each
other.
￿ States seek power, vis a vis other states, in order to achieve their interests.
￿ States, like consumers in the economic free market, tend to act rationally.
12
Leaving aside critical approaches such as Marxist or neo-Marxist and postmodern or post-
structuralist theories,
13 the second main group of post-war theories of international rela-
tions are generally described as liberal (or, again, neo-liberal, though the distinction will not
be pursued here). In general, liberal theories temper the cynicism of realism in which states
are the only relevant actors, with an awareness of the inﬂuence of domestic and international
civil society on international relations, including its inﬂuence on the growing body of new
international law that has burgeoned in the post-war period.
14
Beyond its acknowledgment of the relationship between state and society, liberalism in inter-
national relations theory is nothing if not heterogeneous, with insights being drawn from a
range of other ﬁelds including economics and game theory. Diﬀerent strains of liberal theories
have diﬀerent foci: for example, institutionalism stresses the role that international rules and
institutions can play in constraining state behaviour,
15 institutions being deﬁned as“persistent
and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations.”
16
One of the most pertinent insights of many liberal scholars, that is sometimes referred to as
pluralism,
17 is that the arena of international relations involves the interrelation of various
competing and yet interdependent bodies, of which states are only a subset. In contrast to the
approach of realism, and even mainstream liberal institutionalism,
18 this approach admits of
actors other than states as the primary subjects of interest. It acknowledges that international
law and the bodies that make it do signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the behaviour of states (and vice
12. Mastanduno, Michael, An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies (1999), 21–22,
and cf Slaughter, Annie-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States (1995) , 5.
13. But see Muldoon Jr, James P, The Architecture of Global Governance: An Introduction to the Study of
International Organizations (2004), 84–87 and 92–94, and Ferguson, Yale H & Mansbach, Richard W, Between
Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory (1991) .
14. See Muldoon Jr, James P, The Architecture of Global Governance: An Introduction to the Study of In-
ternational Organizations (2004), 80–92 for a survey of liberal theories which include functionalism, rational
choice theory, and regime theory which is referred to below, and more generally see Slaughter, Annie-Marie,
International Law in a World of Liberal States (1995) , 5–6.
15. See Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 4–5.
16. Keohane, Robert O, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics (1989), 3
17. Dahl, Robert, Pluralist Democracy in the United States (1967), 24
18. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Econ-
omy (2003), 2
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versa), but that so too do trade unions, terrorists and transnational corporations alike. Like
states, these other institutions also powerfully represent social interests in the international
sphere; in fact, in the new era of globalisation and international terrorism this has become
almost a truism.
3.1.2.1. Regime theory
But further than this, the institutions that shape international relations need not even be
formal organisations, so much as practices applied by international actors to a speciﬁc activity
or group of activities.
19 As deﬁned by regime theory (which falls within the neo-liberal in-
stitutionalist camp), regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations.”
20 Participants in regimes may include either state or non-state actors
(in which case they may be respectively described as international or transnational regimes),
21
or a mixture of both.
Recall, from the Introduction to Chapter 2, WGIG’s deﬁnition of Internet governance (re-
peated in the Tunis Agenda):
Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and
civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making proce-
dures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.
22
WGIG is here, implicitly but unmistakably, identifying Internet governance as a regime. And
that is exactly what it is: a regime in which both state and non-state actors (those identiﬁed
in Chapter 2) participate in governance.
23 But to say this, which is hardly even controversial,
does not necessarily mean that the actors in the Internet governance regime, still less the
non-state actors, make international law. On that particular question, we must turn back to
the study of international law.
19. See Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 120.
20. Krasner, Stephen D, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables (1982),
1
21. Young, Oran R, Governance in World Aﬀairs (1999), 10
22. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 4, emphasis added.
23. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 5. More
narrowly, Mueller has identiﬁed the issue area inhabited by ICANN as a regime: Mueller, Milton, Ruling the
Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002) , 212.
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3.2. Actors in international law
Traditionally, states are considered the only subjects of (to use the terminology of interna-
tional law) or actors in (to use the equivalent international relations term) international law.
24
Thus whilst the actions of non-state actors may prompt the development of an international
legal rule, it is only through the acts and agreements of states that it becomes law.
25
The rise of states to preeminence in the international legal system was one of the deﬁning
characteristics of the transition from feudalism to the modern age, marked by the Treaties of
Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years’ War in 1648.
26 Prior to the Treaties of Westphalia
27
the Western world was characterised by the rise and fall of territories to various princes, each
variously challenging the authority of the others, and each subject in turn to the claims of
the Holy Roman Emperor to secular power.
The Treaties established the principles that each state should be equal and sovereign within
its own territorial boundaries, and should in turn show comity or respect for the sovereign-
ty of its neighbours, without interfering in their internal aﬀairs. Westphalian states began to
settle their disputes through formal diplomatic relations rather than through warfare, which
ushered in an era of comparative peace, certainty and territorial stability.
28 An analogy used
to describe the interactions of such states was that they were like balls on a billiard table:
autonomous, atomic and impermeable.
29
But the world has changed since 1648. In the post-globalisation era, the world is returning
to a pre-Westphalian state in which multiple overlapping spheres of legal authority co-exist.
No longer is the authority in question that of kings, knights, guilds, cities, and the Pope, but
that of states, multinational corporations, international organisations and transnational civil
society groups. Hall and Biersteker write:
We ﬁnd it telling that at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century there are so many examples
of sites or locations of authority that are neither states, state-based, nor state-created. The state
is no longer the sole, or in some instances even the principal, source of authority, in either the
domestic arena or in the international system.
30
24. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Econ-
omy (2003), 21. Strictly, an actor is lesser than a subject, the distinction being that a subject bears rights and
duties under international law. The word “agent” is also sometimes seen in the international relations literature,
confusingly for lawyers, but its use will be avoided here.
25. Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 43.
26. Aschendorﬀ/M¨ unster, The Westphalian Treaties from October 24th, 1648 (2006)
27. Or more correctly the Peace of Westphalia, marked by the Treaties of M¨ unster and Osnabr¨ uck.
28. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Econ-
omy (2003), 244–245
29. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States (1995), 5
30. Hall, Rodney B & Biersteker, Thomas J, The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System
(2002), 5
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This condition, aptly dubbed “new medievalism,” will be discussed further at Section 3.2.4.
But suﬃce it for now to say that reﬂecting the new reality of globalisation and the accordant
diﬀusion of legal authority, there is growing pressure on intergovernmental bodies such as
the United Nations to open up their processes to broader public participation;
31a trend the
United Nations has itself acknowledged.
32
The Tunis Agenda therefore clearly identiﬁes three groups of stakeholders who are to par-
ticipate in Internet governance: governments, the private sector (which it also refers to as
“business entities”), and civil society.
33 In the remainder of this section, the three stakeholder
groups identiﬁed in the Tunis Agenda will be outlined in relation to their roles the develop-
ment of international law.
3.2.1. Governments
Governments of states participate in international law by concluding bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements, and through their involvement in intergovernmental organisations that are
typically formed by such agreements.
34
Such intergovernmental organisations may be categorised by their geographical reach, their
manifest purposes and their membership base. The geographical reach of an organisation
may be global as in the case of the United Nations, or regional as in the case of APEC. Its
manifest purposes may be general or speciﬁc, as in the case of the OECD in the ﬁrst instance
and the WTO in the second—and if speciﬁc, may be political, economic or socio-cultural. Its
membership base may be governmental (as in the case of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) or hybrid (as in the case of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which
contains both governmental and non-governmental members), and in either instance may be
open to all states, or only to a subset, as in the case of the G8.
35
In this section, four intergovernmental organisations will be described in turn; beginning
with the United Nations which is global in reach, general in purpose and governmental in
membership, followed by three organisations that diﬀer on one or more of these variables: the
31. See generally Held, David & McGrew, Anthony, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the
Globalization Debate (2000).
32. Annan, Koﬁ, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All (2005), 41
33. Arguably, it also identiﬁes intergovernmental organisations and international organisations such as ICANN as
separate stakeholder groups. These are not accepted as such here, as will be explained at Section 5.1.2.2.
34. But not always, as in the case of ICANN’s GAC. Intergovernmental organisations may also be recognised by
treaty following their formation: Detter, Ingrid, The International Legal Order (1994), 91.
35. Muldoon Jr, James P, The Architecture of Global Governance: An Introduction to the Study of International
Organizations (2004), 100–101
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WTO which is speciﬁc in purpose, the ILO which is of hybrid composition, and the European
Union which is regional in reach.
3.2.1.1. The United Nations
The United Nations (UN) was established following the Second World War in 1945 as an
association of 51 states, succeeding the League of Nations which had been established following
the First World War in 1919. As at 2008 the United Nations is headquartered in New York
City with 191 states as members.
The UN is notable amongst intergovernmental organisations not simply because of its size,
but also because of its supranationality; that is, it occupies a realm of international gov-
ernment and international law that prevails over the sovereign authority of the domestic
governments and law of their member states.
An example of this is that its member states are required to submit to decisions of its Security
Council relating to international peace and security, which (in theory) limits the circumstances
in which they may unilaterally employ the use of military force.
36 Even within a member state,
its billiard ball shell may be permeated by the United Nations in the case that the state is
abusing its citizens’ human rights.
37
The United Nations is composed of ﬁve active principal organs; the General Assembly, the
Security Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Secretariat and the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC).
38 To use the simplest of analogies to the domestic equivalents
of each organ, the General Assembly can be understood as the parliamentary body of the
United Nations, the Security Council as its militia, the ICJ as its judiciary, the Secretariat as
its public service, and the Economic and Social Council as a peak body of executive ministries.
Taking ﬁrst the General Assembly, this is a body composed of 191 delegates, one from each
member state, whose votes are weighted equally. The General Assembly’s power does not have
a“hard legal”character, as it is empowered only to make non-binding recommendations.
39 One
of its few substantive powers is to resolve a deadlock of the Security Council in circumstances
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of international
36. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1945 ATS No 1 (entry into force for Australia 1 November
1945), articles 24, 25, 33.
37. McCorquodale, Robert, Human Rights and Self-Determination (1996)
38. The Trusteeship Council, which is no longer active, is excluded from this list.
39. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1945 ATS No 1 (entry into force for Australia 1 November
1945), articles 10–13
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aggression.
40 The General Assembly has a number of subsidiary bodies, including the newly-
formed United Nations Human Rights Council.
The Security Council is the only organ of the United Nations with the power to make decisions
that are binding on UN members pursuant to the UN Charter. It is empowered to institute
action ranging from the imposition of economic sanctions to the use of armed force in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
41 The Security Council also has various
standing and ad-hoc subsidiary bodies.
The Security Council’s composition is the same today as it was following the second World
War, when the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Russia and China were appointed
permanent members (Germany and Japan being omitted for obvious reasons). There are
ten other seats on the Council, divided into ﬁve regional blocs to which members from the
applicable region are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. However in order
for the Council to pass any resolution, the unanimous approval of the permanent members is
required, with the result that it is very easy for the Council to become deadlocked.
The International Court of Justice exists to settle disputes between UN members—that is,
states. It is also empowered to render Advisory Opinions, but only on the request of Unit-
ed Nations bodies.
42 Fifteen judges are elected by the General Assembly and the Security
Council to the ICJ for nine year terms. The main limitation on the eﬀectiveness of the ICJ is
that it requires the consent of each party before it can exercise jurisdiction.
43 Neither does its
power to render advisory opinions function as a form of compulsory judicial review of the acts
of other organs of the United Nations. Whilst a party is not bound to consent to the ICJ’s
jurisdiction, once it has done so, the ICJ’s ruling may be enforced by the Security Council.
44
The Secretariat of the United Nations comprises the staﬀ of seventeen departments and
oﬃces who facilitate the operations of its other organs, headed by a Secretary-General who
is appointed to a ﬁve year term by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the
Security Council.
Finally, the Economic and Social Council oversees and coordinates the numerous United
Nations commissions, programmes and agencies that exist to promote international economic
40. General Assembly of the United Nations, Uniting for Peace (1950)
41. Articles 39–42
42. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1945 ATS No 1 (entry into force for Australia 1 November
1945), article 65 para 1
43. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 Jun 1945, 1975 ATS No 50 (entry into force for Australia 1
Nov 1945), article 36.
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 Jun 1945, 1975 ATS No 50 (entry into force for Australia 1
Nov 1945), article 94
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and social cooperation and development. The Council’s 54 members are elected by the General
Assembly from amongst the UN membership to take three-year terms.
Under the Council’s oversight are eight active functional commissions, ﬁve regional commis-
sions, ten main programmes and funds, ﬁve research and training institutes, and a small
number of other programmes, oﬃces and fora.
There are also seventeen specialised agencies under the Council’s oversight, which were either
established by treaty, or have formed the subject of subsequent treaties between UN members.
These may be categorised into technical agencies, and economic organisations. The techni-
cal agencies include the ITU, the UPU,
45 the ILO,
46 the ICAO, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO),
47 WIPO and UNESCO.
The economic organisations are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the World Bank)
48 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
49 both of which were formed
following a conference in 1944 at Bretton Woods, at which it was also intended to form an
International Trade Organisation. Whilst the last of these did not then eventuate, the GATT
(General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade) that was formed in 1948, both as an agreement
and as a loose organisation sharing its name, became the predecessor of the WTO.
3.2.1.2. World Trade Organization
The WTO succeeded the GATT in January 1995, following the Uruguay Round of negotiations
conducted between 1986 and 1994.
50 Its scope was much broader than that of its predecessor
(with services and intellectual property coming within its remit for the ﬁrst time), and its
powers of enforcement were considerably strengthened.
As at 2008 the WTO has 151 members and is headquartered in Geneva, where the most
powerful countries have permanent delegations. It is not a body of the United Nations, but
operates parallel to it, having the principal responsibility of administrating all multilater-
al trade agreements and arbitrating disputes that arise under them.
Broadly, the six most fundamental WTO agreements are those establishing the WTO, dealing
with trade in goods (GATT), trade in services (GATS), intellectual property (TRIPS), dispute
45. See http://www.upu.int/.
46. See http://www.ilo.org/.
47. See http://www.imo.org/.
48. See http://www.worldbank.org/.
49. See http://www.imf.org/.
50. The principal reference for this section is WTO, Understanding the WTO (2005).
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settlement (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes),
and review of national trade policies (Trade Policies Review Mechanism).
The WTO meets continuously, but the Ministers of member countries also meet at least once
every two years at a Ministerial Conference which is the WTO’s peak authority. In between
Ministerial Conferences the General Council, also sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body and
the Trade Policy Review Body amongst others, consists of all members represented by their
permanent delegations if available.
One of the main functions of the WTO that sets it apart from other intergovernmental
organisations is that it provides a mechanism for member states to challenge the laws of
other states on the grounds that they function as a barrier to trade. For example, Antigua and
Barbuda recently successfully challenged the US prohibition on interstate gambling over the
Internet.
51
Another characteristic of the WTO that sets it apart from other intergovernmental organ-
isations is that its decisions are made by consensus, rather than by weighted voting as at
the IMF and the World Bank, or by means of a steering committee as in the case of the
European Union (where the European Commission fulﬁls that role). In practice, little or
no eﬀort is made to achieve a grass roots consensus on signiﬁcant agreements or decisions
within the membership at large. Instead, the most powerful countries, particularly the so-
called “Quad”—the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada—broker their
own agreements and“sell”these to the rest of the membership. This occurs through a process
of informal meetings at which decisions are concluded before being presented to the WTO at
large.
Although the WTO itself states that “informal consultations within the WTO play a vital
role in bringing a vastly diverse membership round to an agreement,”
52 the lack of inclu-
siveness and transparency associated with the closed-door informal meetings has engendered
much criticism from less powerful WTO members, some of whom have made their own al-
liances through which to oppose the quad.
53
In the face of both public
54 and scholarly
55 pressure, the WTO has embarked upon pro-
51. Lynn, Jonathan, Antigua Wins Modest Sanctions in US Gambling Case (2007)
52. WTO, Understanding the WTO (2005), 104
53. These alliances include the so-called Like Minded Group (LMG) of developing nations, ASEAN (the As-
sociation of South East Asian Nations), and the Cairns group, an organisation of seventeen nations, including
Australia, arguing for agricultural trade liberalisation: Kwa, Aileen, Cancun Preparatory Process: “Opaque, Ex-
clusive and Rule-less” (2003).
54. Shiva, Vandana, Doha: Saving WTO, Killing Democracy (2001)
55. Keohane and Nye have argued that what the WTO lacks is political leadership to intermediate between itself
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grammes to increase its transparency and accountability, although these have been of limited
scope. The WTO’s inaugural public symposium held in July 2001 included a session address-
ing the relationship between the WTO and civil society, and in May 2002 the General Council
increased the availability of WTO working documents on its Web site. However it has been
implacable in its opposition to the involvement of non-members in the decision-making pro-
cesses. Article V of the agreement establishing the WTO
56 provides:
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with
non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.
A framework within which such consultation and cooperation could take place was adopted by
the General Council in July 1996,
57 but it contained little other than a unilateral commitment
to publish derestricted documents on the Internet, an acknowledgment that discussions with
NGOs may take place by informal means, and a recitation of the supposedly “broadly held
view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or
its meetings.”
Commencing in Singapore in 1996, qualifying NGOs could become accredited to attend Min-
isterial Conferences, but they were not permitted to speak at them, nor even to circulate
documents, until 1998 when the WTO began to circulate a monthly list of civil society po-
sition papers to its members, and to accept amicus curiae briefs from NGOs to its Dispute
Settlement Body on broader issues engaged by disputes, such as environmental or human
rights concerns. In 2001 the General Council agreed to increase its brieﬁngs to civil society,
and to hear presentations from selected NGOs. However despite these limited reforms, it may
still be said that the WTO’s consultations with civil society have been less of a dialogue than
a monologue.
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Ironically, prior to the establishment of the IGF, the WTO was put forward as a possible
model for international public policy governance of the Internet.
59 Yet recalling the manner in
which IANA presented its private blueprint for ICANN in response to the US Government’s
White Paper as a fait accompli in the guise of consensus, perhaps the suggestion is not so
far fetched. Perhaps consensus is simply too unwieldy an instrument for the governance of a
and its constituencies: Keohane, Robert O & Nye, Joseph S, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy (2000).
56. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 Apr 2004, 1995 ATS No 8 (entry into
force 1 Jan 1995) (WTO Agreement)
57. WTO, Guidelines for arrangements on relations with Non-Governmental Organizations (1996)
58. Woods, Ngaire & Narlikar, Amrita, Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and
the World Bank (2001), 580
59. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 184
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large intergovernmental or multi-stakeholder organisation. This is a charge to be investigated
further in Chapter 4.
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3.2.1.3. International Labour Organization
The ILO is as exceptional an intergovernmental organisation as the WTO, but in quite dif-
ferent respects. Formed in 1919 as an agency of the League of Nations, and becoming the
ﬁrst specialised agency of the United Nations upon its formation in 1946, the ILO was struc-
tured from the outset to include private sector and civil society representatives as full voting
members.
61
Article 2 of the Constitution of the ILO
62 establishes its three constituent bodies: the General
Conference, the Governing Body and the International Labour Oﬃce.
The General Conference of the ILO, better known as the International Labour Conference,
meets annually in Geneva. Each state delegate may (and most do) appoint a representative
from the country’s peak employers’ and workers’ bodies to attend with them. In Australia’s
case, these are representatives from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(ACCI)
63 and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU).
64 The employer and worker
representatives are permitted to speak and vote independently of each other and of their
governments. The Conference elects a President and three Vice Presidents, the latter including
representatives of governments, employers and workers.
The fundamental purpose of the Conference is to approve by a two-thirds majority Con-
ventions and Recommendations on labour standards and other employment related issues.
ILO Conventions, once signed and ratiﬁed, become binding international agreements, whereas
its Recommendations are “soft law” for the guidance of member states, often supplementing
the subject matter of a Convention. The Conference also adopts the ILO’s biennial work
programme and budget which are prepared by the Executive Council of the Governing Body.
The Governing Body (also known as the Executive Council) manages the ILO’s work pro-
gramme between each Conference. It meets three times per year in Geneva and is composed of
28 government members and 14 members each from the worker and employer groups, all sit-
ting for a three year term.
65 Ten of the government seats are reserved for the major industrial
60. See Section 4.4.4.
61. See generally ILO, The ILO: What it is. What it Does (2004).
62. Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization of 28 June 1919,
as amended, 9 Oct 1946, 1948 ATS No 8 (entry into force 20 Apr 1948) (ILO Constitution)
63. See http://www.acci.asn.au/.
64. See http://www.actu.asn.au/.
65. ILO Constitution, Article 7
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powers, and the remainder are elected by the other government delegates of the Conference.
The employers and workers each elect their own representatives.
Apart from its tripartite structure, another distinguishing feature of the ILO is the extent to
which it supervises the implementation of its Conventions and Recommendations by mem-
ber states. Each member state is required to present a periodic report on this topic, which
must also be submitted to its worker and employer representatives who may present their
own reports in response. A Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, comprised of 28 independent experts in labour law and policy, receives
the reports and compiles an annual report of its own to the tripartite Conference Committee
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.
An additional check on states’ compliance with Conventions is the facility for employer and
worker organizations to initiate“representations”against a member state alleging that it has
failed to comply with a Convention that it has ratiﬁed. Representations are examined by
a tripartite body that submits its ﬁndings to the Governing Body. States too can submit
complaints alleging that another state has failed to comply with a convention they both have
ratiﬁed.
Article 12 of its Constitution authorises the ILO to make whatever arrangements it thinks
ﬁt to consult with other intergovernmental organisations and with civil society. Pursuant to
this Article, in May 2005 the Governing Body agreed upon a policy permitting qualifying
NGOs to attend Conferences provided that their request to do so was received at least one
month in advance of the opening session of the Governing Body preceding the opening of the
Conference.
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3.2.1.4. The European Union
The complex structure of the European Union (EU) is quite diﬀerent from that of the United
Nations, or that of any other intergovernmental body. Whilst the earliest predecessor of the
EU, the Council of Europe established in 1949,
67 was more traditionally intergovernmental
in character, the uniﬁed face of Europe became increasingly supranational with the estab-
lishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. The ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Com-
66. ILO, Representation of International Non-Governmental Organizations at the International Labour Confer-
ence and Other ILO Meetings (2005)
67. It still exists, though now mainly as a human rights watchdog; see http://www.coe.int/.
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munity (or Euratom) merged with the EEC in 1965.
68 Following the Treaty of Maastricht of
1993,
69 the EEC—or now the EC; the European Community—forms the ﬁrst pillar of today’s
European Union.
The EU exhibits supranational features to an even greater extent than the UN, in that
EU law is capable of overriding the domestic law of its members. For example, the legal
sovereignty of the EU is exclusive in areas such as trade, agriculture and customs, as it might
be in a federation of states such as the Commonwealth of Australia. The European Court of
Justice may also rule against a member state, and to impose sanctions, for its breach of a
European Commission Directive. On the other hand sovereignty is shared with its member
states in such areas as consumer and environmental protection, and is excluded altogether
in favour of its members’ sovereignty in areas such as domestic law enforcement and housing
policy.
The EU is composed of ﬁve main organs: the European Parliament, the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, the European Commission, the European Council and the European Court of
Justice.
The European Parliament is analogous to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the
main diﬀerences being that that it has proportionately more representatives from the more
populous countries, and that since 1979 they have been directly elected by their constituents.
Since the passage of the most recent governing treaty of the EU, the Treaty of Nice in 1999,
70
the total number of MPs has been capped at 732. These Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) hold oﬃce for ﬁve years, and elect a President who serves for half that term. Much of
the Parliament’s day to day work is performed within its 20 standing committees organised
along functional lines.
The power of the European Parliament has been progressively enlarged from its initial status
as a merely consultative body. This began in 1986 with the passage of the Single European
Act,
71 and continued in the Treaty of Maastricht when it was ﬁrst given“co-decision”powers,
which were expanded to additional policy areas in the Treaties of Amsterdam
72 and Nice.
Co-decision is a process by which the European Parliament must reach agreement with the
Council of the European Union on the text of any EU law proposed by the European Com-
68. See Urwin, Derek W, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945 (1995).
69. Treaty on European Union, 7 Feb 1992, 1992 O J (C 191), 31 ILM 253
70. Treaty of Nice amending the TEU, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, 26 Feb 2001, 2001 OJ (C 80) 1
71. Single European Act, 17 Feb 1986, 1987 O.J (L 169) 1, 25 ILM 506
72. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Com-
munities and related acts, 2 Oct 1997, 1997 OJ (C 340) 1, 37 ILM 56
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mission (which in simple terms is known as a directive if it requires domestic implementing
legislation, and a regulation if it does not).
The Council of the European Union is constituted by one serving minister from each of the
member states, drawn from their national parliaments. Diﬀerent ministers may however serve
on the Council as it deals with diﬀerent issues. The Council is the main decision-making body
of the EU, responsible for passing laws put forward by the European Commission, subject
to the oversight of the European Parliament through the co-decision procedure. Councillors
are assisted by a Secretariat on administrative matters, and by a Committee of Permanent
Representatives—somewhat like the civil service of a domestic ministry—on policy matters.
The Presidency of the Council rotates on a six-monthly basis.
Originally decisions of the Council were required to be made by consensus, but “qualiﬁed
majority” voting was introduced on certain issues with the Single Europe Act, and subse-
quently extended to additional issues with the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Nice.
The eﬀect of the latter treaty was also to introduce new weighting of members’ votes and to
impose a triple-majority requirement: that the majority of weighted votes be in favour, along
with a majority of states voting in favour, and that these represent at least 62% of the EU’s
population. This stipulation has proved diﬃcult to satisfy in practice.
The European Commission is composed of up to 27 members who serve for terms of ﬁve
years. Pursuant to the Treaty of Nice, one Commissioner is appointed by each member state
subject to approval by the European Parliament, provided that if there are more than 27
states (which from January 2007 there are), the member state omitted from representation
on the Commission rotates. Commissioners do not sit as representatives of their appointing
states, but as independent oﬃcials of the EU.
The four main roles of the Commission are to propose new policies to form the agenda of
the Council of the EU in consultation with member states, to monitor the application of the
EU treaties by its members and other EU institutions, to oversee the implementation of EU
policies by member states, and to represent the EU in other fora such as the WTO. The
Commission is supported in these activities by approximately 35 Directorates General and
Services (divided further into directorates and departments) which oﬀer policy, administrative
and logistical support.
There is also a European Council (distinct from the Council of the European Union, and
from the Council of Europe) which is constituted by the heads of the member states, and the
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President of the European Commission. The role of the European Council was ﬁrst formalised
in the Single Europe Act, which accorded it the role of peak oversight of the EU as a whole.
However the character of this role is one of guidance and persuasion rather than formal legal
authority.
Finally the European Court of Justice is akin to the International Court of Justice, save that
it not only adjudicates upon disputes between states, but also between states and EU insti-
tutions and even between citizens of EU states and EU institutions. Domestic courts can also
refer questions of EU law to the European Court of Justice for decision. Its power extends to
the ability to declare domestic legislation unconstitutional for inconsistency with EU law.
Apart from the ﬁve main organs of the EU referred to above, there are also a number of
supporting organisations under the EU umbrella, including the European Ombudsman,
73
and two advisory bodies; the Economic and Social Committee (EESC) which represents the
interests of civil society to the organs of the EU,
74 and the Committee of the Regions (CoR)
which does the same for sub-national governments.
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3.2.2. The private sector
The economic and political inﬂuence of the private sector in international relations, partic-
ularly that of multinational (or transnational) corporations (MNCs), exceeds that of many
states. It is, after all, often noted that the sales revenue of the largest MNCs exceeds the GDP
of mid-sized nations.
76 The private sector has accordingly begun slowly to win new rights of
direct access to intergovernmental fora,
77 most relevantly including WSIS.
78
The formal reception of input from private sector representatives into intergovernmental pro-
cesses mirrors a process that is known in a domestic political context as corporatism (or
neo-corporatism), deﬁned as
a system that gives a variety of functional interest groups—most predominantly business organi-
zations and trade unions—direct representation in the political system, defusing conﬂict among
them and creating instead broad consensus on policies.
79
73. See http://ombudsman.europa.eu/.
74. See http://eesc.europa.eu/.
75. See http://cor.europa.eu/.
76. Cavanagh, John & Anderson, Sarah, Top 200. The Rise of Corporate Global Power (2000); though the
comparison is imperfect, as GDP and corporate sales are not directly commensurable.
77. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Econ-
omy (2003), 198–199
78. See Section 5.1.
79. Ottaway, M, Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organization Net-
works, and Transnational Business (2001), 277.
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The ILO is perhaps the archetypal example of modern corporatism.
80
But the private sector also, of course, exercises considerable inﬂuence on government policy
development outside of its formal representation in governmental or intergovernmental fora.
On a domestic level, this may be done either directly, through lobbying and campaign dona-
tions
81 (or their illegitimate counterparts, political cronyism and bribery), or through more
indirect means such as regulatory capture, whereby the behaviour of a regulatory authority is
unduly inﬂuenced by the interests of the regulated industry,
82 and perhaps most signiﬁcantly
of all through control of the mass media.
83
Another indirect means by which MNCs can inﬂuence the development of domestic law is
simply in their choice of jurisdictions from which to operate, which may be based on where
tax and labour conditions are most favourable.
84 The economic repercussions of MNCs’ choices
in this regard exert an inﬂuence on the domestic law of nations vying for foreign investment
in what is often described as a “race to the bottom,”
85 and which has been blamed for the
dismantling of the domestic social safety nets of welfare states.
86
On an intergovernmental level, some of the same eﬀects are observed. For example, MNCs
were instrumental in the passage of the WTO’s TRIPS agreement. The most active MNC in
this endeavour was pharmaceutical MNC Pﬁzer, which engaged in a broad range of strategies
to secure the acceptance of TRIPS, including lobbying, donations, sponsorship of think tanks,
and the appointment of its CEO to chair a US government Advisory Committee on Trade
Negotiation.
87
A more broadly-based organisation representing private sector interests in international pub-
lic policy development is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), headquartered in
Paris.
88 The ICC has acted as a representative for the private sector to most United Nations
organs, and to other intergovernmental bodies such as WIPO, the WTO (with whom its on-
going relationship is governed by an MOU), the OECD and the ITU (including most notably
by chairing the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors at WSIS).
80. See Section 3.2.1.3, and compare consociationalism at Section 4.4.1.1.
81. Ota, Alan K, Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars (1998)
82. As allegedly in the case of Australia’s Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB): Walker, R G, Australia’s
ASRB: A Case Study of Political Activity and Regulatory “Capture” (1987).
83. Herman, Edwards S & Chomsky, Noam, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media
(1994)
84. Strange, Susan, Territory, State, Authority and Economy: A New Realist Political Ontology of Global Political
Economy (1997)
85. Kahler, Miles, Modeling Races to the Bottom (1998)
86. Mishra, Ramesh, Globalisation and the Welfare State (1999)
87. Drahos, Peter & Braithwaite, John, Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?: Political Organising Behind TRIPS
(2004), 8–9, 11; Sell, Susan K, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (2003)
88. See http://www.iccwbo.org/.
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The ICC’s work programme is divided between a number of specialised Commissions (cur-
rently 16) which formulate its policy and draft papers for submission to governments and
intergovernmental organisations. Commissions in turn may contain a number of task forces;
for example within the E-Business, IT and Telecoms (EBITT) Commission is the Task Force
on Internet and IT Services, which specialises in Internet governance issues.
EBITT is also the policy development foundation for the work of BASIS, or Business Action
to Support the Information Society; an initative of the ICC that emerged from WSIS as an
umbrella for its post-WSIS programmes.
89 It is oﬃcially through BASIS that the ICC partic-
ipates in the UN fora and activities that have emerged from WSIS, such as the IGF.
3.2.2.1. The new law merchant
The private sector’s involvement in international public policy governance as described above
is, by its nature, secondary to the primary lawmaking role of governments and intergovern-
mental organisations, since it is they who control the fora in which negotiations and drafting
take place. But the contribution of the private sector to international public policy governance
can also be understood as a primary lawmaking role, in which the tables are turned and the
private sector exercises principal authority, with states receding into the background.
This is not as revolutionary a notion as it might sound. In medieval times, the“law merchant”
or lex mercatoria was a system of law developed and enforced by merchants themselves, which
enjoyed primacy over domestic law in the regions (mostly along trade routes) where it was
applied.
90 The medieval law merchant did not derive its force from the consent of sovereign
states, but operated independently and alongside the domestic law of the region. As Cutler
explains,
[t]his gave rise to a dualistic system of commercial governance: the regulation of local transaction
under the local systems of law and the regulation of wholesale and long-distance transactions
under the autonomous law merchant system.
91
This is not to say that domestic law of a particular region was suspended where the law
merchant had eﬀect. Rather, the authority of each legal system overlapped, and it is this
characteristic of private lawmaking that is found also in its modern analogues. Jensen writes:
States and individuals may be members of diﬀerent communities for diﬀerent purposes. Just as
we might understand the nation-state as an association between people who share a common
89. See http://www.iccwbo.org/basis/.
90. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Econ-
omy (2003), 108–140
91. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Econ-
omy (2003), 109
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language and cultural identity for the purposes of their mutual security and well-being, we might
understand the various forms of transnational interaction (which include, but are not limited
to, commerce and intellectual exchanges between citizens of diﬀerent nation-states) as providing
the germ for the emergence of numerous communities extending across state boundaries. Each
of these communities would possess its own norms of conduct, expressed as either formal rules
in treaties and commercial contracts or simply unexpressed mutual understandings. Such norms
would enjoy legitimacy because their observance facilitates orderly interaction between members
of the community and because they represent the opinion of the many rather than the rationally
constructed will of the few.
92
Thus there are today specialised transnational business communities that create and enforce
their own transnational norms and rules, much as the merchants of medieval times did. Indeed
these have been described as the “new law merchant.”
93
As will be noted at Section 3.3.1, there are degrees of “legalisation” of international law. So
too, there are degrees of legalisation within the new law merchant, ranging from the law-like
rules of stock markets and ﬁnancial networks such as Visa, to softer, more innately private
orderings such as the rules of self-regulating professional communities.
94
There are also degrees of institutionalisation within the new law merchant, ranging from
informal industry norms and practices that are not institutionalised at all, through to private
international regimes which provide“an integrated complex of formal and informal institutions
that is a source of governance for an economic issue area as a whole,”
95 as in the case of
international commercial arbitration.
This last case provides perhaps the clearest example of the private sector’s development
of its own quasi-legal rules, as international commercial arbitration is now the dominant
method for the resolution of transnational commercial disputes.
96 The market leading arbi-
tration provider is none other than the International Chamber of Commerce, though it has
numerous competitors.
Although each arbitration provider applies its own sets of substantive and procedural rules
in resolving disputes, they almost universally incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration
97 or a derivative of this, along with substantive law
92. Jensen, Darryn M, The Transformation of International Law (2004), 42
93. But also as transnational commercial law, transnational economic law, the law of private international trade,
and international business law: Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law
in the Global Political Economy (2003), 1.
94. Cooter, Robert D, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralised Law (1994),
216
95. Cutler, A C, Hauﬂer, Virginia, & Porter, Tony, Private Authority and International Aﬀairs (1999), 13
96. Dezalay, Yves & Garth, Bryant, Merchants of Law as Moral Entreprenuers: Constructing International
Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes (1995)
97. UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules (1985)
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drawn from international and domestic sources, and unwritten commercial norms.
98
Whilst the use of international commercial arbitration is normally restricted to business-to-
business (B2B) transactions, there are analogous private fora for the resolution of consumer
disputes, such as the credit card chargeback system that operates as a private dispute reso-
lution mechanism between consumers and merchants,
99 eBay’s Dispute Console for disputes
relating to its online auction service,
100 and numerous generic third party mediation and
arbitration services such as SquareTrade
101 and Cybersettle.
102
To be sure, there are diﬀerences between the new law merchant and the old. One is that
the success of the medieval law merchant in prevailing over domestic law owed more to the
feudal nature of society in those times than to the power of medieval capital, whereas the
position is now reversed. Another important diﬀerence is that the eﬀects of the new law
merchant now extend in many cases far beyond the boundaries of the communities that
developed them and thus take on a character closer to that of public international law. An
example is the role of credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor, which
assess not only their members’ credit, nor only that of private sector entities, but of entire
national economies, with consequences often comparable to those of trade sanctions imposed
by an intergovernmental authority such as the WTO.
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Is the new law merchant, however, accurately described as law? It is easy enough to argue
that it should be law. One scholar from the school of law and economics argues that if norms
represent the consensus of the community that developed them, and if they are aligned with
the broader public good (which the author examines in terms of economic eﬃciency, but could
equally be analysed by reference to alternative paradigms), such norms should be “elevated”
to the level of law by“issuing an authoritative statement of the norm and backing it with the
state’s coercive power.”
104
Whether such norms can be described as already amounting to law is more contentious.
Some have argued that the new law merchant amounts to customary international law,
105 but
98. Drahozal, Christopher R, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration
(2000)
99. Perritt Jr, Henry H, The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal System (2000), 945
100. See http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/using-dispute-console.html.
101. See http://www.squaretrade.com/.
102. See http://www.cybersettle.com/.
103. Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization (1996), 16;Sinclair, Timothy J,
Passing Judgment: Credit Rating Processes as Regulatory Mechanisms of Governance in the Emerging World
Order (1994)
104. Cooter, Robert D, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralised Law (1994),
226
105. Goldman, Berthold, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law—The Lex Mercatoria (1986)
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empirical evidence to support this is lacking.
106 On a narrow view, that may be enough for the
question to be answered in the negative: that the new law merchant is not international law.
But the consequences of that conclusion are as profound as the converse would be. It means
that entire private international regimes, by which some of the most signiﬁcant institutions
in our economic and social lives are governed, are entirely invisible to international law.
107
This is surely not a conclusion that should be reached lightly or through the application of
overly formalistic criteria. The question will therefore be revisited at Section 3.3.3.1.
3.2.3. Civil society
Civil society and the private sector are the two classes of non-state actor recognised by the
United Nations as stakeholders in Internet governance. As such, there is much in common
between them, and much that has been written in the previous section is applicable to civil
society also.
However the sense in which the phrase “civil society” is generally used in relation to the
international system diﬀers somewhat from its usage elsewhere. First, it refers to organised
civil society, rather than to civil society at large. It is possible that civil society at large may
in some circumstances qualify as an international actor in its own right; for example, in 1992
the UN Security Council authorised action on behalf of civilian populations of Somalia.
108
Also, the IGF allows for the participation of individual actors from civil society, who need
have no particular institutional aﬃliation other than with the IGF itself. However these are
exceptions to the usual rule that the participation of civil society in the international system
occurs only through organised groups.
Second, “civil society” ordinarily refers to global (or transnational
109) civil society, rather
than domestic civil society. Hence it is the more precise meaning of organised, global civil
society that will be referred to when the term “civil society” is used here, and NGO will be
used where appropriate as the singular form.
110
Once understood as NGOs, the characteristics of civil society participants in the development
of international law may be further narrowed by the following factors:
106. Zamora, Stephen, Is There Customary International Economic Law? (1989)
107. Johns, Fleur, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal
Theory (1994); Cutler, A C, Private International Regimes and Interﬁrm Cooperation (2002) , 33
108. Security Council of the United Nations, Resolution 794 (1992)
109. Held, David, Law of States, Law of Peoples (2002), 44—“transnational” is often used in contrast to “inter-
national” respectively to diﬀerentiate the actions of non-state actors across borders from those of states.
110. See Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 188
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￿ Being formal organisations intended for indeﬁnite life, not being ad hoc.
￿ Being, or aspiring to being, self-governing with their own constitutions.
￿ They are private, neither deriving their power from states nor having authority over them.
￿ They are non-proﬁt.
￿ They are transnational in their orientation and/or operations.
111
Some would add an additional criterion to the list given above: that they act politically. Civil
society traditionally represented the group of citizens who upheld the rule of law of a state,
and from amongst whom new regulatory authorities and arrangements might emerge.
112 This
constriction would exclude for example cultural or sporting organisations. It is diﬃcult to
understand why the deﬁnition needs to be so restricted, as it has not been suggested that the
involvement of the private sector in the international system should be similarly conditioned.
Moreover, it could be said that any NGO that seeks a voice in the international system will
be acting politically by deﬁnition.
It has also been suggested that NGOs with a positively illiberal programme, such as Hizb ut-
Tahrir
113 that have been linked to international terrorism, should be excluded by limiting the
deﬁnition of civil society to those groups that provide a “civilizing process”
114 and excluding
“uncivil society.”
115 This particular question is a thorny one that raises questions about how
cultural diﬀerences should be treated in international law, and will be revisited at Section
3.4.3.3.
3.2.3.1. Civil society’s inﬂuence on international law
Much like the private sector, civil society has been active in inﬂuencing the development of
international law since the 18th century, particularly in areas such as the abolition of slavery,
the pursuit of peace, worker solidarity and free trade.
116 Civil society was even central to
the development of the international law of intellectual property, with the Berne Convention
having been drafted by governments based upon the proposals of the International Literary
and Artistic Association, a civil society organisation headed by Victor Hugo.
117
111. Gordenker, Leon & Weiss, Thomas G, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions
(1996), 20–21.
112. Lipschutz, Ronnie D & Mayer, Judith, Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance (1996)
113. See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/.
114. See eg Elias, Norbert, The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization (1982).
115. Cardoso, Fernando H, Civil Society and Global Governance (2003), 5
116. Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 191–194
117. Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 201
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Civil society remains active in inﬂuencing the shape of international law today. For exam-
ple, civil society’s participation has been central to the success of climate change negotia-
tions,
118 the prohibition of commercial whaling,
119 and the establishment of the International
Criminal Court.
120 The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty,
121 now signed by over 150 states, was also
largely the product of civil society action.
122 In working on such issues across national bound-
aries, transnational NGOs have participated in international negotiations directly rather than
through the intermediation of governments. As Charnovitz puts it, “[i]t is illogical to tell an
NGO like the ICC or the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to channel its
concerns through its own government. Such an instruction negates the purpose of the orga-
nization.”
123
Thus civil society has won permanent representation at a variety of intergovernmental or-
ganisations and conferences, including the World Bank’s Panel of Inspection hearings on
environmental issues, and to a limited degree, WSIS.
124 At the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972, there were more NGO represen-
tatives present than governments, and by 1987 in Montreal they were not merely observing
but addressing plenary sessions in their own right.
125
Perhaps the high water mark in this evolution was reached in 1992 with the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, principle 10 of which recited that “[e]nvironmental issues
are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.” Upon
this base, the Aarhus Convention was established in 1998 to set minimum standards for the
inclusion of the public in international environmental governance.
126
In 1994, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali had addressed NGOs in the following
terms:
I want you to consider this your home. Until recently, these words might have caused astonish-
ment. The United Nations was considered to be a forum for sovereign states alone. Within the
118. See Matthews, Jessica T, Power Shift (1997).
119. Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 263
120. See eg the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, at http://www.iccnow.org/.
121. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction, 18 Sep 1997, 1999 ATS No 3 (entry into force for Australia 1 Sep 1999) (Mine Ban
Treaty)
122. Cameron, Maxwell A, Global Civil Society and the Ottawa Process: Lessons From the Movement to Ban
Anti-Personnel Mines (1999)
123. Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 276
124. See Section 5.1.
125. Perritt Jr, Henry H, The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal System (2000), 899; Charnovitz,
Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997) , 262
126. UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters, 25 Jun 1998, 1998 SD No 46 (entry into force 30 Oct 2001) (Aarus Convention)
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space of a few short years, this attitude has changed. Non-governmental organizations are now
considered full participants in international life.
127
As catalogued by Charnovitz, there are no fewer than ten ways in which NGOs can partic-
ipate, and have historically participated in intergovernmental organisations.
128 These range
from the utilisation of the NGO on an advisory panel or as a delegate to an international
conference, through to allowing it full membership of the organisation. The 2004 Cardoso
report on UN–Civil Society recommended to the UN that it “should embrace an array of fo-
rums, each designed to achieve a speciﬁc outcome, with [civil society] participation determined
accordingly.”
129
Taken a step further, whilst normally civil society’s actions merely contribute to the forma-
tion of international law that must in the end be created by agreements between states,
130
there are cases in which NGOs have negotiated agreements with governments in their own
right. For example, principles of the Declaration of Panama regarding tuna ﬁshing standards
were negotiated between a group of ﬁve environmental NGOs and Mexico in 1995, before
being signed by eleven other governments.
131 Greenpeace also negotiated an agreement with
France over damages to be paid to Greenpeace for the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior.
132
Taken a step further still, civil society’s role in international public policy governance can
bypass governments altogether. For example, it was civil society, including AIDS activists
and organisations such as Doctors Without Borders/M´ edecins Sans Fronti` eres, that were
largely responsible for pharmaceutical companies agreeing to reduce the price of AIDS drugs to
Africa and other third world regions during 2000–2001.
133 This was a case in which the private
sector and civil society together achieved a public policy outcome without state intervention
at all.
Civil society’s eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing the shape of international law has only continued to
increase through the use of technologies such as the Internet,
134 which have assisted the growth
of social movements and action groups in civil society and given given them a louder voice in
policy networks,
135 by making it easier and less expensive for them to mobilise resources and
constituents.
127. United Nations Non-Government Liaison Service, NGLS Roundup, November 1996 (1996)
128. Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 281
129. Cardoso, Fernando H, Cardoso Report on Civil Society (2004), 33
130. Detter, Ingrid, The International Legal Order (1994), 177.
131. Scott, Michael, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy (1996)
132. Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997), 265
133. Kobrin, Stephen J, Economic Governance in Global Economy (2002), 65
134. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Government Networks: the Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order (2000), 200;
Perritt Jr, Henry H, The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal System (2000) , 899
135. Deibert, Ronald J, Altered Worlds: Social Forces in the Hypermedia Environment (1998), 6
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3.2.3.2. ECOSOC
Although most of the bodies and specialised agencies of the United Nations have regular
dealings with NGOs, by far the largest number of NGOs that collaborate with the United
Nations do so within the UN Economic and Social Council. Article 71 of the Charter of the
United Nations states that ECOSOC
may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which
are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with in-
ternational organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consulta-
tion with the Member of the United Nations concerned.
A framework to give eﬀect to Article 71 was ﬁrst entered into by resolution of ECOSOC in
1950, which has been amended twice by further resolutions in 1968 and 1996.
136 The 1996 res-
olution (“the resolution”) seeks to achieve“a just, balanced, eﬀective and genuine involvement
of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world.”
137
An NGO may apply for consultative status to the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs if it satisﬁes
the criteria set out in the resolution, including having been registered for at least two years,
having an established headquarters, and not having been established or primarily funded by
government.
138 The Committee, which is composed of 19 member states and meets twice
per year, may then recommend to ECOSOC that it admit a qualifying NGO to consultative
status in one of three tiers; general, special and roster.
139
NGOs in the general tier may propose items for the provisional agenda of meetings of
ECOSOC, submit written statements of up to 2000 words for circulation (if longer, a sum-
mary will be circulated), and request opportunities to make oral presentations. NGOs in the
special tier may submit statements of up to 500 words in their ﬁelds of speciality for cir-
culation, and the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs may also recommend to the Council that
they be permitted to make oral presentations in those ﬁelds. All tiers of NGOs may attend
public meetings of ECOSOC as observers, but those on the roster tier only when the meeting
concerns matters within their ﬁeld of competence.
140
136. See generally Willets, Peter, Consultative Status for NGOs at the UN (1996).
137. ECOSOC, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations
(1996), paragraph 5
138. ECOSOC, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations
(1996), paras 9–13
139. These are described in ECOSOC, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-
Governmental Organizations (1996). In 2007 there were 136 NGOs in the general tier, 1955 in the special tier
and 960 on the roster tier.
140. ECOSOC, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations
(1996), paras 28–32
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ECOSOC was careful to state in its 1996 resolution that “the arrangements for consulta-
tion should not be such as to accord to non-governmental organizations the same rights of
participation as are accorded to States,” and that “arrangements should not be such as to
overburden the Council or transform it from a body for coordination of policy and action, as
contemplated in the Charter, into a general forum for discussion.”
141
3.2.4. New medievalism
The foregoing discussion of the contributions made not only by governments, but also by
the private sector and civil society to the development of international law, are illustrative
of the fact that the preeminence of the state’s authority has receded since the zenith of the
Westphalian age, and is continuing to do so.
In fact, there are those who predict that the ongoing processes of cultural and economic
globalisation, led by advances in information technology that erode the power of states (and
equally indeed other territorially-based constructs such as national markets),
142 will lead
to the increasing irrelevance of nation states.
143 The ﬁrst signs of this can be seen in the
development by non-state actors of their own regulatory arrangements, their own law-like
standards, their own arbitration systems, and so on,
144 through supra-territorial networks of
relations beyond the state’s control.
145
Rosenau describes “a multi-centric world composed of diverse ‘sovereignty-free’ collectivities
[which] has evolved apart from and in competition with the state-centric world of ‘sovereignty-
bound’ actors,”and observes that the“authority of states is regarded as undergoing relocation
to proliferating actors in the multi-centric world—either ‘outwards’ to supranational and
transnational collectivities or ‘inwards’ to subnational actors.”
146
Some have gone so far as to portend “the end of the nation state.”
147 Hedley Bull, as long
ago as 1977, in describing what he called a“neomedieval system”of international relations in
emergence stated
141. ECOSOC, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations
(1996), paras 18 and 19
142. Guehenno, Jean-Marie, The End of the Nation-State (1993); Matthews, Jessica T, Power Shift (1997) ;
Mowshowitz, Abbe, Virtual Feudalism (1997)
143. Kobrin, Stephen J, Economic Governance in Global Economy (2002), 62; but see Section 4.3.4.2.
144. Scholte, Jan A, Global Capitalism and the State (1997)
145. See Graham, Gordon, The Internet: A Philosophical Enquiry (1999), 87.
146. Rosenau, James N, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order (1992), 282
147. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Government Networks: the Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order (2000), 199; van
Dijk, Jan, Models of Democracy and Concepts of Communication (2000) , 33.
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that the demise of the states system is taking place as a consequence of the technological uni-
ﬁcation of the world—of which the multinational corporations and the non-state groups which
conduct international violence are only particular expressions, and which is bound to lead to
the politics of “spaceship earth” or of the “global village” in which the states system is only a
part.
148
On this account, governance in the post-Westphalian world occurs through a system of net-
works between authorities with “overlapping and competing competencies”
149—international
bodies, governments, corporations, civil and political organisations and citizens, mediated by
technology.
Like the Internet itself, such a system lacks a central point at which its lines of authority
converge. The intersecting governance regimes are not naturally compatible, and there is great
variation in their degrees of institutionalisation and legalisation. They have been described
as“ungainly in the sense that they lack the hierarchical arrangements to which practitioners
of politics have long been accustomed.”
150
Ungainly the new medieval system may be, but it is clearly not anarchistic, contrary to
the dreams of Internet pioneers such as John Perry Barlow.
151 In fact a citizen of the neo-
medieval world is subjected to more law rather than less (depending on how broadly one
deﬁnes “law”; a question to be revisited at Section 3.5). It is again truly an age of legal
pluralism, as it was before the Treaties of Westphalia reduced the overlapping spheres of
medieval authority to the opaque billiard balls of state sovereignty.
The unavoidable ungainliness of the new medieval system is not its only fault. Perhaps more
importantly, it is intrinsically less transparent than the Westphalian states system, at least in
liberal states, which provide such protections as regular democratic elections, the separation
of powers, judicial review and freedom of information legislation. It may also be less repre-
sentative overall—or at least, less easily shown to be representative. Who is to say that a new
regime of Internet governance that takes shape under the authority of a network of state and
non-state actors, really represents the will of those whom it governs—or indeed the will of
anyone at all?
Whilst these questions will come to be addressed,
152 it should at least be mooted at this
point that our preference for governance by networks over the hegemony of state power may
148. Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (1977), 273.
149. Friedrichs, J¨ org, The Neomedieval Renaissance: Global Governance and International Law in the New Middle
Ages (2004), 3
150. Rosenau, James N, The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World (1992), 256
151. Jayakar, Roshni, What Stops Free Flow of Information is Dangerous (2000)
152. See Section 4.3.
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have been premature. Perhaps it is to be be hoped after all that rumours of the death of the
nation state have been greatly exaggerated.
153 After all, as we have seen it remains possible
for governance to be exercised by rules, albeit with certain limitations and diﬃculties. As
Rosenau puts it:
Because public order still needs to be maintained, because economies still need a modicum of
management, because justice still needs to be dispensed, because systemwide laws still need
to be framed and administered, because the resources necessary to carry out these tasks still
need to be generated—because there is still a need, in other words, for polities that attend to
the demands of societies—there is no reason to anticipate a diminution in the competence of
states and their international system to the point where they are irrelevant actors on the world
stage.
154
On this more moderate view, it is not so much the death of states that is heralded by the
new medieval age, but rather the fact that they will no longer be privileged over other actors
in international fora. They are neither capable of being so privileged, as the governance of
many transnational issues is literally outside their competence,
155 nor are they entitled to
be so privileged, as their legitimate authority does not extend to those who have neither
participated in nor consented to their lawmaking.
156 States are now required, not merely as
a matter of courtesy or protocol, but as a linchpin of their legitimacy and therefore their
authority, to cooperate with other international actors as equal partners.
157
3.3. Sources of international law
Less time needs to be spent discussing the sources of international law than was spent on
discussing its actors or subjects. In fact international relations theorists do not even employ
a concept of the sources of international law, distinct from the actors who constitute it.
158
International lawyers on the other hand, having traditionally decreed that states were the
only subjects of international law, accordingly determined that international treaties and
customary law to which state consent could be traced were its only sources.
159
153. Wu, Timothy S, Cyberspace Sovereignty?: The Internet And The International System (1997)
154. Rosenau, James N, The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World (1992), 256
155. See Section 3.4.2.
156. See Section 3.4.1.
157. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
22–23
158. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 77
159. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 21
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The conceptual usefulness of such a narrow view has been limited, even leaving aside most
of the implications of new medievalism, and accordingly scholars have found it necessary to
expand it. They have done this by drawing a distinction between hard law and soft law, as
brieﬂy alluded to in the Introduction.
160
As might be expected, the divide between hard law and soft law is in reality a continuum.
One group of authors has deﬁned three variables of obligation, precision, and delegation by
which the hardness or“legalisation”of international law can be measured.
161 Obligation is the
extent to which the compliance or non-compliance of states (or, as a slight gloss, international
actors) with a rule is subject to scrutiny by international and/or domestic legal institutions.
Precision is the degree to which the rule in question is capable of expression in a certain and
unambiguous form. Delegation exists where a neutral body has been authorised to implement
(for example, to interpret or enforce) the rule in question.
An example of international law which is high on every dimension is the TRIPS convention:
it is strongly obligatory, being enforceable through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Process,
it is drafted with a high degree of precision, and the determination of a state’s compliance or
otherwise with the convention has been delegated to the Dispute Settlement Body.
An example which is low on every dimension is the obligation that participants in WSIS as-
sumed when they agreed, for example, to “commit ourselves to promote the inclusion of
all peoples in the Information Society through the development and use of local and/or in-
digenous languages in ICTs.”
162 The compliance of individual states with this undertaking
is not monitored, the content of the obligation is highly imprecise, and although there is
a WSIS follow-up process, no legal consequences ﬂow from it for participants who fail to
implement the commitment.
3.3.1. Hard law
Even leaving soft law aside for now, the breadth of sources of law that traditional hard law
encompasses is in itself considerable. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice is often used as a codiﬁcation of the sources of international law. It provides:
160. See Section 1.4.1.
161. Abbot, Kenneth W, Keohane, Robert O, Moravcsik, Andrew, Slaughter, Anne-Marie, & Snidal, Duncan,
The Concept of Legalization (2000), 404–406
162. WSIS, Tunis Commitment (2005), paragraph 32
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1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognised by the contracting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualiﬁed publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et
bono,
163 if the parties agree thereto.
2. These sources will be examined in turn, save for judicial decisions and juristic writings as
these are merely subsidiary means for the determination of the content of international
law.
3.3.1.1. International conventions
International conventions range from bilateral agreements, such as extradition treaties and
the Australia–United States Fair Trade Agreement, through to multilateral agreements such
as the Geneva Conventions to which almost all countries of the world are signatories. A treaty
or convention only has the status of international law for those states that have signed and
ratiﬁed it. How this is accomplished, and the eﬀect its ratiﬁcation may have in local law, is
a domestic matter that varies from one jurisdiction to another.
In Australia, treaties and conventions may be ratiﬁed by the Federal Cabinet, without the
need for the passage of legislation or to be debated in Parliament. However since 1996, a
policy has been adopted requiring a treaty to be tabled in both houses of Parliament for
15 sitting days, for a Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties to engage in
public consultation concerning the proposed ratiﬁcation of the treaty, and a National Interest
Analysis in respect of the treaty to be prepared, before it is ratiﬁed.
164
In order to comply with its obligations under the instrument in question, it will then usually
be necessary for the government to introduce legislation into Parliament which will be debated
163. “In justice and fairness.”
164. Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Treaty Making Process (1999)
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in the usual manner. This is also necessary in order for the instrument to have any eﬀect in
Australian law, other than as a general guide for the exercise of executive discretion and
statutory interpretation.
165 This diﬀers from the position in certain other jurisdictions, such
as the United States, although there the President requires the concurrence of two-thirds of
the Senate before entering into a treaty.
166
3.3.1.2. International custom
Customary international law is found where there is both a“common, consistent and concor-
dant”
167 pattern of behaviour amongst states, without substantial dissent from other states,
168
coupled with the acknowledgment that the practice is observed because it is as a legal obli-
gation; or in law Latin, that opinio juris sive necessitatis or simply opinio juris is present.
169
Opinio juris (and indeed some evidence of state practice) can in appropriate cases be de-
termined from the declarations that a state makes in international fora,
170 from its domestic
legislative, executive and judicial institutions, and even from the existence of a treaty on the
topic that other states have ratiﬁed but that it has not.
171
Therefore in simple terms, it could be said that customary international law is law because it
is regarded as such by international actors.
172 More so than domestic law, it is thus a social
construction, since its very existence depends on the subjective beliefs of the actors who
comply with it. In that respect, the process for formation of customary international law does
not seem so very diﬀerent from the New Haven approach referred to at Section 3.1.1, according
to which international law is found wherever there is a conﬂuence of authority (that is, where
a decision is perceived to be made legitimately by those whom it purports to cover) and
control (that is, the decision does in fact inﬂuence their behaviour). In New Haven terms,
control equates to state practice and authority to something like opinio juris.
173
Much of what begins as customary law ends up being codiﬁed by treaty, as for example
in the case of the rules of war that are now found in the Geneva Conventions. However,
165. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Aﬀairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
166. Constitution of the United States of America, 17 Sep 1787, Article VI and Article II, section 2
167. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Reports 3, 50
168. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Reports 14, 98
169. Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 559–560
170. Langille, Benjamin, It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001 (2001), 151–152
171. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v
Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Reports 3, 41
172. Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 33.
173. Where New Haven scholars diverge from orthodoxy is of course in contending that non-state actors can be
involved in this process.
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new customary international law is in the process of formation all the time, and there are
circumstances in which this can take place extremely quickly.
174
To give a recent example of this, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New
York City and Washington DC, United States President George W Bush declared that in
bringing those responsible to justice, “we will make no distinction between the terrorists
who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” Subsequently dubbed the “Bush
Doctrine,”this principle has since been aﬃrmed by resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly and Security Council and begun to be acted upon by states. On one account, it
thereby became a new principle of “instant” customary international law.
175
On this basis, it is certainly possible for norms of Internet governance to become custom-
ary international law in the orthodox sense quite quickly. In such cases, suﬃcient evidence of
state practice and opinio juris may simply take the form of each aﬀected state communicating
their recognition of the practice as customary law, or by means of a resolution of a body such
as the General Assembly of the United Nations.
176
Whilst there is doubt as to whether the new law merchant can be said to have made this
transition (it is, after all, largely created and observed by non-state actors),
177 the early and
full involvement of states in the IGF (and through the GAC in ICANN) may make many of
the norms of Internet governance more promising candidates for promotion to the status of
international law.
178 This question will be reconsidered in the conclusion to this chapter.
3.3.1.3. General principles of law
Little need be said about the general principles of law that form another source of hard
international law, save that they are thought to include the principles of equity and estoppel,
which are broadly comparable to those concepts as known in common law jurisdictions, and
provide a moderating inﬂuence on the strict application of the law in cases where it is necessary
to avoid unfairness.
179
174. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 230 per Lachs J
175. Langille, Benjamin, It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001 (2001)
176. Van Bogaert, E R C, Aspects of Space Law (1986), 20
177. Zamora, Stephen, Is There Customary International Economic Law? (1989); Chinkin, C M, The Challenge
of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law (1989) , 857
178. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 172
179. White, Margaret, Equity—A General Principle of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations? (2004)
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Some would also include within this category the jus cogens—literally, compelling law—which
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention deﬁnes as “a peremptory norm of general international
law ... accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modiﬁed only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.”
180 Examples include the prohibitions
upon torture, slavery, piracy and genocide.
3.3.2. Soft law
The fora in which treaty law is developed are in general highly bureaucratised and subject
to much diplomatic formality. Often it can be slow and expensive at best, and practically
impossible at worst, to conclude treaties in such fora.
181 Once made, treaty law is also (by
design) diﬃcult to avoid when circumstances change.
182
On the other hand the degree of “legalisation” of customary international law is often lower
than desirable for purposes of certainty, and its content is more diﬃcult to control, only being
susceptible to conclusive determination by a judgment of the International Court of Justice.
Soft law can overcome many of the shortcomings of both these types of hard law.
183 The
diﬀerence between soft law and hard law is akin to the diﬀerence between guiding principles
and binding rules. Whereas hard law is consummated through diplomacy, soft law is devel-
oped through the exercise of “soft power,” which is characterised by more horizontal power
relationships in which consensus can be built, and by the exchange of information rather than
the use of threats and rewards.
184
Soft law is cheaper and easier to establish than hard law, and oﬀers greater scope for the
participation of international actors other than states.
185 The ﬂexible and adaptive nature
of soft law is also an attraction, since for the private sector voluntary codes of conduct and
private arbitration are a“softer touch”than black-letter regulation and national court systems,
180. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1974 ATS No 2 (entry into force 27 Jan 1980)
181. Negotiations towards a new protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the stalled
Dohor Development Round of WTO talks, provide two contemporary examples.
182. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 23
183. Strictly, this section describes what is tautologically described as “non-legal” soft law. “Legal” soft law can
in fact include treaties, albeit treaties that are so vaguely worded that they impose no discernible obligations
on their signatories: Ferguson, Yale H & Mansbach, Richard W, Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive
Suggestions for Future International Theory (1991), 851.
184. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks (2000)
185. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 23
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and for states soft law leaves them more room for “cheating,” and is thus less restrictive of
their sovereignty.
186
Three of the principal forms of soft law are resolutions and declarations of international
bodies, codes and model laws, and standards. These will brieﬂy be examined in turn.
3.3.2.1. Resolutions
Resolutions and declarations of intergovernmental meetings such as the General Assembly
of the UN and WSIS are by nature not binding in nature. However they are regarded as a
form of soft law, used to guide the behaviour of states both internationally and domestically.
For example, General Assembly resolutions can be used to establish state practice and opinio
juris as a precondition of the recognition of new customary international law,
187 are authori-
tative on questions within the General Assembly’s competence such as the interpretation of
the UN Charter,
188 and can be used as a guide to the interpretation of municipal law.
189
Pre-eminent in its impact amongst all declarations of the General Assembly, and perhaps
amongst all instruments of soft law of any kind, is the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, proclaimed in 1948.
190 Although not binding, the Declaration strongly inﬂuenced the
ﬁrst two major treaties on human rights that followed, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,
191 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
192
Similar resolutions and declarations are also regularly made by NGOs, such as the Internation-
al Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit International/Institute of International
Law (IIL).
193 The accession of international actors to such documents constitutes them as
forms of soft law,
194 which much like resolutions of the General Assembly, can have a similar
inﬂuence upon the later formation of opinio juris and the development of treaty law. Thus the
186. Cutler, A C, Private International Regimes and Interﬁrm Cooperation (2002), 35
187. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Reports 14
188. Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Reports 90
189. They would naturally be less persuasive than a treaty that Australia had actually ratiﬁed: Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Aﬀairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273.
190. General Assembly of the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
191. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec 1966, 1980 ATS No 23 (entry into force for
Australia (except Article 41) 23 Mar 1976)
192. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 Dec 1966, 1976 ATS No 5 (entry into
force for Australia 10 Mar 1976)
193. See http://www.idi-iil.org/, not to be confused with the International Law Institute, an unrelated Amer-
ican educational institution; see http://www.ili.org/.
194. D’Amato, Anthony & Engel, Kirsten, International Environmental Law Anthology (1996), 55–60
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United Nations’ International Law Commission has acknowledged that these private bodies
have “had a considerable eﬀect on the development of international law.”
195
3.3.2.2. Codes
A code in soft law may take a number of forms. It may simply be a draft treaty; that is, a
document that, if it were eventually signed and ratiﬁed, would become an ordinary treaty, but
in respect of which“the law has not yet been suﬃciently developed in the practice of States”
for that to occur.
196 The progressive development of international law in this manner is one
of the objects of the International Law Commission, which was established by the General
Assembly of the UN in 1947 with this as one of its two objects.
Secondly, a code may be a codiﬁcation of existing law, which was the second object with which
the International Law Commission was formed. Codiﬁcation is“the more precise formulation
and systematization of rules of international law in ﬁelds where there already has been ex-
tensive State practice, precedent and doctrine.”
197 Naturally, the signature and ratiﬁcation
of such a code by states would eﬀect its promotion to hard law and supplant the underlying
customary international rules for those states.
Third, a code may be in the form of a recommendation (or a “code of conduct,”“guideline,”
etc), which is conceptually much like a resolution, but in a more legalised form similar to that
of a treaty. A body may conclude a recommendation rather than a treaty because a treaty is
beyond its competence, as in the case of an NGO or the General Assembly of the UN,
198 or
because the subject matter of the recommendation is too far in advance of the actual practice
of states, as is commonly the case with recommendations of the ILO and WIPO. A good
example of this is WIPO’s Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection
of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet.
199
The European Commission can issue non-binding recommendations to member states, in
place of its hard law regulations or directives.
200 The EU Commission also issues other soft
195. International Law Commission, Introduction—International Law Commission (2006)
196. International Law Commission, Introduction—International Law Commission (2006)
197. International Law Commission, Introduction—International Law Commission (2006)
198. Detter, Ingrid, The International Legal Order (1994), 218–219.
199. WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in
Signs on the Internet (2001)
200. Directives are slightly softer than regulations, in that they prescribe a minimum standard that a member
state’s laws must adhere to, without dictating their form, and may contain provisions from which a state is
permitted to “opt out.”
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law instruments to its member states and other EU organs that are not explicitly provided
for in the EU treaties, including guidelines and communications.
201
Fourth, a code may be a model law; this is a somewhat stronger form of a recommendation in
that it is intended for direct adoption or incorporation by states into domestic law, with a view
to harmonising national legislation. One of the most active intergovernmental bodies engaged
in drafting codes of this nature today is UNCITRAL, whose 1996 Model Law on Electronic
Commerce
202 formed the basis of Australia’s Electronic Transactions Act 2001 (Cth). Its
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has also been received into a number of
public and private legal systems, including the law of Canada.
203
UNIDROIT, the International Institute for the Uniﬁcation of Private Law,
204 is another inter-
governmental organisation involved in drafting models laws, as well as other forms of hard and
soft law including its codiﬁcation of contract law, the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.
205
Of the four types of codes examined, three of them—draft treaties, recommendations and
model laws—oﬀer a template for multi-stakeholder Internet governance, in that while non-
state actors are not precluded from drafting them, they are readily able to be received into
hard law, whether that be by treaty or by custom. This is not simply a hypothetical ob-
servation. For example, the International Commercial Terms (or “Incoterms”) are a code
drafted by the International Chamber of Commerce that is almost universally incorporated
into transnational commercial contracts, to such an extent that it has arguably begun to
evolve into customary international law.
206
3.3.2.3. Standards
Standards are much like codes in the“recommendation”sense, but may be distinguished from
these in that they fall within the standards development sphere of governance, rather than
the sphere of public policy governance; in other words, standards are usually documents of
technical speciﬁcation, that do not explicitly (but may implicitly) engage issues of public
policy.
201. Various examples can be accessed at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/
telecoms/regulatory/maindocs/comgreen/index en.htm.
202. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996)
203. Cutler, A C, Canada and the Private International Trade Law Regime (1992), which contains a review of
the central role of the private sector in the uniﬁcation of trade law in Canada.
204. See http://www.unidroit.org/.
205. UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004)
206. Rowe, Michael C, The Contribution of the ICC to the Development of International Trade Law (1982); but
compare van Houtte, Hans, The Law of International Trade (1995) , 151.
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The development of international standards is consequently seen as a form of “low politics”;
that is, a realm of politics that does not strike at the core security concerns of states.
207 States
are therefore more ready to delegate the development of standards to bodies that include non-
state members, such as the ISO and ITU, than they would be willing to so delegate matters
of “high politics” such as trade or defence policy.
Although treated here as a species of soft law, international standards can also be found in
hard law, such as the Metric Convention Treaty,
208 and in customary international law, such
as those standards promulgated by specialised agencies such as the ICAO and IMO.
209
However the majority of international standards—de facto standards as opposed to the de
jure standards of hard law
210—are soft law because of their non-binding nature. This is the
category into which Internet standards fall, as whilst it is convenient that all countries in
the world use the same DNS root servers, it has never been suggested that China would be
in breach of international law for establishing its own servers in competition to those of the
oﬃcial root.
211
There is no uniform mechanism, analogous to ratiﬁcation, by which a state is required to adopt
an international standard that is not contained in a treaty. It may incorporate the standard
by reference in domestic legislation or policy, but equally the state may have no involvement
in a country’s adoption of a standard at all, its adoption being purely left to market forces.
Neither is there any legal distinction between the adoption of a standard promulgated by a
public standards body such as the Codex Alimentarius
212 or the International Organisation
of Legal Metrology,
213 and that of an NGO such as IETF or the W3C.
For example, Standards Australia which serves as the peak standards body for Australia is
non-governmental, although it receives government funding. As at 2006 there were 6850 pub-
lished Australian standards, about 2400 of which were referenced in legislation or delegated
legislation by Australian governments.
214 ITU standards are also referenced directly in Com-
monwealth regulations such as the Radiocommunictions Regulations 1993 (Cth). Internet
207. Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 123.
208. Convention Concerning the Creation of an International Oﬃce of Weights and Measures, 20 May 1875,
1947 ATS No 22 (entry into force 20 Dec 1875) (Metric Convention)
209. These have the force of customary law because the standards in question, such as the IMO’s International
Code of Signals, can be considered binding even on states that are not members of the IMO, due to their
importance to international air and maritime safety: IMO, International Code of Signals (2003).
210. Crocker, D, Making Standards the IETF Way (1993)
211. Geist, Michael, China and the Break-Up of the Net (2006)
212. See http://www.codexalimentarius.net/.
213. See http://www.oiml.org/.
214. Productivity Commission, Standard Setting and Laboratory Accreditation (2006), 38
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standards of the IETF and W3C are not explicitly speciﬁed in any Australian legislation, but
have been recognised at an executive level.
215
3.3.3. Private law
Both categories of sources of international law considered above, hard law and soft law,
are sources of public international law. Private international law is traditionally considered
something else entirely. In fact, some scholars take the view that it is a misnomer to call it
international law at all, since the conﬂict of laws rules used to determine which state’s law
should apply to an international dispute are domestic, and so are the laws that it is eventually
decided should apply.
216
Whilst this observation may be true, it implicitly limits the scope of international law to its
traditional narrower sense of relations between states. If states are not the only international
actors, and public law is not the only law, then private international law is indeed international
law, and the private sector, not states, are its principal players.
217 This is particularly so
when considering private international law not simply as a regime of conﬂict of laws, but
as an independent and private source of governance which co-exists with (and may also be
adopted into) national legal systems or hard international law, as for example in the case of
the international commercial arbitration regime.
218
Even in the narrower sense in which private international law is restricted to rules of conﬂict
of laws, these rules can be seen as limitations on state sovereignty, in that they deﬁne the
extent to which a state’s authority extends to private arrangements made in the transnational
arena. This alone gives them the quintessential character of public international law.
Private international law in this narrower sense will fall for consideration later in the discussion
of the jurisdictional limitations of international law,
219 whilst private law in the broader sense
of transnational law will be discussed here.
215. For example in the Australian Government Web Publishing Guide at http://webpublishing.agimo.gov.
au/.
216. Nygh, P E, Conﬂict of Laws in Australia (1995), 4
217. See Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 32–54; Janis, Mark W, Why Do We Continue to Distinguish Between Public and Private
International Law? (1985)
218. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 40
219. See Section 3.4.2.
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3.3.3.1. Transnational law
An outline of the content of transnational law—or at least, that subset of it found in the
new law merchant—has been given at Section 3.2.2.1, but it has not been precisely deﬁned.
For present purposes, transnational law comprises those forms of international governance
that exist apart from formal state or intergovernmental institutions, or as Rosenau puts it,
“regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function eﬀectively even though they
are not endowed with formal authority.”
220
It was foreshadowed above that we would here revisit the question of whether such law can
be considered to be international law proper. In the absence of suﬃcient evidence of state
practice and opinio juris to support its elevation into customary international law, the answer
has to be that it cannot, in conventional terms. At most, individual rules or speciﬁc regimes
may attain that status, but not the full corpus of transnational law.
But the very fact that we must consider the legal status of private law in terms of whether
suﬃcient evidence of state practice has been amassed reveals the perversity of the exercise
and how impoverished the conventional understanding of international law is. Twining writes,
A ius humanitatis, a transnational lex mercatoria, Islamic law, transnational humanitarian and
human rights law, and, in a diﬀerent way, some new regional orderings, and even parts of public
international law itself are all arguably more or less clear examples of the amorphous category
“non-state law.”... [A]n account of the phenomenon of law in the contemporary world would for
most purposes be incomplete if it did not treat of [these] legal families and legal cultures.
221
Whilst one might demur at whether some of these examples do or should have the status of
law, the criteria by which their claim to do so can be assessed should surely be capable of
empirical assessment, rather than turning upon a formalistic Westphalian doctrine that only
admits of laws made by or agreed between governments as law. So, what is law, fundamentally?
H L A Hart’s classic examination of this question in The Concept of Law concluded that a
legal system is a system of primary and secondary rules—primary rules governing conduct
that are generally obeyed by the citizens, and secondary rules governing how primary rules
are made, amended, repealed, interpreted etc, that are accepted by public oﬃcials.
222 But
Hart did not claim to oﬀer a deﬁnitive deﬁnition of law,
223 and indeed he did not do so, as by
his own concession his conclusions were problematic for international law which lacked many
of the features of a fully developed legal system, yet was widely recognised as law.
220. Rosenau, James N, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics (1992), 5
221. Twining, William, Globalisation and Legal Theory (2000), 52
222. Hart, H L A, The Concept of Law (1987), 116
223. Hart, H L A, The Concept of Law (1987), 213
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A more recent attempt to accommodate diverse legal phenomena within a single framework
is Tamanaha’s A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society, in which he reassesses Hart,
abstracts out some of the conceptual underpinnings of his Concept of Law, and concludes
simply that “Law is whatever people identify and treat through their social practices as
law.”
224 If this sounds familiar, it may be the echo of the authority and control test of the
New Haven School, or even the opinio juris test for the existence of customary international
law, as all of these are to a large degree restatements of the same recurrent theme, expressed
with greater or lesser generality.
On this basis, it can be concluded that whilst transnational law may not be international
law as such, the formal deﬁning criteria of international law are too narrow to be complete
(or perhaps even useful) in the post-Westphalian age, as they leave a gaping hole between
international law and domestic law, for which there is no conceptually consistent reason, and
to which orthodox international lawyers are wilfully blind.
The concept of transnational law as law ﬁlls that hole, allowing non-state actors and their
private law the conceptual place in international society that they already, plainly, possess
in fact. This is even beginning to be recognised within the United Nations. As Fernando
Cardoso, Chair of the High Level Panel on UN–Civil Society, commented in 2003:
This on-going process of building a cosmopolitan law represented a great leap towards a world
order that is not based on the uncontested will of sovereign states, but on universally agreed prin-
ciples and norms. In a major break with the past, individuals were acknowledged as subjects not
only of national law, but also of cosmopolitan rules, enforceable by transnational institutions.
225
The relevance of this conclusion is that it greatly broadens the potential lawmaking role of
the IGF, since it is primarily transnational law, and only incidentally (if at all) international
law, that is the product of public policy governance by network.
226
3.4. Limitations of international law
The international (and similarly the transnational) lawmaker is faced with a number of prob-
lems and limitations that do not face the domestic lawmaker to the same extent. Not the
least of these is the very legitimacy of the exercise itself. Whereas the domestic lawmaker
224. Tamanaha, Brian Z, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (2001), 194
225. Cardoso, Fernando H, Civil Society and Global Governance (2003), 3
226. Even so, to avoid confusion this will be described in future chapters as a “policy-setting” rather than a
“lawmaking” role: see Section 6.2.
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inherits the legitimacy of the national legal system by which she was appointed or elected,
from what source do lawmakers in international arena, particularly non-state actors, gain
their legitimacy? If their constituents can be identiﬁed, what checks and balances are in place
on an international level to ensure that they are accountable to those constituents?
Once this has been settled, the lawmaker then encounters very signiﬁcant substantive prob-
lems in reconciling the transnational character of the lawmaking to which she is called with the
legacy of the Westphalian system. Both legal questions of jurisdiction, and practical problems
of enforcement loom large.
Even the use of soft law does not overcome all of these diﬃculties. Say that a model law is
drafted to be adopted into the legal systems of any states that choose to do so. How would
such a law take account of the diﬀerences between legal systems of diﬀerent heritage, such
as common law and civil law (or indeed Islamic law)? How could a law of uniform content
bridge the ideological diﬀerences between East and West, or indeed North and South?
These diﬃcult questions will now be examined, although answers cannot be provided to all
of them. Problems and limitations of other forms of large-scale decision-making outside the
international public policy arena will not be considered here, but will be discussed in Chapter
4.
3.4.1. The legitimacy of authority
Calls for broader participation in transnational public policy-making generally ﬂow from
criticisms either of the eﬀectiveness, or the legitimacy (or both), of those processes when
dominated by intergovernmental bodies. The question of the eﬀectiveness of rule-based gov-
ernance has already been dealt with at some length in previous chapters and will be revisited
at Section 3.4.2,
227 but the issue of legitimacy will be addressed here.
Authority and legitimacy are closely related concepts. One simple deﬁnition of authority is
that it is legitimised power.
228 That authority can be multi-layered is not a novel concept,
227. For a broader taxonomy of variables impacting upon the eﬀectiveness of international institutions, both
endogenous and exogenous to the institutional arrangements in question, see Young, Oran R, The Eﬀectiveness
of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables (1992).
228. Milner, Helen, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique (1991). Another is that it
is eﬀective governance: Ferguson, Yale H & Mansbach, Richard W, Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive
Suggestions for Future International Theory (1991) , 376. The diﬀerence between the two deﬁnitions is mostly
one of focus—on the legitimacy of the authority in the ﬁrst case, and its eﬀectiveness in the second. Yet neither
deﬁnition is entirely satisfactory. As to the ﬁrst, it is possible, at least for the legal positivist, for law to exist
that is illegitimate; but it would be inaccurate to say that such law necessarily lacks authority. As to the second
deﬁnition, Rosenau at least would regard it as tautologous; see Rosenau, James N, Governance, Order and
Change in World Politics (1992), 5.
124Chapter 3. The international system
even to the Westphalian international lawyer; since even assuming that the nation state is
autonomous within its sphere, authority is also exercised at other levels ranging from the
family, the church congregation, the classroom and the workplace, to the market and the
intergovernmental arena.
229 Naturally the governance exercised at each level is not necessarily
of the same type—governance by rules may predominate at one level, by norms at another,
and so on—yet they can all be equally legitimate in their respective spheres.
Understanding this, the concepts of legitimacy and eﬀectiveness can be brought back together,
in that legitimacy is one of the factors that makes authority eﬀective. The legitimacy of an
actor is that which induces those to whom it addresses its authority, to accept it. Thus Franck
speaks of legitimacy in an international law context as
a property of a rule or a rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on
those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule has come into being
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.
230
In a broader context, this is the “belief in legality” which Max Weber isolated in 1909 as
the main ground of legitimacy for a social order, and which forms the basis for legal (some-
times called “legal-rational”) authority. The three other sources of legitimacy identiﬁed by
Weber were tradition (upon which “traditional authority” rests), aﬀectual faith (based on
an emotional response to the charismatic authority of a leader), and value-rational faith (in
which the validity of the authority has been deduced as an absolute—natural law is given as
an example).
231
Thus for Weber, diﬀerent forms of legitimacy can ground the exercise of authority in the
three spheres of state, economy and society. So it is too, in the present context, that the
three stakeholder groups who dominate those spheres—governments, the private sector, and
civil society—draw their legitimacy as actors in transnational public policy governance from
diﬀerent sources.
It is for this reason that moves to involve the private sector and civil society in transnational
governance are intended to do more than plug the holes in the representativeness of inter-
governmental fora. That would imply that a single stakeholder group would suﬃce if only
the group’s composition could be made adequately representative. Rather, the eﬀect of such
reforms is to balance the legitimacy of the government stakeholders with those of the other
groups.
229. Rosenau, James N, The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World (1992), 259
230. Franck, T M, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), 16.
231. Weber, Max, Roth, Guenther, & Wittich, Claus, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology
(1968), 36–37, 215
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What, then, are the sources of legitimacy from which the three stakeholder groups draw their
authority? This question will now be addressed, taking each stakeholder group in turn.
3.4.1.1. Governments
As the legitimacy of individual states in transnational governance and that of intergovern-
mental organisations diﬀer conceptually, they will be treated here in turn, beginning with
that of states.
Since Westphalia, states drew their legitimacy from their claims of territorial sovereignty,
which for Weber is a form of traditional authority.
232 It is on this basis too that states claimed
a monopoly on the legitimate use of international violence.
233 One of the characteristics of
traditional authority is that citizens’ recognition of the state’s authority is largely habitual,
234
so that states do not actually need to exercise physical coercion in order to secure widespread
compliance.
Increasingly however, in the post-Westphalian age, states must ground their legitimacy in
something more than tradition, by showing that their authority has been conferred demo-
cratically (which is a legal-rational basis, for Weber). For example, democratic rule is now
an important criterion for the recognition of a new state, particularly if it wishes to exercise
the unfettered right to participate in international aﬀairs.
235 The primary ground upon which
a state authority is now seen as legitimate is therefore that its government represents the
interests of its citizens.
This is not to say however that the state fully and transparently represents all of the interests
of its citizens, for if it did there might be no need of the other other three stakeholder groups.
To so argue would assume that once the people have vested their authority in the state, they
have somehow disposed of it altogether. The contrary position is that there remains “the
possibility of authority and legitimacy being relocated and the right to engage in coercive
action thereby being redeﬁned.”
236 For one thing, the Internet has facilitated citizens’ creation
232. See also Ferguson, Yale H & Mansbach, Richard W, Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Sug-
gestions for Future International Theory (1991), 370.
233. Though as noted above this monopoly has to a large extent been formally ceded to the United Nations
Security Council pursuant to articles 24, 25 and 33 of its charter.
234. Ferguson, Yale H & Mansbach, Richard W, Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for
Future International Theory (1991), 381
235. See Detter, Ingrid, The International Legal Order (1994), 73; Fox, Gregory H, The Right to Political Partic-
ipation in International Law (2000) , 90; Murphy, Sean D, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States
and Governments (2000), 153, Marks, Susan, International Law, Democracy and the End of History (2000) , 548.
236. Rosenau, James N, The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World (1992), 258
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of and participation in new transnational civil society networks which coincide with no one
state’s territorial reach.
True it is that a state can still indirectly exercise control over such civil society networks by
reason of its authority over those of the networks’ members within its borders, but for it to
do so is no more a legitimate exercise of its authority than it would be for the European
Commission to seek to control the participation of EU member states in the United Nations.
Citizens, like states, can divide their loyalties, and the civil society networks that they choose
to participate in, also like states, are social entities in themselves, more than just the sums
of their members.
237 Such transnational social entities are not legitimate subjects of any
territorially-based authority. Post writes:
The proper presumption for a Liberal theory would seem to be a presumption of a-territoriality;
a law’s reach is conﬁned and bounded ultimately by the network of those who have participated
in its adoption and consented to its application. If that network is itself bounded or deﬁned by
physical geography, the presumption of territorial reach and the power of the territorial agent
is well-founded, if not, not.
238
Thus states, whilst legitimate in their sphere, cannot be the only legitimate actors in transna-
tional governance.
As for intergovernmental organisations, the legitimacy of their authority is inherited from
that of their member states. What intergovernmental organisations contribute on their own
account is not legitimising force, but the expertise of their secretariats, and their instrumental
value as a forum for discussion and an enabling infrastructure for state action.
However there is a signiﬁcant problem with their inheritance of legitimacy from that of their
member states, namely that it is weakened in its derivative form. The further removed the
processes of intergovernmental organisations are from the ultimate source of their legitima-
cy—the people—the more liable they are to charges of suﬀering from democratic deﬁcits.
In a truly representative intergovernmental organisation, policy would bubble up from the
norms and practices of states as implemented by the citizens’ elected representatives, into
intergovernmental fora, to be debated and in due course adopted as international law. But in
reality, the reverse is often the case. That is, public policy is often generated in intergovern-
mental organisations in advance of it being adopted by states.
239
237. Malcolm, Jeremy M, Do Corporations Have Rights? (1994), Chapter 1
238. Post, David G, The “Unsettled Paradox”: The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed (1998),
542.
239. Jensen, Darryn M, The Transformation of International Law (2004), 38.
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This is made explicit in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women
240 which requires signatories to take all appropriate steps:
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women.
Thus one of the most commonly voiced criticisms made by the anti-globalisation movement
of governance by intergovernmental organisations such as the WTO, the World Bank and
the IMF is that they are undemocratic.
241 Whilst there are many ill-informed and isolationist
voices within the anti-globalisation movement, on this particular point there is accord with
many mainstream commentators, and even within the UN.
242 Paulus writes,
The reliance on democratic principles and the consent of the governed, which legitimize politi-
cal decisions in the Western tradition, are of little help in international aﬀairs. The“democratic
deﬁcit” of international organizations is a commonplace. Rather, the international lawyer must
justify his authority by the acceptance of the results of his activity by his audience and ad-
dressees, in particular states, and increasingly non-governmental actors.
243
But is the perceived democratic deﬁcit within intergovernmental organisations, commonplace
as it may be, truly inevitable, or is there in fact scope for intergovernmental organisations to
be made more representative? Reformists such as the Campaign for a More Democratic United
Nations (CAMDUN)
244 and the World Federalist Movement,
245 along with many international
relations scholars, believe that there is (whilst admitting that “in the end, there is no single
answer”).
246
The ﬁrst-mentioned groups above are amongst those which have called for the establishment
of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (or Global Parliamentary Assembly, or Citi-
zens’ Assembly) to exercise popular oversight over the activities of the UN.
247 Such calls are
not new,
248 but have been growing louder in recent years, most notably with the European
Parliament issuing a resolution in June 2005 in which it called:
for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) within the UN
system, which would increase the democratic proﬁle and internal democratic process of the
240. 18 Dec 1979, 1983 ATS No 9 (entry into force for Australia 27 Aug 1983)
241. Shiva, Vandana, Doha: Saving WTO, Killing Democracy (2001)
242. Cardoso, Fernando H, Cardoso Report on Civil Society (2004), 24
243. Paulus, Andreas L, From Territoriality to Functionality?: Towards a Legal Methodology of Globalization
(2004), 61
244. See http://www.camdun-online.gn.apc.org/.
245. See http://www.wfm.org/.
246. Nye, Joseph S, Globalization’s Democratic Deﬁcit: How to Make International Institutions More Accountable
(2001)
247. See generally CAMDUN, Main Options for a UN Peoples’ Assembly (2002).
248. See Clarke, Grenville & Sohn, Louis B, World Peace Through World Law (1958).
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organisation and allow world civil society to be directly associated in the decision-making process
...
249
It is said by its proponents that such a body would increase the legitimacy of the United
Nations, provide a new mechanism for the enforcement of international law, and perhaps
even defuse international conﬂict.
250 Most likely, such a body might begin with only advisory
powers, but could be inclined as the European Parliament has been, to accumulate power
through the moral force that it is perceived to inherit from its democratic composition.
251
Other intergovernmental organisations have been subject to similar calls as the UN to become
more democratically accountable to citizens;
252 particularly the EU in which the unelected
European Commission’s powers are wide-ranging.
253 In March 2002 an intergovernmental
conference was convened, along with a forum for the reception of non-state views, to discuss
the preparation of a new constitution for the European Union to supersede the existing
EU Treaties.
The draft constitution that resulted
254 would have provided a mechanism whereby the Com-
mission could be requested to consider any legislative proposal put forward by a petition of
one million citizens.
255 However, whilst the constitution was eventually signed in October
2004, it failed ratiﬁcation by referendum in France and the Netherlands, leaving it in a state
of limbo which continues to the present.
3.4.1.2. Private sector
The private sector draws its legitimacy from the superior eﬃciency of free markets in the dis-
tribution of goods and services; a value-rational justiﬁcation in Weberian terms. Adam Smith
famously used the metaphor of an “invisible hand” to describe how, without the imposition
of central planning, the self-interested behaviour of producers and consumers in a market can
in fact promote the common good.
256
Welfare economists have since conﬁrmed this mathematically, demonstrating by their so-called
ﬁrst theorem that in a perfect free market, the distribution of wealth will be Pareto-optimal:
249. European Parliament, Resolution on the Reform of the United Nations (2005)
250. Strauss, Andrew, Taking Democracy Global: Assessing the Beneﬁts and Challenges of a Global Parliamentary
Assembly (2005), 1–3.
251. Strauss, Andrew, Taking Democracy Global: Assessing the Beneﬁts and Challenges of a Global Parliamentary
Assembly (2005), 4
252. For example, the WTO: see Section 3.2.1.2.
253. But see Moravcsik, Andrew, Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union (2002).
254. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 29 Oct 2004
255. Article I-47
256. Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations (1976), 477
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that is, the natural state of the market is such that no participant will be able to be made
better oﬀ without making at least one other participant worse oﬀ.
257
However there may be many Pareto optimal distributions of wealth in an economy, and the
theorem makes no normative distinction between them—it is equally eﬃcient for wealth to be
distributed evenly between all consumers, as it is for the same wealth to be concentrated in the
hands of an elite whose neighbours are left to starve. Although the second theorem of welfare
economics does posit that a fair distribution can be attained by means of the government
imposing a lump-sum redistribution of wealth, as to what this fair distribution is, it gives no
answer.
258 It is thus unfortunate that other important social values besides eﬃciency, such as
distributional equity and human rights, are less easily susceptible to economic analysis.
Unregulated markets also fail to guard against the impact of externalities; the external eﬀects
of the decisions of a producer or consumer that are costless to them, but costly (or more costly)
to others or to society.
259 This can lead to outcomes such as the“tragedy of the commons,”in
which it is in each individual’s self-interest to deplete a shared resource to nothing, because
the beneﬁts of such depletion accrue only to them, while its costs are also borne by others.
And these are only the products of a theoretically perfect market; in practice, no market is
perfect, and the less perfect it is (as in the case of a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry),
the less benevolent are the movements of the invisible hand. Moreover, MNCs are not parties
to the international human rights instruments that are binding on states, with the United
Nations’ voluntary Global Compact
260 providing a weak substitute at best.
For all these reasons, the private sector’s role in the operation of markets, whilst legitimate in
its sphere, is insuﬃcient. It is one of the roles of the liberal state to intercede in markets and
societies to ensure that markets work eﬃciently and that other social values are upheld.
3.4.1.3. Civil society
A widely-held view is that the third stakeholder group, civil society, claims its legitimacy as
“a specialist, a scholar, or an expert whose authority derives from specialized knowledge and
practices that render such knowledge acceptable, and appropriate, as authoritative.”
261 In
257. Arrow, Kenneth J & Debreu, Gerard, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy (1954)
258. Arrow, Kenneth J & Debreu, Gerard, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy (1954)
259. Coase, R, The Problem of Social Cost (1960)
260. See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/.
261. Cutler, A C, Private International Regimes and Interﬁrm Cooperation (2002), 26; Charnovitz, Steve, Two
Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance (1997) , 274; and compare “consensual knowl-
edge”: Hall, Rodney B & Biersteker, Thomas J, Private Authority as Global Governance (2002), 209.
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Weberian terms, the application of such expertise as the most eﬃcient means to an end is
instrumental-rational; in other words, it is instrumentally-rational for a decision maker to
defer to civil society to gain the beneﬁt of its technical expertise.
262 But this can be true only
of a limited subset of civil society, including certain of the more active NGOs.
An alternative and preferable view is that it is not just the expertise that civil society brings,
but rather the values it puts forward, that justiﬁes its participation in international gover-
nance. It therefore draws its legitimacy from the promotion of substantive values for their
own sake,
263 which is a value-rational ground. Put in more familiar terms, to include civil
society in governance because of its expertise would be an instrumental justiﬁcation for doing
so (and doubtless private sector consultants could fulﬁl that role just as well), whereas to
include it by reason of its promotion of substantive values is a normative justiﬁcation.
On the face of it, this seems to overlap with the legitimacy of states, as are not democratic
governments intended to provide a mechanism for the transmission of the substantive val-
ues of their citizens? Perhaps so, but as noted above, that is not to say that those citizens
thereby forfeit their right to form other communities of interest through which to express their
values in other fora, that may transcend the state’s boundaries. A state cannot therefore be
considered the sole and sovereign agent of its citizens while they may choose to delegate their
sovereignty outside and across its borders too. Post writes,
Normative Liberal theory does not merely give “non-governmental organizations” a place at
a negotiating table whose shape and agenda is deﬁned by existing state actors; it places non-
governmental institutions of all kinds and states on equal footing and asks, as a threshold matter:
to which institution(s) has the “sovereign” delegated its power?
264
The argument can be taken further: that NGOs are potentially better representatives of their
constituents’ interests than are states, because they have“the function of representing people
acting of their own volition, rather than by some institutional ﬁat.”
265 There will be no impetus
for the formation of an NGO if its members’ interests are already adequately represented by
their states. But inevitably there are interests that states inadequately represent, and for
which NGOs have become the dominant representatives.
Take for example Amnesty International
266 in representing the interests of political prisoners
262. But importantly, Weber did not relate this to a form of authority or consider it a ground of legitimacy for
a social order.
263. Friedrichs, J¨ org, The Neomedieval Renaissance: Global Governance and International Law in the New Middle
Ages (2004), 20
264. Post, David G, The “Unsettled Paradox”: The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed (1998),
536.
265. Gordenker, Leon & Weiss, Thomas G, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions
(1996)
266. See http://www.amnesty.org/.
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(whose interests are by deﬁnition ignored by their states), the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines
267 in campaigning against the use of landmines (against the military interests of
states), and Greenpeace
268 in lobbying for environmental protection (against states’ economic
interests).
These are not isolated cases, but examples of a systemic problem inherent in the concentra-
tion of authority in state organs. Just as the free market imperfectly achieves the value of
eﬃciency to which it aspires (let alone other social values), so too the state, although it may
be structured along democratic lines and aspire to fairly represent its citizens’ interests, is
inclined to represent powerful interests more successfully than those of social minorities and
the economically powerless.
269
For Marxists, this is primarily because the capitalist state is a dictatorship of the bour-
geoisie which subdues competing interests through cultural hegemony. A more nuanced ap-
proach within the Marxist tradition is that of Poulantzas, for whom the state, although
enjoying relative autonomy from the capitalist class, is bound to support the long-term inter-
ests of capitalists in order to ensure its own continued existence. Thus the state will broker
only so many concessions to the interests of the working class as are necessary to subdue a
socialist revolution.
270
This is of course in contrast to the liberal pluralist conception of the state, which constructs
it as a neutral vessel to which all classes and their interests have equal access to shape policy.
However liberal neo-pluralists such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom have since conceded
that:
common interpretations that depict the American or any other market-oriented system as a
competition among interest groups are seriously in error for their failure to account of the
distinctive privileged position of businessmen in politics.
271
Yet a third approach to the study of the state alongside Marxism and pluralism is that of
institutionalism,
272 according to which the state, and the interest groups that participate in
domestic political processes, are institutions in themselves, with their own interests indepen-
dent of, and perhaps in conﬂict with, those of the citizens whom the system is intended to
represent. As such,
267. See http://www.icbl.org/.
268. See http://www.greenpeace.org/.
269. See more generally Section 4.3 regarding the limitations of democratic governance.
270. Poulantzas, Nicos, Political Power and Social Classes (1968)
271. Dahl, Robert & Lindblom, Charles, Politics, Economics and Welfare (1991), xli
272. Or new institutionalism, of which the scholarship of the so-called “historical” branch is described here.
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the political demands that come to be expressed in politics are not an exact reﬂection of the
preferences of individuals but rather deviate considerably from this potential “raw material”
of politics. Various institutional factors inﬂuence the political processes that adjudicate among
conﬂicting interests and may hence privilege some interests at the expense of others.
273
Cutting across these three approaches, Cutler describes the “material, ideological, and insti-
tutional” power of capital as the power of the “mercatocracy.”
274
Thus the basis of transnational civil society’s legitimate authority in international governance
is that it acts as a check on the power of the state to the extent that the state’s authority
fails to adequately represent the interests of its citizens—particularly including interests that
cut across states, and those that are not valued by the mercatocracy. Indeed, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations in 1994 acknowledged NGOs as “a basic form of popular
representation in the present day world” that is “a guarantee of the political legitimacy of
those international organizations” in which they participate.
275
Does this mean that civil society groups should take the place of states as representatives of
substantive values? Not at all, for three main reasons: their inability to independently imple-
ment policy at state level, their lack of representativeness, and their lack of accountability.
The ﬁrst of these reasons is that civil society often depends upon states to actually implement
the policies for which NGOs lobby.
276 Naturally, exceptions are easily found, such as the
campaigns of the Rainbow Warrior and the direct humanitarian action of NGOs such as
Oxfam, but it remains that domestic law reform is often the primary objective of the work
of civil society in intergovernmental organisations.
As for the issue of representativeness, it goes without saying that states remain the dominant
form of large scale social ordering, and thus for all their faults will always be more represen-
tative of their citizens than any NGO could be. NGOs may compensate for the deﬁciencies
of states’ representativeness of their citizens, but neither claim to nor do provide the broad
representation of society that states do. As Cardoso puts it:
The legitimacy of civil society organizations derives from what they do and not from whom they
represent or from any kind of external mandate. In the ﬁnal analysis, they are what they do.
The power of civil society is a soft one. It is their capacity to argue, to propose, to experiment,
to denounce, to be exemplary. It is not the power to decide.
277
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As to civil society’s accountability, whilst the extent to which states reﬂect their citizens’
values may be obscure, the extent to which many NGOs do so is even more obscure, as
they may not be particularly democratic internally. In fact it is precisely the NGOs that
possess the resources to participate actively in international fora that may be most at risk
of being unduly inﬂuenced by powerful interests. Whilst, as we have seen, states are subject
to the same risk, at least liberal democratic states are constrained in this respect by certain
institutional checks and balances that NGOs may lack.
278
Thus although civil society acts legitimately in international governance, it does so only
in collaboration with other legitimate stakeholders. As a corollary, organisations involved
in international public policy governance lay their strongest claim to legitimacy when their
processes incorporate all three complementary founts of authority: states, markets and soci-
ety—the very forces that have deﬁned the study of sociology since Weber.
No stakeholder will ever take the place of the others in international governance, because
their legitimacy and consequent authority is independently derived. It is this, rather than the
fact that any individual stakeholder will be ineﬀective in attempting to exercise governance
without the others, that lies at the core of the need for governance by networks in which all
stakeholders are involved.
3.4.2. Jurisdiction
The second set of issues that particularly confront international and transnational lawmakers,
especially those engaged in public policy governance of the Internet, concerns the intersection
of the international and domestic legal systems. These issues include the limited range of
mechanisms available for the enforcement of international law, given that the international
system lacks a conventional police force or judiciary. There are also diﬃculties in determining
the appropriate domestic law that should govern a particular factual circumstance and in en-
forcing that law internationally, as well as diﬃculties in containing the extraterritorial eﬀects
of either domestic law or the conduct to which such law is directed. These problems will be
dealt with in turn.
3.4.2.1. Enforcement of international law
There are few formal mechanisms for the enforcement of international law. Whilst there is the
278. See Section 4.3, but also ECOSOC, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-
Governmental Organizations (1996), paras 10 and 12.
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International Court of Justice, the main limitation of its jurisdiction is that it requires the
consent of each party in order to be enlivened.
279 Furthermore whilst judgments of the ICJ
against states may be enforced by the Security Council of the UN, the veto powers of each
of the permanent members make it unlikely that such a judgment would ever be enforced
against them.
Austin even concluded in 1832 that international law was not law at all because it lacked a
judiciary or an executive to enforce it.
280 Yet it has nevertheless been observed that “almost
all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time,”
281 prompting research by international relations scholars (particularly
institutionalists) as to why this should be so.
282 It is now more widely accepted that the lack
of a conventional mechanism of enforcement for international law is not fatal to its status
as law,
283 and that in any case there are a number of informal institutions by which it is
enforced.
First, states can exercise self-help measures against other states believed to be in breach of
their international law obligations. An obvious example is found in the United States military
oﬀensive against Iraq in the 2003 Gulf War. However as this action was taken in deﬁance of
UN Security Council resolutions, it also illustrates the lack of legitimacy that such unilateral
measures may carry as against actions authorised by the United Nations.
Second, particular international organizations have created frameworks within which interna-
tional law can be enforced through methods other than reference to the ICJ or the Security
Council. The best example is the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body of which can impose
a number of innovative penalties on non-compliant states including ordering the payment
of compensation to other aﬀected states. Of course, if the payment is not made then the
WTO falls back on its ultimate self-enforcing remedy of trade sanctions.
Third and more fundamentally, there are forces which drive states towards voluntary com-
pliance with international law, such as “concerns for reputation, reciprocity, perceptions of
legitimacy, trust, and the like, which do not rest on coercion or sanctions.”
284 Indeed, regime
279. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 Jun 1945, 1975 ATS No 50 (entry into force for Australia 1
Nov 1945), article 36.
280. Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (1954)
281. Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (1979), 47
282. Slaughter observes that it is not all states, but more particularly liberal states who tend to comply with
international law: Slaughter, Annie-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States (1995). But see contra
Koh, Harold H, Transnational Legal Process (1996) and Koh, Harold H, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law (1997).
283. Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 30–31
284. Cutler, A C, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (2003), 75; Franck, T M, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) .
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theory is built on the assumption that states will only establish an international regime (which
includes a regime of law) if they consider it is in their long term best interests to do so.
285
3.4.2.2. Conﬂict of laws
Domestic law (including the rules of conﬂict of laws) tends to be premised on the assumption
that events can be located territorially. Thus for example the postal acceptance rule provides
that a contract is formed in the“place”where the acceptance is communicated to the oﬀeror.
286
But what if that place is the Internet? One of the earliest preoccupations of academics writing
on cyberspace law was in tracing the implications of jurisdictional problems such as these
where the location of a legally relevant event is obscure.
The diﬃculties in assigning online conduct to a jurisdiction have however sometimes been
overstated,
287 and most are soluble by the use of general principles of conﬂict of laws. Diﬃculty
in ﬁnding a state to assume jurisdiction over online activity is unusual; more often there is
more than one that might do so. But that is rarely a problem in a contractual context, as it
is enough that one jurisdiction can be found to hear the case and generally irrelevant that
more than one might.
Similarly in tort and criminal cases, the law to be applied is normally the lex loci delicti
commissi (broadly that of the place where the act was committed), and even if there is more
than one such place, then principles of forum non conveniens in civil matters and of double
jeopardy in criminal matters will normally prevent the case from being tried twice before
diﬀerent tribunals.
True, the prospect of a multiplicity of states extending their jurisdiction over a single dispute
is productive of some uncertainty, but in contractual cases that uncertainty can easily be
resolved by the parties selecting their desired jurisdiction for the agreement pursuant to
article 3(1) of the Rome Convention
288 (and if they so wish having it enforced in some other
jurisdiction of their choosing pursuant to the New York Convention
289). These choices can in
285. Keohane, Robert O, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984)
286. Adams v Linsell (1818) 106 ER 250
287. Goldsmith, Jack L, Against Cyberanarchy (2003); Kronke, Herbert, Applicable Law in Torts and Contracts
in Cyberspace (1998)
288. Goldsmith, Jack L, Against Cyberanarchy (2003), 67–69
289. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 Jun 1958, 1975 ATS No 25
(entry into force for Australia 24 Jun 1975) (New York Convention), an UNCITRAL treaty which provides for the
enforcement of both agreements to arbitrate and the resulting arbitral awards in the state of each signatory to the
Convention (presently numbering over 130). Compare also the Hague Convention on Choice of Law Agreements,
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general be elected online even more easily than they can oﬄine, for example using so-called
click-wrap agreements hosted on one party’s Web site
290 (subject of course to any compulsory
consumer protection provisions applicable in the jurisdiction of either party, such as article
12(2) of the EU Directive on Distance Contracts).
291
Where no such election has been or can be made contractually, there is still some provision
through a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral instruments for the enforcement of court
judgments between various jurisdictions, including the states of the EU,
292 and between Aus-
tralia and some 36 states and Canadian provinces pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act
1991 (Cth).
As for criminal matters, the ability of a state to enforce its laws against a defendant in another
jurisdiction will depend on the existence of an agreement between the two nations in question
for the extradition of criminal defendants. The procedure by which Australia makes and
receives extradition requests is set out in the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), and the countries
from which it receives requests are provided in regulations to that Act. This includes most
of the same countries as included in the regulations to the Foreign Judgments Act, but with
the notable addition of the United States.
3.4.2.3. Spillover eﬀects
A more serious issue arises in cases where the problem is not so much in locating an event in
a particular jurisdiction, but in dealing with its eﬀects that cross multiple jurisdictions. The
eﬀects may be those of wrongful conduct, such as tortious, criminal or intellectual property law
infringements, or they may be those of the laws themselves, whereby an attempt by one
jurisdiction to regulate conduct on the Internet impacts too widely against other sovereign
jurisdictions. Such eﬀects are known as “spillover eﬀects.”
293
Spillover eﬀects are seen in one of two forms. First, the least stringent regulations applicable to
any Internet-connected jurisdiction may be those that prevail in practice; a “lowest common
denominator” eﬀect. This can be seen in the case of spam regulation, where the greatest
290. Kunkel, J D & Richard, G, Recent Developments in Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in the
United States (2002)
291. Burnstein, Matthew, A Global Network in a Compartmentalised Legal Environment (1998), 33. It provides,
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by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-member country as the law applicable to the contract
if the latter has close connection with the territory of one or more Member States.”
292. Pursuant to the Brussels Regime which comprises the EEX Convention, the Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 16 Sep 1988 (EVEX Convention) and European
Commission, Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002).
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amount of spam is sent from those countries with the weakest anti-spam laws, often on behalf
of advertisers from elsewhere in the world.
294 It is also a hallmark of content regulation that
content providers will relocate their hosting operations to less highly-regulated jurisdictions
oﬀshore,
295 as in the examples previously given of Australia’s Interactive Gambling Act and
Broadcasting Services Act.
296
The second and converse eﬀect of spillover is that online behaviour may be required to conform
to the most stringent regulations in force worldwide, the potential for which is illustrated by
the Gutnick defamation case and the Yahoo! Nazi memorabilia case both previously examined
above,
297 as well as by the eﬀect of the EU Data Protection Directive which has, for example,
led Microsoft Corporation to change the way it manages user data for its dot-NET Passport
service, not only within Europe, but worldwide.
298
Without overstating the point, the protection of the First Amendment of the US Constitution,
in particular, can result in very diﬀerent regulatory regimes being applied inside and outside
the United States in cases such as these. Taking the example of libel, it is for example
necessary for American plaintiﬀs to demonstrate that a false statement published in the press
was written with actual malice.
299 Such diﬀerences as these may result in the more tightly
regulated country’s laws“spilling over”upon those in the more loosely regulated jurisdiction.
In either case, whether it is conduct or law that spills over into less regulated jurisdictions, the
outcome is that at least one sovereign nation’s law is eﬀectively being trumped by another’s.
Goldsmith argues that the eﬀects of spillover have again been overstated, in that it remains
possible for indirect regulation to be exercised over much conduct that spills over jurisdic-
tions, for example by criminalising the use of oﬀ-shore hosting facilities,
300 or by controlling
intermediaries within the local jurisdiction, such as banks, ISPs and domain registrars.
301 A
recent example of the latter is found in the withdrawal of credit card processing facilities
by the Visa International network to AllofMP3.com, a Russian music download service that
allegedly contravened United States (but arguably not Russian) law.
302
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The spillover of law on the other hand, for Goldsmith, is unexceptional, as it is well within
the competency of states to pass laws with extraterritorial eﬀect in order to regulate eﬀects
within their own jurisdictions.
Post on the other hand, whilst not denying this as a general proposition, contends that there
are suﬃcient diﬀerences between the way in which such laws impact upon online and oﬀ-line
conduct that diﬀerential treatment of the former is warranted.
303 One diﬀerence that he notes
is scale, such as the way in which the automatic distribution of millions of Usenet messages
through thousands of servers worldwide could lead to unreasonable liability in the event that
a message so distributed infringed copyright.
304 This, and the extent to which, in cyberspace,
“virtually all events and transactions have border-crossing eﬀects,” along with the fact that
domestic regulation of same will almost always impact upon those who are not subject to
that state’s sovereignty, point Post to the need for reforms to mitigate these eﬀects.
And, indeed, there have been a number of eﬀorts to do so, both technical and legal. Techni-
cal reforms aimed at overcoming the spillover eﬀects of online conduct include ﬁltering and
geolocation. These work in approximately opposite ways. Filtering prevents content that is
prohibited in a particular jurisdiction (such as unwanted speech or oﬀensive images) from
entering that jurisdiction via the Internet. In Australia, for example, both the spam
305 and
content regulation
306 legislative regimes make use of co-regulatory codes drafted by indus-
try groups and registered with the ACMA, pursuant to which ISPs are required to make
appropriate ﬁltering products or services available to their users.
Geolocation on the other hand, prevents content that is made accessible on the Internet,
from being accessed from a particular jurisdiction. For this purpose the IETF has proposed a
DNS-based method for determining the geographical location of Internet addresses,
307 though
more ad hoc geolocation services, both commercial
308 and non-commercial,
309 are currently
more widely used.
Neither ﬁltering nor geolocation technologies are foolproof, however, as both measures run
counter to the Internet’s decentralised and cosmopolitan architecture. A 2002 study of six
popular ﬁltering products found that depending on how they were conﬁgured they would block
between 89% and 91% of pornographic Web sites, but also between 33% and 91% of safe sex
303. Post, David G, Against “Against Cyberanarchy” (2003)
304. For a description of Usenet, see Section 4.1.
305. See http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310325.
306. See http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_90080.
307. IETF, A Means for Expressing Location Information in the Domain Name System (1996)
308. See eg Quova, Inc at http://www.quova.com/, and MaxMind LLC at http://www.maxmind.com/.
309. See http://www.hostip.info/.
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information sites.
310 Similarly, the highest accuracy claimed for geolocation technology admits
an approximate 10% error rate at the city level.
311 These ﬁgures do not take into account
users’ ability to deliberately attempt to evade the technologies in question by means such as
encrypted tunnels or proxies.
As for the options to mitigate the eﬀects of spillover through law reform, the ﬁrst example to
emerge was the development of a consistent doctrine in United States case law to determine
whether a Web site, available internationally, should fall subject to local regulation, in the
early case of Zippo Manufacturing v Zippo Dot Com, Inc.
312
The test established by that case described a sliding scale from “passive” Web sites, which
were merely information-based, with minimal interaction with the user, through to “active”
Web sites, of which the predominant purpose was to conclude business with the user. In
between were the intermediate category of “interactive” Web sites. It was adjudged that the
jurisdiction of the user in question could assert authority over active sites but not passive
ones, whereas for interactive sites the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the
information exchanged would determine whether it would be treated as one or the other of
the other categories.
Whether or not this test is an adequate one,
313 it applies on a domestic level only. Since
spillover is a transnational issue, it calls out for a uniform transnational solution. There are
three ways in which this could be approached. The ﬁrst and least radical would be to uniﬁy
domestic choice of law rules, which was the intent of negotiations over a proposed Hague Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
314 which
however fell through largely due to objections from the United States.
315
The next most radical is the imposition of a sui generis Internet law regime, which could still
in appropriate cases be applied in domestic tribunals. A sui generis regime could take shape
through the uniﬁcation of Internet-related law through formal international agreements as
has begun to happen with the UNCITRAL model law on Economic Commerce, or simply
310. Kaiser Family Foundation, See No Evil: How Internet Filters Aﬀect the Search for Online Health Information
(2002)
311. See http://www.quova.com/page.php?id=106.
312. (1997) 952 F Supp 1119
313. See Geist, Michael, The Shift Towards “Targeting” for Internet Jurisdiction (2003) for criticism and an
alternative proposal.
314. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1999)
315. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Some Reﬂections on the Present State of Negotiations on
the Judgments Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme of the Conference (2002)
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through the continued development of private transnational law, in what could become like
the process by which the common law developed.
316
A ﬁnal and even more radical solution would be the removal of Internet legal issues into a
specialised Internet jurisdiction. This was the early approach of scholars like Johnson and
Post, who reasoned that due to the inevitable jurisdictional problems associated with the
application of domestic laws to the Internet, cyberspace should be left apart from territori-
al regulation to develop its own self-regulatory structures based on shared norms.
317
Whilst to date even the least radical of these alternatives has proved to be a dream, elements
of all of them can be seen in development. Whilst we do not have the Hague Convention
on Jurisdiction, we do have the Hague Convention on Choice of Law Agreements. We may
not have a sui generis legal regime covering all Internet-related issues, but we do have the
UNCITRAL model law. And whilst the world lacks a legal system exercising specialised
Internet jurisdiction, there is such a system for the resolution of domain name disputes, the
UDRP. These are the seeds from which bodies such as the IGF may be able to grow a more
comprehensive transnational legal regime for the Internet in the future.
3.4.3. Universality
The last category of limitations of international and transnational law to be discussed is the
diﬃculty of applying uniform rules across a diversity of legal systems and cultures. Although
the distinction can be a narrow one (particularly in Islamic states), the diﬀerences between
national legal systems will be examined ﬁrst, followed by consideration of ideological and
cultural diﬀerences.
3.4.3.1. Diﬀerences between legal systems
Unlike some of the jurisdictional issues that are magniﬁed in an Internet-related context,
issues of the universal application of international and transnational law across multiple legal
systems are no novelty to international society. Thus, article 9 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice requires that common law, civil law and socialist law jurists be
represented in the Court’s panel. But although these are the most prominent legal systems
present within the membership of the United Nations (less so socialist law, of course, since
316. Burnstein, Matthew, A Global Network in a Compartmentalised Legal Environment (1998), 28
317. Johnson, David R & Post, David G, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace (1996), but see Lessig,
Lawrence, The Zones of Cyberspace (1996) .
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the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia), they are not the only ones. Notably
omitted are customary and religious legal systems such as Hindu law, Talmudic (Jewish) law,
and Islamic theocratic law, or Sharia.
Of these, Sharia law is applicable within the greatest number of member states to varying
degrees, since there are states within the Muslim world such as Lebanon, Syria and Egypt that
largely follow Western civil law, others such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen drawing
strongly from the Sharia, and still others such as Iraq, Jordan and Libya possessing something
of a hybrid.
318
There is a similar degree of heterogeneity within the other legal systems referred to above.
For example the code law systems of East Asia are heavily inﬂuenced by Confucian ideas
that of course are absent in Europe,
319 and those of the new democracies in Eastern Europe
bear the legacy of socialist law.
320 Likewise, within common law systems, there is signiﬁcant
divergence between United States law and Anglo-Australian law.
One of the relevant diﬀerences between such legal systems is the structure and procedures
of their legislative, executive and judicial institutions, which may impact on a state’s ability
to comply with international instruments presupposing a diﬀerent set of institutions and
procedures. For example, Japan has interpreted references to its police force in international
instruments to include the country’s ﬁre service.
321 They also may include constitutional
diﬀerences, which may inﬂuence how international law is received into or implemented in
domestic law. For example, since Australia’s international obligations are required to be
implemented in legislation before having domestic eﬀect, it is easier for Australia than for the
United States to fall into non-compliance with a treaty that it has signed and ratiﬁed.
As noted above, these sorts of diﬀerences are nothing new to international law, and they are
dealt with largely by leaving them up to the state to resolve. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties
322 provides in article 27 that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justiﬁcation for its failure to perform a treaty.” The only concession allowed
on account of legal and constitutional diﬀerences between states is the acknowledgment in
articles 19 to 23 that certain treaties may allow for signatories to accede with reservations in
respect of speciﬁc articles. For example, there are extensive reservations (and interpretative
318. Shaaban, H S, Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: Which Law Governs? (1999)
319. Ma, Herbert H P, Law and Morality: Some Reﬂections on the Chinese Experience Past and Present (1971)
320. Lehmann, Christopher, Bail Reform in Ukraine: Transplanting Western Legal Concepts to Post-Soviet Legal
Systems (2000)
321. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4_asp.htm.
322. 23 May 1969, 1974 ATS No 2 (entry into force 27 Jan 1980)
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declarations, whereby a party indicates its intention to interpret articles in a particular way)
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
323
As for transnational law, diﬀerences between legal systems may impact upon a state’s abil-
ity to participate in programmes of private law harmonisation with other states, although
bodies acting in this area such as UNCITRAL have striven at least to include a balance of
civil and common law traditions in its working groups.
324 Such diﬀerences will also aﬀect a
state’s willingness to recognise foreign judgments. For example, the award of civil damages
by jury in United States courts, which tend to be of much greater quantum than damages
assessed by judges in other common law jurisdictions, has precluded Australia from adding
the United States to those jurisdictions whose judgments will be recognised and enforced in
Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991.
Despite these issues, the diﬃculties of reconciling diﬀerences between legal systems are not
widely taken as cause for a wholesale programme of legal uniﬁcation. On the contrary, the
advantage of a multiplicity of legal systems and laws addressing common problems is that
this fosters jurisdictional competition,
325 which can lead to the most eﬃcient laws gaining an
evolutionary advantage, and only then perhaps inﬂuencing law reform eﬀorts elsewhere. On
one (controversial)
326 view, an example of this is found in the relative ﬁnancial strength
327 and
quality of government
328 of countries that have adopted legal systems based on the common
law.
More importantly than supporting jurisdictional competition, taking a non-prescriptive ap-
proach as to the form of domestic law on the part of international and transnational
lawmakers, and perhaps also allowing reservations to be made in respect of provisions that are
manifestly unsuitable for adoption by a particular state, allows the diﬃcult task of adapting
the law for a variety of legal systems to be delegated to authorities at the domestic level. This
is much the same approach—known as subsidiarity—that the EU takes in passing directives
that prescribe an objective to be achieved, but not the form and means by which it is put
into eﬀect by member states.
329
Since the IGF’s contribution to transnational law will be in the form of non-binding soft
323. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4_asp.htm.
324. Honnold, John, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods (1979)
325. Deakin, Simon, Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism Versus Reﬂexive Harmoni-
sation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros (1999)
326. Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L, Statistics of Legal Infrastructures: A Review of the Law and Finance Literature
(2006)
327. La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F L, Shleifer, A, & Vishny, R W, Law and Finance (1998)
328. La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F L, Shleifer, A, & Vishny, R W, The Quality of Government (1999)
329. See Section 6.2.2.1.
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law,
330 it follows that the use of codes (whether so described or described as guidelines, best
practice recommendations or the like), or even draft treaties, is to be preferred to the use of
model laws in order to ensure that they are applicable across the greatest number of states.
3.4.3.2. Ideological diﬀerences
More intractable than the diﬀerences between legal systems are the cultural and ideologi-
cal diﬀerences between states. Ideologies are normally to be taken to be sets of political and
economic values and beliefs, such as liberalism, socialism and fascism, whereas cultures are
both broader—incorporating language, history, art, etiquette and so on—and at the same time
narrower, in that states that share political ideologies may have vastly diﬀerent cultures.
The history of most of the 20th century was characterised by a clash of ideologies, particularly
the three major ideologies mentioned above. But the end of the Cold War to a large extent
brought this era to an end, with liberal democracy apparently emerging victorious. This
outcome has been characterised as the“end of ideology,”
331 or by Fukuyama even as the“end
of history.”
332 What is it about liberalism that could account for its dominance, and why
should this be expected to be more than transitory?
The liberal’s own answer is that liberal states aim to construct a society in which individuals
are free to pursue their own conception of the good, consistent with the same freedom being
aﬀorded to others. The fundamental unit of value to the liberal is the individual human being,
rather than the state, the community or the family.
333
The role to be assumed by the classical liberal state is therefore straightforward: to administer
institutions that facilitate individual autonomy and inhibit interference with the same.
334
Such institutions include the free market, private property, and human rights, which are
assumed to be morally neutral, insofar as human autonomy (or as variously expressed the
right to freedom,
335 or equal concern or respect,
336 or to be treated with equal dignity
337), is
a transcendent, universal value.
However the assumption of the moral neutrality of the free market and private property has
330. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paragraph 77
331. Kurth, James, War, Peace and the Ideologies of the Twentieth Century (1999)
332. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History? (1989)
333. Kant, I, Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (1965)
334. Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974)
335. Hart, H L A, Are There Any Natural Rights? (1955)
336. Dworkin, R, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 275
337. Kant, I, Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (1965)
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long been disputed, perhaps most vividly in the Communist Manifesto in 1888.
338 Even within
the liberal tradition itself, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice attempted to accommodate some of
the intuitive unease of liberals at the disinterest of their ideology in distributive justice, by
demonstrating that from a given (though contrived) original position in which they were
ignorant of their own capacities and preferences, rational beings would forge a social contract
that would not only uphold basic human rights for all, but would also limit social and economic
inequality to cases where there is equality of opportunity for all, and the inequality improves
the lot of the least fortunate member of society.
339 This was a more egalitarian conception of
distributive justice than the more libertarian normative liberal conceptions of the good such
as Mill’s utilitarianism,
340 or Posner’s wealth maximisation.
341
Although Rawls’ social liberalism addresses the objections of Marx to some degree in the-
ory (as in practice do the social programmes of modern welfare liberal states), criticisms
have also been made of another more fundamental assumption of classical liberalism: that
human autonomy is a fundamental value, common to all human beings by virtue of their
having been born into a free state of nature.
342 This individualist assumption is challenged
by communitarians on the ground that humans are not born as atomistic individuals but
as members of families and communities,
343 which contrary to the assumptions at least of
Rawls’ original position, are partly constitutive of our identities.
344 The true value of such
communal orderings is therefore not counted either in the (“deontological”) liberalism of Kant
and Rawls that recognises pre-legal rights and duties of individuals, nor in the calculus of
utilitarian (“teleological”) liberalism.
345
However, unlike Marxism, communitarianism has no normative political program for the
dismantling or radical reform of the liberal state. Indeed, without an underlying system of
liberal rights and the rule of law, a communitarian society would have no safeguard against
the community visiting tyranny upon minorities.
346 Rather, the implications of the communi-
tarian critique for the modern social liberal state, insofar as they are directed to the state at
338. Marx, K & Engels, F, The Communist Manifesto (1998), 53
339. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), but see in response Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia
(1974) .
340. Mill, John S, Utilitarianism (1895)
341. Posner, R, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory (1979). It was also more strongly put, being accorded
the ontological priority of a right, or“primary good,”which no individual conception of the good could displace:
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971) , 93.
342. Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government (1963), 301–311
343. Gutmann, Amy, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism (1985)
344. Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998), 150
345. Malcolm, Jeremy M, Do Corporations Have Rights? (1994), chapter 3
346. Gutmann, Amy, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism (1985), 318–320
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all, are largely limited to the greater inclusion of civil society in public policy development,
347
and as discussed at length above this is precisely one of the programmes of reform that the
liberal state and international society have already begun to undertake.
What liberalism can claim, that communism cannot and communitarianism does not attempt,
is evolutionary success. The neo-Marxist criticisms of the 1960s and the communitarian cri-
tiques of the 1980s have been heard and the liberal state has sought to adapt accordingly,
even if it has in a narrow sense lost theoretical coherence in doing so. Empirically, liberal
states have come to dominate the globe,
348 they generally have strong and stable economies,
and have also maintained a remarkable record of peace with each other.
349 By deﬁnition,
liberal democracies are simply better at what they do—representing their people—than au-
thoritarian and totalitarian states, as their authority is grounded in the legal-rational force
of the liberal democratic order rather than purely on their territorial sovereignty.
350
3.4.3.3. Cultural diﬀerences
Cultural diﬀerences can pose as much of an impediment as ideological diﬀerences to in-
ternational and transnational lawmakers seeking to apply public policy uniformly across a
multitude of states. Indeed, the diﬃculties are greater, in that cultural diﬀerences exist not
only between liberal and illiberal states, but also amongst liberal states, as demonstrated by
the Yahoo! dispute. And whereas there are perhaps a handful of major political ideologies,
one of which has achieved dominance, there are hundreds if not thousands of distinct world
cultures.
351
Of these, the impact of Islamic culture and its clash with Western culture, as epitomised most
infamously by the events of 11 September 2001, have become one of the deﬁning phenomena of
the ﬁrst part of the 21st century. It is of signiﬁcance in this context that the Sharia broaches no
clear distinction between law, politics and religion. Thus, to the Muslim the clash of cultures
is just as much a clash of political ideologies. Moreover, at least in Islamic states that strictly
apply Sharia law, Westphalia never happened; there is no division of religious and secular
authority in the Muslim world.
352
347. Putnam, Robert D, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital (1995), 76–77; Sandel, Michael,
Morality and the Liberal Ideal (1984) , 17
348. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History? (1989)
349. Doyle, Michael, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Aﬀairs (1983)
350. Perritt Jr, Henry H, The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal System (2000)
351. Certainly, these can be categorised into major groupings (“civilisations”), but this still leaves at least seven
or eight.; on one account Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and
possibly African: Huntington, S P, The Clash of Civilizations? (1993), 25.
352. Ali Khan, L, A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History (2003), 106
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An examination of the points of variance between Islamic culture and Western culture would
exceed the scope of this thesis. But in general Western culture, reﬂecting liberalism itself, is
far more individualistic than Islamic culture, which places greater emphasis on submission to
the will of Allah than it does on individual autonomy and rights.
353
Consequently, international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which were drafted without the participation of most Islamic
states,
354 are incompatible with various provisions of the Sharia.
355
But by the same token, just as Islamic states may breach international human rights instru-
ments which oﬀend their cultural norms, those instruments fail to address grave breaches
of Sharia law that are considered equally or more fundamental by Muslims as the freedoms
enshrined in the International Covenant. Most notable amongst these grave breaches are
defamation of Islam or of the prophet Muhammad, as allegedly perpetrated by the pub-
lication of cartoons depicting Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30
September 2005, which resulted in protests and riots worldwide.
356
Given such dramatic gulfs between the cultural norms of the West and those of the Muslim
world, how can it ever be possible for international and transnational lawmakers to settle
upon a set of universal moral rules that are culturally neutral? Some commentators have
indeed expressed the view that it will be diﬃcult or impossible to do so.
357
If that is so, then Islamic states are faced with the prospect that they must simply ﬁnd a way
to accommodate Western liberal values if they wish to participate in international society;
since for better or worse,
[v]irtually all of the norms that are now identiﬁed as essential ingredients of international law and
global society have their roots in the jurisprudence of European scholars of international law and
in the notions and patterns of acceptable behavior established by the more powerful Western
European states.
358
353. Schooley, Kimberley Y, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights—Towards a Communitarian Revi-
sion (1995), 694–695
354. Mutua, Makau w, Why Redrew the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Enquiry (1995), 1122
355. Thagirisa, Pavani, A Historial Perspective of the Sharia Project and a Cross-Cultural and Self-Determination
Approach to Resolving the Sharia Project in Nigeria (2003), 493–498. This is particularly evident in respect of the
equal rights of women, as enshrined in Article 3 of the International Covenant. Schooley writes, “Regulating the
life and home of a woman within a particular non-western culture by a universal measure that is in truth western
oﬀends the deeply religious culture of Islam. Islamic culture has no concept of the western standards embodied
in international documents”: Schooley, Kimberley Y, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights—Towards
a Communitarian Revision (1995) , 659.
356. Rose, Flemming, Why I Published Those Cartoons (2006)
357. Khan, Isha, Islamic Human Rights: Islamic Law and International Human Rights Standards (1999), 79–81;
Arend, Anthony C, Legal Rules and International Society (1999) , 18
358. Nadelmann, Ethan A, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society (1990),
484
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Whilst the bias of international legal norms towards Western liberal values may be hegemon-
ic from a Muslim perspective, and although “[o]ne cannot gain traction or start a normative
dialogue with devout Muslims by quoting Locke or Kant,”
359 even Muslims must agree that
it is now too late to seek to call into question the cultural underpinnings of norms that have
been accepted by the majority of United Nations member states, including states of other
ideologies such as North Korea and Cuba.
Consequently, the most fundamental diﬀerences between cultures that impact upon interna-
tional norms will continue to tend to be settled in favour of liberal states. For example in the
context of Internet-related public policy, Internet access will be framed as a human rights is-
sue. Speciﬁcally, article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which
protects the freedom to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds” will
prevail over religious considerations to mandate that reasonable Internet access be allowed to
each state’s citizens.
360
On the other hand, even if this approach is defensible on liberal democratic grounds, the
ultimate outcome of such trampling of Islamic cultural values is not diﬃcult to fortell, as the
fruits of the Jyllands-Posten caricature dispute demonstrate. Thus, the UN has endeavoured
to reach a pragmatic medium with Islamic interests.
361, and there have also been eﬀorts
to develop, if not a “thick consensus” that provides a complete system of culturally-neutral
values for the development of international and transnational law, then at least a “thin”
consensus on values which might be suﬃcient to establish a minimal set of determinate
answers.
362
The way forward for international and transnational lawmakers in seeking a culturally sen-
sitive medium for public policy development probably lies in between the extremes of strict
359. Etzioni, Amitai, Leveraging Islam (2006), 104
360. This approach is evident in the statement of Abid Hussain, Special Rapporteur to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, that “The instinct or tendency of Governments to consider regulation rather
than enhancing and increasing access to the Internet is ... to be strongly checked:” ECOSOC, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (1999),
and compare also Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on
Measures to Promote the Public Service Value of the Internet (2007) .
361. General Assembly of the United Nations, Combatting Defamation of Religions (2005)
362. Franck, T M, Fairness in International Law (1995). The “golden rule,” or the ethic of reciprocity (that is,
that one should treat others as one wishes to be treated by them), has been suggested as a plausible value that
is common to almost all religious traditions, and for that matter almost all secular ethical traditions dating
back at least to Hobbes (see respectively Lepard, Brian D, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal
Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions (2002) , 50–52,
and Hobbes, Thomas & Curley, Edwin, The Leviathan (1994), 99). In fact, the Declaration of Independence of
Cyberspace nominates it as a shared value for the online community as well. However such a general principle
does not scale to a suﬃcient level of granularity to account for all principles of international law; for example,
it may not prevent the amputation of limbs as a punishment for theft as the Sharia allows: Schooley, Kimberley
Y, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights—Towards a Communitarian Revision (1995) , 688–689.
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cultural relativism, in which no culturally inappropriate international norms can be consid-
ered, and universalism in which the Western liberal paradigm is treated as universal and
immutable. This middle ground of moderate cultural relativism requires some “minimum
standard of protection [of human rights] that must be evaluated and legitimated through
culture.”
363 The programme of evaluating and legitimating international norms within the
framework of Sharia would fall to liberal Muslims, in collaboration with others in interna-
tional society.
364
So in summation, although there is no simple solution to the complex problem of how to ac-
commodate cultural diﬀerences in international and transnational lawmaking, the beginnings
of an answer are found in a fourfold approach:
￿ Firstly, to engage aﬀected cultural groups at all stages of policy development to see whether
norms originating in the Western liberal tradition can be explicated in culturally appro-
priate forms—or, importantly, vice versa in the case of norms important to other cultures
that they may seek to have recognised in international fora. Whilst this exercise is open
to criticism on the ground that it seeks to retro-ﬁt norms that presuppose underlying val-
ues of Western liberal individualism into a culture that does not hold those underlying
values
365 (or vice versa), it may still be the only workable compromise in a fundamentally
multicultural world.
￿ Second, the inability of an international forum to conclude an instrument that is universally
culturally acceptable does not mean that the instrument cannot still be widely adopted.
Even hard international law is not automatically binding on nation states, as they remain
free either not to accede to it at all, or in some cases to do so with reservations. Thus if
international or transnational law is developed with an intrinsic liberal character, it will
only be appropriated by liberal actors: so be it. In the case of Internet-related public policy,
this may be inevitable, as Internet culture largely reﬂects liberal values such as freedom
of expression, and indeed embeds them deeply in its technical and social architecture.
363. Schooley, Kimberley Y, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights—Towards a Communitarian Revi-
sion (1995), 679
364. Etzioni, Amitai, Leveraging Islam (2006). This approach is reﬂected in the new constitutions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the former of which provides in Article 3 that “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary
to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” yet in Article 7(1) that “The state shall abide by
the UN charter, international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights”: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 4 Jan 2004.
365. Schooley, Kimberley Y, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights—Towards a Communitarian Revi-
sion (1995), 713–714
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The Internet itself is not a culturally neutral artifact, any more than other communications
technologies are.
366 Internet-related public policy therefore cannot be expected to be either.
￿ Third, it is common for certain issues, such as matters of security, to be left out of the sphere
of the governance of an international regime, in which case national regulation is left to
“ﬁll in the gaps.”
367 It is likely that the most contentious matters of Internet-related public
policy can be dealt with in this way. For example, a policy on content regulation can be
drafted in broad principles, leaving details to be implemented on a national level with regard
to domestic cultural norms. Whilst this will not result in a uniform and comprehensive
international content regulation regime, it will still be more than exists now. In fact for
liberals, this is not merely a pragmatic compromise, but rather the just outcome in cases
where cultural diﬀerences between peoples preclude a uniform approach.
368
￿ Finally, and as a proviso to the other points, there may be some cases in which custom-
ary international law or even jus cogens has developed from which states are unable to
opt out, even if it does conﬂict with their cultures. This is most likely to be the case in
respect of human rights. In these cases, where the issues involved are ideological rather
than merely cultural, there is likely to remain some trampling of cultural values that are
plainly at variance with international norms. Little more can be said than that this is an
instance in which the hegemony of the liberal majority is (justly, by its own standards)
exercised over the illiberal minority. In most instances, this will not apply to the work of
the IGF which is only involved in the development of soft law.
3.5. Internet governance as law
The purpose of this chapter was to survey the ﬁeld of international law, as the dominant in-
ternational order for the governance of public policy issues, in order to describe the context in
366. Innis, Harold A, The Bias of Communication (1991)
367. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 206
368. Goldsmith, Jack L & Wu, Tim, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (2006), 152–153.
It is also consistent with the principle of subsidiarity: see Section 6.2.2.1.
A practical example of this is found in the approach advocated by the Keep the Core Neutral campaign that
opposes ICANN’s application of cultural as well as technical standards for the approval of new gTLDs (see
http://www.keep-the-core-neutral.org/), on the basis that“[i]f Saudi Arabia objects to the .allah domain or
the Vatican city dislikes .jesus then they will be free to block them, but we should not limit the capabilities of the
network just because of these sectional interests”: Thompson, Bill, Time To Led a Thousand Domains Bloom?
(2007). The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention also illustrates this approach, in that its provisions to
curb the promulgation of xenophobic content online are contained in an Additional Protocol against Racism, in
order to allow countries such as the USA for whom these provisions conﬂict with free expression principles to
ratify only the balance of the Convention.
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which any institution seeking involvement in Internet public policy governance must operate.
In the course of this survey, it has been revealed that apart from international law there are
also other international orders for the governance of public policy issues, of which the new
law merchant is a speciﬁc case, and which in their generalised context have been described
as transnational law.
The obvious question that remains, and which has been touched on obliquely but not resolved,
is whether Internet public policy governance takes place, or will in the future take place, in
the environment of international law, or transnational law—or perhaps both, or neither.
As outlined in Chapter 2, the most mature institutions for governance of the Internet are those
involved in standards development, rather than those involved in public policy governance.
Since international standards are as we have seen a form of soft law,
369 it is therefore arguable,
for what it is worth, that Internet standards already constitute international law.
Similarly, the regime that has been described in this thesis as technical coordination also
constitutes international law in the same “soft law” sense. ICANN, the preeminent body of
technical coordination of the Internet, is an active subject of international society, directly
entering into agreements with states over ccTLD administration,
370 and convening its own
intergovernmental advisory panel, the GAC.
Although it may have been accurate in earlier days to say that bodies such as ICANN “have
no authority and no ability to implement anything, other than what they care to make avail-
able and hope that people use,”
371 ICANN’s perceived legitimacy and thereby its authority
have grown as its actions in the administration of the DNS system have been accepted (or at
least not directly challenged) by states.
372 At the very least, this illustrates that ICANN op-
erates as a subject of international society under de facto delegation from the international
community.
373
Is it possible to go further and contend that the international legal order, by accepting the
ICANN regime, has elevated it to the status of customary international law? There is certainly
widespread state practice to support such a contention; universal in fact if the use of ccTLDs
369. See Section 3.3.2.
370. See http://www.icann.org/cctlds/agreements.html.
371. Rutkowski, A, Regulate the Internet?: Try If You Can (1999)
372. Hurd, Ian, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics (1999); Strange, Susan, Territory, State,
Authority and Economy: A New Realist Political Ontology of Global Political Economy (1997) . On one view
though, the contribution to this phenomenon of the underlying authority of the United States government should
not be underestimated: Froomkin, A M, Form and Substance in Cyberspace (2002), 94. On the other hand see
Section 5.1.4.1.
373. Council of Europe, Building a Free and Safe Internet (2007), 7
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under the ICANN root is used as a measure.
374
Opinio juris is more diﬃcult to demonstrate without empirical evidence, of which none has
been collected, but there is no reason in principle why this could not be found and why
customary international law could not therefore form from the norms of the Internet commu-
nity,
375 either directly or by the intermediate soft law stages of an international code (such
as the Incoterms), or standard (such as the International Code of Signals). Arguably, such
norms have already impacted upon the development of Internet-related domestic law.
376
However it must be acknowledged that even if the ICANN system for management of the
DNS root has attained (or is on the way to attaining) the status of customary international
law, Internet governance at large as outlined in Chapter 2 involves far more than just ICANN.
Whilst its various other constituent institutions from all stakeholder groups (the IETF, the
W3C, the EFF, the LAP, the ITU, WIPO, CERT, TRUSTe, the OECD, UNCITRAL and
many others) may be accepted by state and non-state actors alike as legitimate authorities
in their ﬁelds, the corpus of their work is not accepted as international law.
But if the governance of these institutions is acknowledged by the existing international or-
der as legitimate and authoritative, yet is not accepted as law, then what is it accepted as?
A regime is the most obvious answer. And what is a regime, but part of an autonomous
transnational legal order distinct from and coexistent with that of orthodox international
law. The acceptance of the regime of Internet governance as an autonomous legal order is
shown both in the words of international actors—the very words of the Tunis Agenda ac-
knowledge it
377—and also through their actions, such as their conclusion of agreements with
ICANN and their passage of domestic and international instruments that complement rather
than seeking to trump the existing regime.
378 A like case is the way in which states recog-
nise and support the new law merchant through accession to the New York Convention and
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration which reinforce the
transnational commercial arbitration regime.
374. The ﬁnal ccTLDs—those for North Korea (kp), Serbia (rs) and Montenegro (me)—were delegated in 2007,
though no request has been recognised for a delegation of the Western Saharan ccTLD (eh), as the country’s
sovereignty is disputed: see http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm.
375. Weber, Rolf H, Regulatory Models for the Online World (2002)
376. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), and see 1267623 Ontario Inc v Nexx Online Inc (unreported Ontario Superior Court of Justice, OJ No
2246, decided 14 June 1999) in which it was ruled that “sending unsolicited bulk e-mail is in breach of the
emerging principles of Netiquette, unless it is speciﬁcally permitted in the governing contract.” Compare also
Mueller, Milton, Net Neutrality as Global Principal for Internet Governance (2007) .
377. See Section 3.1.2.1.
378. For example, the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
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Recognition of Internet governance as a regime is not limited to the United Nations. It is
also accepted by scholars such as Spar who considers it as a private international regime,
379
and Franda who considers it an international regime in formation, in which the parame-
ters of its governance are shaped by “a wide variety of private business ﬁrms, governments,
universities and scientiﬁc, professional and epistemic communities spread across the globe.”
380
However the terminology of regime theory, being rooted in international relations theory,
obscures something very important about Internet governance that has been lost since we
have ceased to speak of its reception into customary international law, and that is the scope
for the institutions of Internet governance to be seen as law (for a regime is nothing other
than transnational law, restricted to a single issue-area).
381
It is important to make that point, because if it is not made, it is implicitly being accepted
that governance of the Internet fundamentally depends for its force upon the old Westphalian
system of international and domestic law. While it is true that some of the institutions acting
in Internet governance remain loosely tied to that system (ICANN to the United States gov-
ernment, the IGF to the United Nations), it is vital to comprehend that the transnational
law that they create need not be so tied, loosely or otherwise.
This is not to say that the two systems of law cannot interact. They can, and inevitably
will. But the fundamental point is that the transnational law of Internet governance need not
collapse if states ceased to take any part of it. It need not even do so even if states ceased
to recognise it, as they do at present, for a state’s failure to recognise an independent and
coexistent system of law does not extinguish it.
382
Having said that, in practice the fate of the nascent regime of Internet governance as it
matures under the leadership of the IGF remains a matter of speculation. Whilst it does
have the potential to ﬂourish into a fully formed transnational legal institution that would
survive cut free of its roots, there is also the risk that it will become dominated by state
hegemony and be absorbed into the old international legal system.
It is important that the IGF does not allow this to happen, becoming just another intergov-
ernmental organisation beholden to its Westphalian masters, but rather that it should live
up to its mandate to initiate “a transparent, democratic, and multilateral process, with the
379. Though she allows that the private sector will control “not the Internet of course, but their own growing
corners of commerce and communication ... through a combination of formal and informal rules, administrative
and technical means”: Spar, Debora L, Lost in (Cyber)space: The Private Rules of Online Commerce (1999), 48.
380. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 5
381. Rosenau, James N, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics (1992), 8
382. Mabo v Queensland (#2) (1992) 175 CLR 1
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participation of governments, private sector, civil society and international organizations.”
How the IGF is to do this is question to be examined in the next chapter.
154Chapter 4. Designing a governance network
Who rules the Net? You and I and
600 million others, in some mea-
sure.
Vinton Cerf
To resolve that public policy governance of the Internet should be the province of a network
of governments, private sector and civil society organisations does not presuppose that its
form should be that which has in fact taken shape in the IGF. The structure and processes
of the IGF, which are to be examined in Chapter 5, were not organised spontaneously, nor
inevitably. A network can in fact take any of a number of diﬀerent forms. The main purpose
of this chapter is to examine and compare four such forms that might be used to structure a
governance network such as the IGF.
As background to this exercise, an instructive analogy is found in the topology of comput-
er networks such as the Internet. During the NSFNET period, the Internet was arranged in an
hierarchical (or tree) structure whereby networks connecting to the Internet were required to
establish direct links to the NSFNET backbone network (or if they were too small to justify a
direct link, to link to larger networks that were in turn connected to the NSFNET backbone).
So for example, in order for one university network to reach another, rather than sending its
data across a link that directly connected the two universities, the data would be sent by
the ﬁrst university to the NSFNET backbone which would route it through to the second
university by reference to an authoritative table of routing information that was maintained
by the NSF.
1 This is a “top–down” structure.
The topology of the modern day Internet on the other hand is a distributed mesh network, in
which the routing function is decentralised. Any node on the network can communicate with
any other node across a multiplicity of possible paths, none of which need include any given
central point. The redundancy of any given link in such a network makes the network as a
whole more resilient against failure. Although it contrasts starkly with the top–down model,
this is not so much a bottom–up structure—since that still implies the existence of a hierarchy,
though inverted—as middle–out; or in computer network terminology, peer-to-peer.
Top–down and peer-to-peer computer networks have their equivalents in what we will respec-
tively term hierarchical and consensual organisations. Whilst on the Internet the consensual
paradigm is dominant, in organisations, the hierarchical paradigm prevails. This is in part the
1. Ford, P S, Rekhter, Y, & Braun, H W, Improving the Routing and Addressing of IP (1993)
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legacy of Weber, who theorised that a bureaucracy structured along hierarchical lines, with
a strict division of labour and standardised procedures, was the most eﬃcient (or rational)
form an organisation could take.
2
However examples of post-bureaucratic organisations, in which decisions are made by dia-
logue and consensus between peers,
3 have also more recently begun to emerge, and in fact
are exempliﬁed by a number of the institutions of Internet governance.
4 For such organisa-
tions, electronic communications are an enabling force,
5 not merely making old structures
more eﬃcient, but oﬀering new ways of organising of which Weber could not have conceived,
characterised by the ﬂuidity of authority and the use of soft power.
These organisational forms, hierarchical and consensual, will be discussed below as two of the
possible structures for a governance network such as the IGF. However, two other structures
for which no ready analogue is found in computer networking are also possible: the bot-
tom–up form, which will be described as democratic, and the absence of ordering altogether
which will be described as anarchistic.
6
This chapter describes each of these four forms of organisational structure in turn, with
consideration of their inherent merits, as well as where relevant their compatibility with the
international system described in Chapter 3, and with the culture of the Internet as described
in Chapter 2. The aim is that by the end of the chapter we will have settled (if at a fairly
abstract level) upon an appropriate organisational structure for international public policy
governance of the Internet, which satisﬁes the criteria developed in previous chapters.
4.1. Anarchistic
It is often mistakenly thought that anarchists favour disorder and chaos. In fact the essence
of anarchy as a political philosophy is the promotion of private, voluntary ordering as an
2. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1964)
3. Heckscher, C, Deﬁning the Post-Bureaucratic Type (1994)
4. See Section 4.4.3.
5. Fulk, Janet & DeSanctis, Gerardine, Electronic Communication and Changing Organizational Forms (1995)
6. It might seem a retrograde step to be considering top–down and bottom–up structures for a governance
network, when governance by network has already been distinguished from governance by rules in its lack of
hierarchy. However this can be explained by distinguishing between governance by network, which is a mechanism
of governance through which public policy issues are addressed in concert by a coalition of aﬀected stakeholders,
and governance of the network, which is the coordination of the application of that mechanism through whatever
internal structures and processes the stakeholders may devise. There is no reason why governance of the network
might not involve a hierarchy of organisational roles.
To put this more concretely, an organisation consisting of governmental, civil society, private sector and inter-
governmental stakeholders could equally conduct its aﬀairs through the leadership of an elite subcommittee, or
by democratic vote, or through consensus, or without relying on any predeﬁned mechanism at all.
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alternative to the hierarchical ordering of, principally, the state. Malatesta writes,
of the destruction of all political order based on authority, and the creation of a society of
free and equal members based on a harmony of interests and the voluntary participation of
everybody in carrying out social responsibilities.
7
Anarchism thus does not imply so much lack of ordering, or even a lack of authority per se,
as lack of hierarchy. Authority that stems from the natural inﬂuence of an expert amongst
her peers is welcomed by the anarchist. As Bakunin wrote:
In general, we ask nothing better than to see men endowed with great knowledge, great ex-
perience, great minds, and, above all, great hearts, exercise over us a natural and legitimate
inﬂuence, freely accepted, and never imposed in the name of any oﬃcial authority whatsoever,
celestial or terrestrial.
8
Anarchism is therefore quite a natural structure for a governance network between peers. So-
cial movements structured in such manner have been termed SPINs:“segmentary, polycentric,
integrated networks,” and have been the subject of study for well over 30 years.
9
4.1.1. Anarchy and the Internet
The compatibility of the architecture and culture of the Internet with these ideals was recog-
nised early in its development. Bruce Sterling famously described the Internet in 1993 as “a
rare example of a true, modern, functional anarchy.”
10 A few years later, John Perry Bar-
low issued the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace;
11 an anarchist tract par exemplar.
With the inroads that governments have since begun to make into the Internet’s inherent
architectural anarchism, those who would practise anarchy on the Internet have not so much
retreated as regrouped. Today, self-styled crypto-anarchists utilise technologies such as strong
encryption, virtual private networks (VPNs), and electronic cash,
12 in an endeavour to forge
a stateless anarchist society online.
13
These technologies further this aim by enabling users to craft online spaces, known as
cypherspace (or cipherspace), in which they may act anonymously or pseudonymously, there-
7. Malatesta, E, Anarchy (1974), 13
8. Bakunin, Mikhail A, God and the State (1970), 35
9. Gerlach, Luther, The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism and Its Opponents (1999)
10. Stirling, Bruce, A Short History of the Internet (1993)
11. Barlow, John P, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996)
12. For example e-gold; see http://www.e-gold.com/, and compare Ripple at http://ripple.sourceforge.
net/, which is an open source implementation of electronic cash, the value of which depends upon the trust
between debtor and creditor, rather than being backed by a valuable commodity.
13. May, Timothy C, Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities (1995)
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by rendering domestic laws on such matters as copyright, content regulation, and taxation
unenforceable and thus, it could be said, inapplicable.
14
Predictably, resources hosted in cypherspace include unlicensed copies of copyrighted media,
child pornography, and even supposed confessions to murder, but also anonymous support
fora for victims of sexual assault, communiques from dissidents and whistle-blowers, and lively
pseudonomous chat and discussion fora.
4.1.1.1. Usenet
Anarchy is also a familiar governing principle for some more conventional and widely-used
Internet services. An early example is found in the governance of Usenet. Usenet was one of
the early applications deployed on the Internet, preceding the World Wide Web by six years,
but even before that it existed as an independent online network of computers running the
Unix operating system (the name Usenet being derived from Unix User Network).
Unix users were no strangers to anarchistic governance regimes. Richard M Stallman, founder
of the GNU project to create a free Unix-like operating system,
15 discussed the philosophy that
lay behind a previous operating system developed by hackers, the Incompatible Time-sharing
System (ITS) of the Artiﬁcial Intelligence Lab at MIT. ITS was designed to solve problems
of users hacking into each other’s accounts and bringing down the computer, precisely by not
putting any controls in to begin with: the system had no passwords, and could be brought to
its knees by any user typing the command “KILL SYSTEM.” Stallman boasted,
If I told people it’s possible to have no security on a computer without people deleting your ﬁles
all the time, and no bosses stopping you from doing things ... nobody will [scil would] believe
me. For a while, we were setting an example for the rest of the world.
16
Usenet provides a discussion board system, that unlike most similar systems before or since,
is distributed. That is to say that, in keeping with the principle of decentralisation that
underlies Internet architecture generally, there is no central archive of Usenet messages (or
posts); rather, each site that participates in the Usenet network maintains its own copies of
posts, and periodically synchronises them with its peers. New posts can therefore enter the
Usenet network from any such site. Haubern writes that
Usenet should be seen as a promising successor to other people’s presses, such as broadsides
at the time of the American Revolution and the Penny Presses in England at the turn of the
19th Century. Most of the material written to Usenet is by the same people who actively read
14. One of the tools used in this way is Tor, which was discussed at Section 1.3.1.
15. See http://www.gnu.org/, GNU standing for “GNU’s Not Unix.”
16. Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001), 427.
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Usenet. Thus, the audience of Usenet decides the content and subject matter to be thought
about, presented and debated. The ideas that exist on Usenet come from the mass of people
who participate in it. In this way, Usenet is an uncensored forum for debate - where many sides
of an issue come into view. Instead of being force-fed by an uncontrollable source of information,
the participants set the tone and emphasis on Usenet.
17
Usenet posts are categorised by topic in fora known as newsgroups. From the inception of
the network in 1979 until 1985, anyone could create a newsgroup and anyone could delete
one.
18 As the network grew larger, it became evident that this procedure did not scale well,
as there was no way to enforce the addition and deletion decisions made at one site by others.
Additionally, some newsgroups were straining under the weight of oﬀ-topic or oﬀensive posts,
or vituperative and insulting exchanges—“ﬂame wars.”
19
But as anarchy does not imply disorder, rather collaborative and voluntary order, the solution
to these problems came from within. To address the issue of coordination, one Usenet admin-
istrator, Gene Spaﬀord, from 1985 to 1993 published a monthly list of “oﬃcially recognised”
newsgroups which other Usenet-connected sites could (but were not obliged to) follow in
deciding what groups to carry for users on their own servers.
20
To address the issue of inappropriate posts, rather than censoring (“cancelling”) such posts,
the facility for the establishment of new moderated groups was introduced—but even in this
case, the architecture behind the moderation technology was advisory rather than hierarchi-
cal. A message would automatically pass through into a moderated group if an “Approved”
header—which could easily be forged—was inserted.
21
In 1985, a group of system administrators of those servers that had come to function as
something of a backbone of the Usenet network, and who styled themselves with some irony
as the “Backbone Cabal,” reordered the newsgroups into an hierarchical structure. At the
root of the hierarchy at this time were the preﬁxes comp, misc, news, rec, sci, soc and talk,
respectively for discussion on computing, miscellany, Usenet, recreation, science, society and
controversial topics that were likely to produce ﬂame wars. The decision of the Backbone
Cabal to sideline controversial topics in the“talk”(originally“ﬂame”) branch of the hierarchy,
which could be easily omitted from a site’s Usenet feed, was productive of much dissent from
17. Hauben, Michael & Hauben, Ronda, Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet (1996),
chapter 3
18. Pfaﬀenberger, Bryan, “If I Want It, It’s OK”: Usenet and the Outer Limits of Free Speech (1996), 371
19. Pfaﬀenberger, Bryan, “If I Want It, It’s OK”: Usenet and the Outer Limits of Free Speech (1996), 373
20. Pfaﬀenberger, Bryan, “If I Want It, It’s OK”: Usenet and the Outer Limits of Free Speech (1996), 371
21. Later, the facility for the moderator to be authenticated using digital cryptography was added to prevent
such forgeries, though this was only adopted in a minority of moderated groups: Rose, Greg G, The PGP Moose:
Implementation and Experience (1996).
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ordinary Usenet users.
22
Still further controversy resulted from the refusal of Backbone Cabal members to carry the
newly-formed groups rec.sex and rec.drugs. The process by which new newsgroup could be
formed had by around this time been formalised, such that proposals should ﬁrst be discussed
on the news.groups newsgroup, and a vote taken: if 100 more votes favoured the creation of
the newsgroup than opposed it, being at least two-thirds of the total number of votes, it
would be added to the list of oﬃcially recognised groups.
23 Yet although rec.sec and rec.drugs
had passed this test (or a less formal precursor of it), Spaﬀord declined to add them to his
“oﬃcial” list.
24
Whilst this may have suggested that Usenet was no longer organised along anarchistic lines
after all, but had become subject to the dominance of the Backbone Cabal, this did not
account for the fact that Usenet’s anarchistic origins had been embedded in its technical
architecture. Accordingly in 1987 a small group of Usenet administrators, dissatisﬁed with the
policies of the Cabal, simply bypassed it by establishing a new hierarchy of alt (“alternative”)
newsgroups, amongst the ﬁrst of which were alt.sex, alt.drugs, and for good measure, alt.rock-
n-roll.
25
In the alt hierarchy, new newsgroups could once again be created or deleted by anyone,
though normally a site would only choose to carry a group upon request, or following the
emergence of suﬃcient consensus as to the utility of the group on the alt.conﬁg newsgroup.
The alt hierarchy soon became, and remains, the biggest on Usenet.
A regular posting to the newsgroup news.announce.newusers, intended for new Usenet users
and originally authored by Chip Salzenberg, states under the heading“Usenet is not a democ-
racy,” that “[s]ince there is no person or group in charge of Usenet as a whole—ie there is
no Usenet ‘government’—it follows that Usenet cannot be a democracy, autocracy, or any
other kind of ‘-acy.’”
26 Whilst much else has changed in Internet governance in the intervening
years, Salzenberg’s statement remains accurate.
This is not to say that Usenet is a utopia. Far from it. The anarchistic system by which it
is governed has resulted in a measure of chaos and antisocial conduct online, ranging from
the omnipresent newsgroup spam that originated with lawyers Canter and Siegel,
27 to the
22. Pfaﬀenberger, Bryan, “If I Want It, It’s OK”: Usenet and the Outer Limits of Free Speech (1996), 375–376
23. Lawrence, David C, How to Create a New Usenet Newsgroup (2000)
24. Hardy, Henry E, The History of the Net (1993)
25. Pfaﬀenberger, Bryan, “If I Want It, It’s OK”: Usenet and the Outer Limits of Free Speech (1996), 377
26. Salzenberg, Chip, Spaﬀord, Gene, & Moraes, Mark, What is Usenet? (1998)
27. Campbell, K, A Net Conspiracy So Immense (1994)
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creation of groups such as alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.rape and alt.kill.jews. However, the
anarchistic project is not to create a utopia. Rocker writes,
Anarchism is no patent solution for all human problems, no Utopia of a perfect social order,
as it has so often been called, since on principle it rejects all absolute schemes and concepts.
It does not believe in any absolute truth, or in deﬁnite ﬁnal goals for human development, but
in an unlimited perfectibility of social arrangements and human living conditions, which are
always straining after higher forms of expression, and to which for this reason one can assign
no deﬁnite terminus nor set any ﬁxed goal.
28
4.1.1.2. Wikipedia
The popular online encyclopædia Wikipedia
29 provides an example of how an organisation
both more formal and more recent than Usenet might be successfully governed along anar-
chistic lines.
Wikipedia is the world’s largest encyclopædia. Its one millionth article in its English lan-
guage edition was published in March 2006, at which time there were also 228 other lan-
guage editions, eleven containing 100 000 articles or more. In February 2007 Wikipedia reached
its highest ranking of eighth amongst the most popular Web sites worldwide.
30
Wikipedia is only the most prominent example amongst thousands of “wikis”; Web sites
constructed and hosted using software which allows visitors to the site to collaboratively edit
its content using a convenient Web-based interface.
31 Other typical characteristics of wikis
are the heavy use of cross-hyperlinking between pages, and that contributors are required to
license their contributions under an open source style licence, so as to allow other users to
freely make their own adaptations of the content.
32
The problems that might have been expected to result from such a liberal regime have in-
deed arisen in Wikipedia’s case: regular vandalism of pages, “edit wars” between users who
compete to have the last word by undoing (“reverting”) each other’s changes, and the pub-
lication of inaccurate or erroneous information. Given that the mission of the site is to act
as an encyclopædia, it is this last problem that has drawn the most comment from critics. A
correspondent to the Washington Post is representative of these, writing:
28. Rocker, Rudolf, Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice (2004), 15
29. See http://www.wikipedia.org/.
30. See http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia.org_is_more_popular_than....
31. See generally Leuf, Bo & Cunningham, Ward, The Wiki Way: Quick Collaboration on the Web (2001).
The original Wiki software, WikiWikiWeb (see http://c2.com/cgi/wiki/), was released in 1994, but numerous
reimplementations and improvements upon the idea have since been written, including MediaWiki (see http:
//www.mediawiki.org/) upon which Wikipedia is built.
32. See Section 4.2.4.4.
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It combines the global reach and authoritative bearing of an Internet encyclopedia with the
worst elements of radicalized bloggers. You step into a blog, you know what you’re getting. But
if you search an encyclopedia, it’s fair to expect something else. Actual facts, say. At its worst,
Wikipedia is an active deception, a powerful piece of agitprop, not information.
33
However, other commentators have been impressed with Wikipedia’s accuracy. A 2005 report
in Nature found Wikipedia’s accuracy to be roughly comparable to that of Encyclopædia
Britannica (whilst this was strongly repudiated by Britannica,
34 Nature has defended its
original report
35).
The level of overall accuracy that Wikipedia has attained, and its resilience against attacks
from vandals and disruption from disputes between editors, are not accidental. They are
matters directly addressed by the norms of the Wikipedia community, and formalised in its
structure, and its oﬃcial policies and guidelines. As at September 2006, there were 42 policies
36
and hundreds of guidelines in place (guidelines being less imperative and more advisory in
nature than policies).
37
Tellingly however, there is one policy that explicitly overrides all others:“If the rules prevent
you from improving or maintaining Wikipedia’s quality, ignore them.” It is this policy that
reinforces the distinction between the rules of an hierarchical community and the norms of
an anarchistic one such as Wikipedia.
A further illustration of the diﬀerence between policies as rules and policies as norms is in
respect of the consequences of their breach. A Wikipedia editor who goes by the username
“the Cuncator” explains that breaches of policy “should not be used as reasons to violently
delete other people’s work. Rather, if you believe in the rules, you should attempt to convert
those people to your view. Use words, not force.”
38
Notwithstanding these sentiments, there has been a continuing tension between those Wi-
kipedia administrators and editors such as the Cuncator who favour the retention of an
anarchistic approach to the editing of the encyclopædia, and pragmatists such as Wikipedia’s
original co-founder Larry Sanger
39 who have proposed to create a hierarchy of more trusted
33. Ahrens, Frank, Death by Wikipedia: The Kenneth Lay Chronicles (2006)
34. Encyclopædia Britannica, Fatally Flawed: Refuting the Recent Study on Encyclopedic Accuracy by the Journal
Nature (2006); and Brittanica staﬀ have attacked Wikipedia’s accuracy elsewhere also: McHenry, Robert, The
Faith-Based Encyclopedia (2004) .
35. See http://www.nature.com/nature/britannica/.
36. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_policies.
37. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_guidelines.
38. Thurgood, J, How to Build Wikipedia (2003)
39. Sanger, whilst agreeing with the Cuncator that the Wikipedia project is organised anarchistically, criticises
it for being “anti-elitist (which, in this context, means that expertise is not accorded any special respect, and
snubs and disrespect of expertise is tolerated)”: Sanger, Larry, Why Wikipedia Must Jettison Its Anti-Elitism
(2004).
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users with elevated privileges,
40 such as exists on other community-developed Web sites such
as the venerable news discussion site, Slashdot.
41
Although Sanger’s views have not found favour within the broader Wikipedia community,
this is not to say that the project is completely egalitarian. Outside of its substantive work,
the administration of the project combines anarchistic with consensual, democratic, and even
hierarchical models of ordering.
42
As an example of consensual ordering, ordinary users cannot delete articles: this ability is
reserved to Wikipedia administrators, and then only after the issue has been put up for
discussion by all Wikipedia users for about a week, and a rough consensus has been reached
in favour of deletion. Anyone may nominate themselves (or another user) for the status
of administrator, and requests are assessed in much the same way as proposals to delete an
article; once a consensus is reached following a discussion period amongst Wikipedia editors.
43
As for democratic ordering, Wikipedia has a Mediation Committee and an Arbitration Com-
mittee which take a more substantive role in the editing process, by assisting to resolve
disputes between editors. Whilst membership of the Mediation Committee is open to any
who volunteer and who are approved by consensus discussion, the twelve members of the
Arbitration Committees are elected for three year terms by a vote of Wikipedia editors.
44
The MediaWiki software and databases themselves of course require computer hardware and
network connectivity in order to operate, and these in turn require funding, as well as admin-
istrative oversight. These issues are the responsibility of the ﬁve-member Board of Trustees
of the Wikimedia Foundation, a non-proﬁt organisation that has owned the infrastructure of
the Wikipedia project since 2003.
45
All active Wikipedia editors are eligible to vote in the biannual elections of the Board of
Trustees, and to nominate for one of two Board positions. However the remaining Board
positions are held by Wikipedia’s founder Jimmy Wales, and two members appointed by him.
The authority that Wales exercises in perpetuity is an example of hierarchical ordering within
the Wikipedia project.
46
40. Poe, Marshall, The Hive (2006)
41. See http://slashdot.org/.
42. These are to be discussed at Section 4.3.2, Section 4.3 and Section 4.2.
43. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators.
44. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Elections.
45. See http://www.wikimedia.org/.
46. Wales himself, an objectivist, could be described as a “minarchist” if not an anarchist: Poe, Marshall, The
Hive (2006).
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Thus the Wikipedia project does not embody anarchistic governance in its purest form, but
can perhaps be fairly described, in the words of the Cuncator, as“a noble attempt at a limited
anarchistic society.”
47 It illustrates well for present purposes is how an Internet-based social
entity of signiﬁcant size can, successfully and consistently with the principles of anarchism,
be internally governed largely through the non-hierarchical mechanisms of architecture (the
MediaWiki software) and norms (Wikipedia’s policies and guidelines).
4.1.2. Anarchistic Internet governance
It is appealing on an intuitive level to consider that the same anarchistic principles could
be applied in structuring a governance network to deal with Internet-related public policy
issues. The fact that anarchistic ordering is consistent with the Internet’s core architectural
principles on a technical level, and also philosophically consonant with many of them on a
cultural level (decentralisation, openness, egalitarianism, anonymity and cosmopolitanism in
particular), a network forged on anarchistic principles is likely to be more successful than one
modelled on, say, the hierarchical authority of traditional intergovernmental organisations,
by reason of being more culturally appropriate.
How would this work in practice? In essence, it would simply mean involving all stakeholders
in Internet governance, but disallowing any of them to coerce the others (even by democrat-
ic or meritocratic claims). The applicable structures of governance in an anarchistic order
could thus not be posited in advance, but would be those that emerge from spontaneous
networks between stakeholders that form and reform as required. Reagle, an anarchist who
has examined these characteristics in the Internet’s technical governance, writes,
With the cacophony of ideas, proposals, and debates, and a lack of a central authority to cleave
the good from the bad, how does one sort it all out? It sorts itself out. We need not delegate
our values to a central authority—subject to tyrannical or partisan tendencies. The success of
any policy is based simply on its adoption by the community.
48
Johnson and Post ground their preference for anarchistic ordering in Internet governance in
the fact that the geography of online activities does not coincide with the sovereignty of any
existing legal authority. They posit the emergence of responsible self-regulatory structures
on the net, based upon common consensus, much in the same manner as the law merchant
emerged from amongst those engaged in transnational commerce.
49
47. Thurgood, J, How to Build Wikipedia (2003)
48. Reagle, Joseph, Why the Internet is Good: Community Governance That Works Well (1999)
49. Johnson, David R & Post, David G, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace (1996)
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This should be carefully distinguished from self-regulation, at least in the conventional sense.
Such self-regulation is a form of governance in which stakeholders develop standards or codes
to which they prospectively agree to bind themselves, typically as a trade-oﬀ against the
threat of external coercion (such as governmental regulation). This is both inconsistent with
anarchism and a misreading of Johnson and Post, for whom no structured regulation should be
presupposed at all; rather, spontaneous regulation should be left to emerge through consensus.
To distinguish this notion from self-regulation in the ﬁrst sense given above, the phrase
“decentralised collective action”
50 may be used.
The “rules” that emerge from decentralised collective action do not derive their force from
hierarchical authority, which leaves markets, norms and architecture as the three possible
mechanisms of internal governance for an anarchistic governance network.
51
An example of the use of markets in anarchistic Internet governance is found in some of early
experiments in gTLD administration. At around the time of the IAHC, other DNS systems
such as eDNS
52 were set up on a free market model, that in the case of eDNS would have
allowed an unlimited number of registrars to administer up to ten new domains each, whilst
still interoperating with the legacy IANA and NSI-administered domains.
53 There was even
a similar project in Australia, the AURSC, which ended up with 28 new TLDs.
54 Both,
having been superseded by ICANN (whose registry contracts prohibit dealings with alternate
roots),
55 are now defunct, though there do remain a number of other active alternate roots
with limited use.
The result would have been either a market of competitors oﬀering similar services, or the
market’s convergence on a single winner through the force of network externalities,
56 produc-
ing a succession of serial monopolies. Either of these outcomes could have been alternatives
to the ICANN model in which a single body is institutionalised in the role through the hier-
archical force of its contract with the United States Department of Commerce.
57 Higgs has
50. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, The Idea of ICANN (2001)
51. Though anarchists of the collectivist and communist schools, contrary to anarcho-capitalists, would omit the
ﬁrst of these, since market forces are supported by governmental enforcement of private property rights: Kinna,
Ruth, Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide (2005), 25.
52. Previously at http://www.edns.net/; see http://web.archive.org/web/19981201040715/http://www.
edns.net/.
53. Rony, Ellan & Rony, Peter, The Domain Name Handbook: High Stakes and Strategies in Cyberspace (1998),
544
54. Australian Root Server Consortium - see http://www.aursc.ah.net/. Two other similar projects, uDNS and
AlterNIC, are not only defunct but also no longer live on the Web.
55. Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 220–221
56. That is, the service becomes more valuable when more people use it: see Katz, M L & Shapiro, C, Technology
Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities (1986).
57. Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 56
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even applied game theory to the issue of multiple DNS roots, and concluded that it would
be rational for multiple DNS roots to voluntarily cooperate,
58 as in practice many of them
have.
59
As for the use of norms within an anarchistic transnational network, the London Action Plan
provides a good example. Whilst its members do agree to cooperate in the battle against
spam through the use of tools such as domestic anti-spam legislation and education of users
and businesses, they are not legally compelled to do so as they would be under a traditional
intergovernmental agreement (not to mention that a traditional intergovernmental agreement
would not include the private sector stakeholders that the LAP does). Rather, the LAP relies
solely upon its members’ shared norms as its internal mechanism of governance.
As well as being culturally appropriate for the governance of networks engaged in Internet
public policy development, decentralised collective action also oﬀers a number of practical
beneﬁts over hierarchical methods for the internal governance of networks. These include the
ability to be more responsive to changes in the environment, to transcend the archaic terri-
torial focus that is implicit in the Westphalian state system, and to develop and implement
policies less expensively and more quickly.
60 In short, decentralised collective action is not
only more culturally acceptable on the Internet, but can also be more eﬃcient than hierar-
chical alternatives.
4.1.3. Criticisms
On the other hand, there are also other factors to be considered in assessing the appropri-
ateness of anarchistic organisation for a governance network. At root, these factors are the
network’s legitimacy and its eﬀectiveness.
61 It has already been determined that a network
involving all stakeholders is the most legitimate mechanism of public policy governance for
the Internet, and there is no reason to reopen that question here.
62 However, where that net-
work is organised along anarchistic lines, its involvement of all stakeholders to the requisite
degree is likely to be more diﬃcult to demonstrate.
The two main indicia of an organisation’s legitimacy are its accountability and transparency.
These are important to whichever organisational structure is adopted by a governance net-
58. Higgs, S, Applying Game Theory To The Domain Name Root System (2002)
59. See http://www.publicroot.org/, a project to unify all known operational TLDs under a single
independently-maintained root.
60. Weber, Rolf H, Regulatory Models for the Online World (2002), 80, 83–84
61. See Section 3.4.1.
62. See Section 2.4.
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work, and hence although they will be considered here to illustrate the main shortcomings
of anarchistic ordering for a governance network, they are to be discussed in more depth at
Section 4.3.3.
Brieﬂy then, considering accountability in respect of the anarchistic structure in particular,
the ﬂuidity with which the arrangements between stakeholders in such a structure may form
and reform make it diﬃcult to ensure that at any given point, those arrangements are ad-
equately inclusive of all stakeholders. Governments may, for example (and do), enter into
arrangements between themselves without consultation with the private sector and civil soci-
ety, or vice versa. Even where all stakeholder groups are represented, their power within the
network may be unequal, replicating similar inequalities in the larger international system.
63
This is not important in other contexts—Wikipedia, for example, publishes an encyclopædia;
it does not deliberate upon issues of public policy that might aﬀect stakeholders other than
its own users, and therefore is not required to be accountable to them. But for a public policy
governance network, stakeholders’ uncertainty of the state of power relations in a governance
network at any given time, and (by deﬁnition) their lack of control over the same, is a serious
shortcoming of the anarchistic structure.
As for transparency, the London Action Plan, for example, has a“Members Only”section of
its Web site that conceals a number of the details of its activities. Less formal governance
networks of anarchistic structure are likely to be even less transparent.
As far as eﬀectiveness is concerned, certainly, the eﬃciency of anarchistic ordering, and its
cultural appropriateness (which increases the likely eﬀectiveness of its internal governance
by norms), both of which have already been noted, are positive indicators. On the other
hand, detracting from the eﬀectiveness of an anarchistically ordered governance network is
its very voluntariness. Without denying that norms and architecture can eﬀectively channel
cooperative behaviour, there are also cases in which if stakeholders are given the choice to
cooperate or to act strategically on their own, they will take the latter course.
In fact, rational choice theorists claim that strategic behaviour will be the rule rather than
the exception in such cases. The prisoner’s dilemma famously and simply illustrates the
problem. If two accused prisoners in adjoining cells could cooperate and minimise each other’s
sentence by remaining silent, or could betray the other in order to go free themselves, it would
always be in their rational self-interest to betray each other (or to“defect”in the language of
63. See Section 4.3.5.3.
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game theory). This is so even though cooperation would have resulted in the least collective
deprivation of liberty for them both.
64
Whilst the anarchist’s response is that cooperation does begin to become a rational strategy
over the long term (which it does), even in such cases it is rarely the only rational strategy.
65
Thus for liberals, the institution of the state is necessary to protect individual rights that
might be infringed by the strategic behaviour of others that game theory predicts.
66 In other
contexts, it may be necessary for some other hierarchical authority to take the state’s place
in performing this function.
It may also be properly objected by anarchists that rational choice theory tends to leave
aside the forces of norms and institutions which can result in cooperative behaviour emerg-
ing sooner than rational choice theory might predict;
67 however in the present context the
point remains that there is little empirical evidence of stable governance networks that are
truly inclusive of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organisations
forming spontaneously.
68
But for the supranational authoritative force of the United Nations, for example (admittedly
exercised through a soft law process), it is doubtful that the IGF would have come into being.
There are many more examples (and the IGF may become one of them) in which govern-
ments have strategically gained the dominant position in what should have been a multi-
stakeholder network—in the ITU, for example—and other cases in which non-governmental
stakeholders have done so, as in the case of the ill-fated IAHC and its gTLD-MoU.
What is perhaps needed to overcome the problem of short-term strategic behaviour, and the
other problems of anarchistic ordering that have been noted, is a hybrid which preserves
the eﬃciency and cultural ﬁt of decentralised collective action, with the greater (or at least
more certain) accountability, transparency and eﬀectiveness made possible by more structured
organisational forms that utilise governance by rules. One such hybrid is called co-regulation.
But it is hardly anarchistic; which takes us to the second of the four organisational structures
to be considered in this chapter.
64. Poundstone, William, Prisoner’s Dilemma (1992), 120
65. Rutten, Andrew, Can Anarchy Save Us From Leviathan? (1999), 587–591; Hardin, Russell, Political Obliga-
tion (1989) , 115
66. Sugden, Robert, Maximizing Social Welfare: Is it the Government’s Business? (1989), 83
67. Green, Donald & Shapiro, Ian, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political
Science (1994), 121–123
68. Vedel, Thierry, Four Models for Internet Governance (2005), 65
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4.2. Hierarchical
To suggest that a governance network should be structured along hierarchical lines might
hardly seem worth considering, in light of the conclusion already reached that its structure
should concord with the architectural values of the Internet. But there are three reasons why
this option should be in fact be considered.
First and most fundamentally, it should be recalled that the appropriate internal organisa-
tional structure for a governance network is a conceptually separate issue from the given fact
that it must be inclusive of three separate stakeholder groups in its operation as a network.
No structure that fails to adequately accommodate multi-stakeholderism can be considered
for a governance network such as the IGF, whether it is hierarchical or otherwise—but the
extent to which it does so should not be prejudged.
Second, but similarly, the adoption of an hierarchical structure for a governance network
leaves open the question of how, and by whom, the structure would be established, as it
cannot hoist itself into being by its own bootstraps (unless it could do so by force). There
would have to be an existing organisation superior to, or at least preceding, the governance
network, by which it was formed. That organisation need not itself necessarily be organised
along hierarchical lines, but could emerge by a consensual process involving all stakeholders
(as, supposedly, ICANN emerged from the IFWP).
The third reason why the hierarchical option for the form of a governance network should not
be discounted is that in the present context, it is not to be taken as implying authoritarianism,
but simply top–down ordering, which includes forms such as bureaucracy, oligarchy and
meritocracy. These will be examined in turn, before discussion turns to some examples of
these forms of structure in domestic politics (including the case of co-regulation mentioned
above), and in Internet governance.
4.2.1. Bureaucracy
An hierarchically-structured bureaucracy was considered by Weber as the most eﬃcient form
an organisation could take. Thus the bureaucratic form is often found in governance networks,
especially those in which governments take the lead role.
69
69. Skelcher, Chris, Mathur, Navdeep, & Smith, Mike, The Public Governance of Collaborative Spaces: Discourse,
Design and Democracy (2005), 578, 591
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There are a number of features central to the ideal type of a bureaucracy for Weber. which
include:
￿ The use of impersonal rules as an internal mechanism of governance, covering such issues
as the division of labour into a hierarchy of oﬃces, criteria for selection to hold those oﬃces
and to advance within the organisation, and procedures for the conduct of the organisation’s
work programme.
￿ Oﬃces within the organisation are separated from the persons holding them, so that for
example oﬃce holders do not own the tools with which they perform their service, and
interactions between oﬃce holders are conducted on an impersonal level, thereby limiting
the scope for interpersonal conﬂict within the organisation.
￿ Permanent written records of the organisation’s activities are to be maintained, which not
only supports the separation of person from position, in that if an oﬃce holder is replaced,
a record of their actions remains, but also provides a body of evidence from which the
eﬃciency of the organisation’s rules can be assessed and reﬁned.
70
It may appear from this that a Weberian bureaucracy is not necessarily incompatible with
the multi-stakeholderism required of a governance network, in that it does not preclude those
in authority from allowing their subordinates to contribute to the governance process through
formal channels. On the contrary, it is structured as it is precisely because the division of
labour that it speciﬁes provides each member of an organisation with a unique and formally-
deﬁned role that contributes to the working of the larger whole.
The separation of organisational roles from the identities of those who occupy them, and the
reliance upon merit as the sole criterion for appointment to such roles, might also be said to
also support the participation of all stakeholders, by ensuring that positions of authority are
held by those best qualiﬁed for them, and that they conduct their duties in accordance with
impartial rules rather than in their own personal interests.
However on closer examination, herein also lies a fatal limitation with the use of a bureau-
cratic structure, even in its ideal form, as a model for the internal structure of a governance
network. Requiring that stakeholders participating in a bureaucratically-structured gover-
nance network act in roles precisely deﬁned by formal rules, completely obviates the reason
for involving those stakeholders in the ﬁrst place.
70. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1964)
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The reason for requiring that a governance network include all stakeholders is precisely be-
cause they represent their own values. Governments represent the interests of their citizens,
the private sector represents the value of the free market, and civil society represents the val-
ues of the public outside of their national aﬃliations. Requiring these stakeholders instead to
anonymously act out predeﬁned roles in support of an amorphous collective interest dictated
from above would defeat this purpose altogether.
However saying this does raise an interesting question: what if the interest from above was not
that dictated by a single stakeholder representative (whomever was judged as most meritorious
to exercise authority over the others), but rather by a panel on which all three stakeholder
groups were represented?
Such a panel would be an oligarchy.
4.2.2. Oligarchy
The principal advantage of oligarchical rule, in which power is restricted to a small deﬁned
group, is that by reducing the number of participants, decisions can be made more quickly
and with less contention amongst the decision-makers than in a system, such as democracy,
with a broader power base. These beneﬁts of oligarchy accrue at the cost of it being less
representative and accountable to the governed than democracy, and therefore oﬀering them
less protection against tyranny.
However, the force of this objection is lessened by two observations. First, there is no transna-
tional demos to which the interests of all three stakeholder groups can be traced. Therefore,
at least until such a polity is brought into being, democratic representation is not an option,
leaving oligarchy as perhaps the only practical alternative.
71
Second, there is empirical evidence that oligarchy may be the natural state of any organisation,
no matter how it is initially structured; whether as a bureaucracy, democracy or anarchy.
This is Michels’“iron law of oligarchy”: that in any small group there is a tendency for power
to be concentrated in the hands of an elite who have both the will and the means to organise
others.
72
71. Though this question will be revisited at Section 4.3.
72. Michels, Robert, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy
(1962)
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4.2.2.1. ICANN as an oligarchy
This latter point is evident in the context of Internet governance. Because ICANN for ex-
ample, whilst claiming to operate upon consensual principles, has in practice been driven
largely by its professional staﬀ and select corporate and government stakeholders, it has
been described as an “authoritarian–pluralist” institution.
73 Former ICANN board member
Karl Auerbach explains, “ICANN is an oligarchy. ICANN claims it’s a private organization
yet it claims immunity from things like antitrust because it derives its powers via contracts
with the government.”
74 Weinberg agrees that “ICANN demonstrates Aristotle’s fear of the
degeneration of aristocracy into oligarchy.”
75
One of the factors to which the ICANN board’s unilateralism in policy formation is attributed
is that there has been widespread disengagement from and apparent apathy towards many
of the issues in question by the Internet community. However this may be explained in part
by the fact that the constituencies for community participation in ICANN’s policy processes
were established in a top–down fashion,
76 that the avenues for the receipt of input have been
unduly limited,
77 and indeed that the community’s input, when provided, has been largely
disregarded.
78
In any case, if Michels’ Law holds, then attempting to reform ICANN to redress its perceived
lack of public accountability is a misguided endeavour. An alternative, putting idealism aside,
is to recognise ICANN for the oligarchy that it perhaps inevitably is, and allow it to make
policy according to its own best judgment, without being distracted by the need for token
eﬀorts at public engagement. After all, nobody (not even ICANN) ever claimed that the
organisation was a democracy. To the extent that its board exercises a representative function
at all, it is more in the nature of guardianship than agency. Franda writes:
For business people generally, the idea of a board member’s representation is not the public
representational function of someone duly authorized by an election or other legitimizing process
to speak for a large constituency. Rather, it is the idea that someone will know and understand
a speciﬁc business interest and be able to speak for that interest in forums where such interests
are being challenged.
79
73. Palfrey Jr, John G, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed
(2004), 40, 45
74. Koman, Richard, Karl Auerbach: ICANN “Out of Control” (2002)
75. Weinberg, Jonathan, Geeks and Greeks (2001), 327
76. See Section 2.1.1.1.
77. For example, a 2007 request for public comments on ICANN’s performance was held open for less than one
month: see http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-08may07.htm.
78. Palfrey Jr, John G, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed
(2004), 34, 50–52
79. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 67. To similar
eﬀect is the proposition discussed within the IGF’s Advisory Group that its “members should be chosen on the
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Thus the EFF, for example, was often described as a representative body long before it
actually had an open membership, by dint of its demonstrated ability to advocate for the
rights and interests of online communities.
80
On this view, an“autocratic approach might well be most eﬃcient way to structure ICANN in
order to carry out its mission.”
81
4.2.2.2. The IGF as an oligarchy
The same argument applies in principle to the IGF. If power within a governance network such
as the IGF would inevitably evolve (or devolve) into an oligarchical form anyway, concen-
trated in the hands of those who have the initiative to put the most into the process, then
perhaps it is quixotic to insist that the IGF should ever pretend to anything other than an
oligarchical structure. If those whose power was most critical to the IGF’s establishment were
those who would lead it, the IGF would perhaps be an oligarchy of the United States and
European Union, the ICC, ISOC and the ITU for each of the respective stakeholder groups.
No doubt they would do at least as good a job of policy development between themselves as
ICANN has in its domain.
82
But there are two problems, one procedural and the other normative. The procedural problem
is that we still have no answer as to how the governance network is to operate, save that its
composition is to be limited to a small number of powerful members. How are those partici-
pants to resolve disagreements between themselves? The speciﬁcation of the oligarchical form
alone provides no answer. Perhaps the power of certain large stakeholders will exceed that of
others. For example the ICC had much less to do with the ﬁnal form of the Tunis Agenda
than did the other three stakeholder representatives nominated in the previous paragraph.
What would prevent those other representatives from vetoing the power of the ICC within the
IGF oligarchy, and thus eﬀectively excluding the private sector as a stakeholder altogether?
The second and more fundamental problem is that there are no normative criteria implicit
in the oligarchical form by which to determine who is to be privileged with the status of
membership. Indeed, this question is entirely exogenous to the oligarchical structure, which
simply entrenches existing power relations. Whilst it may be true that organisations will tend
basis of how large and diverse a community they connect to (which is diﬀerent than ‘represent’)”: IGF Secretariat,
Advisory Group Discussion 6 December 2007 to 15 January 2008 (2008) , 3.
80. Godwin, M, The Electronic Frontier Foundation and Virtual Communities (1991)
81. Palfrey Jr, John G, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed
(2004), 57
82. The IGF’s stakeholders have indeed divided into a small number of factions, but not quite along the lines
suggested here: see Section 5.2.1.1.
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towards oligarchy in any case, it is fatalistic simply to allow that “those who will rule, will
rule”without questioning how it came about that they should do so. Would those who might
form an oligarchical governance network be the most public spirited amongst the stakeholder
representatives, or simply the most politically and economically powerful?
Even the bureaucratic organisation, whilst already rejected as unsuitable for a governance
network, provides normative guidelines for the progression of suitable candidates up the hi-
erarchy of authority, by requiring that promotion should be on the grounds of merit, rather
than on other grounds such as nepotism or political inﬂuence. But can the concept of merit
be applied to a governance network, and if so, how would it fall to be assessed? These are
questions central to another form of hierarchical governance: meritocracy.
4.2.3. Meritocracy
The idea that rule should be exercised by those who are the best was originally conveyed by
the term aristocracy, for which it is the literal meaning of the Greek. Though it is not named
for him, aristocracy is often associated with Aristotle, who championed it in his Politics in
the third century BC.
83 However the modern understanding of aristocracy, especially since
the French revolution in 1789, is no longer associated with individual merit but with the
hereditary power of an idle bourgeoisie, whose rule could often more suitably be described as
plutocracy (rule by the rich).
The more modern term meritocracy is used to denote a system of rule by which those best
qualiﬁed to do so, by reason of their personal attributes or their technical expertise.
84 Of all
the hierarchical forms of organisation considered so far, meritocracy could be said to hold
the most promise, in that it provides a normative basis upon which the most competent
representatives of each of the stakeholder groups, rather than necessarily the most powerful,
could be aﬀorded the right to lead the governance network.
This conception of a peak body of moral leaders or technical experts is not even so far from the
way in which representative democracy functions, whereby the people delegate their power
to those representatives who they believe not only share their political preferences, but are
also the most capable and well informed in political matters.
83. Aristotle, Politics (1943)
84. The latter is more speciﬁcally termed technocracy.
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Unlike representative democracy of course, there is no democratic process by which the most
meritorious candidates are selected. Therefore in order for the principle of merit to prevail
over the “law of the jungle” of oligarchy it will be necessary for the rules by which merit is
assessed to be either agreed by consensus, or be settled by some other objective means.
85
The requirement of objectivity rules out the basis upon which Aristotle, a virtue ethicist,
assessed merit. For Aristotle, merit was earned by doing virtuous deeds, where the virtuous
choice in most cases would be found by pursuing the “Golden Mean” between two extreme
ethical alternatives.
86 But there are a variety of alternative and incompatible ethical systems,
including deontological, teleological and consequentialist variants, and at least one secular
teleological ethical system, Objectivism, which explicitly claims to be objectively valid.
87
No such claim is compatible with the liberal neutrality that allows all to pursue their own
conception of the good life, subject only to the observance of the equal rights of others to do
the same.
88
Assuming that some consensual or objective basis for the assessment of merit exists, it will
also be necessary for the continuing merit of the incumbent authorities to be periodically
measured against the same standard, lest they begin to act with unmeritorious self-regard
and the meritocracy thus degenerate into oligarchy, a fate of which Aristotle warned.
89
4.2.3.1. The IETF as a meritocracy
In the context of Internet governance, the IETF provides an example of an organisation in
which merit is assessed using a consensually-agreed standard. Despite its open membership
and bottom–up character, the IETF been described as a technical meritocracy (or technoc-
racy) because of the priority that is aﬀorded by the community to the views and preferences
of those who have demonstrated their superior technical expertise.
90 In this, the standard of
merit that prevails within the IETF mirrors the principle of the Hacker Ethic that “hackers
should be judged by their hacking.”
91
Although the assessment of merit within the IETF is principled, it is inherently imprecise.
85. As an aside, why objective? Simply because a meritocracy subjectively so declared by hierarchical means, and
an oligarchy with no normative basis for its composition, are indistinguishable to the governed; each is equally
arbitrary and hegemonic. If an authority is to establish a meritocracy that can be properly so called regardless
of the lack of consent of the governed, then it must be able to demonstrate that merit by objective means.
86. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (2000)
87. Rand, Ayn, The Virtue of Selﬁshness: A New Concept of Egoism (1964)
88. See Section 3.4.3.2.
89. Aristotle, Politics (1943), 138–139
90. Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 91
91. Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001), 43
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In other online contexts, less ad hoc metrics for the assessment of merit have been used. For
example, on Wikipedia, users are more likely to be promoted to the status of administrator
if they can demonstrate the range, extent and quality of their contributions to the project
to the Wikipedia community. Although no formal criteria apply, a number of members of
the community have established their own metrics for the assessment of applicants’ merit,
including the length of time they have been participating and the number of articles of
particular types that they have edited.
92
Even more quantitative measurements of merit (or reputation) are used elsewhere online,
as for example on eBay, where each registered user has a feedback score comprised of the
total of positive, neutral or negative ratings by other users with whom they have transacted
business, and which has been found to have a direct correlation with the selling price of items
they sell at auction.
93 Similarly on discussion sites such as Slashdot, a user can earn“karma”
by means such as posting comments that other users rate as “insightful” or “interesting.” A
higher karma score elevates the user’s privileges on the site.
94
Whilst most reputation-tracking mechanisms are speciﬁc to a particular Internet site or ser-
vice, there are also those designed to be used across various sites or services that a user might
inhabit. For example Playerep is a Web-based reputation-tracking service which allows play-
ers of online games to rate each other on factors such as competency, knowledge, fairness and
sociability.
95
More relevant to the IGF, there are also products designed for online deliberation and col-
laboration, such as the Dialog Dashboard, which incorporate the facility for participants to
attribute reputation points to one another based on their contributions to the discussion pro-
cess. Unchat is a similar product which allows contributors to choose which of them should
be granted moderation privileges (or have them revoked) based on their contribution to the
discussion as it occurs. Both of these products will be revisited at Section 4.3.4.3.
All of the forms of meritocracy described here are notable in that the process by which
the recognition of merit is bestowed is not a unique event, but a conditional and ongoing
one, thus fulﬁlling Aristotle’s admonition that a meritocracy must be guarded against its
tendency to degrade into a mere oligarchy. However, therein lies the problem with each of the
meritocracies described (although it is not so much a problem, as an ontological issue): at what
92. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_adminship.
93. Resnick, Paul, Zeckhauser, Richard, Swanson, John, & Lockwood, Kate, The Value of Reputation on eBay:
A Controlled Experiment (2006)
94. Froomkin, A M, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace (2003), 863–867
95. See http://www.playerep.com/.
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point does a meritocracy in which positions of authority are assigned through a democratic
or consensual process, cease to be hierarchical at all, and simply become a democratic or
consensual organisation?
For consistency, that dividing line must be reached when the power of the meritocracy is
conditioned upon the ongoing consent of the governed. Thus if criteria for the assessment
of merit are at ﬁrst decided by consensual means and the composition of the meritocracy is
thereafter only to be determined by reference to those agreed criteria, the organisation may
be described as an hierarchical meritocracy. If the criteria are subject to ongoing review by
either consensual or democratic means, then the organisation is more accurately described as
democratic or consensual.
By this deﬁnition, it may be concluded that the IETF, even if it is a meritocracy, is not in
fact an hierarchical one, as the criteria by which technical merit is assessed are informal and
subject to continual re-evaluation by the community.
4.2.3.2. The IGF as a meritocracy
This is not however to say that there is no organisation in the context of Internet governance
which is both meritocratic and hierarchical (that is, the structure of which is not subject to
displacement by consensual or democratic means). Take the example of the IGF’s Advisory
Group, a steering committee tasked with the preparation of the substantive agenda and
programme for the IGF’s annual meetings. Rather than through a democratic or consensual
process, this group was appointed through the hierarchical power of the United Nations.
96
Unfortunately the question of how the Advisory Group’s merit was assessed is somewhat
obscure, as the process by which its members were selected was not public. Nonetheless as
the selection process did not avail itself of (what is, let us accept for now)
97 the inherent
normative force of a democratic or consensual process, and as the United Nations has no
legitimate authority to unilaterally prescribe the composition of a multi-stakeholder group,
98
some other objective normative basis must be presented for the attribution of merit to those
selected, if the Advisory Group is to be considered as anything other than an oligarchy.
There are two possible such criteria by which the merit of the members of a multi-stakeholder
governance network formed by hierarchical means might be assessed. First (and most funda-
mental) is the extent to which they embody the values that that stakeholder group brings
96. See Section 5.2.1.
97. See Section 4.3.
98. See the introduction to this section and Section 6.3.1.3.
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to the governance network. Second is the extent to which they contribute to the substantive
work of the governance network. Taking these in turn:
￿ It is not too diﬃcult to objectively determine which stakeholder group a member represents.
However, beyond this there is no objective basis upon which to compare their relative merit
within each stakeholder group. For example, there could have been no objective basis for
the United Nations to determine that the values of civil society were better represented
within the Advisory Committee by ICANN than the IETF, or of the private sector by
Microsoft rather than Red Hat.
This is not to say that there are no objective metrics that could be used to distinguish
these stakeholders from each other: for example, GDP in the case of governments, net
proﬁts in the case of the private sector, and membership numbers in the case of civil
society. Neither is it even to say that these metrics are irrelevant to the values that the
stakeholders in question bring to a governance network.
99 Rather, the lack of objectivity is
in the assumption that size matters (or that any other applicable quantiﬁer for the metric
chosen does).
The argument is easier to understand when the respective merits of stakeholders inter se
are considered in other contexts. For example, does the United States have more merit
as a stakeholder within the United Nations than China? Does McDonalds better embody
the values of the market than The Body Shop? Is Greenpeace more important than World
Vision within civil society? In each case, perhaps so. But equally, perhaps not; and the point
is not to decide the question either way, but simply to acknowledge that it is a subjective
one.
￿ It may be possible to objectively analyse the participants’ capacities to contribute to the
workload of a governance network, based on much the same criteria as would have been used
in assessing their suitability for employment. There are, certainly, a wealth of more-or-less
objective criteria by which work-related competencies can be judged.
100 And there is in fact
nothing wrong with the use of this criterion to judge the productive merit of members of a
governance network, in so far as it goes. The problem is simply that without having been
able to objectively determine which stakeholders were most meritorious by the preceding
criterion, this criterion alone is a poor substitute. To rely upon it solely is to assess the merit
99. That is, the merit of citizen representation for government, of market eﬃciency for the private sector, and
of transnational substantive values for civil society.
100. For example, Dubois, David & Rothwell, William, The Competency Toolkit (2000).
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of members of a governance network, by reference to their instrumental worth rather than
their intrinsic worth as stakeholders, is to treat them as cogs in a decision-making machine,
rather than as the very source of the values from which their decision-making draws its
legitimacy.
A fundamental diﬃculty with the selection by hierarchical means of a meritocracy to lead
a governance network is thus exposed. Democratic and consensual processes aside, there is
no objective basis for adequately assessing the merit of candidates to lead a governance
network engaged in the development of public policy. Thus in the end, although hierarchi-
cal meritocracy has come much closer than bureaucracy and oligarchy, it is still not quite an
appropriate organisational form for a governance network.
4.2.4. Hybrid models
This does, however, suggest the way forward: a hybrid between hierarchical ordering in the
form of meritocracy, and a more participatory form of anarchistic, democratic or consensual
ordering, to ﬁll the normative holes in the hierarchical option, while retaining many of its
beneﬁts (such as the greater eﬃciency of a smaller governance body). Such a mixed system
of governance is in fact precisely what Aristotle recommended.
101 It is also widely seen in
Internet governance. ICANN, most notably has been described as a “semi-democracy,”
102
combining hierarchical and democratic elements, through the composition of its board which
is drawn partly from the meritocratic Supporting Organisations and partly from the At Large
community.
103 The same idea is found in other organisations in which a standing committee
is appointed alongside elected members, for example in the Wikimedia Foundation and the
W3C.
4.2.4.1. Co-regulation
Another example of an eﬀective hybrid of hierarchical and participatory forms, as foreshad-
owed at the close of the discussion of anarchism, is the case of co-regulation.
Co-regulation illustrates a possible compromise between anarchistic forms of ordering (by
norms, markets and architecture) and governance by rules, in which decentralised collective
action is guided or directed by government (or to generalise this case, by some other hierar-
101. Aristotle, Politics (1943), 195
102. Palfrey Jr, John G, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed
(2004)
103. Weinberg, Jonathan, Geeks and Greeks (2001), 329
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chical authority). To be more speciﬁc, co-regulation is the process by which an industry or
industry segment is permitted to draft its own code of conduct on a particular issue, which
if acceptable to the executive agency responsible for regulating that issue area, will be “reg-
istered” by it to serve in lieu of government regulation. Once registered the code applies to
the entire industry sector in question, so that even those who are not signatories to it can be
directed by the agency to comply with it.
There are numerous possible variations of this model along a continuum between pure hierar-
chical ordering and pure decentralised collective action (or between “command and control”
and self-regulation, in simpler if less precise terms),
104 and these are sometimes known by
other names such as“enforced self-regulation”
105 and“policy co-ordination,”
106 but the name
and description given reﬂect the dominant practice in Australia.
Examples of co-regulatory regimes already in place in Australia include the various codes on
topics such as billing and customer complaints developed by Communications Alliance Ltd for
the telecommunications industry under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), the Internet
content regulation regime established under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) and
drafted by the IIA for the Internet industry, and two codes under the Spam Act 2003 (Cth),
one of which was drafted by a committee of the IIA for the Internet industry and the other by
the Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA) for the direct marketing industry.
107
In all of these cases, the government agency responsible for the registration of the codes is
ACMA.
108
The beneﬁts of co-regulation can be described by comparison to either of the pure forms of
which it is a hybrid. Over pure hierarchical organisational forms, it oﬀers many of the same
beneﬁts as self-regulation, such as its greater speed and reduced expense over traditional
governmental regulation, the ability of industry to develop or modify codes swiftly in response
to environmental stimuli, as well as the pull towards voluntary compliance that is associated
with governance by norms.
109
As for the beneﬁts of co-regulation over anarchistic forms of ordering, the ability for compli-
ance with a co-regulatory code to be independently enforced addresses the limited eﬀective-
104. Sinclair, Darren, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control?: Beyond False Dichotomies (1997), 544
105. Braithwaite, John, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control (1982)
106. Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang, Global Governance in the Information Age: GBDe and ICANN as “Pilot Projects”
for Co-regulation and a New Trilateral Policy? (2001), 20
107. Malcolm, Jeremy M, Australia’s Stand on Spam (2004)
108. See http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_2525.
109. Weber, Rolf H, Regulatory Models for the Online World (2002), 80, 83–84
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ness of anarchistic ordering that results from its voluntary nature.
110 Although a registered
co-regulatory code does not have the full force of law, pursuant to section 121 of the Telecom-
munications Act 1997 (Cth), a member of an industry covered by a code can be directed to
comply with its provisions by ACMA. It is an oﬀence to fail to comply with such a direction.
The substantive content of the code is also more likely to reﬂect public policy concerns, rather
than serving only the interests of its drafters as is often found in cases of pure self-regulation.
111
This is achieved in much the same way as in the case of directives of the European Union,
whereby the government regulator speciﬁes certain minimum outcomes that code is required
to achieve, but not how those outcomes are to be achieved, which is left to the discretion of
the industry.
112
The problems of accountability and transparency associated with anarchistic ordering can
also be addressed in co-regulatory structures, by establishing systems for the regulator to
monitor compliance and for complaints to be independently heard. For example, clause 12
of the Internet Industry Spam Code of Practice drafted by the IIA provides that consumers
may make complaints about an ISP’s breach of the code to ACMA, which will refer them to
the IIA or the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) for determination.
113
Since these are all beneﬁts to government more so than to industry, it is a misapprehension
to consider that phenomena such as co-regulation represent a loss of power by states to the
private sector. Rather, the sharing of state authority with private actors is a process for which
states are largely responsible, and which serves their own ends ﬁrst and foremost.
114
However whilst addressing some of the shortcomings of each of the pure regulatory forms, the
co-regulatory form does introduce or exacerbate certain other problems. These include the
risk of regulatory capture,
115 and the inherent incentive for industry to “cheat,” for example
by writing loopholes into its codes.
116
These dangers underline the need for broadly-based oversight of co-regulatory arrangements,
from civil society as well as government.
117 For example section 117 of the Telecommunications
Act requires codes registered under that Act to be subjected to an open process of public
110. Braithwaite, John, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control (1982), 1470
111. Page, A C, Self Regulation and Codes of Practice (1980)
112. Gunningham, Neil & Rees, Joseph, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective (1997), 401
113. IIA, Internet Industry Spam Code of Practice (2005)
114. Sassen, Saskia, The State and Globalization (2002)
115. Braithwaite, John, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control (1982), 1492
116. Braithwaite, John, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control (1982), 1495–1496
117. Gunningham, Neil & Rees, Joseph, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective (1997), 402–405
181Chapter 4. Designing a governance network
consultation. All codes registered to date have also been subject to regular review, with the
ﬁrst review of the Spam Code for example taking place one year after its registration.
4.2.4.2. Hybrid models in Internet governance
The model of domestic co-regulation could in principle be extended to the international arena,
as self-regulatory arrangements are naturally extensible transnationally, as for example in the
case of the International Bar Association’s
118 International Code of Ethics.
119 However in
practice this is complicated by the limited choice of international authorities to assume the
regulator’s role. Although there may already be an appropriate regulator in some issue areas,
such as the WTO (which with the assistance of its members could transform international
commercial arbitration into a co-regulatory regime), in other issue areas such as Internet
governance new intergovernmental agreements may be required to establish a regulatory
framework.
For this reason there are few existing international or transnational examples analogous to
domestic co-regulation, but the European Union’s CE mark found on consumer and industrial
goods oﬀers one. The requirement for goods sold within the European Union to conform to
EU standards and to carry the CE mark is mandated by EU resolution, but a product’s con-
formity to those EU standards is self-assessed by or on behalf of the product’s manufacturers,
who must create a test report and declaration of conformity to support their assessment.
120
Hybrid regulatory models are found in the context of Internet governance also. Most signiﬁ-
cantly, ICANN remains contracted until at least 2009 to the NTIA, which allows ICANN to
manage the DNS essentially independently, while the NTIA retains ultimate authority over
the DNS root.
auDA provides another good example. The process by which control of the au ccTLD passed
from a pure self-regulatory regime under Robert Elz and later ADNA, to auDA has already
been described.
121 In particular it was noted that this was facilitated by NOIE, a Common-
wealth government agency, and that the Commonwealth reserved authority to itself under
the Telecommunications Act 1997 to take over from auDA in the event that it ceased to act
eﬀectively.
118. See http://www.ibanet.org/.
119. International Bar Association, International Code of Ethics (1988)
120. European Commission, Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the
Global Approach (2000)
121. See Section 2.1.2.3.
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In the context of the IGF, the scope for a co-regulatory approach can be found in the fact
that one of the concessions made by governments in the Tunis Agenda was that the issues
of DNS management and IP address allocation would be left outside the IGF’s mandate,
and remain under the private management of the ICANN regime. There is no reason why
the governmental stakeholders in the IGF could not similarly agree to leave other issues to
be regulated through the decentralised collective action of the stakeholders at large, whilst
retaining ultimate authority to intervene on a domestic or intergovernmental level should
decentralised collective action fail to adequately address the issues in question.
122
4.2.4.3. Governments as a proxy for the meritocracy
Would an IGF structured in such a manner, as a hybrid between the hierarchical power of
governments and the anarchistic ordering of all other stakeholders, still amount to a gover-
nance network as it has been described in this thesis? It is not exactly the hybrid between
meritocracy and decentralised collective action that was previously considered, as it substi-
tutes governments for a meritocratic elite drawn from amongst all stakeholders. This is in one
way indefensible, in that it privileges one stakeholder group over the others; a stakeholder
group that we have already found lacks the legitimacy to exercise authority over transnational
public policy issues.
Yet in another way, it could be argued that if it is necessary to concede to hierarchical ordering
in order to address some of the identiﬁed limitations of anarchistic ordering, governments are
in a better practical position to hold this elevated position than any of the other stakeholder
groups. After all, it is they who can most eﬀectively wield the coercive power of rules. And
to allow governments to wield hierarchical power would neatly side-step the dilemma of how
to select a meritocratic elite to do so. Whilst it was vaguely suggested above that such an
elite could be selected through democratic or consensual means, most governments can be
presumed already to have been selected by such means (though admittedly not in respect of
transnational issues). Why then should it be necessary to reinvent the wheel? Reﬂecting this
view, former ICANN President and CEO M Stuart Lynn has argued,
122. That may be the practical eﬀect of the prevailing hegemony of states in any case; that is, provided that
a public policy issue is technically amenable to being addressed by rules, there would be nothing to stop gov-
ernments or intergovernmental authorities from trumping the IGF’s recommendations even if the IGF were not
structured in such a manner as to facilitate their doing so. The distinction though, formal as it may be, is between
a multi-stakeholder governance forum structured to include a role for formal intergovernmental oversight, and
one in which policy development is undertaken in the shadow of the exogenous power of states to intervene in
and override the process.
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Although governments vary around the world, for better or worse they are the most evolved and
best legitimated representatives of their populations—that is, of the public interest. As such,
their greater participation in general, and in particular their collective selection of outstanding
non-governmental individuals to ﬁll a certain portion of ICANN Trustee seats, could better ﬁll
the need for public accountability without the serious practical and resource problems of global
elections in which only a relatively few self-selected voters are likely to participate.
123
If this view were to prevail, it would be that all stakeholders are equal within the IGF, but
that some are more equal than others. Perhaps, however, this is the only practical outcome.
The following discussion of hierarchy within open source software development may provide
an insight into that suggestion.
4.2.4.4. Hierarchy and open source software
Although the burgeoning success of open source software and the philosophy underpinning it
has been often described as the “open source revolution,”
124 open source software is actually
nothing new; in fact it is older than proprietary software. Levy describes how even in the late
1950s and early 1960s, software for the ﬁrst generation of minicomputers was made available
“for anyone to access, look at, and rewrite as they saw ﬁt.”
125
Another common observation is that it is no coincidence that the rise of open source soft-
ware has coincided with that of the Internet.
126 As never before, the Internet facilitated the
development of open source software en masse by geographically distributed groups of hack-
ers. But the relationship goes back still further, as the technical infrastructure of the Internet
was itself largely built on open source software—even before it was known by that name.
Prior to the term“open source”being coined in 1998,
127 it was more commonly known simply
as “free software.”
128
However, the software is free in more than one sense. Free or open source software
129 is in
the FSF’s words not only free in the sense of “free beer,” but also in the sense of “freedom,”
encompassing:
￿ The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0).
123. Lynn, M S, President’s Report: ICANN—The Case for Reform (2002)
124. DiBona, Chris, Ockman, Sam, & Stone, Mark, Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution (1999)
125. Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001), 65
126. Raymond, Eric S, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental
Revolutionary (2001), 51
127. Raymond, Eric S, Goodbye, “Free Software”; Hello, “Open Source” (1998)
128. It is still so known by many, notably including the Free Software Foundation; see http://www.fsf.org/.
129. Both appellations being encompassed by the acronym FOSS or F/OSS; FLOSS is also sometimes seen,
adding the French libre.
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￿ The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1).
Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
￿ The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2).
￿ The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so that
the whole community beneﬁts (freedom 3). Access to the source code is a precondition for
this.
130
Although it is not required in order to satisfy this deﬁnition, certain open source software li-
cences, most notably the GNU General Public License (GPL) which is used by a majority
of all open source software (see FSF, GNU General Public License (1991)), require any work
copied or derived from software covered by the GPL to be distributed under the same licence
terms. This characteristic is referred to by the FSF as “copyleft,” as a play on “copyright,”
in that it requires those who base their own works on copyleft-licensed software to forgo the
exclusive rights that copyright law gives them to copy and modify their works, and to share
those rights freely with the community.
More signiﬁcant than the freedoms associated with open source software are the larger cul-
tural and organisational consequences to which their exercise gives rise. These include the
widespread voluntary service that members of the open source community provide in cod-
ing and documenting the software projects to which they contribute,
131 and the typical high
quality, timeliness and innovation of their output.
132
Eric Raymond, a hacker himself, has famously described the diﬀerence between the develop-
ment methodology for proprietary software and that for open source software as that between
“the cathedral and the bazaar,”in his essay of that name. To be built like a cathedral, in that
context, is to be “carefully crafted by individual wizards or small bands of mages working in
splendid isolation, with no beta to be released before its time,” whereas the bazaar style of
development was epitomised by the Linux kernel development process, which
seemed to resemble a great babbling bazaar of diﬀering agendas and approaches (aptly symbol-
ized by the Linux archive sites, who’d take submissions from anyone) out of which a coherent
and stable system could seemingly emerge only by a succession of miracles.
133
130. Stallman, Richard M, The Free Software Deﬁnition (1998). A similar but more comprehensive list of ten
requirements of open source software was ﬁrst published by the Open Source Institute in 1998 in its Open Source
Deﬁnition (see http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd).
131. Hertel, Guido, Niedner, Sven, & Herrmann, Stefanie, Motivation of Software Developers in Open Source
Projects: An Internet-based Survey of Contributors to the Linux Kernel (2003)
132. Feller, Joseph & Fitzgerald, Brian, Understanding Open Source Software Development (2002), 131
133. Raymond, Eric S, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental
Revolutionary (2001), 21–22
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The same phenomenon of“peer production”has begun to propagate beyond software develop-
ment into other ﬁelds. It has already been observed in the hours that hundreds of contributors
devote each week to the Wikipedia project, producing the most comprehensive encyclopædia
ever written. The licensing model employed by Wikipedia is equivalent to that of open source
software, although the material licensed may be more accurately described as“open content,”
and the license employed is the GNU Free Documentation License (GFDL).
134
There are, of course, other open content licences. Creative Commons is a project to draft
and promote licences suitable for the release of all manner of literary, musical, artistic and
dramatic works as open content.
135 The Creative Commons Web site makes some of this
content available, though Creative Commons licensed content is also found on many other
sites including the Internet Archive
136 and the OpenCourseWare project,
137 inaugurated by
MIT and since extended to other institutions
138 for the publication of course materials.
The success of the open source development methodology is often explained by economic
sociologists in terms of the low transaction costs associated with communication between
developers,
139 and the network eﬀects which increase the value of the open source“commons”
to all as more people become involved.
140 Although puzzled as to what individual incentives
developers have to voluntarily build up this open source commons,
141 they posit that it is a
barter or gift exchange system in which developers exchange their labour for such goods as
feedback from users and an enhanced reputation amongst their peers,
142 or that it is a means
of improving their future employment prospects.
143
To developers such as Raymond the question is less of a mystery: they do it because it is
fun.
144
Linus Torvalds, original author of the Linux operating system kernel, concurs with this view
in his autobiography (which is suitably enough titled Just For Fun),
145 as does Levy in his
134. FSF, GNU Free Documentation License (2002)
135. See http://creativecommons.org/, though for criticism of the openness of the Creative Commons li-
cences see Hill, Benjamin M, Towards a Standard of Freedom: Creative Commons and the Free Software Movement
(2005).
136. See http://www.archive.org/.
137. See http://ocw.mit.edu/.
138. See http://www.ocwconsortium.org/.
139. Benkler, Yochai, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm (2002)
140. von Hippel, Eric, Democratizing Innovation (2005)
141. Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond (2004), 7
142. Ghosh, Rishab A, Cooking Pot Markets: An Economic Model for the Trade in Free Goods and Services on
the Internet (1998)
143. Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond (2004), 8
144. Raymond, Eric S, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental
Revolutionary (2001), 60
145. Torvalds, Linus & Diamond, David, Just For Fun: the Story of an Accidental Revolutionary (2001), 248
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history of the hacker community.
146 Software development is only one application of the open
source ethic, but the fun extends to publishers of other forms of open content too: Jimmy
Wales of Wikipedia for example unpretentiously states,“The goal of Wikipedia is fun for the
contributors.”
147
The same motivation also extends to projects small enough to be pursued by a single develop-
er. Whilst these might not be thought of as organisations, lacking a community of developers,
they are still aimed at a community of users or readers
148 and thus fulﬁl similar social needs
as more structured virtual communities.
149 Take the example of blogs (“Web logs”); self-
published online journals numbering over 100 million as at 2008.
150 Tim Wu observes that
“in general, bloggers writing for fun—or out of single-minded obsession—can thump reporters
trying to get home by 6pm.”
151
But what underlies the fun? It might be argued that it is inherent in the creative process,
but that begs the question, what underlies that?
At least to some extent, the answer is empowerment: the power to independently create
or achieve something one perceives to be of value. The desire for such power is known by
psychologists as a mastery, competence or achievement motive,
152 and Maslow placed it at
the pinnacle of his hierarchy of human needs, naming it the need for self-actualisation.
153
Sociologists as far back as Weber came to the same realisation that increasing the bureaucratic
rationalisation of work could be dehumanising; Weber describing this trend as an“iron cage”
in which humanity was destined to be trapped.
154 Scholars of organisational behaviour have
inherited this insight, and proposed strategies by which employees can be empowered (and
thus made happier and more productive) by increasing their autonomy at work.
155
Although the emergence of the open source methodology has been quite orthogonal to this
scholarship, it is an exemplar of its programme in the extent to which it empowers the
members of the open source community to pursue their own objectives, in their own way, in
a manner that is not possible within an hierarchical bureaucracy.
It follows that the licence under which open source software is released, as important as it
146. Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001), 46
147. Poe, Marshall, The Hive (2006).
148. Davies, William, You Don’t Know Me, But... Social Capital and Social Software (2003), 32
149. Rheingold, H, The Virtual Community (1993)
150. According to blog analysis ﬁrm Technorati; see http://www.technorati.com/about/.
151. Wu, Tim, The Power of Fun (2006)
152. Matthews, Gerald, Deary, Ian J, & Whiteman, Martha C, Personality Traits (2003), 128
153. Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality (1987)
154. Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2003), 181
155. Fragoso, Heloisa, An Overview of Employee Empowerment: Do’s And Don’ts (2000)
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may be to the success of the software and to the movement as a whole, is not the most critical
factor in its success as a software development methodology; rather, it is the empowerment of
its contributors that is central. The licence is simply the means by which hackers have institu-
tionalised in law (or rules) the ethic that“all information should be free”
156 in respect of open
source software and open content, as they embedded it in the architecture of the Internet in
respect of data communications.
On this basis, the egalitarianism of the open source software development model can be seen as
reﬂecting that of the Internet itself. Both are models of anarchistic ordering largely of hackers’
own creation.
157 Thus as already observed it is no coincidence that the Internet is an enabling
force for the open source paradigm, levelling the playing ﬁeld between media juggernauts
and software powerhouses, and teenagers writing or coding in their attic.
158 Freed of the
hegemony of hierarchy, hackers and others pursing their need for self-actualisation become
more empowered, fulﬁlled and happy.
However, to characterise the open source software development model as purely anarchistic is
simplistic. In most projects, anarchy is balanced with hierarchical control.
159
It is in fact common for open source software development projects to be governed by a
“benevolent dictator for life” (or BDFL).
160 These are found in projects ranging from the
Linux operating system kernel itself, of which Linus Torvalds is the BDFL,
161 Linux-based
operating system distributions such as Ubuntu led by Mark Shuttleworth,
162 application soft-
ware such as the Samba networking suite coordinated by Andrew Tridgell,
163 and program-
156. Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (2001), 40
157. Imhorst, Christian, Anarchy and Source Code—What Does the Free Software Movement Have to Do With
Anarchism? (2005)
158. Reynolds, Glenn, An Army of Davids: How Markets and Technology Empower Ordinary People to Beat Big
Media, Big Government, and Other Goliaths (2006)
159. Holck, Jesper & Jørgensen, Niels, Do Not Check In On Red: Control Meets Anarchy in Two Open Source
Projects (2005)
160. Reagle, Joseph, Why the Internet is Good: Community Governance That Works Well (1999)
161. See http://www.kernel.org/.
162. Ubuntu, founded in 2004 (see http://www.ubuntu.com/), is based on an earlier Linux distribution called
Debian GNU/Linux, founded in 1993. The Debian project is the most egalitarian of the two; for example its elected
Project Leader is directed by clause 5.3 of its constitution to “attempt to make decisions which are consistent
with the consensus of the opinions of the Developers”and to“avoid overemphasizing their own point of view when
making decisions in their capacity as Leader”: Debian Project, Debian Constitution (2006). In contrast, Mark
Shuttleworth, who founded the Ubuntu distribution in 2004 and termed himself its SABDFL (self-appointed
benevolent dictator for life), appoints the members of both of its main decision-making bodies (the Technical
Board and the Ubuntu Community Council) and exercises a casting vote in those bodies.
A prominent former Debian Developer who resigned in 2006 compared the Debian and Ubuntu distributions
by saying, “There’s a balance to be struck between organisational freedom and organisational eﬀectiveness. I’m
not convinced that Debian has that balance right as far as forming a working community goes. In that respect,
Ubuntu’s an experiment—does a more rigid structure and a greater willingness to enforce certain social standards
result in a more workable community?”(quoted in Byﬁeld, Bruce, Maintainer’s Resignation Highlights Problems
in Debian Project (2006), which links to the original source).
163. See http://www.samba.org/.
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ming languages such as Perl,
164 PHP
165 and Python
166 in which Larry Wall, Rasmus Lerdorf
and Guido van Rossum respectively act as project leaders in perpetuity.
167
In the case of the Linux kernel, Torvalds who is perhaps the archetype of a BDFL, possesses
ultimate authority to decide which contributions (“patches”) to the Linux operating system
kernel should be accepted and which should be refused. Torvalds no longer personally manages
the whole of the kernel and has delegated authority to a number of trusted associates to
manage particular subsystems and hardware architectures, but it remains his authority to
appoint these so-called “lieutenants” and to supervise their work. A document distributed
with the Linux kernel source code that is subtitled “Care And Operation Of Your Linus
Torvalds”describes him as“the ﬁnal arbiter of all changes accepted into the Linux kernel.”
168
Thus contrary to what might be assumed from Raymond’s claim about “the Linux archive
sites, who’d take submissions from anyone,”the Linux kernel development process is neither
anarchistic nor consensual: if Torvalds does not like a patch, it does not go in to the kernel.
169
This has often antagonised other kernel developers, one of them commencing a long-running
thread on the kernel development mailing list by saying:
Linus doesn’t scale, and his current way of coping is to silently drop the vast majority of patches
submitted to him onto the ﬂoor. Most of the time there is no judgement involved when this code
gets dropped. Patches that ﬁx compile errors get dropped. Code from subsystem maintainers
that Linus himself designated gets dropped. A build of the tree now spits out numerous easily
ﬁxable warnings, when at one time it was warning-free. Finished code regularly goes unintegrated
for months at a time, being repeatedly resynced and re-diﬀed against new trees until the code’s
maintainer gets sick of it. This is extremely frustrating to developers, users, and vendors, and
is burning out the maintainers. It is a huge source of unnecessary work. The situation needs to
be resolved. Fast.
170
Torvalds’ initially unapologetic response
171 recalls another classic example of his sardonic
view of his position as BDFL, when announcing the selection of a penguin logo for Linux.
Acknowledging the comments of those who had expressed reservations about it, Torvalds
concluded with the quip, “If you still don’t like it, that’s ok: that’s why I’m boss. I simply
164. See http://www.perl.org/.
165. See http://www.php.net/.
166. See http://www.python.org/.
167. The position of BDFL normally falls to the developer who initiated a project, though in the case of multiple
original core developers, the phenomenon of a benevolent oligarchy for life is not unknown (for example Matt
Mullenweg and Ryan Boren for the WordPress blog engine at http://wordpress.com/).
168. See Documentation/SubmittingPatches within the kernel source tree which can be downloaded from http:
//www.kernel.org/.
169. For a more detailed case study of Linux kernel development see Schach, S, Jin, B, Wright, D, Heller, G, &
Oﬀut, A, Maintainability of the Linux Kernel (2002).
170. Landley, Rob, A Modest Proposal—We Need a Patch Penguin (2002)
171. See http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/linux/linux-kernel/2002-04/0389.html.
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know better than you do.”
172
The Mozilla
173 and OpenOﬃce.org
174 projects provide a slightly diﬀerent example of hierar-
chical ordering in open source software development.
175 In these cases, the authority is not
that of an individual, but a corporation: originally Netscape Communications in the case of
Mozilla,
176 and Sun Microsystems in the case of OpenOﬃce.org.
177
This kind of collective hierarchical control over an open source software project can also be
exercised by a civil society organisation. The non-proﬁt Mozilla Foundation, for example,
succeeded to the rights of Netscape, such as the trademark and rights under the Netscape
Public License.
178 Membership of its governing body (or“staﬀ”) is by invitation only. Another
example of such an organisation, also taken from one of the most prominent and successful
open source projects, is the Apache Software Foundation (ASF),
179 which is best known for
the Apache HTTP Server which powers the majority of Web sites on the Internet.
180
The case of the ASF also illustrates well that there are also various strata of developers
underneath the BDFL. One study has categorised these into core members (or maintainers),
active developers, peripheral developers, bug reporters, readers and passive users,
181 and
conﬁrmed previous ﬁndings that the core developers are generally the smallest group but
write the majority of the project’s code.
182 Whilst developers in lower strata are mostly self-
selected,
183 in many projects, including those of the ASF, the core developers are selected by
172. Originally published on Usenet at news:4sv02t$j8g@linux.cs.Helsinki.FI, now archived at http://groups.
google.com/group/comp.os.linux.advocacy/msg/ee350cc97f7d0e69.
173. See http://www.mozilla.com/.
174. See http://www.openoffice.org/.
175. For more detailed case studies of these projects see Holck, Jesper & Jørgensen, Niels, Do Not Check In On
Red: Control Meets Anarchy in Two Open Source Projects (2005) and Mockus, A, Fielding, R T, & Herbsleb, J
D, Two Case Studies of Open Source Software Development: Apache and Mozilla (2002) for Mozilla, and Strba,
Fridrich, From TrainedMonkey to Google SoC Mentor (2006) for OpenOﬃce.org.
176. As well as leading development, Netscape originally held the “Mozilla” trademark (as Linus Torvalds does
for “Linux” in various jurisdictions: see http://www.linuxmark.org/), and until 2001 required modiﬁcations to
its source code to be licensed under terms that exclusively exempted it from the copyleft provisions applicable
to other users: see http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/FAQ.html in its description of the Netscape Public License.
177. Sun requires contributors to the OpenOﬃce.org project to assign joint copyright in their work to it: see
http://www.openoffice.org/licenses/jca.pdf.
178. See http://www.mozilla.org/foundation/.
179. See http://www.apache.org/. The Apache Software Foundation is a non-proﬁt corporation governed by a
board of nine directors who are elected by the Foundation’s members for one-year terms, and who in turn appoint
a number of oﬃcers (66, in 2008) to oversee its day-to-day operations. As of 2008 there are 249 members of the
ASF, each of whom was invited to join on the basis of their previous contributions to ASF projects, and whose
invitation was extended by a majority vote of the existing members.
180. See http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_server_survey.html.
181. Ye, Yunwen, Nakakoji, Kumiyo, Yamamoto, Yasuhiro, & Kishida, Kouichi, The Co-Evolution of Systems
and Communities in Free and Open Source Software Development (2005)
182. Mockus, A, Fielding, R T, & Herbsleb, J D, Two Case Studies of Open Source Software Development:
Apache and Mozilla (2002)
183. Ye, Yunwen, Nakakoji, Kumiyo, Yamamoto, Yasuhiro, & Kishida, Kouichi, The Co-Evolution of Systems
and Communities in Free and Open Source Software Development (2005), 64
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the BDFL, applying stringent meritocratic standards.
184
In fact of the examples given of open source projects in which a signiﬁcant hierarchical struc-
ture exists or has existed—the Linux kernel, Mozilla, OpenOﬃce.org and Apache, as well as
Samba and Ubuntu mentioned earlier—all are the most widely-used open source projects in
their class, and have large and active communities of developers. How can this be reconciled
with the earlier hypothesis that it was the very lack of hierarchy that empowered developers
and attracted them to volunteer their services to open source projects?
Despite the fact that its signiﬁcance to developers had earlier been downplayed, the answer
is found in the open source licence. It is the open source license that enforces benevolence
upon the dictator. It does this by ensuring that for any open source project, there is always
relatively costless freedom of exit, in that any developers who feel they are being oppressed
by a project leader can simply cease participating in the project, take its source code, and
use it as the base for a new project of their own (known as a “fork” of the original project).
This “exit-based empowerment”
185 enjoyed by developers mitigates the power of the project
leaders.
As Torvalds has put it,
I am a dictator, but it’s the right kind of dictatorship. I can’t really do anything that screws
people over. The benevolence is built in. I can’t be nasty. If my baser instincts took hold, they
wouldn’t trust me, and they wouldn’t work with me anymore. I’m not so much a leader, I’m
more of a shepherd.
186
The Linux kernel has, indeed, been forked numerous times. One prominent fork was that
maintained by Red Hat Linux developer Alan Cox, who released a series of kernel source
trees that contained patches not yet accepted by Torvalds.
187 However since 2002, a technical
solution to Torvalds’ backlog was found in the use of specialised revision control software,
188
which has placated many of Torvalds’ critics, and resulted in the obsolescence of many former
forks of the kernel.
Both Mozilla’s Firefox browser and the OpenOﬃce.org oﬃce suite have also been forked. The
Debian project, for example, has replaced Firefox in its distribution with a forked version
called Iceweasel, to escape the onerous trademark licence conditions imposed by the Mozil-
184. For a more detailed case study of Apache see Mockus, A, Fielding, R T, & Herbsleb, J D, Two Case Studies
of Open Source Software Development: Apache and Mozilla (2002).
185. Warren, Mark E, Controlling Corruption Through Democratic Empowerment: Market-Style Accountability
Revisited (2006), 2
186. Hamm, Steve, Linus Torvalds’ Benevolent Dictatorship (2004)
187. Corbet, Jonathan, Where Does Kernel Development Stand? (2001)
188. Originally, ironically, a proprietary product called BitKeeper, and subsequently an open source equivalent
called Git written by Torvalds himself: see http://git.or.cz/.
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la Foundation for the use of the Firefox name and logo.
189 As for OpenOﬃce.org, a prominent
fork called NeoOﬃce
190 has been customised to integrate more smoothly with the Mac OS
X operating system. Debian itself has also spawned a number of derivative distributions,
Ubuntu being one.
191
Admittedly, forking an open source project is not costless. Usually the most signiﬁcant cost
is that it will be necessary for the new project leader to establish a community of users and
developers to support the project in the long term. For economic sociologists, this is the
cost of developing social capital.
192 Thus, the more successful the parent project is (and the
more cohesive its communities of developer and users), the higher its social capital will be,
the higher the transaction costs of a fork, and the more eﬀectively that fork will have to
diﬀerentiate itself from its parent in order to overcome those costs.
This is illustrated by the case of Samba-TNG which forked from the highly successful Sam-
ba project in 1999,
193 seeking to diﬀerentiate itself by ﬁrst oﬀering the facility to replace a
Microsoft Windows server as the Primary Domain Controller for an oﬃce network. Howev-
er it struggled to build a development community comparable in size and expertise to that
of its parent project, which in the meantime implemented its own version of Samba-TNG’s
diﬀerentiating feature. In comparison, forks of less dominant and stable projects have been
forked more often and more successfully.
194
This characteristic of the transaction costs associated with migration from one open
source project to another provides a cohesive force against the unnecessary fragmentation
of open source projects, that will only be overcome if enough developers become suﬃciently
dissatisﬁed to form a viable competing project (which the project leaders have an incentive
not to allow to happen, lest they lose their base of developers). In comparison, developers
within Microsoft Corporation face much higher transaction costs in replicating their work
189. Corbet, Jonathan, Debian and Mozilla—A Study in Trademarks (2005)
190. See http://www.neooffice.org/.
191. The same phenomenon is found in other open content development communities. For example in 2002,
Spanish Wikipedians who were dissatisﬁed with the Wikipedia project created their own fork, Enciclopedia Libre
(“free encyclopædia”), as permitted by the GNU Free Documentation License under which Wikipedia’s content is
licensed: see http://enciclopedia.us.es/. More recently Larry Sanger has attempted to do the same, creating
“a responsible, expert-managed fork of Wikipedia” titled Citizendium: see http://www.citizendium.org/.
192. Uphoﬀ, N, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation (1999).
Social capital can be formally deﬁned as“the value of those aspects of the social structure to actors, as resources
that can be used by the actors to realize their interests”: Coleman, J, Foundations of Social Theory (1990) , 305.
193. See http://www.samba-tng.org/.
194. For example, the oft-criticised PHP-Nuke content management system: see http://phpnuke.org/ and Cor-
bet, Jonathan, PHP Nuke Remains Vulnerable (2001). These forks include Post-Nuke at http://www.postnuke.
com/, Envolution at http://sourceforge.net/projects/envolution, MyPHPNuke at http://sourceforge.
net/projects/myphpnuke and Xoops at http://www.xoops.org/.
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and their communities elsewhere if they are dissatisﬁed, if indeed it is possible for them to
do so at all.
Thus it is from the unexpected source of the open source licence that a solution is found to
the problem of maintaining an organisation under an hierarchical structure to address the
limitations of anarchistic ordering, in that it provides an implicit ongoing consensual check
on the power of the authority which side-steps the diﬃcult task of objectively assessing the
authority’s merit antecedently.
4.2.5. Anarchistic–hierarchical Internet governance
What has been described is essentially a hybrid of anarchistic and hierarchical governance;
but the distribution of power in this hybrid is much more even than in the case of co-
regulation described previously. It is closer to the kind of voluntary association that anarchist
Colin Ward describes in stating
that there are at least two kinds of organisation. There is the kind which is forced on you, the
kind which is run from above, and there is the kind which is run from below, which can’t force
you to do anything, and which you are free to join or free to leave alone. We could say that the
anarchists are people who want to transform all kinds of human organisation into the kind of
purely voluntary association where people can pull out and start one of their own if they don’t
like it.
195
How, if at all, is this insight applicable to Internet governance?
To answer this will require the implications of the “open source-style” hybrid structure to be
isolated; speciﬁcally, the assumptions that must be satisﬁed to ensure that the stakeholders
in a governance network that is structured in hierarchical form are not at risk of being
oppressed.
196 These assumptions can be reduced to three:
￿ the existence of perfect substitutes for the product of the governance network;
￿ freedom of exit from the network; and
￿ that stakeholders are not coerced to accept the product of the governance network by
exogenous forces.
197
195. Ward, Colin, Anarchism as a Theory of Organization (1965), 171
196. That is, being subjected to hierarchical power that has not passed the normative tests of either objective
merit or consent.
197. Or in anarchistic terms, other than by the“natural and legitimate inﬂuence”of other stakeholders: Bakunin,
Mikhail A, God and the State (1970), 35.
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If these assumptions sound familiar, it is because the ﬁrst two are amongst those that underlie
the ideal of the perfect free market (along with additional assumptions not needed here, as
we do not require that the governance network be eﬀective, only that it not be oppressive),
198
and the third is one of those underlying deliberative democracy, to be discussed in the next
section.
199 With these three criteria satisﬁed,
[i]t does not matter whether online discussion groups or even entire networks of such groups
are internally autocratic, since individuals can always choose “their own more congenial online
homes.” Cyberanarchists, then, see cyberspace as a market of alternative rule regimes. It is the
ease of exit and the abundance of alternatives—in essence consumer choice in conditions ap-
proaching perfect competition—that bring to fruition the liberal ideals of liberty and consent.
200
The next question then is the extent to which these assumptions can be fulﬁlled in the case of
a governance network as they are in the case of open source software development. Examining
each of them in turn:
￿ In the case of a governance network, the substitutes for governance through that network
are governance either through another network, or through another mechanism: that is,
by rules, norms, markets and/or architecture. In few cases is the substitution likely to be
perfect, and the closest available substitute will vary from one case to another. However, it
may be good enough in many cases to persuade stakeholders who feel oppressed to opt out
of the governance network in favour of pursuing the same end by that substitute means.
￿ Freedom of exit from a governance network is impeded by the transaction costs of switching
to an acceptable substitute mechanism of governance, or developing a new governance
network afresh. As suggested in the preceding point, the quantum of the transaction costs
incurred may vary considerably from case to case. However in general, as seen from the
example of open source software, these costs will be higher the more social capital the
original project (or in this context, the original network) has developed, and the less the
defecting project has to oﬀer to diﬀerentiate itself.
￿ Whether the requirement of lack of coercion is satisﬁed in the case of a governance net-
work depends on who it is that has authority over the network. At Section 4.2.4.3, it was
suggested that on pragmatic grounds, governments might be the best parties to act as
the authorities of a governance network structured in hybrid anarchistic/hierarchical form,
following the example of co-regulation.
198. See Section 1.4.3.
199. See Section 4.3.2.2.
200. Netanel, Neil W, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory (2000),
404–405
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However if it is required that no coercion be exercised from outside the governance net-
work, governments are the very worst stakeholders who could lead it, as they are the only
stakeholders who can exercise signiﬁcant coercive power over all other stakeholders through
their domestic legal regimes, even if those stakeholders have opted out of the governance
network in favour of other mechanisms of governance.
An example will put these observations in more concrete terms. Let us assume that the IGF
has an hierarchical leadership, which drafts a code governing the issue of Internet intercon-
nection costs. This code is entirely satisfactory to all of the other stakeholders, except for
the private sector who claim that interconnection costs should continue to be left to the free
market (an alternative mechanism of governance, which it is costless for them to substitute
for that of the IGF).
Are the three criteria satisﬁed? Yes, there is a perfect (or at least a costless) substitute
for the code of the IGF. Yes, there is freedom of exit from the IGF so that even if its
hierarchical leadership required all IGF members to subscribe to the code, the private sector
would be at liberty simply to withdraw from the network. And as to whether the private
sector could be coerced to accept the code, regardless of its departure from the IGF—well,
this depends on whether the authority behind the IGF is governmental or not. If it is, then
it can ignore the private sector’s concerns and pass the code into international or domestic
law regardless, which defeats the very purpose of developing it through a governance network.
Let us change the scenario a little. In this case, the hierarchical leadership of the IGF has
managed to address the concerns of the private sector in a new code on interconnection
costs that is now acceptable to all. A few private sector stakeholders however decide to opt
out of the IGF regime and revert to reliance on the market to set interconnection prices. They
immediately ﬁnd that the success of the IGF’s code has permanently lowered market prices
for interconnection, and that the costs of diﬀerentiating their service so that it can be sold
at higher prices are insurmountable. The hierarchical leadership of the IGF (if not composed
of governments) not only cannot coerce these private sector stakeholders into accepting the
code, but it does not need to. The IGF’s very success has made it self-governing.
Granted, less extreme examples could be given in which the applicable transaction costs
would vary markedly from these. But the lesson from open source software remains that if
conditions are right, the question of how to impose hierarchical ordering on a governance
network (for example by attempting to select a meritocracy through objective or consensual
means), becomes redundant. If the hierarchical leadership, however selected, does not act in
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the best interests of the IGF, then its output will be ignored (the more so, the greater the
segment whose interests are disregarded) and it will become powerless. If it does act in the
best interests of the IGF, then its power will grow.
It can best do this by engaging all stakeholders in the process of public policy development
using a participatory process, much as open source developers collaboratively work on open
source software projects. In doing this, the stakeholders will become empowered, the social
capital of the governance network will increase, and its eﬀectiveness will grow.
4.2.6. Criticisms
At the commencement of this section on hierarchical organisation it may have seemed unlikely
that such a structure could be suited for a governance network; and indeed, like anarchism,
it was found to be unsuitable in its pure form. To recap brieﬂy, the bureaucratic form of
hierarchical organisation was found unacceptable because it devalued the identities of par-
ticipants by limiting them to the performance of deﬁned roles; oligarchy was unacceptable
because it provided no normative basis to justify the authority of the oligarchs; and meri-
tocracy was found unacceptable in cases where the merit of its incumbents was assessed by
hierarchical means.
However when combined with a participatory form of governance such as anarchism, it has
been found that an hierarchical structure does have merit. In particular, the following two
hybrid cases have shown promise:
￿ A meritocracy established by a democratic or consensual process, such as either a vote of all
stakeholders, or a consensually-appointed nominating committee (a Nomcom in IETF and
ICANN parlance); or
￿ An hierarchical structure whose leaders’ merit is ensured by the force of certain idealising
assumptions drawn from the example of open source software.
Both of these options remain vulnerable to criticism. As for the ﬁrst, it was found necessary
that the meritocracy not only be established by, but remain subject to the supervision of
some democratic or consensual process, which begs the question, what such process? Whilst
there may be an answer to this, it has not yet been discussed.
As for the second option, the idealism of the assumptions required for this form of hierarchi-
cal ordering to become tenable is its main downfall. For example, all that holds it together are
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the transaction costs that make other mechanisms of governance relatively more expensive.
What is to ensure that these transaction costs are set at the right level, particularly in the
short term?
201 While they are too low, the governance network may lack cohesion, reducing
its eﬀectiveness. If they are too high, then its stakeholders may still be oppressed, reducing
its legitimacy.
Even where the assumptions of this model do hold, some of the same shortcomings of the free
market may be replicated in a forum whose authority is drawn from its success in what Netanel
describes as the market for “alternative rule regimes.”
202That is, just as the free market is
regulated in order to more closely conform with society’s norms of distributive justice, it
may be necessary to mediate disparities between the power of participants in a governance
network (such as civil society and governments) if the network is not to exhibit the same
imbalances as exist in the broader international system. The anarchistic/hierarchical hybrid
does not do this (and neither for that matter does pure anarchistic ordering).
Even apart from this, all that has really been shown is that the success of a governance
network such as the IGF depends upon it not upsetting its stakeholders enough that they are
forced to seek alternative mechanisms of governance. Like the ﬁrst option above, it still begs
the question of how it is to make decisions that are most acceptable to the IGF at large, save
that it be through some participatory mechanism.
Thus, although we have come close to an acceptable form of organisation for a multi-
stakeholder governance network, there remain signiﬁcant unresolved issues. If these issues
can be resolved, then it may be through one of the democratic or consensual forms of organ-
isation that have yet to be considered, but to which we now turn.
When previously considering a democratic method for the selection of an hierarchical leader-
ship for a multi-stakeholder governance network, it was a considered problematic that there
was no existing democratic polity to represent all stakeholders transnationally. But does this
necessarily defeat the ideal of democratic ordering? This is one of the principal questions next
to be addressed.
201. In the longer term, if the market for governance regimes works well, network eﬀects should reduce the
number of competing governance networks to a sustainable number, whilst the oppression of stakeholders should
be minimised by the prospective entry of new entrants into that market. However such an equilibrium might
take decades to achieve.
202. Netanel, Neil W, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory (2000),
405–406
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4.3. Democratic
Democracy is most often associated with the political system of liberal democratic states.
However for the liberal, democracy is not an end in itself but rather a means of securing the
greatest possible measure of justice for the individual. There may in fact be other forms of
government that would secure this end just as well: for example, libertarians posit that a
minarchic (minimal, near-anarchistic) government could do so.
203 Conversely, a democracy
would not serve this end as well if it were permitted to degenerate into a tyranny of the
majority,
204 which may require an hierarchical hand to restrain their excesses.
Even so, mainstream liberal democratic theory turns on the assumption that it is through
some form of democratic government coupled with the recognition of individual civil and
political rights, that its citizens’ freedom to exercise their autonomy may be maximised.
At the root of this assumption is that democratic government best provides citizens with
freedom of self-determination; that“citizens should always be able to understand themselves
also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees.”
205 Put even more simply,
following Locke, it is to ensure that at some level government operates with the consent of
the governed.
206 This will be described here simply as “the democratic principle.”
As democracy is thus an instrumental rather than a primary good for liberals, it is necessary
for them to construct a theory by which the democratic principle can be shown to support
their fundamental moral intuition of the primacy of the value of human autonomy. One of
the most popular such theoretical models, common to Rousseau, Kant and Rawls amongst
others, is that of the social contract. This is a thought-experiment by which one considers
what constitutional principles a society would consensually adopt if it it found itself in an
anarchistic original position (in Rawls’ case, without its members even knowing their own
capacities and preferences).
An alternate model by which the democratic principle can be supported is that of dis-
course theory, of which Habermas is the most prominent scholar, and which will be discussed
in more detail below. But at root, this and all other liberal models of democracy serve the
same purpose: to demonstrate that a democratic system of government fulﬁls the liberal moral
intuition that any interference with a person’s liberty requires their consent.
207
203. Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974)
204. Hayek, F A, The Road to Serfdom (1976), 53
205. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 449
206. Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government (1963)
207. A contrast is provided by the main competing broad theoretical conception of democracy, which is the
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However, what democracy means for a liberal democratic nation state is not necessarily the
same as what it means for a multi-stakeholder governance network. Notions such as “one
vote, one value” and an institutionalised rule of law may well be quite foreign to a context
in which collectivities join individuals as stakeholders, and in which the only decisions made
are non-binding.
In particular it was already observed at Section 3.2.4 that governance networks are likely
to lack the institutional guarantees that liberal states provide of representativeness (such as
universal suﬀrage and regular elections) and of accountability and transparency (such as the
separation of powers, judicial review and freedom of information legislation). What, then, are
the criteria for a governance network that would satisfy the democratic principle, outside of the
nation state? To answer this question by examining the essential nature of liberal democratic
governance is the purpose of this chapter. This endeavour will be conducted under the four
headings of representation, consent, transparency and accountability, and inclusion.
Under the ﬁrst heading we will consider what it means for a governance network to be
representative (or “democratic” in the narrowest sense). A point that will be made in that
discussion is that one of the usual characteristics of the representative democratic model, that
is a deﬁciency from a liberal perspective, is that it is possible for the rule of a majority to
override minority interests.
Under the heading of consent, we will consider ways in which this deﬁciency can be addressed.
Whilst consent is an overriding principle, in this context it is used to illustrate how partici-
patory forms of democracy, such as deliberative democracy, can help to include all aﬀected
viewpoints, including those of minorities, in the democratic decision-making process.
Next, the related issues of transparency and accountability will be considered. The importance
of accountability lies in the fact that as Aristotle observed, in its absence pure democracy
is liable to regress into oligarchy. The essence of transparency on the other hand is that
democratic justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done (nemo judez in
sua causa, in law Latin). When both transparency and accountability are assured along with
representation and consent (in the sense given above), one is left with a system of governance
civic republican model (see generally Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance (1995), 6–7). Civic republicanism emphasises the duties of citizens over their rights, as
on this account it is through active citizenship (that is, participation in public aﬀairs) that the democratic republic
is constituted and sustained. Today communitarians are the intellectual successors of this political philosophy.
Whilst the civic republican model of democracy is mentioned for completeness, it is the dominant liberal con-
ception of democracy that will mainly be discussed here, as it is this model that prevails within the international
legal system (as illustrated for example in the prominence of the discourse on human rights, and the absence of
a balancing discourse on civic responsibility).
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which operates in accordance with the consent of the governed, through a process by which
their interests are considered rather than just aggregated, and the adherence of which to these
standards is demonstrable.
This leaves the remaining issue of inclusion, which concerns the fact that even if procedures
exist to institutionalise the other principles of liberal democracy, these will be to no avail if
the governed do not take recourse to those institutions. Here, the Internet is both an example
of how participation in democratic governance may be extended, and of its limitations on
account of the so-called “digital divide.”
If, at the conclusion of the chapter, it is resolved that a governance network can be structured
that is democratic in every important sense of the word, then the result will be a holy grail
of transnational governance—the ﬂexibility and balanced legitimacy of a network, with the
procedural justice and accountability of a liberal democracy.
4.3.1. Representation
In its original ancient Athenian form, democracy was of course literally what its name sug-
gests—the rule (or power, kratos) of the people (the demos). Today known as direct democ-
racy, it was a form of self-government in which citizens participated in making decisions
in a political forum without the intermediation of elected representatives. Much subsequent
democratic rhetoric has appealed to the same notions of popular rule; for example, Abraham
Lincoln’s mantra from the Gettysburg Address describing a “government of the people, by
the people, for the people.”
Yet neither in Athens, nor in any subsequent democratic society of large scale, have all the
people really participated in government. For example only adult male citizens of Athens and
surrounding Attica were permitted to participate in its assembly, which comprised less than
a ﬁfth of its resident population.
208 Such a society could hardly be called a democracy today,
though by the same token Dahl refuses to grant that appellation to modern liberal states
either, preferring to describe them as “polyarchies.”
209
Dahl’s conception of the appropriate constitution of the demos is more inclusive than that
of the Athenians, though he would still exclude transients and those shown to be mentally
defective.
210 Alternative formulations focus more on the principle of consent; for example that
208. Ober, Josiah, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People (1991),
128
209. Dahl, Robert, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in the American City (1961)
210. Dahl, Robert, Democracy and its Critics (1989), 129
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the people entitled to make a law ought to be those who are subject to it,
211 or those who
are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by it,
212 or all but those who have no legitimate material interest in
it.
213
4.3.1.1. Direct versus representative
There are a few isolated cases in which the demos so constituted does still act directly to
some extent today. Examples include the initiative (by which the Parliament can be required
by citizens to consider a bill), the referendum (by which the people can pass a bill into law
or repeal an existing law), the recall (by which they can remove an oﬃcial from oﬃce) and
the plebiscite (by which they can make constitutional changes).
214
The most signiﬁcant present-day example of direct (or plebescitary) democracy at the na-
tional level is in Switzerland, where a petition signed by 1% of the electorate may call for a
referendum on an issue currently before the Parliament, or signed by 2% of voters if the issue
is not yet before the Parliament.
215 The referendum itself in most cases passes with a simple
majority of those voting, though at the national level there must also be a majority of states
in which a majority of votes were in favour of the proposal.
California has had since 1911 a system of a“ballot propositions”similar to the Swiss system,
save that the required percentages of registered voters to put forward a proposed statute or
constitutional amendment are 5% and 8% respectively, and that only a simple majority is
required at referendum in either case. Many other states of the United States have adopted
similar procedures.
216 Although there is no equivalent at the national level, at the local gov-
ernment level, by-laws proposed in New England are commonly enacted by a Town Meeting
open to all registered voters.
217
Direct democracy is of course also seen in the private sector and in civil society, although
more often in smaller, grass roots organisations. The clearest example of direct democracy in
action in the private sector is at general meetings of public companies, which in countries
including Australia are required to be open to all shareholders of the company.
218
211. See Graham, Gordon, The Internet: A Philosophical Enquiry (1999), 72
212. Held, David & McGrew, Anthony, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization
Debate (2000)
213. Gastil, John, Democracy in Small Groups (1993), 19
214. Clarke, Roger, The Internet and Democracy (2004)
215. Kobach, Kris W, The Referendum: Direct Democracy In Switzerland (1993).
216. Zimmerman, Joseph F, The Initiative: Citizen Law-Making (1999)
217. For example, this is required for any town of Massachusetts with a population of up to 6000, and is optional
in larger towns. See Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 25 Oct 1780, article LXXXIX.
218. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), part 2G.2
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In civil society, it is seen at levels ranging from the local bridge club, up to the scale of
political parties and trade unions. Sweden is particularly notable here, with political parties
at both the local
219 and national levels,
220 as well as a large trade union,
221 organised along
direct democratic lines.
However by far the dominant form of democratic rule is representative democracy, which
rather than allowing the demos the right to rule directly, grants it the power and responsibil-
ity to delegate skilled specialist representatives to rule on its behalf. Seminal liberal scholar
John Stuart Mill was amongst those who saw representative democracy as necessary to over-
come not only the cost and logistical diﬃculty of implementing direct democracy on a large
scale, but also the disinterest and indeed the incapacity of many citizens to act directly.
222 In
more recent times, Dahl has agreed, contending “that representative government by elites is
appropriate and that direct (as opposed to indirect through voting) participation is unwork-
able in the modern bureaucratic state.”
223
4.3.1.2. Filter versus mirror
There is however a division between the populist conception of representative democracy rep-
resented to some extent by Dahl, and the elitist conception of Mill. On the former account,
representative democracy is favoured over direct democracy mainly as a concession to practi-
cality. The peoples’ representatives are expected to act as a mirror of the community’s views,
reﬂecting the views they would express in person if given the opportunity.
The alternative conception is of a representative assembly as a form of protection against
ill-informed populism, including the tyranny of the majority.
224 Its function is to compensate
for the deﬁciencies of direct democracy, such as the phenomenon whereby broad but shallow
interests will always be trumped by narrow and deep interests pushed by organised groups.
225
This division of opinion has a long heritage; it created a schism during the Constitutional
Convention that drafted the United States Constitution,
226 and continues today between those
219. Demoex; see http://demoex.net/en/.
220. Aktiv Demokrati; see http://aktivdemokrati.se/.
221. Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (Central Organization of the Workers of Sweden); see http://www.
sac.se/en/.
222. Mill, John S, Considerations on Representative Government: Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy (2000)
223. Dahl, Robert, Democracy and its Critics (1989)
224. Walton, D, Appeal to Popular Opinion (1999)
225. Olsen, M, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965)
226. Fishkin, J S, Virtual Democratic Possibilities: Prospects for Internet Democracy (2000), 2–10
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who conceive of government as the agent of the people, and those who see it as separate from
the people and potentially acting against its collective wishes.
227
Whilst it might be assumed that the liberal approach is the former, brief mention of insights
from from two quite diﬀerent theoretical perspectives will suﬃce to demonstrate that this is
not the case, and that the pure direct democratic, and populist representative democratic
models are deﬁcient from a liberal standpoint. The root problem from which both theoretical
insights stem lies in the diﬃculty of selecting a voting system which precludes the majority,
as determined by the aggregation of individual votes, from tyrannising minorities and thereby
compromising the democratic principle.
The ﬁrst theoretical perspective is Dworkin’s observation that the preferences of voters ex-
pressed in a democratic forum will tend to include preferences as to distributions of beneﬁts
that other voters should receive. These so-called“external”preferences are not entitled to be
given any weight in a democratic calculus which attempts to aggregate individual preferences
in order to maximize overall welfare.
228 An example of this problem is that the community
may express its preferences through the ballot box as to the rights that should be accorded
to (or withheld from) homosexual couples, whereas it is only the preferences of the couples
themselves that should be counted on that issue.
229
The second perspective comes from economist Kenneth Arrow, who has demonstrated that
it is impossible even in theory to construct a democratic voting system that simultaneously
satisﬁes all the criteria that might be considered necessary to produce an outcome fairly
representing the voters’ collective best interests.
230
Amartya Sen extended Arrow’s impossibility theorem to demonstrate a further and even more
fundamental shortcoming of democracy for the liberal, which has come to be known as the
liberal paradox: that it is impossible to devise a voting system that both upholds individual
rights, and results in a Pareto optimal outcome. Put another way, if individual liberty is to
be upheld, then the outcome of any voting system will always be inferior to some alternative
that all voters would have been happier with.
231
These observations of Dworkin, Arrow and Sen illustrate just some of the signiﬁcant shortcom-
ings with all democratic voting systems in expressing the true preferences of the demos (and
227. Holden, B, Understanding Liberal Democracy (1998), 20
228. Dworkin, R, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 277
229. As will be seen, Dworkin’s answer to this paradox is that it is the purpose of human rights to prevent most
such external preferences from being given expression in a democratic political system.
230. Arrow, Kenneth J, Social Choice and Individual Values (1963)
231. Sen, Amartya, Liberty and Social Choice (1983)
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there are further practical shortcomings not even mentioned, such as those of strategic voting
and institutional eﬀects).
232 Whilst they do not detract from the democratic principle, they
do demonstrate that its implications extend well beyond a system of voting.
They also give licence to elected representatives to pursue the democratic ideal beyond the
expressed preferences of their constituents. Even to state this fact immediately heralds its
risks. Whilst further thoughts will be oﬀered in the succeeding section on transparency and
accountability, for now it can be foreshadowed that any representative democratic authority
must “be held in check by institutional constraints that guarantee turnover in government
and provide dissenters with many opportunities for political veto.”
233
4.3.1.3. Procedural versus substantive
Another perspective on the observed procedural shortcomings of representative democratic
government (or governance) comes from the proponents of what can be called substantive
democracy. What distinguishes procedural democracy from substantive democracy is a dif-
ference in focus: an institutional focus in the former case, and a social focus in the latter.
Where the procedural democrat may be satisﬁed that democratic institutions and procedures
are in place, the substantive democrat looks behind them to examine outcomes: does a par-
ticular system of governance actually reﬂect the aggregated preferences of the electorate, and
if not, why not?
In practice, what this means is that procedural democracy is concerned mainly with the
establishment and maintenance of a free and fair electoral system, whereas the concern of
substantive democracy is broader and encompasses the maintenance of a society in which
electors are, and remain, free to form and change their preferences.
234 The liberal, therefore,
is a substantive democrat, who requires of the state not only a fair electoral system, but
also to maintain the bedrock upon which that system stands. Such a liberal scholar is Dahl,
who posits ﬁve criteria that a democratic polity should satisfy (most of which will fall, or
have fallen, for separate discussion within the four slightly broader headings of this section
on democracy):
￿ eﬀective participation (that all citizens are equally empowered to participate in the politi-
cal process);
232. Cox, Gary W, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (1997)
233. Immergut, Ellen M, The Theoretical Core of New Institutionalism (1988), 14
234. Fox, Gregory H & Nolte, Georg, Intolerant Democracies (2000), 400–401, and see Section 3.4.3.2
204Chapter 4. Designing a governance network
￿ enlightened understanding (that these citizens are provided with adequate information to
allow them to contribute meaningfully);
￿ control over the agenda (that citizens should be empowered to decide which issues should
be placed on the public agenda);
￿ voting equality at decisive stages (that all citizens should have a vote of equal weight at
every point when a decision is made); and
￿ inclusiveness (that the rights of citizenship should be available to all besides transients and
the mentally deﬁcient).
235
The satisfaction of these criteria in turn requires the state to ensure that their preconditions
are safeguarded even against infringement by the state itself (as in a protective democracy).
The ﬁrst of two related ways in which this can be done is by recognising these preconditions
as rights, and there are in turn two main categories into which such rights could be classed.
The ﬁrst category of rights required to meet the criteria of a democratic society are the
basic civil and political rights of individual autonomy common to liberal scholars from Kant
to Nozick, that Habermas describes as the “right to the greatest possible measure of equal
individual liberties,”
236 and with which he includes the right to freedom of political association
and due process. These are the rights necessary for even procedural democracy to function
as designed, and which international law recognises through the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
In the second category, and more peculiar to substantive democrats, are what Dahl refers to
as rights to support the agency of individuals,
237 and that Habermas describes as rights to
the basic living conditions that are necessary in order for the citizens to exercise their other
rights.
238 These rights, which include the right to a basic standard of living and to an ele-
mentary education,
239 are amongst those found in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
240
235. Dahl, Robert, Democracy and its Critics (1989)
236. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 122 (emphasis in original)
237. Dahl, Robert, Can International Organizations be Democratic?: A Skeptic’s View (1999); Dahl, Robert,
Democracy and its Critics (1989) , 170
238. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 123
239. See General Assembly of the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Articles 25
and 26.
240. This second category of rights, which are in the nature of entitlements rather than freedoms, are more
controversial than the ﬁrst because their fulﬁlment is likely to require the redistribution of property (normally
through taxation) in violation of the property rights of others: Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
But by the same token, the status of the right to private property, and the free market system which arises from
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Deontological liberalism has long recognised such fundamental pre-legal rights (at least of the
ﬁrst category) as being sacrosanct against the state, though such priority is more diﬃcult
to invoke in terms of teleological liberalism (and does raise diﬃcult questions about how
conﬂicting rights claims are to be resolved).
241
A second and complementary way in which to safeguard the preconditions of democratic
governance against infringement by the state is to elevate them to constitutional level. This
is the manner in which the political institutions of representative democracy are generally
enshrined in law, including the separation of powers and the rule of law, both of which will
be discussed in more detail in the section on transparency and accountability below.
However a constitution can also be used to enshrine rights, as Kant for example observed,
242
(which avoids the diﬃculty of the recognition of pre-legal rights and duties in teleological lib-
eral theory, since a constitution is still law, though its most fundamental example). Rawls
identiﬁes the purpose of constitutional rights as preserving or mirroring the justice of the
original position, a position of equality and fair representation from which common principles
are identiﬁed that are to the mutual beneﬁt of all.
243 For Dworkin on the other hand, the
purpose of rights is to compensate for the deﬁciencies of procedural democracy described
above.
244
Habermas, too, sees the place of rights as being constitutional principles, generated through a
public discourse that constitutes its citizens as legal subjects, whereafter they are constrained
from determining discursively the form that their discursive creation of other law will take.
Thus for Habermas, “the requirement of legally institutionalizing self-legislation can be ful-
ﬁlled only with the help of a code that simultaneously implies the guarantee of actionable
individual liberties.”
245
In summary of the last three subsections, then, it has been found that liberal democratic
governance requires the establishment of accountable and transparent institutions that allow
for the public to eﬀectively participate as authors of the laws to which they are subject,
subject to various superadded guarantees such as the protection of civil and political, and
it, is itself controversial. Some liberals point out that the right to private property may be distinguished from
other fundamental rights in that its exercise is rival: Weale, Albert, The Limits of Democracy (1989) , 42. It is
unnecessary for present purposes to enter this debate.
241. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
217
242. Kant, Immanuel & Reiss, Hans, Kant: Political Writings (1991), 191
243. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971), 221–222
244. Dworkin, R, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 277
245. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 455 (emphasis in original).
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probably some degree of economic and social rights of individuals, through constitutional and
international law.
4.3.1.4. Transnational democracy
Unfortunately however, even this is not enough in the transnationally interconnected world
of the new medieval era, since democracy might well be protected by such measures with-
in the state, and yet still be impeded by forces from outside the state such as other states
or transnational institutions (including government networks, civil society and the private
sector),
246 which take roles in governance without the concomitant constitutional and in-
ternational legal responsibilities of states.
247 Since decisions made in such fora may aﬀect
individuals across diverse territorial boundaries, it becomes diﬃcult to determine whose con-
sent to them should be required, and how that consent could be measured.
248
The study of transnational democracy is directed towards this dilemma, and puts the norma-
tive position that it is necessary to extend democratic guarantees of autonomy on a transna-
tional basis at all applicable levels of governance. There are however three broad approaches
to achieving this end.
The ﬁrst of these is liberal institutionalism (of which regime theory is a special case).
249
For the liberal institutionalist, transnational democracy is furthered through pluralism of
transnational governance and by increasing the transparency of the operations of each of
the actors, which approximates to the position put forward at Section 3.5. Fukuyama has
describes it as a vision of“a world populated by a large number of overlapping and sometimes
competitive international institutions, what can be labelled multi-multilateralism.”
250 Civil
society has a central role to play here both instrumentally (in facilitating this process) and
normatively (as a participant in it).
251
A limitation of the liberal institutional approach is that its normative programme does not
include any mechanism to ensure that there is an overall balance of views represented amongst
the various actors participating in transnational public policy governance. For example, an
246. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
226; Held, David, Democracy and the New International Order (1995) , 99–100
247. Picciotto, Sol, Democratizing Globalism (2001), 342
248. Held, David, Democracy and the New International Order (1995), 102
249. McGrew, Anthony, Transnational Democracy (2002)
250. Fukuyama, Francis, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006),
158
251. McDougal, Myres S, Lasswell, Harold D, & Reisman, W M, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
Decision (1981), cited in Charnovitz, Steve, Two Centuries of Participation, NGOs and International Governance
(1997) , 271–273
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issue area such as IPR may be dominated by private sector rights holders, governments be-
holden to them, civil society organisations representing them, and WIPO, leaving alternate
perspectives under-represented.
This is one of the insights that may be drawn from the second approach to transnational
democracy, which can be termed radical democratic pluralism
252 or radical plural democra-
cy.
253 The radical democratic pluralist is critical of the ability of powerful interests to capture
pluralistic governance processes, and in response urges direct action by grass roots social
movements to achieve transnational governance outcomes through a variety of fora at diﬀer-
ent levels.
254
This position is antagonistic to the dominance of the existing liberal world order even in its
pluralistic form, so for example the radical democratic pluralist would likely not seek to work
within the IGF, but to subvert it. From a liberal perspective this is the main shortcoming of
the approach, along with the fact that although it aims to develop a structure of checks and
balances to hold the hegemony of powerful interests to account, the legitimacy, transparen-
cy and accountability of these grass roots endeavours themselves remain, if anything, even
more obscure than those of a governance network structured within the liberal paradigm.
The third transnational democratic approach is cosmopolitan democracy, which builds on
liberal institutionalism in its vision of multi-layered governance, but has a more ambitious
normative program. It proposes, in the words of its foremost scholar David Held,“the estab-
lishment of an international community of democratic states and societies committed to up-
holding a democratic public law both within and across their own boundaries: a cosmopolitan
democratic community.”
255 This requires all transnational governance institutions, including
private regimes such as the new law merchant, to be held to an overarching cosmopolitan
legal framework that upholds accountability to liberal democratic norms such as the rule of
law.
256
In the long term, this will mean nothing less than the creation of a global parliament and
an internationalised global legal system.
257 The short-term objectives of the cosmopolitan
programme are not much less ambitious; including the creation of a second chamber of the
252. McGrew, Anthony, Transnational Democracy (2002)
253. Hekman, Susan, Radical Plural Democracy: A New Theory For the Left? (1996)
254. McGrew, Anthony, Transnational Democracy (2002), 274
255. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
229
256. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
234; Held, David, Law of States, Law of Peoples (2002)
257. Held, David, Democracy and the New International Order (1995), 113
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UN, the reform of the UN Security Council, enhanced political regionalisation on the model of
the EC, the creation of a new international Human Rights Court with compulsory jurisdiction,
and the establishment of an international military force.
258
It is to criticism of these high-ﬂown ideals that cosmopolitan democracy is most vulnerable,
with Keohane and Nye dramatically pointing out that “a cosmopolitan view that treats the
globe as one constituency, implies the existence of a political community in which citizens
of 198 states would be willing to be continually outvoted by a billion Chinese and a billion
Indians.”
259
On this account, cosmopolitanism falls victim to its own ambition. It encounters the same
problems discussed at Section 3.4.3.2 as to the extent to which diverse communities can form
a single normative regime that also has adequate content to be of any value.
260 Keane, for
example, doubts that even the principles of procedural democracy, that the cosmopolitan pro-
gramme seeks to instil in all transnational governance institutions, are culturally neutral.
261
These criticisms lose some of their cogency when the principles of cosmopolitan democracy
are applied to a governance network such as the IGF rather than to the international system
as a whole. In this narrower context, the preparedness of aﬀected stakeholders to accept the
democratic principle should be widespread enough that few will be excluded (and for those
who are, the IGF exercises only soft power anyway, and is unable to enforce its output upon
them).
On the other hand it is true that the range of substantive issues upon which it would then be
possible for stakeholders to go on to decide by democratic means may be limited: cultural or
ideological diﬀerences may either prevent decisions from being made at all, or if the decision-
making method employed (such as a voting system) allows the forum to push through a
majority decision, it may yet be defeated by the minority’s ability to boycott it. Granted that
this provides an incentive for the forum to aim towards consensus, but if the only decisions
that can thus be made are amorphous platitudes, it would still be as well if no decisions were
made at all.
Whilst this criticism is relevant and will be addressed in detail later,
262 it does not foil the
258. Held, David, Democracy and the New International Order (1995), 111; Held, David, Democracy and the
Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995) , 279–280
259. Keohane, Robert O & Nye, Joseph S, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Demo-
cratic Legitimacy (2000), 33.
260. McGrew, Anthony, Transnational Democracy (2002), 276
261. Keane, John, Global Civil Society? (2003), 124–125
262. To some extent in the following subsection, and again at Section 4.4.4.1.
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cosmopolitan democratic programme. Such cases are simply examples of those in which it is
not appropriate for the decision in question to be dealt with at such a high level, and where
it should fall back to be dealt with at a lower layer of governance in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity.
Held has developed tests of extensity, intensity, and comparative eﬃciency to determine
whether it is most appropriate for governance to be exercised at a grass roots level (the
corporation or city, for instance), the national level, or a higher, supranational or transna-
tional level.
263 These three tests respectively examine how extensive is the range of people
aﬀected within and across borders, how intensely each particular group of people is aﬀected,
and whether a lower governance level would likely be ineﬀective, requiring it to be dealt with
at a higher level.
The appropriate constituency in any given case is to be“deﬁned according to the nature and
scope of controversial transnational issues.”
264 In some cases it may be unavoidable that the
closest ﬁt is not a perfect one, and in others the best outcome may be for an issue to be
dealt with in overlapping and competing ways at multiple layers of governance. This equates
to Fukuyama’s“multi-multilateral”model, and illustrates the commonality of the core of the
cosmopolitan democratic approach with that of liberal institutionalism.
In fact, leaving aside the most overreaching ambitions of cosmopolitan democracy and the
postmodern excesses of the radical democratic pluralist programme, all three approaches
aﬃrm the importance of the democratic principle not just at the level of the state, but at
all levels of transnational ordering, public and private,
265 extending beyond the state-centric
demos, to the cosmos; that is, to all humankind.
266
4.3.2. Consent
One problem that transnational democratic theory does not resolve is how to extend the
limited range of decisions upon which agreement can be reached, given that freedom of exit
from a governance network provides an in-built check on its power to oppress its stakeholders.
That is, because its authority is non-binding, stakeholders can simply ignore or avoid the
263. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
234
264. Held, David, Models of Democracy (1996), 355
265. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
252
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dictates of a governance network that do not accord with the democratic principle of consent.
As Rosenau puts it,
governance is a system of rule that only works if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least,
by the most powerful of those it aﬀects), whereas governments can function even in the face of
widespread opposition to their policies.
267
Whilst this characteristic of governance networks is well aligned with the most basic principle
of democratic governance—that of the consent of the governed—it may also be inclined to
splinter an ideologically and culturally diverse network into smaller, more agreeable but also
more homogeneous groups,
268 unless there were some other mechanism to hold the larger
network together.
In the discussion of open source software, it was suggested that transaction costs could serve
this purpose, and that those transaction costs would be the higher, the greater the social
capital that the governance network had developed, making it relatively more attractive to
its stakeholders than alternative mechanisms or fora of governance.
269
It is possible to go further and say that social capital is the deﬁning attribute of a successful
network, as such success is measured by its ability to coordinate mutually beneﬁcial collec-
tive action (or MBCA) among its stakeholders, which is eﬀectively the “income” that social
capital returns.
270 In order to maximise the range of decisions that a democratic governance
network such as the IGF might make, the long-term value of its social capital to its stake-
holders, and thus the transaction costs of defecting from it to alternative fora, should be high
enough to persuade them to voluntarily abide by and implement the network’s decisions even
when they go against their own short-term interests.
How, then, may social capital be cultivated within a governance network, in order to achieve
this end? One of the most important factors is the inculcation of norms that reinforce vol-
untary participation in the activities of the network, with the expectation that this will be
reciprocated by other stakeholders to the common beneﬁt.
271 These norms of cooperation in
turn depend upon the stakeholders being institutionally empowered to participate in gover-
nance through the network. As suggested in the discussion of open source software, but as
267. Rosenau, James N, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics (1992), 4
268. For example, consider the factions into which the WTO is eﬀectively divided: see Section 3.2.1.2.
269. See Section 4.2.4.4.
270. Uphoﬀ, N, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation (1999),
218–219
271. Uphoﬀ, N, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation (1999),
228–229
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research also conﬁrms,
272 there is a strong positive link between empowerment and partic-
ipation, which is simply to state the perhaps obvious point that in order to encourage the
participation of stakeholders in democratic or consensual governance, they must be able to
see that their participation can inﬂuence the outcome.
Institutionalising the empowerment of stakeholders can also foster the development of an
environment in which stakeholders trust each other to reciprocate the participation they each
contribute to the governance network, resulting in a“virtuous circle”(or conversely, avoiding a
vicious circle) that encourages their continued and enhanced participation in turn. Ironically,
experience from open source software development suggests that it is counter-productive to
pay stakeholders for their participation in the network, because this will only demotivate
those who participate voluntarily in the knowledge that others are doing the same.
273
Although these instrumental beneﬁts may seem reason enough to empower stakeholders to
participate in democratic governance, to do so is defensible on the broader theoretical basis
that it better fulﬁls the democratic principle of consent (hence the title of this subsection
of the thesis). Recall that democracy is a means rather than an end for the liberal, the end
being a form of governance that permits the smallest possible encroachment upon individual
liberty. Thus for the liberal, a democracy in which everyone’s views are heard and taken into
consideration in more than just a token way, is simply a better democracy than one in which
only the majority participates.
However the gulf between this ideal and the way democracy most often works in practice is
quite wide. Conventionally, decisions made by the simple aggregation of preferences through
representative democratic procedures can be quite arbitrary. Even without infringing upon
any citizen’s human rights, the majority’s decision could still be entirely capricious and un-
reasoned. Although generally some deliberation takes place in representative fora (such as
parliaments), at the level of broadest democratic participation (such as the ballot box), no
reasons need be presented at all. Many voters may lack the time or inclination to assimilate
all the information they need to even form a reasoned position, and it may be entirely rational
for them, individually, not to do so.
274
This illustrates a practical tension between developing a democratic polity in which a large
number of stakeholders are directly involved, and one in which the decisions they make are the
272. Lyons, Michal, Smuts, Carin, & Stephens, Anthea, Participation, Empowerment and Sustainability: (How)
Do the Links Work? (2001), 1236
273. Vaughan-Nichols, Steven J, Disgruntled Debian Developers Delay Etch (2006)
274. Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957)
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product of reasoned deliberation—something of a trade-oﬀ between “quantity and quality.”
Yet in fact these are not the end-points of a continuum, but rather variables. Although the
forms of democratic governance cannot be neatly plotted against these variables in a tabular
or matrix form,
275 the chart below is a limited attempt to visualise their relationship, showing
various forms and conceptions of democratic governance, the number of participants generally
involved, the degree to which they involve greater or lesser deliberation, and the other forms
or conceptions with which they intersect.
Figure 4-1. Conceptions of democracy
Although this chart by no means includes all major forms or conceptions of democratic
governance, it does demonstrate for example that representative democracy can result in well
reasoned decisions, but that these are the result of the deliberations of very few, and that at
the other extreme direct democracy can involve the entire demos, but typically with a low
level of deliberation.
Potentially rating highly on both variables is deliberative democracy, which is to be discussed
below, and which intersects at its apex with transnational democracy (illustrating the the-
oretical case in which deliberative democratic principles are institutionalised at all levels of
transnational democratic governance). Preceding that discussion and by way of drawing a
275. Though for one attempt see Fishkin, J S, Virtual Democratic Possibilities: Prospects for Internet Democracy
(2000), 12
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contrast to it, a more conventional conception of democratic governance will be described:
that of participatory democracy.
4.3.2.1. Participatory democracy
Participatory or collaborative democracy is that in which the process of policy development by
a representative democratic decision-making body, but not the ﬁnal decision-making process
itself, is open to the reception of direct input from all stakeholders, in a process known as
consultation or dialogue. This is already a matter of practice for most domestic governments,
and a matter of legal obligation for some others,
276 and traditionally takes place through the
reception of written submissions and the holding of open public hearings.
As the participants in such processes are usually self-selected, opportunities for public par-
ticipation in policy making are generally advertised through the media, though brieﬁngs to
known interest groups may also be initiated by government (a feature of so-called pluralist
democracy).
A number of civil society and private sector organisations are involved in advancing the cause
of participatory democracy, putting forward principles or providing services by which consul-
tation can be made more eﬀective.
277 Such organisations from civil society include the United
States-based Centre for Collaborative Policy,
278 and those from the private sector include
Dialogue by Design
279 and Citizen Space.
280
At an intergovernmental level, participatory democracy has most notably been promoted
by the OECD in a publication which distinguishes three levels of citizen engagement in
government: information, consultation and active participation.
281 Of these, the ﬁrst level,
information provision, does not qualify as participatory democracy as it is described here, as
it does not involve any element of participation on the citizens’ part.
282
The second and third levels, consultation and active participation, describe a continuum which
extends from participatory democracy of a purely formal kind, through to the use of the de-
liberative democratic techniques described at Section 4.3.2.4 (subject to the proviso that
276. Innes, Judith E & Booher, David E, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century (2004),
5
277. Carson, Lyn, Innovative Consultation Processes and the Changing Role of Activism (2001); Government of
Western Australia, e-Engagement: Guidelines For Community Engagement Using Information And Communi-
cations Technology (ICT) (2005) , 11
278. See http://www.csus.edu/ccp/.
279. See http://www.dialoguebydesign.net/.
280. See http://www.citizenspace.co.uk/.
281. OECD, Engaging Citizens in Policy-Making: Information, Consultation and Public Participation (2001)
282. Though is still a vital component of democratic transparency, to be discussed at Section 4.3.3.
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“responsibility for the ﬁnal decision or policy formulation rests with government”
283—which
may or may not be consistent with the deliberative democratic programme, depending on
how accountable the government is for the consideration of the citizens’ input through insti-
tutionalised political processes.)
284
Drawing on these principles, both the OECD,
285 and Australia’s AGIMO, have drafted sets
of guidelines for eﬀectively conducting public consultations online.
286 AGIMO has applied
these principles in proposing the introduction of an Australian Government Consultation
Blog, which unlike the Commonwealth government’s current public consultations Web site,
287
could enable respondents not only to present their own views, but also to deliberate upon and
debate the views of others (though without necessarily being empowered to actively shape
government policy).
288
Consistent with this at a State level is a Victorian report on Electronic Democracy that
recommended that “online consultation should allow citizen-to-citizen communication, mod-
erated only to prevent incidence of defamation or legal risk,”
289 though this recommendation
has not been implemented to date.
4.3.2.2. Deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy takes this notion of citizen-to-citizen communication further. It is
concerned with citizens exercising their votes (or otherwise engaging in democratic decision-
making processes) in a considered manner that reﬂects their reasoned deliberations formed
during engagement with other citizens on the issue at hand.
290 Thus where direct democra-
cy fails because its ability to produce reasoned decisions is predicated upon the existence of
a more well-informed citizenry than exists in practice, and representative democracy cannot,
even in theory, fairly represent the interests of all citizens (and in practice best represents
those of powerful elites),
291 deliberative democracy aims to remedy both those deﬁciencies,
292
resulting in closer adherence to the democratic principle of consent.
Cohen writes,
283. OECD, Engaging Citizens in Policy-Making: Information, Consultation and Public Participation (2001), 2
284. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 380
285. OECD, Guidelines for Online Public Consultation (2006)
286. AGIMO, Principles for ICT-enabled Citizen Engagement (2006)
287. See http://www.regulations.gov/.
288. AGIMO, Australian Government Consultation Blog Discussion Paper (2007)
289. Scrutiny of Acts & Regulations Committee, Inquiry into Electronic Democracy: Final Report (2005), 147
290. See Pettit, Philip, Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory (2003) 138–139.
291. See Section 3.4.1.3.
292. Dryzek, John S & List, Christian, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (2003)
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The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association
in which the justiﬁcation of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public
argument and reasoning among equal citizens. Citizens in such an order share a commitment to
the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic
institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free public deliberation.
293
He suggests a set of four criteria by which a system of democratic governance can be compared
against the deliberative democratic ideal:
￿ It should be free; that is, participants should not be constrained either in considering
proposals, or in implementing them once agreed, by external claims of authority.
￿ It should be reasoned, in that arguments should not be based upon force or unexamined
preferences.
￿ It should be equal, such that parties to the deliberation are identically placed both in
procedural terms, and also in that their status outside the forum does not impinge upon
consideration of their substantive contributions.
￿ It should aim to achieve a rational consensus.
294
Some more insight into what deliberative democracy is may be obtained from distinguishing
it from some of those things that it is not:
￿ Unlike participatory democracy it is concerned with decision-making
295 rather than sim-
ply understanding; however the dialogue that participatory democracy fosters can be a
preliminary stage to deliberation.
296
￿ On the other hand unlike direct democracy, deliberative democracy is concerned not only
with decision-making, but also with opinion formation.
297
￿ At the other extreme, a democracy concerned only with opinion formation, as a means of de-
veloping a community of civically virtuous citizens, would be an example of“developmental
democracy”;
298 a species of civic republicanism from which deliberative democracy should
also be distinguished.
293. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 21
294. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 22–23; Cohen, Joshua, Democracy and
Liberty (1998) , 194, and compare the eight criteria of Coleman at Coleman, Stephen & Gøtze, John, Bowling
Together: Online Public Engagement in Policy Deliberation (2001), 5.
295. Or at least, decision-shaping; see Section 6.2.1.
296. Schoem, David & Hurtado, Sylvia, Intergroup Dialogue: Deliberative Democracy in School, College, Com-
munity and Workplace (2001)
297. van Dijk, Jan, Models of Democracy and Concepts of Communication (2000), 38–39.
298. Macpherson, C B, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977), 43
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￿ It may again be distinguished from “grass roots democracy” which holds that democracy
is to be exercised at the lowest possible level.
299 Whilst deliberative democratic procedures
may be applied at the grass roots level, they are equally applicable within other layers of
governance that may be further removed from the grass roots.
￿ Similarly deliberative democracy is broader than empowered participatory governance,
300
because to empower stakeholders with the authority to make decisions aﬀecting them only
fulﬁls one of“two key elements: giving community members the authority to make decisions
and choices and facilitating the development of the knowledge and resources necessary to
exercise these choices.”
301 A distinguishing feature of deliberative democracy is its focus on
the latter.
￿ Finally in its focus on the reﬁnement of preferences through reasoned deliberation, de-
liberative democracy also departs from rational choice theory, which tends to regard
democratically-expressed preferences as relatively “stable and exogenous to the decision
process, [whereas] deliberative democracy [regards them] as transformable and endoge-
nous.”
302
Perhaps the most important corollary to the above criteria follows from the proposition
that opinions cannot be shaped by force. This being so, any position contended for must be
supported by reasons that appeal not just to the proposer but to all, or at least to a majority.
This results in a tendency for democratic deliberation to be framed in terms of the common
good, simply because a participant’s appeal solely to his own self-interest is unlikely to be
successful in convincing others.
303
This bias away from arguments based on pure self-interest makes it important that the pref-
erences of participants in the deliberative democratic process are open to reasoned adaptation
in response to other viewpoints, and that such adaptation is not constrained by underlying
power relations. This does not mean that participants may not privately hold preferences
for selﬁsh reasons, but simply that for these preferences to prevail will require others to be
convinced of them (perhaps on quite diﬀerent grounds), through no other force than that of
reason.
299. Kaufman, Michael & Dilla Alfonso, Haroldo, Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transfor-
mation of Social Life (1997)
300. Fung, Archon, Wright, Erik O, & Abers, Rebecca, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Em-
powered Participatory Governance (2003)
301. Zippay, Allison, The Politics of Empowerment (1995), 264
302. Landwehr, Claudia, Rational Choice, Deliberative Democracy and Preference Transformation (2005), 41
303. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 25; Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy
and Beyond (2002) , 171
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To put this same proposition more starkly, it is the position of the deliberative democrat
that a decision that “cannot arise from free reasoning among equals . ... is for that reason
undemocratic.”
304
Habermas phrases the same concept slightly diﬀerently and terms it the “discourse princi-
ple”: that “just those norms deserve to be valid that could meet with the approval of those
potentially aﬀected, insofar as the latter participate in rational discourses.”
305
To give a concrete example of the eﬀect of this principle, it might be that, if a majority of the
citizens in a democratic polity were of Caucasian extraction, they would all privately prefer
to receive preferential treatment in taxation or social services than citizens of other racial
backgrounds. Yet as it would be diﬃcult for them to justify such discriminatory treatment as
policy through the use of public reason, the measure would would be less likely to pass into
law in a deliberative democracy than in (for example) a direct democracy in which public
deliberation was not required.
Eﬀectively, deliberative democracy thus resolves the tension between the ﬁlter and the mirror
conceptions of representative democracy. It is no longer necessary in order to overcome ill-
informed populism for the people to cede authority to a sagacious elite whose task it is
to ﬁlter their raw, uninformed preferences to reveal a kernel of truth. Rather, deliberative
democracy provides the people themselves with the opportunity to form more informed and
public-spirited judgments before their preferences are counted.
It is this phenomenon, in which the act of public deliberation transforms the democratic pro-
cess from something potentially quite arbitrary into an approximation to the liberal ideal, that
makes the impossible (according to Arrow’s theorem) possible.
306 Not only does the delibera-
tive democratic process thus produce better (more reasoned) outcomes, but because it takes
place through a process of open and equal public deliberation, its transparency and account-
ability are also of a high standard, which in turn contributes to the perceived legitimacy of
its output and the breadth of that output’s acceptance.
307
Another feature of deliberative democracy is that it is not conceptually limited to the state,
304. Cohen, Joshua, Democracy and Liberty (1998), 221
305. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 127. In fact, for Habermas it is speciﬁcally in the discourse principle, rather than the democratic principle,
that the legitimacy of a democratic society that upholds popular sovereignty and fundamental human rights is
founded: Habermas, J¨ urgen, Three Normative Models of Democracy (1998) .
306. Dryzek, John S & List, Christian, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (2003)
307. Innes, Judith E & Booher, David E, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century (2004),
429
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as prevalent models of electoral democracy are.
308 First, there is no theoretical upper limit
to the scale at which deliberative democratic principles can be applied; it can for example
complement the existing international system, working across states within intergovernmental
fora, as easily as it is applied at the domestic level.
309
Second, its focus on deliberation renders the quixotic endeavour to achieve numerically pro-
portional representation in transnational fora less central. More important is to ensure that
all relevant perspectives are considered, and in fact for this purpose it may in some cases
be necessary to speciﬁcally engineer disproportional representation of particularly aﬀected or
otherwise marginalised groups (thus, deliberative democracy sits ﬁrmly within the substan-
tive democratic paradigm). An example is provided in the case of Australia’s deliberative
poll on reconciliation which is to be described below, in which Aboriginal stakeholders were
provided greater than proportional representation.
310
4.3.2.3. Deliberation in the public sphere
Although deliberation can (and occasionally does) take place within the existing institutions
of representative democracy, a more ambitious deliberative democratic program that coincides
with the program of transnational democracy is that the ideals of decision-making through
the public use of reason should be extended from the“organs of governments to every active,
state-related organization.”
311 This would require that appropriate conditions exist within (or
perhaps alongside) each of those organisations to enable such deliberation to take place.
In an idealised historical European context, such conditions were according to Habermas ex-
empliﬁed by the coﬀee-houses of eighteenth-century London, which provided fora within which
a broad range of participants could engage with one another, exchanging and comparing their
various perspectives on social and political issues of the day. Habermas describes such fora
collectively as“the public sphere”;“a communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through
the associational network of civil society.”
312
It perhaps goes without saying that today’s Starbucks does not provide quite the same facility
for public deliberation that the eighteenth century coﬀee houses may have done.
313 Yet the
308. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Three Normative Models of Democracy (1998), 248
309. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (2002), 120, 175
310. Innes, Judith E & Booher, David E, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century (2004),
429
311. Habermas, J¨ urgen, The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist
Reason (1987), 256
312. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 359
313. Though the extent to which even they ever did so has been questioned, since they excluded many potential
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existence of an eﬀective public sphere within which social issues can be debated, springing
from civil society and permeating each of the layers of democratic governance, could provide
the basis for the extension of deliberative democratic principles on a transnational basis.
Whilst there is no such public sphere in the international system as it exists,
314 the conditions
of developing one suﬃcient to support transnational deliberative democracy can be stated in
ﬁve points:
￿ As Dryzek notes consistently with the views of Habermas,
315“a ﬂourishing civil society pro-
vides both a resource for future democratization of the state and a check against reversal of
the state’s democratic commitments.”
316 In this context, suggestions that activity in civil
society is not in fact ﬂourishing but withering are of potential concern.
317
￿ It has already been noted that both civil and political rights, as well as economic and
social rights, are required to be observed within organs of governance in order to satisfy
the conditions of substantive democracy. At least according to Habermas, the superadded
requirements of deliberative democracy call for the separate protection of “rights to equal
opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will-formation in which citizens
exercise their political autonomy and through which they generate legitimate law.”
318
￿ Appropriate institutional constructs are also needed in order to give eﬀect to these rights
to the public use of communicative freedom. This is done within a democratic state by en-
shrining them in law, or more particularly as noted above from Kant, in constitutional law.
Thus institutionalising the procedures of deliberative democracy dispenses with the need
for individual actors within the system to deliberately uphold others’ public communicative
rights, because they have been “hard-coded” into the political system.
319
What should the content of these institutional constructs be? More than one option exists,
but the least ambitious within the context of the liberal democratic state amounts to “a
public sphere based in civil society with the opinion- and will-formation institutionalized in
participants on the grounds of class and gender: Fraser, Nancy, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to
the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy (1990).
314. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Three Normative Models of Democracy (1998)
315. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 371. Rawls however would disagree, as he excludes deliberation within civil society from his conception
of public reason: Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (1993) , 213, 220.
316. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (2002), 171
317. Putnam, Robert D, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital (1995)
318. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 123 (emphasis in original).
319. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 341
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parliamentary bodies and courts.”
320 In such a system, citizens have inﬂuence over public
policy development through the public sphere, but direct political power is reserved to ac-
countable and transparent parliamentary and judicial institutions. This separation between
deliberation and the ultimate decision-making power of the state encourages participants
in deliberation to do so freely and with open minds.
321
￿ A responsible mass media is one important means
322 by which to manage the availability of
information to participants in public deliberations.
323 For the deliberative model to be eﬀec-
tive, participants should be presented with“a wide range of alternative views supported by
sincere arguments and reasonably accurate information.”
324 In many cases, the participants
themselves will generate these arguments by contributing from their own knowledge and
experience. However, depending on the composition of the group (including its professional,
cultural and gender composition), it may be that the viewpoints of all aﬀected participants
are not being voiced, and that not all relevant factual material is being heard. The media
is one mechanism through which these deﬁciencies can be addressed.
￿ Finally there must be a mechanism by which public opinion generated within civil soci-
ety can be put on the public agenda to be formally considered and implemented within
the political arena.
325 Tools of direct democracy such as the initiative, and of participatory
democracy such as open public hearings and the solicitation of public submissions by par-
liamentary committees and agencies, can be drawn upon here. However, in order to avoid
the biases inherent in the usual self-selection of contributors to such processes, a pro-active
programme of outreach should be undertaken to draw in viewpoints from the public sphere
that would otherwise go unheard.
326
These ﬁve conditions for the realisation of deliberative democracy within existing organs of
governance through an empowered public sphere, make somewhat stronger normative claims
upon the democratic process than arise from classical liberal democratic theory (though
weaker than those arising from civic republicanism).
327 Indeed, some scholars have proposed
320. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 371
321. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia (2005)
322. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 378
323. Hanna, K S, The Paradox of Participation and the Hidden Role of Information: a Case Study (2000)
324. Fishkin, J S, Virtual Democratic Possibilities: Prospects for Internet Democracy (2000), 12
325. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 380
326. Particular examples of how this ideal can be applied in practice will be discussed at Section 4.3.2.4.
327. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 298
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additional conditions that have not been included here, such as the requirement of Rawls that
those engaged in the use of public reason act with civility to one another.
328
Similarly Picciotto, one of the few scholars who has combined the studies of transnational and
deliberative democracy, adds a condition of responsibility, which he deﬁnes as the means by
which participants in deliberation and debate fulﬁl the democratic norms attaching to those
processes, for example by adhering to relevant ethical, professional and scientiﬁc standards
of discourse; a “deontology of deliberation.”
329
4.3.2.4. Deliberation in domestic politics
In any case, it has already been noted that even the above ﬁve conditions do not yet exist
in the international system. However this does not render the foregoing discussion a purely
abstract and aspirational exercise, as it may still be possible to realise those same or similar
conditions at a lower layer of governance. Most research in this area has been directed to the
case of the domestic political system.
The dominant paradigm of participatory governance at the domestic level is the public con-
sultation model of participatory democracy. Hence these new frameworks for deliberative
democracy, in which all stakeholders subject their perspectives to the light of public reason
in working towards a joint decision, are designed to supplant older processes by which self-
selected activists seek to inﬂuence governance processes taking place at higher levels. The
change of paradigm is signiﬁcant enough that most of these deliberative democratic frame-
works are still only used experimentally, and with a few exceptions to be discussed below,
not widely institutionalised in government.
Since there is no single template by which deliberative democratic norms can be institution-
alised domestically, four major institutional frameworks for deliberative democracy will be
dealt with here. These are the 21st Century Town Meeting, Deliberative Polling, the citizens’
jury and its close variants, and speed exchanges. Although there are a number of others in
use,
330 most of these are variations or hybrids of one or more of these four popular methods,
328. Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (1993), 217–218; to which Dryzek has responded,“deliberative democracy is
not an exclusive gentlemen’s club”: Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (2002) , 169.
329. Picciotto, Sol, Democratizing Globalism (2001), 349. Picciotto also (at 344) recognises conditions of trans-
parency, accountability, and empowerment, which will be left aside here since transparency and accountability,
although important in deliberative democratic structures, are equally important in other democratic structures,
and hence will be dealt with separately in the following section, whereas empowerment essentially subsumes the
second, third and particularly the ﬁfth conditions already outlined above.
330. AmericaSpeaks, a non-proﬁt organisation active in this area (see http://www.americaspeaks.org/), has
listed eight presently used in the United States: Goldman, Joe & Torres, Lars H, Approaches to Face-to-Face
Deliberation in the US (2004).
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which themselves share a number of common elements.
The 21st Century Town Meetingﬁ, developed by AmericaSpeaks,
331 was inspired by the tra-
ditional New England town meeting. It is a large scale forum of hundreds or thousands of
citizens who meet face to face in small table groups. All groups are provided with background
material to read covering the issues under consideration in a balanced manner, and the meet-
ing at large also hears presentations on these issues from experts. Each group is assisted by
a trained facilitator to discuss the issues, and once it has formed a view on them, relays this
to the meeting at large through networked laptop computers and voting keypads. The views
expressed most strongly by table groups form the basis for a set of recommendations upon
which the group as a whole votes, with the results being declared before the participants
leave.
Although to date 21st Century Town Meetings have taken place only within the United States,
they have been perhaps more enthusiastically adopted by government than any other method
of democratic deliberation, with hundreds of meetings having been held across 31 states since
1997. The “Listening to the City” event at which the future for the site of the former World
Trade Center in New York was discussed is one high proﬁle example of a successful 21st
Century Town Meeting.
332
Deliberative Pollingﬁ, the product of the Centre for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford
University,
333 is another large-scale exercise in which a random sample of citizens is selected
to take part in a preliminary opinion poll and to receive background brieﬁng materials on
an issue. They then come together and are divided into smaller groups to discuss the issue
in depth, assisted by a facilitator. Questions from individual groups are put to experts in
plenary sessions. The groups then deliberate again and at the conclusion, are polled once
more. The strength of this method is that by polling before and after the event, the eﬀect of
the deliberative process can be gauged.
As at 2008 Deliberative Polling has been successfully conducted in ten countries including
Australia, and across the European Union. Australia’s ﬁrst Deliberative Poll was held by
Issues Deliberation Australia
334 preceding the 1999 referendum on whether Australia should
become a republic. Following deliberation the preconceptions of participants were altered
331. See Lukensmeyer, Carolyn J & Brigham, Steve, Taking Democracy to Scale: Creating a Town Hall Meeting
for the Twenty-First Century (2002).
332. Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York, Listening to the City: Report of Proceedings (2002)
333. See http://cdd.stanford.edu/.
334. See http://www.ida.org.au/.
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dramatically.
335 A second poll held in 2001 on Aboriginal reconciliation, and a third in 2007
on Muslims and non-Muslims in Australia, resulted in similar dramatic shifts.
336 A distinc-
tion of the 2001 poll was that Aboriginal representatives were provided with greater than
proportional representation amongst the otherwise randomly-selected participants, in order
to ensure that all of the smaller groups had direct access to Aboriginal perspectives.
The third method to be noted here is the citizens’ jury (or planning cell). This is a random
group of citizens chosen much like a jury and of similar size, who are presented with a range of
expert opinions on the issue in question, and given time to deliberate on them privately. This
usually takes place over a period of a few days. Citizens’ juries or planning cells have been
used in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia.
337 The method’s
main weakness against most of its alternatives is its small size, and thus weaker claim to
represent a diverse cross-section of views.
A citizens’ assembly is much the same as a citizens’ jury, but typically of a larger size. These
have been successfully used in Canada, with an Ontario Citizens Assembly on Electoral
Reform of 103 members reporting in 2007,
338 following a similar assembly of 161 members
from British Columbia that reported in 2004.
339 A standing citizens assembly, also on electoral
reform, concluded in the Netherlands in 2006.
340
A consensus conference is very similar again, except that it takes place on a still larger scale,
potentially also over a longer period, and that those who attend are given greater control over
the agenda and the choice of experts who are called.
341 These are widely used in Denmark,
342
and has also been trialled in the United States, Australia and New Zealand.
Australia’s ﬁrst large scale consensus conference, convened by the Australian Museum, was
held on the topic of Gene Technology in the Food Chain in 1999.
343 As in the case of the
two Deliberative Polls, the consensus conference was nationally televised. Although the lay
panel’s report was not formally received by the Commonwealth government, shortly after it
335. Support for the republic increased from 53 to 73 percent, support for a directly elected President dropped
from 50 to 19 percent, and those who believed the President should be non-political rose from 53 to 88 percent:
Fishkin, J S, Consulting the Public Through Deliberative Polling (2003).
336. Issues Deliberation Australia, Australia Deliberates: Muslims and Non-Muslims in Australia (2007), 7
337. Carson, Lyn, Innovative Consultation Processes and the Changing Role of Activism (2001), 11
338. See http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/.
339. See http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/.
340. Snider, J H, Citizens Assemblies: A Mechanism for Enhancing Legislative Transparency and Account-
ability (2007). Its Web site at http://www.burgerforumkiesstelsel.nl/ was not accessible as at February
2008, but an archived version can be found at http://web.archive.org/web/20070716172416/http://www.
burgerforumkiesstelsel.nl/.
341. Carson, Lyn, Innovative Consultation Processes and the Changing Role of Activism (2001), 12
342. Joss, S, Danish Consensus Conferences as a Model of Participatory Technology Assessment: An Impact
Study of Consensus Conferences on Danish Parliament and Danish Public Debate (1998)
343. See http://www.abc.net.au/science/slab/consconf/.
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was released the government established Biotechnology Australia largely in conformity with
some of the panel’s recommendations.
344
The ﬁnal method of democratic deliberation to be brieﬂy outlined here is the speed exchange
or speed dialogue, a technique developed by the American Bar Association.
345 It diﬀers from
the other methods discussed above in two respects: that it is not usually used as a decision-
making tool, and that so far it has been used in an intergovermental rather than a govern-
mental context; namely by the ITU. However it is worthy of discussion here because of the
brief period for which it was included on the agenda for the second meeting of the IGF in
Rio.
Speed dialogues have much in common with the 21st Century Town Meeting, in that they are
conducted in table groups, each of which is equipped with a ﬂip chart and staﬀed by an expert
moderator. The main distinction is that each table group generally discusses a diﬀerent issue
(or a diﬀerent facet of a given issue), and has a limited time period in which to do so; 20
minutes, in the ITU’s implementation of the process.
After the expiration of this time period, table groups rotate, so that by the close of the
session, all participants have deliberated upon all of the issues that were set for the group’s
deliberation. The moderators of each table group then summarise the discussion and any
areas of agreement that were reached, for the consideration of the meeting at large.
Apart from the strong support of the Danish government for consensus conferences, state sup-
port for the practice of deliberative democracy has been less forthcoming. Most of the research
into and promotion of deliberative democratic techniques has come from civil society.
346
In Australia, neither of the three Deliberative Polls nor the consensus conference was govern-
ment organised. At a state level, the Western Australian government has shown the greatest
resolve to make use of deliberative forms of citizen participation,
347 having experimented at
an executive level with the use of 21st Century Town Meetings, Deliberative Polling and
Citizens’ Juries.
348 The Dialogue with the City for example, held by the Department of Plan-
ning and Infrastructure in 2003 and reportedly“the biggest interactive consultation ever held
in the southern hemisphere,” incorporated a 21st Century Town Meeting attended by 1100
344. See http://www.biotechnology.gov.au/.
345. ITU, Introduction to Action Line C5 Speed Exchanges (2007)
346. Most organisations active in this area are members of the Deliberative Democracy Consortium (see http:
//www.deliberative-democracy.net/). Lyn Carson is an Australian researcher who has also instigated a number
of projects in this ﬁeld: see http://www.activedemocracy.net/.
347. Government of Western Australia, A Voice For All: Strengthening Democracy (2004), 6
348. See http://www.dpi.wa.gov.au/communityengagement/727.asp.
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participants.
349
4.3.2.5. Deliberation in non-state entities
To conclude the present review of deliberative democracy, it remains to consider how de-
liberative processes may be institutionalised at layers of governance other than those of the
state and the civil society public sphere. These include layers constituted by the governance
of private sector or civil society organisations such as Microsoft and the IETF respectively,
and that of networks such as the IGF.
Taking the case of private sector organisations ﬁrst, a starting point is found in the literature
on “participative-democratic” forms of organisation design. This illustrates the potential for
companies to adopt structures such as that of Rensis Likert’s System 4 organisation, in which
the communicative freedom of their staﬀ is institutionally upheld, in broad concordance with
deliberative democratic principles.
350
However it is a limited conception of the democratic principle that considers a corporation
to have obtained“the consent of the governed”merely by extending the power of governance
from its owners to its staﬀ. A broader conception of the democratic principle that looks to all
those signiﬁcantly aﬀected by a decision
351 requires yet other stakeholders to be considered,
including the corporation’s customers, and the public at large.
Although at variance with early established principles of corporate law,
352 this is no longer
a revolutionary concept. Now known as“corporate social responsibility”or CSR,
353 it was as
long ago as 1943 that it was embodied in the corporate credo of Johnson & Johnson, which
explicitly put customers ﬁrst, employees second, the community third, and shareholders fourth
and last.
354
There are a number of strategies by which companies seeking to fulﬁl their corporate social
responsibility can empower stakeholders to participate in decisions of the company that aﬀect
their interests, not all of which could be described as deliberatively democratic. Even those
that could, do not much resemble the models by which deliberative democracy is pursued in
the public sector. As Parker puts it,
349. Department for Planning & Infrastructure, Dialogue With the City—Final Report of Proceedings (2003), 4
350. Likert, Rensis & Likert, Jane G, New Ways of Managing Conﬂict (1976)
351. Held, David & McGrew, Anthony, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization
Debate (2000)
352. See Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927
353. Carroll, Archie B, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Deﬁnitional Construct (1999)
354. See http://www.jnj.com/our_company/our_credo/index.htm.
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Making corporations democratically accountable is not simply about copying public institutions
of representative democracy within the corporate microcosm .... Rather, the challenge is to
understand the norms of democracy and then to create new institutions for applying them to
the unique world of corporate enterprise.
355
She goes on to suggest three best practice guidelines by which deliberative democracy can be
institutionalised within the corporation:
￿ to draw on the cultures, values and self-identities of employees to build organisational
integrity;
￿ to consult with legitimate external stakeholders to introduce their perspectives into the
decision-making process, then to report back to them and allow them to challenge those
decisions once made; and
￿ to integrate into the company’s management systems the means to inform itself of, learn
from, and respond to its social and legal responsibilities.
356
Similarly in civil society organisations, the prevalent governance structures, in this instance
often based around the strictures of Robert’s Rules of Order,
357 are being challenged by
newer, less divisive and more collaborative models that are more consistent with deliberative
democratic principles.
358 One example of these is Gastil’s model of small group democracy,
which deﬁnes it by reference to ﬁve characteristics, most of which can be traced back to other
conceptions of deliberative democracy discussed above:
￿ Group power (which essentially incorporates the same conditions as Picciotto’s“empower-
ment”);
￿ Inclusiveness (that all those signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the group’s decisions are invited to par-
ticipate; this condition is derived from Dahl’s conception of the appropriate constitution of
the demos discussed at Section 4.3.1);
￿ Commitment to the democratic process (a condition also found in Cohen’s conception of
deliberative democracy);
359
￿ Relationships between group members (whereby members acknowledge each other’s indi-
viduality and competence, recognise the mutuality of the group, and act in a congenial
355. Parker, Christine, The Open Corporation: Eﬀective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002), 37
356. Parker, Christine, The Open Corporation: Eﬀective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002), 197–198
357. Robert, Henry M & Robert, Sarah C, Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised (2000)
358. Susskind, L, A Short Guide to Consensus Building. An Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order for Groups,
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies that Want to Operate by Consensus (1999)
359. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 21
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manner to each other—which as noted above Rawls speciﬁed as a requirement of the exer-
cise of public reason);
360 and
￿ Deliberation (which describes the rights and responsibilities of both speakers and listeners
in the deliberative process).
361
As for governance networks such as the IGF, the most appropriate structure may be based on
that of this small group model, or on the private sector, the domestic political, or the public
sphere models, or a hybrid of one or more of these, depending on the network’s size, extent
and composition. It is unnecessary to be too prescriptive about the appropriate structure of
a deliberative democratic IGF at this point, at least until Chapter 6 when the IGF’s present
structure and composition are outlined.
It is more important however to have settled upon some essential principles of deliberative
democracy that can be applied in various circumstances through a variety of implementations,
than to ﬁnd the blueprint for an implementation that is equally applicable across all organs of
governance. Lacking such a blueprint, the closest approximation to the transnational demo-
cratic programme that can reasonably be pursued in the short term, and the most eﬀective
in furthering the democratic principle, is to simultaneously implement separate strategies for
the deliberative democratisation of all appropriate domestic, international and transnational
governance fora, by various techniques all drawing from the common underlying principles
discussed in this section.
A corollary of this pragmatically heterogeneous approach is that the adoption of a deliberative
democratic organisation structure for a governance network such as the IGF need not await
the development of an international public sphere (essentially the“transnational demos”whose
absence was earlier assumed to preclude the adoption of a democratic organisation structure
for a transnational governance network). Rather, deliberative democratic theory equips such
governance networks to pursue the democratic principle here and now, by pursuing a variety
of strategies to draw in all aﬀected viewpoints and perspectives and subject them to the
transformative power of dialogue.
362
4.3.3. Transparency and accountability
Although fundamental, the criteria of transparency and accountability are not constitutive
360. Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (1993), 217–218
361. Gastil, John, Democracy in Small Groups (1993), 16
362. Roberts, N C, The Transformative Power of Dialogue (2002)
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of the democratic organisational form in the same way as the principles of representation
and consent. Thus, the lack of transparency or accountability alone does not entail that a
democratic polity lacks formal legitimacy (though it may cause it to lack the appearance of
legitimacy, which is much the same thing in practice).
Rather, transparency and accountability are auxiliary precautions against the potential for
the regression of democracy into hierarchical forms such as bureaucracy or oligarchy, which in
turn may oﬀer a mask for ineﬃciency and corruption.
363 The allegation of democratic deﬁcit
is most often levelled against organisations that although democratic in form, in practice lack
transparency and accountability because their operations are closed to their constituents.
4.3.3.1. Transparency
Transparency has been described as the“distinguishing feature”of democracy by one author,
who explains:
Only when a record becomes public are citizens in a position to judge it, and hence to exercise
one of the fundamental prerogatives of any citizen in a democracy: the control of his rulers.
364
In the context of the liberal state, transparency is often known as open government. Amongst
the principal guarantees of transparency in government are freedom of information legislation,
and regulations or policy providing for the open and accessible publication of public docu-
ments and ensuring public access to parliamentary, executive and judicial fora of deliberation.
The extent to which these institutions have in fact eﬀectively exposed the liberal democratic
process to public observation has been mixed. Clarke’s assessment of the state of access to
information in Australia in 1999 was that access to “personal data has been becoming in-
creasingly open, information held by corporations remains largely protected, and information
held by governments is largely protected, but subject to some limited access provisions.”
365
Thus as in the case of deliberative democracy in the liberal state, in which civil society plays
a central role in the maintenance of a public sphere for deliberation, it is necessary to look
outside government in order to ﬁnd institutions to further its transparency. As again in the
case of deliberative democracy, foremost amongst these is the mass media, supported by
associated institutional guarantees of its independence such as freedom of the press.
363. Warren, Mark E, Controlling Corruption Through Democratic Empowerment: Market-Style Accountability
Revisited (2006); Aristotle, Politics (1943)
364. Bobbio, Norberto, Democracy and the International System (1995), 36
365. Clarke, Roger, Freedom of Information?: The Internet as Harbinger of the New Dark Ages (1999)
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The Internet also has an important role to play in increasing democratic transparency, by
broadening the potential accessibility of information and reducing the cost of its provision.
It has also played a secondary role in heightening public expectations of the transparency of
their governments’ actions; for example, expectations of the free public dissemination of the
law.
366 This may be traced to the principle of the hacker ethic, reﬂected in the culture of the
Internet, that “information wants to be free.”
367
The importance of transparency to democratic governance of course extends beyond the
context of the liberal state to international and transnational governance fora also. Thus
transparency is the ﬁrst of seven critical variables identiﬁed by Young as contributing to the
eﬀectiveness of international institutions of governance,
368 and is also nominated by Picciotto
as the ﬁrst of four constitutive principles for democratizing globalism.
369
Certain of the criteria by which the democratic transparency of the liberal state may be
judged, the basic strategies by which it may be pursued, and the institutions by which it
may be safeguarded, are equally applicable outside it. Examples include the maintenance of
records of governance processes and outcomes, the provision of access to those records and
to other documents developed in the pursuit of governance functions, and the facilitation of
public access to deliberative processes by means such as the publication of agenda for open
meetings.
However as the following section will illustrate, there are fewer established metrics for the
assessment of the transparency of international or transnational fora of democratic gover-
nance, which renders problematic any endeavour to rate or compare the transparency of such
institutions.
4.3.3.2. Accountability
Accountability is so called because it describes the process by which one exercising authority is
required to account either to those by whom that authority was delegated for its use
370 (which
366. Greenleaf, Graham, Mowbray, Andrew, King, Geoﬀrey, Chung, Philip, & Austin, Daniel, AustLII—Changing
the Nature of Public Access to Law (1998)
367. Clarke, Roger, Information Wants to be Free .. (2000); Levy, Steven, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer
Revolution (2001) , 40
368. Young, Oran R, The Eﬀectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables (1992),
176
369. Picciotto, Sol, Democratizing Globalism (2001), 344
370. Ranson, Stewart & Stewart, John, Management for the Public Domain: Enabling the Learning Society
(1994), 4
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can be called bottom–up accountability), or to another institution or another branch of the
same institution exercising hierarchical oversight over it (that is, top–down accountability).
371
For the liberal democratic state, the most basic guarantees of accountability are fair and
regular elections, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. Of these, elections are a classic
example of bottom–up accountability, in that not only do they fulﬁl the democratic principle,
by ensuring that the government holds oﬃce with the consent of the governed, but they also
publicly and regularly demonstrate the state’s fulﬁlment of that democratic principle. The
separation of powers on the other hand is more of a mechanism of top–down accountability,
designed to maintain mutual oversight between the legislative, executive and judicial arms of
government (at least in Westminster systems of government).
372
Finally the content of the rule of law (which intersects both bottom–up and top–down spheres
of accountability) was classically deﬁned by Fuller: that the laws should be cast in general
terms, that they should be public, they should not be retrospective, they should be intelligible,
they should not be contradictory, that they should not be impossible to comply with, they
should be suﬃciently stable to provide a guide for the citizen’s conduct, and that they should
be administered as announced.
373
The main limitation of the use of these three measures of democratic accountability is that
they have limited application outside the context of the liberal state. For example, in a
deliberative democratic forum, elections may not occur; the democratic principle may instead
be satisﬁed by the representation of all aﬀected viewpoints during an open and inclusive
deliberative process. Similarly, within a democratic governance network there may be no
need for separate legislative, executive and judicial functions, and neither would the rule of
law assume much prominence within a network that lacks coercive power.
There are alternative models for accountability besides that of the democratic state, such as
that of the domestic administrative agency, which may have closer application to governance
networks in some respects. For example, this is the model which ICANN has employed, though
somewhat haphazardly, by adopting the participatory democratic approach of open public
comment before policy making and in institutionalising mechanisms of review.
374
Other applicable mechanisms to ensure the accountability of government agencies that could
371. Rundle, Mary, Beyond Internet Governance: The Emerging International Framework for Governing the
Networked World (2005), 17
372. de Montesquieu, Charles, Cohler, Anne M, Miller, Basia C, & Stone, Harold S, Montesquieu: The Spirit of
the Laws (1989), 157
373. Fuller, Lon L, The Morality of Law (1969), 39
374. Weinberg, Jonathan, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy (2000), 225–226
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be applied to democratic governance networks also include rules to combat corruption (for
example by prohibiting bribery), and nepotism (by documenting objective selection criteria for
appointments and contracts), the requirement to declare conﬂicts of interest, and submission
to independent audits of dealings with assets or compliance with standards.
A strong civil society that lies outside the power of the state (or the network in this case)
is another important inﬂuence upon a network’s public accountability,
375 and so too, once
again, is an independent mass media (as ICANN, for example, has found).
376 Similarly, other
networks or institutions that may be its competitors in the market for governance solutions,
rather than its constituents or overseers, can provide what may be termed “peer-to-peer”
accountability (in distinction to bottom–up and top–down).
377
Even so, as previously noted when considering the most appropriate structure by which to
implement deliberative democratic principles, it is diﬃcult to lay down any universal pre-
scriptions as to how accountability may be assured within a forum of democratic governance,
since there is so much potential for variation amongst these in terms of their size, structure,
culture and hybridisation with other forms of governance.
Lacking such a uniform set of expected institutional protections, or in most cases any di-
rect vertical accountability to national parliaments, it is perhaps no wonder that, as noted
above at Section 3.2.4, transnational governance networks are left with“at best, weak or ob-
scure mechanisms of accountability.”
378 In criticising Slaughter’s enthusiasm for government
networks, Alston complains that:
It implies the marginalisation of governments as such and their replacement by special interest
groups, which might sometimes include the relevant government bureaucrats. It suggests a move
away from arenas of relative transparency into the back rooms, the emergence of what she
[Slaughter] terms a “real new world order” in which those with power consolidate it and make
the decisions which will continue to determine the fate of the excluded, and the bypassing of the
national political arenas to which the United States and other proponents of the importance of
healthy democratic institutions attach so much importance.
379
Slaughter’s response is that the use of soft power (characterised by persuasion rather than
coercion) as is typical in government networks diﬀerentiates them normatively from the hier-
archical arrangement of democratic institutions, and that therefore“[w]e may need to develop
375. Keane, John, Democracy and Civil Society (1988), 237
376. See http://www.icannwatch.org/.
377. Mueller, Milton & Klein, Hans, What to Do About ICANN: A Proposal for Structural Reform (2005), 3
378. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
139
379. Alston, Philip, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization (1997), 440; and
see Barr, Michael S & Miller, Geoﬀrey P, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel (2006) , 17.
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new metrics or even new conceptions of accountability geared towards the distinctive features
of power in the Information Age.”
380
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart have taken up this challenge and begun to sketch the outlines
of a new global administrative law designed to provide
structures, procedures and normative standards for regulatory decisionmaking ... that are appli-
cable to formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies; to informal intergovernmental regulatory
networks, to regulatory decisions of national governments where these are part of or constrained
by an international intergovernmental regime; and to hybrid public–private or private transna-
tional bodies.
381
Similarly, Mathur and Skelcher have begun to develop metrics of accountability and trans-
parency of governance networks in order for the extent of their democratic deﬁcit to be
assessed, and thereby more methodically addressed. They describe two approaches to this
exercise. First, they present a universalist approach whereby such metrics are devised by a
priori reasoning from theory.
382 A limitation of this approach is that it may not produce very
speciﬁc and measurable criteria. In contrast, the second approach is to undertake an empirical
exercise to identify speciﬁc best practices within similar existing organisations,
383 though this
may fail to identify any shortfall between current best practice and theory.
Primarily utilising the second approach, Skelcher, Mathur and Smith have developed 27 cri-
teria to assess the democratic deﬁcit of certain types of governance networks (speciﬁcally,
domestic public–private partnerships), grouped into four categories of public access (which
is largely synonymous with transparency), internal governance (which concerns matters of
structure such as the quorum of the executive committee), member conduct (such as the dec-
laration of conﬂicts of interest by executive committee members) and accountability (which
focuses on ﬁnancial and top–down accountability).
384
These criteria are incomplete, and not necessarily all directly applicable to transnational
governance networks, any more than the criteria applicable to liberal democratic states or to
domestic administrative agencies. However a similar approach can be taken when eventually
assessing the accountability of the IGF in Chapter 6, by surveying best practices of the most
closely analogous other institutions and networks, and then determining by reference to more
380. Slaughter, Annie-Marie, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks (2000), 195
381. Kingsbury, Benedict, Krisch, Nico, & Stewart, Richard, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law (2005),
5
382. This is an equivalent approach to that of Habermas in devising the conditions of deliberation within the
public sphere.
383. Mathur, Navdeep & Skelcher, Chris, The Democratic Performance of Network Governance: Conceptual and
Methodological Issues (2004), 8
384. Skelcher, Chris, Mathur, Navdeep, & Smith, Mike, The Public Governance of Collaborative Spaces: Dis-
course, Design and Democracy (2005), 584
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general principles of democratic transparency and accountability whether these leave any
gaps that remain to be ﬁlled by top–down, bottom–up or peer-to-peer mechanisms.
4.3.4. Inclusion
The ﬁnal heading under which the content of the liberal conception of democracy is discussed
is inclusion, as although a transparent and accountable deliberative democracy frees the
liberal democrat from the quixotic imperative of fairly and accurately aggregating dissonant
preferences, it remains true that the wider the participation of the demos in deliberation, the
more likely that all its perspectives will be adequately represented.
There is no reason in theory why all members of the demos who wish to do so should not
participate in an appropriate form of democratic deliberation (as the public sphere theory
of Habermas comprehends). The logistical diﬃculties of direct democracy on the other hand
remain, but these have not dissuaded its advocates from seeking to address and overcome
them.
In particular, advocacy of direct democracy has gained momentum as the facilitating potential
of ICT has become apparent. Before the Internet even existed, futurist Alvin Toﬄer foresaw
a hybrid of representative and direct democracy in which
the elected representative would cast only 50 percent of the votes, while the current random
sample—who are not in the capital but in their own homes or oﬃces—would electronically
cast the remaining 50 per cent. Such a system would not merely provide a more representative
process than “representative” government ever did, but would strike a devastating blow at the
special interest groups and lobbies who infest the corridors of most parliaments.
385
More recently, direct democratic theory has been revitalised by a number of variations on the
idea of direct democracy by delegable proxy,
386 such as representative direct democracy
387 and
liquid democracy,
388 each of which would allow citizens the option of representing themselves
directly in fora of deliberation, or temporarily delegating their right to be so represented to
one or more proxies in respect of particular issues. Whilst such voting systems would once
have been impracticable, Internet-based communications have for the ﬁrst time made them
viable.
385. Toﬄer, Alvin, The Third Wave (1981), 426
386. Green-Armytage, James, Direct Democracy by Delegable Proxy (2005)
387. See Aktiv Demokrati, Partyprogram for Aktiv Demokrati (2006)
388. sayke, Liquid Democracy In Context or, An Infrastructuralist Manifesto (2003)
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Large-scale experiments in online direct democracy have also gradually begun to emerge in the
real world. ICANN’s At-Large elections of 2000, which are to be discussed below,
389 provide
a pertinent example, though this particular experiment was soon terminated on the grounds
that it was thought open to abuse and capture, and to be an imprudent use of ICANN’s
limited funds.
390
Even so, the potential for the use of ICT to increase popular participation in democratic
governance deserves particular consideration in the transnational context of the Internet. As
the Internet itself transcends geographical limitations, it would be ironic if such boundaries
were to constrain the ability of those who wished to participate in its governance from doing
so.
Having said that, none of the speciﬁc implementations of so-called “digital democracy” men-
tioned above are intrinsically consistent with deliberative democratic principles, any more so
than the process for nomination of evictees from the Big Brother house. However, the issues
of greater participation and deeper deliberation are largely distinct, and there is no reason
why compatible approaches to the pursuit of both objectives could not be combined.
In this subsection, a distinction will be drawn between two conceptions of digital democracy:
what will be termed e-democracy on the one hand, and Internet democracy on the other.
The former has been deﬁned as “a collection of attempts to practise democracy without the
limits of time, space and other physical conditions, using ICT or CMC [computer-mediated
communication] instead, as an addition, not a replacement for traditional ‘analogue’ politi-
cal practices.”
391
Internet democracy on the other hand is a broader and more ambitious conception of the
revolutionising potential of ICTs for democracy, that foretells the “use of information and
communication technologies to realise the utopian goal of self-governance.”
392
4.3.4.1. e-democracy
Under the ﬁrst conception, the Internet is simply considered as a communications medium
with greater range and better eﬃciency than traditional media for facilitating communication
with the demos.
393 In the context of the nation state, this makes e-democracy simply a subset
of e-government, which as noted at Section 2.3.1.8 involves the use of ICT in the relation of
389. See Section 5.4.3.
390. At-Large Study Committee, Final Report on ICANN At-Large Membership (2001)
391. Hacker, Kenneth L & van Dijk, Jan, What is Digital Democracy? (2000), 1
392. Leadbeater, Charles, Living on Thin Air: The New Economy (1999), 224
393. See Graham, Gordon, The Internet: A Philosophical Enquiry (1999), 66.
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governments and their citizens online (but in a broader context, including for example the
delivery of government services over the Internet).
Support for e-democratic reform at the state level has emerged from within all stakeholder
groups, including governments such as that of Australia (at a Federal
394 and State level),
395
intergovernmental organisations such as the Council of Europe, which issued a 2004 recom-
mendation supporting the use of ICTs in democratic processes,
396 private sector bodies ser-
vicing this new industry such as the CyberVote consortium, and
397 civil society organisations
such as the United States-based Information Renaissance.
398
The breadth of this support illustrates that rather than challenging existing democratic in-
stitutions, e-democracy simply streamlines their operation in much the same way that e-
commerce streamlines the operation of online markets such as eBay, bringing them closer to
the economic model of the free market than their oﬄine equivalents.
399 Thus e-democracy“can
be deﬁned as a political system in which the use of ICT ensures democratic values”
400 by sup-
porting (but generally not transforming) existing democratic processes, such as:
￿ campaigning and lobbying;
￿ consultation and deliberation;
￿ voting; and
￿ mechanisms of democratic transparency and accountability.
401
Taking these processes in turn, the advantages of e-democratic campaigning and lobbying over
traditional methods are characteristic of those of the other e-democratic processes, and con-
sist ﬁrstly of improvements in the eﬃciency of communications—the ability of the Internet
to provide a highly available, near-instantaneous and inexpensive channel of communica-
tion
402—and secondly of the new modes of interaction between citizens and government that
394. See http://agimo.gov.au/practice/delivery/cop/e-democracy.
395. Queensland established the Community Engagement and Development Unit of the Department of Com-
munities in 2001 to spearhead e-democracy initiatives. It has so far arranged online public consultations,
Internet streaming of Parliamentary debates, and electronic lodgment of petitions to Parliament: see http:
//www.getinvolved.qld.gov.au/. See also Scrutiny of Acts & Regulations Committee, Inquiry into Electronic
Democracy: Final Report (2005), 3, 20.
396. Council of Europe, Electronic Governance (“E-Governance”) (2004), 8–9
397. See http://www.eucybervote.org/.
398. See http://www.info-ren.org/.
399. Hasenpusch, Tina, Does an Economist’s Dream Come True—The Internet as a Perfect Market? (2000)
400. Catinat, Michel & Vedel, Thierry, Public Policies for Digital Democracy (2000), 185
401. See Clarke, Roger, The Internet and Democracy (2004).
402. Government of Western Australia, e-Engagement: Guidelines For Community Engagement Using Informa-
tion And Communications Technology (ICT) (2005), 7
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the Internet facilitates.
403
For example, political party Web sites, and more recently also party political blogs
404 and
online campaign videos
405 are now commonplace in e-democratic campaigning. In many cases
these take advantage of the interactive capacity of Internet communications by allowing citi-
zens to post comments on campaign documents. An even better example of this capacity is
provided by wiki sites in which political candidates and their would-be constituents actually
collaborate on content.
406
As for lobbying, in addition to numerous blogging and commentary sites and wikis, politi-
cal organisations such as MoveOn.org Political Action in the United States,
407 and GetUp
in Australia,
408 have leveraged interactive Internet technologies to coordinate lobbying of
politicians on issues of collective concern.
Internet communications have also facilitated the mobilisation of large groups of activists
in the oﬄine world, such as the 45 000 protesters who disrupted the 1999 World Trade
Organization meeting in Seattle.
409 These protests were accompanied by the launch of a mock
WTO Web site hosted at what appeared to be (but was not) an oﬃcial WTO domain name.
410
Taken further, so-called“hacktivism”is the use (or the subversion) of Internet architecture as
a weapon of protest or civil disobedience, by means such as the launch of DDoS attacks
against or the cracking and defacement of political or corporate Web sites.
411
Consultation and deliberation as e-democratic processes also beneﬁt from the same eﬃciencies
enabled by the use of Internet communications in other contexts, such as greater accessibility
to those who are geographically remote or otherwise unable to participate (for example by
reason of low mobility). Online engagement is also more attractive to certain demographic
groups such as youth, who although able to participate, would otherwise be less inclined to
do so.
412
An additional advantage more speciﬁc to deliberation is that more information can be provid-
ed, to be digested over a longer time period, than the small sound-bites normally disseminated
403. Grossman, Lawrence, The Electronic Republic: Reshaping American Democracy for the Information Age
(1996), 31
404. Chen, Peter, e-lection 2004?: New Media and the Campaign (2004)
405. A dedicated YouTube channel supplemented by content from other Google properties was supported by all
parties in the 2007 Australian federal elections: see http://www.google.com.au/election2007/.
406. See http://campaigns.wikia.com/ and http://congresspedia.org/.
407. See http://www.moveon.org/.
408. See http://www.getup.org.au/.
409. Baldi, Stefano, The Internet for International Political and Social Protest: the Case of Seattle (2000)
410. See http://www.gatt.org/.
411. The Pull, Confessions of a Hacktivist (2002)
412. Macintosh, A, Robson, E, Smith, E, & Whyte, A, Electronic Democracy and Young People (2003)
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through the mass media. Neither is the media any longer the only source for political infor-
mation for the public, as citizens themselves take on the mantle of journalists to inform and
provoke their peers.
413 Thus on the Internet the consumption and production of political in-
formation and other public speech tend to merge.
414 It is this which distinguishes Internet fora
such as threaded discussion groups from the broadcast and print media, and allows (certain)
online communities more closely to approximate the idealised democratic public sphere that
Habermas found in 19th century coﬀee houses.
415 As one commentator puts it,
[n]ew media, and particularly computer-mediated communication, it is hoped, will undo the
damage done to politics by the old media. Far from the television dystropias, new media tech-
nology hails a rebirth of democratic life. It is envisaged that new public spheres will open up
and that technologies will permit social actors to ﬁnd or forge common political interests. Peo-
ple will actively access information from an inﬁnite, free virtual library rather than receiving
half-digested “programing,” and interactive media will institutionalise a right to reply.
416
Some examples of e-democratic consultation have already been given in the discussion of
participatory democracy at Section 4.3.2.1, and more will be said of a variety of online mech-
anisms for deliberation at Section 4.3.4.3. Their limitations will be considered at Section
4.3.5.2.
Voting, in both elections and referenda, is another democratic process that can be conducted
in e-democratic form in order to realise similar beneﬁts of eﬃciency and accessibility. Ross
Perot’s 1992 campaign for the Presidency of the United States incorporated a prominent
proposal to put electronic direct democracy into place through interactive televised discussions
that he called “electronic town halls.”
417 Two years later, then United States Vice President
Al Gore grandiosely heralded “a new Athenian age of democracy forged in the fora that the
Government’s information infrastructure will create.”
418
However, early enthusiasm for the possibilities of Internet voting has since been widely tem-
pered with caution over the risks of abuse.
419 The Internet has also raised new challenges for
oﬄine electoral processes, for example by enabling votes cast oﬄine to be traded in online
413. See http://www.youdecide2007.org/, a forum for citizen journalism established for the 2007 Australian
federal election.
414. Poster, Mark, Cyberdemocracy: The Internet and the Public Sphere (1997), 222
415. Schneider, S M, Creating a Democratic Public Sphere Through Political Discussion: A Case Study of Abortion
Conversation on the Internet (1996); Froomkin, A M, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace (2003)
416. Bryan, Cathy, Tsagorousianou, Roza, & Tambini, Damian, Electronic Democracy and the Civic Networking
Movement in Context (1998), 5
417. Balnaves, Mark, Walsh, Lucas, & Shoesmith, Brian, Participatory Technologies: The Use of the Internet in
Civic Participation and Democratic Processes (2004), 10
418. Gore, Al, Forging a New Athenian Age of Democracy (1995), 4
419. Bacard, A, Electronic Democracy: Can We Retake Our Government? (1993)
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markets.
420
Actual voting over the Internet was ﬁrst seen overseas in the Estonian national elections of
2007.
421 On a smaller scale, Internet voting was used for the Arizona presidential primary
elections in 2000,
422 though plans to expand earlier trials to allow overseas personnel to vote
over the Internet in the 2004 general presidential elections were abandoned due to security
concerns.
423 Canadian municipal elections have also been held over the Internet.
424
The same has not yet taken place in any Australian jurisdiction. The closest approach has
been in the Australian Capital Territory where the Parliamentary elections held since 2001
have allowed for votes to be cast from specially-equipped public computer terminals util-
ising open source software, although these are not linked to the Internet.
425 Victoria since
emulated this model in 2006 in a trial for vision impaired users, though with a proprietary
software product.
426
The ﬁnal democratic process in which there has been signiﬁcant e-democratic reform has
been in furthering transparency and accountability. Transparency has been increased mainly
through the capacity for policy, legislation and parliamentary debates to be inexpensively
and accessibly published online.
427 Accountability has been improved ﬁrstly by streamlining
the process by which citizens can communicate with their representatives, and secondly by
allowing them to report government misfeasance to the world.
On the ﬁrst count, Web-based services such as e.thePeople for the United States,
428 Write-
ToThem.com in the United Kingdom,
429 and Australia’s National Forum,
430 are designed
to simplify the process of contacting politicians not only by email, but also by postal mail
and fax. The UK government has gone further in establishing an oﬃcial Web site for the
presentation of petitions to the Prime Minister online.
431
420. Glasner, Joanna, Vote Swaps Revamped for 2004 (2004)
421. See http://www.vvk.ee/engindex.html.
422. Gibson, Rachel, Elections Online: Assessing Internet Voting in Light of the Arizona Democratic Primary
(2001)
423. McGlinchey, David, Pentagon Scraps Plan for Online Voting in 2004 Elections (2004)
424. Brennan, Richard, E-vote a Virtual Cinch to Take Oﬀ (2006)
425. See http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections/evacsprocess.html.
426. Rossi, Sandra, Victoria the First to Cast E-Vote in a State Election (2006)
427. The Australian Federal Parliament’s Hansard for example is published at http://www.aph.gov.au/
hansard/, and an enhanced interface to the UK Hansard developed by a civil society organisation, mySoci-
ety, is found at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/.
428. See http://www.e-thepeople.org/.
429. See http://www.writetothem.com/, and for a converse service from the same developers, that facilitates
communication from politicians to the public, see http://www.hearfromyourmp.com/.
430. See http://portal.nationalforum.com.au/.
431. See http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/. Estonia has a similar site to receive suggestions from the public for
new legislation: see http://www.eesti.ee/tom/.
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On the second count, anonymous and pseudonomous Internet services can assist citizens
wishing to“blow the whistle”on their governments. Governments not wishing to be made so
accountable have however sought to overcome the Internet’s inherent architectural anonymi-
ty by bringing the mechanism of rules to bear against Internet hosts within their borders.
For example, China has compelled Yahoo to give up the account details of dissident bloggers
who were later arrested and imprisoned,
432 prompting an Amnesty International campaign
and the presentation of a petition to the ﬁrst meeting of the IGF.
433
4.3.4.2. Internet democracy
Digital democracy in the second sense, referred to here as Internet democracy, aims not merely
to support the existing institutions of representative democracy, but to displace them in favour
of a form of direct democracy that challenges the roles of parliaments, political parties, the
media and all other intermediate institutions head on,
434 much in the same way as the open
source movement has upturned the conventional proprietary models of software and content
development.
435 As van Dijk puts it,
[t]he basic problem to be solved, according to this model, is the centralism, bureaucracy and
obsoleteness of institutional politics which fail to live up to the expectations (the primacy of
politics) and are not able to solve the most important problems of modern society.
436
What makes the Internet the solution to this basic problem, for Internet democrats, is in
part the same as the source of its appeal to e-democrats; its capacity to eﬃciently support
interactive communication. However, Internet democrats focus more on the unique attributes
of the virtual communities enabled by the Internet, which are typiﬁed by uncoerced, horizontal
communications.
The classic early text on virtual communities is Howard Rheingold’s, deﬁning them as“social
aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on public discussions long
enough, with suﬃcient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships.”
437 A more
recent account isolates four key structural features of community that may be present in
online or virtual communities just as they are present in the real world: limited membership,
shared norms, aﬀective ties, and a sense of mutual obligation.
438
432. Macartney, Jane, Dissident Jailed “After Yahoo Handed Evidence to Police” (2006)
433. See http://irrepressible.info/.
434. Catinat, Michel & Vedel, Thierry, Public Policies for Digital Democracy (2000), 185
435. Rushkoﬀ, Douglas, Open Source Democracy: How Online Communication is Changing Oﬄine Politics
(2003), 56
436. van Dijk, Jan, Models of Democracy and Concepts of Communication (2000), 45
437. Rheingold, H, The Virtual Community (1993), 5
438. Galston, William A, The Impact of the Internet on Civic Life: An Early Assessment (2004), 65
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Virtual communities have the potential to be very well suited to the deliberative democratic
model, in that they tend to cut across divisions of class, race and gender to a greater extent
than real life communities, allowing participants to organise themselves along lines of under-
lying shared interests.
439 Since an early study found electronic communications to mediate
diﬀerences in status and expertise,
440 further research has suggested that hierarchies are de-
valued within virtual communities in part because of the failure of the medium to transmit
social context cues of dominance associated with status, race and gender.
441 Research has
also shown that online fora thereby allow participants in small group discussions to talk with
increased frankness, and to experience greater participation and more equality than in face-
to-face discussions.
442 Or in the words of the classic New Yorker cartoon, “On the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog.”
443
Figure 4-2. On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog
There is, however, some variance in the political implications that are extrapolated from these
439. Wellman, Barry & Gulia, Milena, Virtual Communities as Communities: Net Surfers Don’t Ride Alone
(1999), 186
440. Dubrovsky, Vitaly J, Kiesler, Sara, & Sethna, Beheruz N, The Equalization Phenomenon: Status Eﬀects in
Computer-Mediated and Face-to-Face Decision-Making Groups (1991)
441. Jordan, Tim, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet (1999), 80; Froomkin,
A M, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace (2003) , 803
442. Sproull, L & Kiesler, S, Computers, Networks and Work (1993); Froomkin, A M, Habermas@discourse.net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace (2003) , 800
443. Steiner, Peter, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog (1993)
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features of virtual communities. Taken to an extreme, the so-called Californian ideology, seen
as the convergence of“the ‘hippie’ dream for a direct, self-empowered citizen government, and
the ‘yuppie’ dream for material wealth,”
444 and typiﬁed by numerous hyperbolic articles from
Wired magazine during the 1990s,
445 theorised that“existing social, political and legal power
structures will wither away to be replaced by unfettered interactions between autonomous
individuals.”
446 Such a conception of Internet democracy is hardly recognisable as democratic
at all, and indeed other commentators simply identify it as anarchism.
447
Another school of thought attributes almost transcendent potential to the interactions that
the Internet enables. Joichi Ito states:
It is possible that there is a method for citizens to self-organize to deliberate on and address
complex issues as necessary and enhance our democracy without any one citizen being required
to know and understand the whole. This is the essence of an emergence, and it is the way
that ant colonies are able to “think” and our DNA is able to build the complex bodies that
we have. If information technology could provide a mechanism for citizens in a democracy to
participate in a way that allowed self-organization and emergent understanding, it is possible
that a form of emergent democracy could address many of the complexity and scalability issues
facing representative governments today.
448
Even Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide Web, posits:
If we lay the groundwork right and try novel ways of interacting on the new Web, we may ﬁnd
a whole new set of ﬁnancial, ethical, cultural and governing structures to which we can choose
to belong, rather than having to pick the ones we happen to physically live in. Bit by bit those
structures that work best would become most important in the world, and democratic systems
might take on diﬀerent shapes.
449
If such predictions were to prove accurate, their consequences would begin to resonate not
only in global institutions, but amongst individuals in families, workplaces and social life. As
Knight contends,
the technological revolution has the potential of creating in the minds of people around the
world a sense of global citizenship which could result eventually in the transfer of individuals’
loyalties from “sovereignty-bound” to “sovereignty-free” multilateral bodies.
450
However, this potential has not yet been realised suﬃciently to be veriﬁed by empirical stud-
ies,
451 and at the moment can best be characterised as a somewhat speculative ideal. Likewise,
444. Hagen, Martin, Digital Democracy and Political Systems (2000), 59
445. Katz, J, Birth of a Digital Nation (1997); Wired, The Wired Manifesto for the Digital Society (1996)
446. Barbrook, R & Cameron, A, The Californian Ideology (1996), 53
447. Bryan, Cathy, Tsagorousianou, Roza, & Tambini, Damian, Electronic Democracy and the Civic Networking
Movement in Context (1998), 7
448. Ito, Joichi, Emergent Democracy (2003)
449. Berners-Lee, Tim & Fischetti, Mark, Weaving the Web (1999), 224
450. Knight, W A, Engineering Space in Global Governance: the Emergence of Civil Society in Evolving “New”
Multilateralism (1999), 277
451. Norris, Pippa, Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens (2000)
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returning to the macroscopic level, this idea of Internet democracy oﬀering an alternative to
institutional politics (wherein those existing institutions are relegated to the role of the ex-
ecutive government),
452 may be regarded for now simply as cyberlibertarian idealism.
In the current institutional political climate, the impact of the deliberations of Internet-based
virtual communities on governance is indirect at best. Whilst the blogosphere and Facebook
may make news headlines, this is often as far as their inﬂuence extends: to the media, rather
than to the sphere of institutional politics in which real power ultimately remains.
453
Perhaps a more moderate and yet still substantive assessment of the implications of Internet
democracy is that it does not pose as signiﬁcant a threat to existing institutions of power
such as the state, as it does to intermediaries. Grossman writes:
The big losers in the present-day reshuﬄing and resurgence of public inﬂuence are the tra-
ditional institutions that have served as the main intermediaries between government and its
citizens—the political parties, labor unions, civic associations, even the commentators and cor-
respondents in the mainstream press.
454
On this account, Internet democracy is less about displacing existing institutions, and more
about providing new venues for public deliberation that take advantage of the high degree
of congruence between the inherent features of virtual communities (such as egalitarianism
and cosmopolitanism), and the requirements of the Habermasian discourse principle for the
conduct of rational political discourses.
455 This creates the potential for the development of
a true public sphere such as has not existed since the demise of the English coﬀee houses of
Habermas, and has in fact never existed on such a transnational scale before now.
456
Whilst the Internet democratic programme is an ambitious one, there are existing virtual
communities, such as that of the IETF, that arguably already exemplify what is required of
such political fora.
457 Thus, virtual communities do have an important role in the formation
of opinions within civil society. In turn, civil society has a vital role within transnational
governance networks; however, it is not a role that supplants that of the other stakeholder
groups.
452. van Dijk, Jan, Models of Democracy and Concepts of Communication (2000), 49
453. Rheingold, H, The Virtual Community (1993), 289
454. Grossman, Lawrence, The Electronic Republic: Reshaping American Democracy for the Information Age
(1996), 161
455. Ess, C, Philosophical Perspective on Computer-Mediated Communication (1996), 216
456. Ess, C, Philosophical Perspective on Computer-Mediated Communication (1996), 216
457. Froomkin, A M, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace (2003)
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4.3.4.3. Online deliberation
Common to both conceptions of digital democracy is the potential for the use of online tools for
democratic deliberation. This potential has recently begun to attract academic attention,
458
although governments have not been widely seized of the same vision, any more so than they
have for the potential of deliberative democracy in general
459 (save to some extent at a local
level).
460
This is unfortunate in that online deliberation has the potential to achieve many of the same
beneﬁts as oﬄine deliberative democracy, whilst also leveraging the eﬃciencies of digital
democracy that could allow deliberation to be facilitated at a far lower cost than many of
those oﬄine techniques such as the 21st Century Town Meeting.
In fact to date, two of the institutional frameworks for deliberative democracy that were
examined at Section 4.3.2.4 have already been successfully transplanted to an equivalent
form online. The inventor of Deliberative Polling, James Fishkin, presided over the ﬁrst online
Deliberative Polls in September and October 2005 using audio conferencing software,
461 and
has proposed this technique as a possible method for the governance of ICANN.
462
Similarly, an online citizens’ jury was implemented by the South Kesteven District Council,
retaining a typical size of twelve members for the jury, but allowing for it to call any number
of witnesses during its deliberations.
463 There is no reason why the larger variations of the
citizens’ jury, such as the consensus conference, could not also be implemented online.
However by the same token, it would be short-sighted to limit the forms of online deliberation
to implementations of oﬄine forms; and indeed, they have not been so limited in practice.
The forms of online deliberation that are not based on the mainstream frameworks for oﬄine
deliberation may be most usefully divided into the following categories:
￿ Group discussion
￿ Synchronous
￿ Asynchronous
458. See http://www.online-deliberation.net/.
459. Coleman, Stephen & Gøtze, John, Bowling Together: Online Public Engagement in Policy Deliberation
(2001), 36
460. Gronlund, A, Emerging Infrastructures for E-Democracy: In Search of Strong Inscriptions (2003)
461. See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/btp/articles/events_dop.html.
462. Fishkin, J S, Deliberative Polling As a Model for ICANN Membership (1999). eDecide is the name of another
software product implementing the functionality of the Deliberative Poll, but which does not require the user’s
computer to be equipped with audio facilities: see http://www.communitypeople.net/.
463. See http://skdc.citizensjury.org.uk/.
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￿ Collaborative authoring
￿ Pre-deliberation
￿ Post-deliberation
￿ Decision-making
The main place of synchronous (or instantaneous) group discussion is where deliberation takes
place concurrently in face-to-face meetings as well as online. It can also be used where it is
necessary or desirable for a group to deliberate and reach a decision quickly, and where broad
participation is not compromised by the need for all to be present online at the same time.
Software to facilitate synchronous group discussion online has a long history, dating back to
1988 in the form of the IRC (Internet Relay Chat) protocol,
464 which is still widely used today.
IRC is a text-only protocol, in that although it allows participants to exchange messages and
ﬁles between themselves, they cannot ordinarily hear or observe each other as they speak.
Although audio and video conferencing software also exists, both proprietary such as Skype
465
and open source such as Ekiga,
466 technology has not yet advanced to the point where these
are practical for the simultaneous use of large groups of users, and they also place signiﬁcantly
greater demands than text-only chat upon the computing power and speed of Internet access
available to the user. The same is true of virtual reality software such as Second Life,
467
although the Second Life world has been used by the ICANN community to host virtual
conferences in conjunction with oﬃcial ICANN meetings, commencing with the 2006 meeting
in S˜ ao Paulo, Brazil.
468
Asynchronous group discussion also has a long history; Usenet is one of the earliest imple-
mentations, but others include email mailing list management software (one of the earliest of
which is Majordomo),
469 and more recently Web-based discussion fora such as SMF (Simple
Machines Forum)
470 which is notable for its use by the IGF Secretariat.
471 Morrisett explains
why asynchronous discussion fora such as these have certain advantages over synchronous
alternatives in their suitability for online deliberation:
In [such] a computer conference, people have access to questions, facts, and opinions and can
take their time about when they are ready to give their own opinion. Input can be made at any
464. IETF, Internet Relay Chat Protocol (1993)
465. See http://www.skype.com/.
466. See http://www.ekiga.org/.
467. See http://secondlife.com/.
468. See http://www.icannwiki.org/Ninca_Island_in_Second_Life.
469. See http://www.greatcircle.com/majordomo/.
470. See http://www.simplemachines.org/.
471. See http://intgovforum.org/forum/.
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time, and the ongoing output of the system can be studied until someone believes he or she has
something to say.
472
Similar observations have been made of blogs, which provide the same facilities in a more
decentralised form.
473
There are also certain asynchronous discussion products, both proprietary such as eConsult,
474
and open source such as DotConsult,
475 that have been speciﬁcally developed for use in
democratic deliberation, for example because they provide enhanced capabilities for managing
citizen panels.
Moving on to the second main class of tools for online deliberation, collaborative authoring
can also be subdivided into two categories. First are tools that facilitate the production
of the balanced brieﬁng material that is required to inform deliberation. One of the few
tools speciﬁcally designed for this purpose is GRASS, for Group Report Authoring Support
System.
476
In the second (though overlapping) sub-category of collaborative authoring tools are those
used as a more eﬃcient mechanism than discussion alone for drafting an agreed text such
as a standard or code. The modern archetype of such collaborative authoring software is
the wiki. Along similar lines, a new generation of editors allows multiple users to edit docu-
ments synchronously, actually seeing each other’s changes as they are typed. SynchroEdit
477
is one of these, which to a large extent also incidentally fulﬁls the role of synchronous dis-
cussion software. Another innovative tool is stet, recently used in the drafting of version 3 of
the GNU GPL, which allowed the public to attach comments to any parts of the text, with
more-commented sections being highlighted in darker colours.
478
The third class of tools are those for decision-making, which includes conventional voting
software such as the open source GNU.FREE,
479 and also more relevantly for present purposes
software that is designed to foster and support deliberation in the decision-making process,
such as the proprietary hosted product eDecide, which implements an online Deliberative
Poll. Each question in an eDecide poll is linked to further information putting alternative
perspectives. A similar eﬀect can be achieved through the use of the polling capabilities
that are built in to certain asynchronous discussion tools such as SMF, provided that the
472. Morrisett, Lloyd, Technologies of Freedom? (2004), 29
473. Lessig, Lawrence, Free Culture (2004), 42
474. See http://www.communitypeople.net/econsult.htm.
475. See http://www.dotconsult.org/.
476. See http://www.wagenvoort.net/grass/.
477. See http://www.synchroedit.com/.
478. See http://gplv3.fsf.org/comments.
479. See http://www.free-project.org/dev/.
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facilitator only opens a poll once satisﬁed that the issues bearing on it have been suﬃciently
discussed to bring out all relevant facts and perspectives.
Figure 4-3. Tools for online democracy
Synchronous discussion
Asynchronous discussion
Collaborative writing
Decision-making
IRC SMF
Synchro
Edit
Drupal
Dialog
Dashboard
Veni
Vidi
Voti
Media
Wiki
Unchat
GNU.
FREE
Other examples of some tools for online deliberation which cross over between two categories
are given in the ﬁgure above. Although it is by no means intended to be comprehensive, some
of the products there described are worthy of separate mention. Unchat is a a proprietary
synchronous discussion product which incorporates a voting facility, along with other features
designed for democratic deliberation such as document repository linked to the discussions,
and the ability for discussions to be moderated, unmoderated, or self-moderated.
480
The Dialog Dashboard is another proprietary product speciﬁcally designed for online delib-
eration which combines synchronous and asynchronous modes of discussion. MediaWiki, the
software used by Wikipedia, is shown in the diagram as a hybrid of collaborative authoring
and asynchronous discussion, simply because every page of substantive content is accompa-
nied by a discussion page on which all editors are encouraged to discuss their ideas for the
page and to resolve disagreements.
Intersecting the collaborative authoring and decision-making categories, VeniVidiVoti is a
somewhat complex though powerful open source software library designed for the drafting
480. As at February 2008, its Web site at http://www.unchat.com/ is inaccessible. An archived version may be
found at http://web.archive.org/web/20070806084821/http://www.unchat.com/.
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of agreed texts.
481 Its most interesting feature is that the decision-making system that it
incorporates is based upon the principles of direct democracy by delegable proxy that were
brieﬂy alluded to at Section 4.3.4.
The ﬁnal segment of the diagram is the centre, in which all four categories of tool for online
democracy intersect. There is yet no such tool that is speciﬁcally designed to meet all of
the technical requirements of an online deliberative democracy. However the example given,
Drupal,
482 is a general-purpose Web content management system which can be extended by
means of a variety of modules to meet these requirements at a basic level.
483 As will be
explained in the next chapter, Drupal was used to develop a community Web site for the ﬁrst
meeting of IGF.
Thus although development is continuing apace on a number of fronts, there is already a rich
variety of software suitable for the facilitation of online deliberation. Even so, software is not
enough. Unmoderated and unstructured discussion is very far from deliberation, as Coleman
and Gøtze note, stating that “[i]n free-for-all discussions anyone can say anything, but no-
one can have much expectation of being heard or of inﬂuencing policy outcomes.”
484 Their
research emphasises the role of expert moderation or facilitation of online deliberation, which
accords with the requirements of most of the deliberative democratic techniques designed for
oﬄine settings.
The particular skills required of such moderators or facilitators, whether online or oﬄine,
include the facilitation of relevant discussion, conﬂict resolution, project management, and
summarising and providing feedback to the group. It may also be necessary to split the
group into sub-groups of managable size, in order to allow them to function as communities
rather than simply as audiences for the views of their most outspoken members.
485 In all,
the moderation and facilitation of online discussion is a very similar role to that of the
BDFL of an open source software project, and provides an example of the place of a hybrid
of hierarchical and democratic ordering, where the hierarchical role is limited to the support
of the institutions of the online deliberative process.
481. See http://vvv.sourceforge.net/English/vvv/element/specifications.html.
482. See http://drupal.org/.
483. It also exists in a forked version called CivicSpace that has been reﬁned for the use of communities: see
http://www.civicspacelabs.org/.
484. Coleman, Stephen & Gøtze, John, Bowling Together: Online Public Engagement in Policy Deliberation
(2001), 17
485. Davies, William, You Don’t Know Me, But... Social Capital and Social Software (2003), 28
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4.3.5. Criticisms
By this point, it has become fairly clear that a democratic organisation structure for a gover-
nance network possesses advantages that the anarchistic and hierarchical structures do not,
and that it overcomes many of their shortcomings, at least in the case where deliberative
democratic principles are followed, and ideally where online participation is also facilitated.
However some signiﬁcant criticisms of such an organisation structure could also be made.
These may be divided into conceptual criticisms of deliberative democracy generally, some
problems speciﬁc to online deliberation, and some broader political issues with implement-
ing an online or oﬄine deliberative democratic structure within a transnational governance
network such as the IGF.
4.3.5.1. Conceptual criticisms
One perceived issue with deliberative democracy, which is really a more particular criticism
of procedural democracy in general, is as to the supposed neutrality of the process. Although
deliberative democracy claims to require nothing more of its participants than that they
commit to resolve their diﬀerences as equals through a process of public reasoning, it has
been contended that the “norms of deliberation are culturally speciﬁc and often operate as
forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people.”
486
Thus whereas Habermas only accepts rational argument as a means of communication in
deliberative fora, Dryzek plausibly suggests that alternative modes of communication such
as rhetoric, testimony or storytelling, and greeting, should also be admitted provided that
they are exercised noncoercively and are “capable of connecting the particular to the gen-
eral”
487—that is, essentially, that rational reasoning underlies them, even if they are not
expressed in an argumentative form. In an online deliberative context, the mode of story-
telling could well be extended to include the use of blogging as an input into the deliberative
process.
488
The question of whether the additional modes of communication noted by Dryzek, or others,
should be allowed within deliberative fora, is not one that goes to the root of the deliberative
democratic programme, but rather one that the moderator or facilitator of a deliberative
process can be called upon to manage with due regard to the composition of the group in
486. Young, Iris M, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy (1996), 123
487. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (2002),
488. Coleman, Stephen & Gøtze, John, Bowling Together: Online Public Engagement in Policy Deliberation
(2001), 34
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question. Having said that, neither Dryzek, nor any liberal, would or could go further to
admit inherently irrational or coercive forms of discourse into deliberative fora, as any strong
form of postmodern skepticism about the neutrality of rational discourse is fundamentally at
odds with the liberal paradigm upon which democratic theory rests.
489
A second criticism is that deliberative democracy does not work well in large groups. This
is both a practical observation and a conceptual one. Dealing with the practical issue ﬁrst,
it is true that in any large group, discussion tends to be dominated by a few active partic-
ipants, with the majority remaining silent (the latter group being known in the context of
virtual communities as“lurkers”).
490 This phenomenon can be addressed by a combination of
measures, including:
￿ designing the framework for deliberation so as to institutionalise the process by which the
views of all participants are solicited;
￿ active engagement by the moderator or facilitator in encouraging silent stakeholders to
participate and discouraging dominant stakeholders from becoming too overbearing;
￿ limiting the size of groups, as in of the citizens’ jury; or
￿ if a large group is involved, splitting it up into smaller units, as in the case of the 21st
Century Town Meeting.
The conceptual problem with large groups is that by deﬁnition they limit the eﬀective ability
of any one member’s participation to make a diﬀerence to the outcome, which in turn makes
it more diﬃcult to ensure that the organisation is acting accountably; a diﬃculty that is
magniﬁed in the case of international organisations.
491
However, this is more of a problem in a representative democracy, where the participation
of a large number makes it easier to produce an accurate (but not necessarily meaningful)
picture of their preferences in aggregate, without necessarily doing anything to produce better
(more reasoned) democratic outcomes. The deliberative approach is designed to mitigate this
problem, by allowing a small number of participants who may have cogent views to express,
to exert a greater than proportionate inﬂuence over the outcome to which the organisation
as a whole eventually agrees.
489. See further Section 4.4.4.1.
490. Nonnecke, Blair & Preece, Jenny, Lurker Demographics: Counting the Silent (2000)
491. Dahl, Robert, Can International Organizations be Democratic?: A Skeptic’s View (1999)
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This in turn gives rise to the further conceptual criticism that whilst deliberative democratic
processes may facilitate grass roots participation in governance, it is simplistic to assume
that rule from the grass roots is always good.
492 As Netanel argues, the diﬀusion of sovereign-
ty over Internet-related public policy issue areas from states to a broader base of stakeholders
opens the door to“invidious status discrimination, narrowcasting and mainstreaming content
selection, systematic invasions of privacy and gross inequalities in the distribution of basic
requisites for netizenship and citizenship.”
493
The deliberative democrat agrees entirely with this, but takes it as a valid criticism only of
orthodox direct democracy, not of deliberative democracy which builds in procedures requir-
ing the preferences of the grass roots to be passed through the ﬁlter of public reason before
being accepted, thereby ensuring that minority viewpoints and the opinions of relevant ex-
perts are heard and taken into account. To continue to object to the broadening of authority
to the grass roots following this process of ﬁltering and reﬁnement might indicate that such
elitism carries an underlying hierarchical programme.
The ﬁnal, and roughly converse, criticism of the deliberative democratic ideal is that it is very
much only an ideal in its insistence that that underlying power relations must play no part in
the deliberative process.
494 Much like the assumptions of the economist that underlie models
based upon the free market, to the extent that those assumptions fail to hold in practice,
the soundness of the model itself is compromised. In a deliberative democratic context, and
speciﬁcally giving the example of a governance network such as the IGF, this means that to
the extent that representatives of governments (for example) are able to use the threat of
the exercise of their authority to govern by rules to sabotage the freedom and equality of the
process, they will retain a hegemonic inﬂuence over the network that belies its apparently
democratic form.
This criticism is the most cogent of those examined here, and to the extent that it can
be managed at all, this can only be through the development of internal norms within the
governance network which value cooperation over coercion, and whereby the equal importance
of each stakeholder group to the success of the process is acknowledged by all. This problem
will be revisited, and an alternative approach to resolving it discussed, at Section 4.4.1.1.
492. Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995),
286
493. Netanel, Neil W, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory (2000),
498
494. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 22–23
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4.3.5.2. Digital deﬁcits
In addition to the criticisms of deliberative democracy discussed above, there are a number
of further limitations of online deliberation in particular that warrant separate treatment.
The ﬁrst is that online communities tend to be insular and prone to balkanisation,
495 which in
turn results in the development of polarised preferences and perspectives. An explanation for
this is that it is more diﬃcult for people to be“accidentally”exposed to political information
on the Internet (or at least on the World Wide Web), than in the case of traditional media,
as audiences can choose what information they wish to receive and when they wish to receive
it.
496 Whilst this might be seen as an advantage over traditional media by the users in question,
it allows them to crowd into virtual ghettos and reinforce each others’ preconceptions, trending
towards ever more extreme views.
497
A number of other dysfunctional behaviours common within virtual communities also work
against deliberative democratic principles. These include the prevalence of“ﬂaming”(sending
intentionally insulting or abusive messages),
498 and an odd dichotomy between the tendencies
of virtual communities either to adopt rash decisions with insuﬃcient research,
499 or conversely
to bog themselves down in a much drawn-out decision-making process.
500
Each of these dysfunctional tendencies gives the lie to the assumption that citizens will
spontaneously and eﬀectively engage in reasoned deliberation if they are only provided the
opportunity and the technical means to do so. Rather, they reinforce the importance of
eﬀective moderation and facilitation of online deliberation if it is to adhere to deliberative
democratic principles.
It is less easy for a facilitator or moderator to overcome the next limitation of online de-
liberation, however; the fact that participants lack the context of verbal, facial and body
language cues that accompany face-to-face deliberation, and thereby often fall into misunder-
standing.
501 Whilst, as already noted, the lack of such cues is in some cases an advantage in
that they might otherwise perpetuate diﬀerences in oﬄine status and power,
502 they can also
exacerbate diﬀerences in written language skills,
503 which can be signiﬁcant in a multicultur-
495. Van Alstyne, M & Brynjolfsson, E, Electronic Communities: Global Villages or Cyberbalkanization? (1996)
496. Klotz, Robert J, The Politics of Internet Communication (2004), 64
497. Sunstein, Cass R, The Law of Group Polarization (2003), 89; Sunstein, Cass R, Republic.com (2001)
498. Sproull, L & Kiesler, S, Computers, Networks and Work (1993), 108–110
499. Gurak, Laura J, The Promise and the Peril of Social Action in Cyberspace (1999), 259
500. Sproull, L & Kiesler, S, Computers, Networks and Work (1993)
501. Rheingold, H, A Slice of My Life in My Virtual Community (1996), 427
502. Jordan, Tim, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet (1999), 80
503. Fishkin, J S, Virtual Democratic Possibilities: Prospects for Internet Democracy (2000), 14–15
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al and multilingual forum.
504
These limitations can be partially addressed by educating participants in online discussions
to make their mood, tone of voice or actions known, where relevant, by textual means. These
include the use of emoticons such as the ubiquitous smiley :-), the use of capital letters to
indicate shouting, and by describing one’s actions as one performs them.
505
Deliberation in a virtual reality environment such as Second Life also allows the possibility
of directing one’s avatar (virtual persona) to adopt the facial expressions, body language or
actions that the user would present in face-to-face deliberation—or at least, those that she
would consciously present, and therefore desire to be transmitted. As previously noted how-
ever, the accessibility of virtual reality environments for deliberation is presently limited by
the demands they place on a user’s computer hardware and Internet connection.
This leads to the ﬁnal and most signiﬁcant criticism of online deliberation to be dealt with
here, which is a criticism of digital democracy generally: that whilst the Internet may provide
an eﬃcient and relatively cost-eﬀective means of communication for deliberation (particularly
in a transnational context, where the alternative is international air travel), there is still a
digital divide between those with adequate access to the Internet and those without. As a
result, the composition of any online deliberative democratic polity will not be widely repre-
sentative, but rather will tend to be biased towards privileged users and against economically
disadvantaged minorities.
506
The digital divide is primarily an economic divide. Thus internationally, there is a considerable
disparity between the incidence of Internet use in developed countries and in less developed
countries, although the gap has been closing over time. At the extremes, in 2006, over 88% of
the Netherlands’ population were Internet users, whereas this only applied to approximately
0.01% of residents of Burkina Faso, Dijibouti, Cˆ ote d’Ivoire or Sudan. (In Australia the ﬁgure
was over 50%.)
507
Domestically—exempliﬁed by United States research—amongst those excluded by the digital
divide are low income earners, those with lower levels of education, the elderly, and disabled
people, all of whom tend to have lower levels of general computer literacy.
508 In Australia, in-
504. See also Section 4.4.4.1.
505. For example in IRC this may be done by typing “/me shakes his head,” which renders the code “/me” as
the user’s pseudonymous screen name.
506. Fishkin, J S, Deliberative Polling As a Model for ICANN Membership (1999), 23–24
507. ITU, ICT Statistics Database (2005)
508. Klotz, Robert J, The Politics of Internet Communication (2004), 21, 24
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frastructure deﬁciencies have also created something of a digital divide between those resident
in metropolitan areas and those in rural, regional and remote areas of Australia.
509
Although there is no quick ﬁx for the problems of the digital divide, they have begun to
be addressed by all stakeholder groups, particularly in the wake of WSIS,
510 which estab-
lished a number of new follow-up mechanisms to monitor and maintain stakeholders’ ongoing
commitments to address this issue.
As with other issues of social equity such as those covered by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the primary responsibility for addressing them falls
upon governments. One of the most basic strategies that they can employ to narrow the
digital divide within their own borders is to provide Internet access to schools, and to public
places such as public libraries and telecentres, as research has shown that these facilities are
most commonly used by those disadvantaged by income or education,
511 and by the citizens
of many developing countries with limited telecommunications infrastructure.
512
As noted above however, access to Internet infrastructure is only one component of the
digital divide. To go further and facilitate their citizens’ use of the Internet, governments can
lead the way by pursuing e-democratic strategies such as publishing government information
and consulting with their citizens online, as well as by promoting (or mandating within
government) adherence to standards of accessibility for local Web sites.
In cases where there is a signiﬁcant domestic digital divide, it may also be necessary for gov-
ernment programmes to recruit members of marginalised, disadvantaged or otherwise “hard
to reach” groups within the community for participation in e-democratic processes. This can
be done by speciﬁcally inviting members of these groups to participate in online deliberation
or consultation, as occurred for example in Australia’s Deliberative Poll on reconciliation,
rather than relying on random selection or self-selection respectively. It may be necessary to
go oﬄine to target members of these groups where they live, work or socialise.
513
The private sector also has a role to play, particularly in building the telecommunications
infrastructure necessary to bring aﬀordable Internet access to the disadvantaged. Although
the particular measures required to bring this about will vary from one community to an-
other, a relatively inexpensive package to provide local connectivity to a disadvantaged and
509. Curtin, Jennifer, A Digital Divide in Rural and Regional Australia? (2001)
510. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 10
511. Klotz, Robert J, The Politics of Internet Communication (2004), 23
512. ITU, World Information Society Report 2007 (2007), 35
513. Brackertz, Nicola, Zwart, Ivan, Meredyth, Denise, & Ralston, Liss, Community Consultation and the Hard
to Reach: Concepts and Practice in Victorian Local Government (2005), 14–15
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isolated community may comprise the provision of low cost or recycled computers,
514 open
source software, and low-cost satellite connections coupled with Wireless Local Loop (WLL)
technology.
515
Civil society is also involved in the provision of inexpensive computer hardware through
organisations such as the One Laptop Per Child project which aims to produce a $100 laptop
for distribution in developing countries,
516 and of course in developing and supporting open
source software, sometimes in conjunction with the private sector (as for example in the case
of the OpenOﬃce.org project established by Sun Microsystems).
The digital divide is thus acknowledged by all stakeholders as a signiﬁcant and ongoing
challenge. Even so, returning to the present context, it hardly provides a fatal objection to
the process of online deliberation within a multi-stakeholder governance network such as the
IGF, for two main reasons.
First, as already noted, the digital divide largely mirrors an underlying economic divide.
Therefore although online deliberation does exclude certain stakeholder representatives from
participation in a governance network, so too does face-to-face deliberation. As long as the
former would exclude fewer participants than the latter, online deliberation will be the prefer-
able option. Furthermore, there is certainly nothing to prevent the network from making use
of both forms of deliberation.
Second, as also already noted, deliberative democracy does not depend as representative
democracy does upon the achievement of numerically proportional representation. Whereas
in a representative democracy the preferences of a minority can be overruled by the majority
without the need for justiﬁcation, in a deliberative democracy this can only occur through
the exercise of public reason. Therefore provided that the moderator or facilitator of an online
deliberative process can ensure that there is at least one stakeholder representative to put
the perspectives of a minority group, it is matters little that other members of that minority
group were excluded from participation by the digital divide.
4.3.5.3. Political issues
The ﬁnal criticism to be examined here has been raised and answered previously: that the
absence of a stable transnational, multi-stakeholder demos for the regime of Internet gov-
514. James, Jeﬀrey, Bridging the Global Digital Divide (2003), 49–53
515. James, Jeﬀrey, Bridging the Global Digital Divide (2003), 47
516. See http://www.laptop.org/.
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ernance by deﬁnition precludes the formation of a democratic governance network for that
regime.
517 This criticism is encapsulated in the bald statement of Nitin Desai, Chairman of
the IGF’s Advisory Group, at a conference preceding the ﬁrst meeting of the IGF, “The fo-
rum has no membership, it’s an open door, a town hall, all views are welcome. But it’s not
a decision-making body. We have no members so we have no power to make decision.”
518
This criticism calls for closer examination again now, because its superﬁcial plausibility, par-
ticularly within the intergovernmental circles of the existing IGF, may in the end be that
organisation’s undoing.
At the commencement of this section, the democratic principle was deﬁned as the fundamental
liberal tenet that a system of legitimate democratic rule must operate with the consent of the
governed (that is, of all those potentially aﬀected by such rule). When deliberative democratic
theory was introduced it was posited that this principle is only fully realised where each of
the governed is given the opportunity to speak on any question of governance in a forum of
public deliberation.
This is all very well in theory. But a governance network actually organised along these lines,
at least in the Internet governance regime, would be required to traverse a wide range of issue
areas, and the stakeholders potentially aﬀected by decisions made by the network could well
vary from one such issue area to another. For example, those potentially aﬀected by decisions
made on the regulation of spam might be quite diﬀerent from those aﬀected by decisions
relating to IPR.
This means that there can be no stable demos in the Internet governance regime. In other
words, the IGF not only does not, but cannot have a deﬁned membership. This is also sound
in theory; it allows the organisation to be ﬂexible and adaptive, growing or contracting to
accommodate anyone who can, and to exclude anyone who cannot, frame their interest in a
particular issue in the discourse of public reason.
However in practice, the notion that a democratic polity can exist in the absence of a deﬁned
transnational and multi-stakeholder demos is a profoundly counter-intuitive one for politi-
cians, diplomats and even academics alike.
519 Governments in particular are loath to share
517. See Section 4.3.2.5.
518. Waters, Darren, Warning Over “Broken Up” Internet (2006)
519. For example, Johnson and Crawford write (in Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, The Idea of ICANN
(2001)) that “[t]he principle of one-person-one vote provides a basis for delegating a people’s sovereignty to a
government. It does not provide legitimacy for a system that seeks voluntary compliance with policies that have
the support or acquiescence of all groups particularly impacted by those policies.”
Strictly speaking this is correct, however it suggests that“one person, one vote”and democracy are synonymous,
whereas in fact deliberative democracy does provide legitimacy for just such a system.
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“their” policy authority in a governance network of uncertain size and composition, and in-
deed one in which governmental representatives may be outnumbered by those from civil
society. As unobjectionable as this may be in theory, it is highly objectionable to diplomats
and politicians.
Unless they can be convinced otherwise, the likely outcome for the governance network is that
if governments participate in it at all, they will seek to circumscribe its role to being strictly
advisory in nature, and will ﬁrmly underscore their reservation of authority to disregard its
output.
This is quite a familiar tale, in which although a network between governments and citizens
may be described as a “partnership,” with the implication of equality between the parties,
governments perceive their own role in such networks as being superior to those of the other
stakeholders.
520 This reﬂects the US government’s relationship with ICANN
521 and the Aus-
tralian government’s with auDA,
522 and as will be shown in Chapter 6, has also been the
IGF’s experience.
Yet there remains a glimmer of hope. Although a deliberative democratic form for the organ-
isation of a governance network is by far the most suitable yet considered, it could be that its
downfall lies in its claim to be a form of democratic rule. As already noted, it is a feature of
deliberative democracy that it “aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus.”
523 Per-
haps, then, recasting the organisation in a formally consensual rather than democratic form,
and modifying its procedures as required to accord with this new nomenclature (whilst still
holding to the democratic principle), might resolve some of the objections of governments.
This prospect is to be considered next.
4.4. Consensual
Much like anarchism, consensus is a widely misunderstood concept. The word itself can be
blamed in part for this, because it refers to the desired outcome rather than the process by
520. Skelcher, Chris, Mathur, Navdeep, & Smith, Mike, The Public Governance of Collaborative Spaces: Dis-
course, Design and Democracy (2005), 578; Cardoso, Fernando H, Cardoso Report on Civil Society (2004) ,
37
521. McCullagh, Declan, Bush Administration Objects to .xxx Domains (2005)
522. Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), Part 22, Division 3
523. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 22–23.
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which it is pursued.
524 A second reason for misunderstanding may be that there are so many
consensus-based decision-making processes in use, with little consistent theory underpinning
their design. As Butler and Rothstein lament, too“[o]ften, the consensus process is informal,
vague, and very inconsistent.”
525
Having said that, the fundamentals of the process of seeking consensus are conceptually
very similar to those of deliberative democracy. Whilst there is much variation in the degree
of agreement required to qualify as consensus, it need not amount to unanimity. Johnson
and Crawford, for example, deﬁne consensus as having been reached when “opposition to a
particular policy is limited in scope and intensity (or is unreasoned), and opposition does not
stem from those specially impacted by the policy.”
526
It can be seen that the elements of this particular test closely resemble those of deliberative
democracy, speciﬁcally in the requirement that opposition to a proposal be reasoned, and
that such opposition stem from those speciﬁcally impacted by the proposal. As for opposition
being “limited in scope or intensity,” this simply substitutes a subjective standard (though a
high one) for the objective test of a democratic vote.
Similarly, most of the advantages claimed for consensus are advantages of deliberative democ-
racy also. For example, it is argued that by seeking to reach consensus—even if it is not
achieved—the group’s members are encouraged to articulate their viewpoints persuasively
and to actively seek acceptable compromise.
527 Public deliberation encourages them to do
the same. Also like democratic deliberation, decision-making by consensus is an inherently
egalitarian process, because all participants carry equal power to block agreement on a deci-
sion from being reached—and once agreement is reached, all can share a sense of ownership
of the decision.
In fact perhaps counter-intuitively, the key diﬀerence between most consensual decision-
making processes and the deliberative democratic process is not that the former require
a higher level of agreement, but rather that they are in other respects procedurally less strin-
gent than the latter. So for example, decision-making by consensus need not require that
deliberation take place at all. Although it will normally be necessary for it to do so in order
524. However its use will be retained here because alternative terms such as “collective decision making” (as in
Saint, Steven & Lawson, James R, Rules for Reaching Consensus (1994)) are confusingly generic.
525. Butler, C T & Rothstein, Amy, On Conﬂict and Consensus: A Handbook on Formal Consensus Decision-
making (2004), 9
526. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, Why Consensus Matters: The Theory Underlying ICANN’s Mandate
to Set Policy Standards for the Domain Name System (2000)
527. Gastil, John, Democracy in Small Groups (1993), 50–53
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to bring all those involved to agreement,
528 it is also possible to gain consensus through purely
strategic bargaining techniques.
529
Some processes for decision-making by consensus do not even require all those amongst whom
a consensus is declared, to have expressed their views on the issue in question. It is therefore
possible for an organisation governed by consensus to declare that consensus exists on an issue
to which not all of its members have even addressed their minds. As Johnson and Crawford
point out, there would be no accountability behind such a declaration unless the organisation
at least gathered and documented some evidence that consensus existed, by engaging in
dialogue with its members.
530
From the above it might be assumed that a consensual decision-making process would most
likely be less useful than one based upon the more theoretically rigorous deliberative democ-
racy for structuring an organisation’s decision-making procedures in accordance with the
democratic principle. However, well-designed consensual processes can in fact be more useful
in at two relevant circumstances.
The ﬁrst is where it is impossible or impractical to satisfy the preconditions of deliberative
democracy. ICANN, for example, purports to act upon the consensus of the entire Internet
community,
531 which, until a universal online public sphere develops,
532 is not a body capable
of public deliberation in the sense required by deliberative democracy. Another example is
where the only criteria for decision-making are technical and objective, since in such a case
the views of the organisation’s members would not be pluralistic as deliberative democra-
cy requires.
533 Thus consensus is the standard of agreement within many technical standards
organisations, including the IETF.
534
The second case in which consensus-based processes can be employed where deliberative
democratic processes cannot is where consensus is to be reached between groups rather than
individuals (either in their own or in representative capacities). In common with its parent
liberalism, deliberative democracy, even more so than representative democracy, has a very
atomistic focus, based on the equal rights of individuals to participate in political deliberation.
528. Steiner, J¨ urg, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule. Conﬂict Resolution in Switzerland (1974), 5
529. Avio, Kenneth L, Constitutional Contract and Discourse Ethics: The Agreement Theories of James
Buchanan and J¨ urgen Habermas (1997), 544–51
530. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, Why Consensus Matters: The Theory Underlying ICANN’s Mandate
to Set Policy Standards for the Domain Name System (2000)
531. Post, David G, ICANN and the Consensus of the Internet Community (1999)
532. Or an IGF-style open forum representing one in miniature is adopted by ICANN to replace its present rigid
hierarchy of ACs and SOs: see Section 4.4.3 and Section 6.3.1.1.
533. Cohen, Joshua, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (1989), 21
534. Though perhaps in denial of the fact that subjective public policy issues are also often engaged in the
development of standards: see Section 2.2.2.
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Lacking this theoretical baggage (or in some cases being grounded instead in communitar-
ianism), the pursuit of consensus is a conceptually more suitable mechanism for reaching
agreement at higher levels, whilst also adhering more closely to the democratic principle than
representative democracy at those levels, due to the democratic deﬁcits to which representa-
tive democracy becomes subject the further removed it is from the grass roots.
The relevance of this to the design of a network for the governance of Internet-related public
policy issues lies in the fact that one of the most distinctive attributes of such a network is
its multi-stakeholder composition. The individualistic focus of the discussion on deliberative
democracy may have obscured the signiﬁcance of the independence of each of the stakeholder
groups. The conclusion of the preceding section has however brought this issue back into
focus, by illustrating the disruptive tendency of governments to act unilaterally in democratic
governance networks; a problem to which deliberative democracy oﬀers no clear solution.
4.4.1. Consensus between stakeholder groups
We will therefore now consider the possibility of requiring that consensus be reached be-
tween the stakeholder groups on any proposal that has been democratically agreed within
and across those groups, thereby essentially giving each stakeholder group the power to veto
it. Since multi-stakeholder governance networks are inherently consensual structures anyway,
and possess only soft power with which to enforce their decisions, the recognition of a for-
mal requirement of consensus amongst stakeholder groups is also a more natural ﬁt for this
mechanism of governance than democratic voting.
This could address the problem of government unilateralism in two ways. First, it would
provide an alternative to the use of the eﬀective power of veto that governments already
possess in many issue areas. Instead of denying the competance of the governance network to
make even non-binding decisions, and overriding its authority through the use of the coercive
force of law, it will be possible for governments to formally veto any proposal the network
makes without thereby undermining its authority as a forum for ongoing collaborative policy
development.
Secondly, and alternatively, even if governments do continue to deny the independent author-
ity of the governance network to develop soft law and purport to relegate it to an advisory
role (which seems more likely, in the IGF’s case),
535 the formal requirement that consensus
be reached between all stakeholder groups would institutionalise a power of veto for the other
535. See Section 6.2.
260Chapter 4. Designing a governance network
stakeholders, that would go some way towards equalising their power with that of govern-
ments. The analogy of the“KILL SYSTEM”command of the ITS operating system, referred
to at Section 4.1.1.1 is an apt one, in that giving all equal power to undermine the governance
process stimulates the development of norms to regulate the use of that power.
4.4.1.1. Consociationalism
Consociationalism is the theory of a form of organisation designed to institutionalise the
reservation of power to distinct stakeholder groups within a consensual decision-making forum.
First and most famously described by Arend Lijphart,
536 it describes an ideal form of what
may more broadly be called consensus democracy, which includes various other forms of
democratic governance characterised by the sharing of power between stakeholder groups at
the executive level.
537
In its ideal type as identiﬁed by Lijphart, a consociation exhibits four characteristics:
￿ power is shared within a “grand coalition” comprised of representatives of all major stake-
holder groups;
￿ the stakeholder groups are elected to the grand coalition by a system of proportional rep-
resentation;
￿ they each enjoy a right of veto over any proposal of mutual concern, regardless of whether
any of them is in the majority; and
￿ their “segmental autonomy” is preserved, which is to say that each group is delegated
the authority to autonomously govern its own segment of exclusive concern (such as the
governance of a particular territory, or of a particular ethnic, linguistic or religious group).
538
As the above characteristics may suggest, consociation has been most commonly studied as
a form of government, in which the various stakeholder groups of a pluralistic community are
divided along territorial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural lines. It is designed to reduce
conﬂict by preserving the independence of groups entitled to be represented in government
but which may not be willing to cede control to a majoritarian democracy.
536. Lijphart, Arend, Consociational Democracy (1969)
537. Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries
(1999)
538. Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (1977)
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Consociationalism can also be applied to other fora of governance, including multi-stakeholder
governance networks.
539 However, some adaptation of Lijphart’s ideal type would be required
for it to provide an appropriate model of a consociational network for the Internet governance
regime. In particular, since the relevant stakeholders would be governments, the private sec-
tor and civil society, it would be diﬃcult to provide for proportional representation within
the grand coalition, because the size of each stakeholder group’s membership is not easily
commensurable.
540
There is however an alternative method of ensuring proportional representation, and thus
also fairly institutionalising the power of mutual veto, without restricting the composition
of the grand coalition. This is for an executive council of the governance network to be
formed, to which each stakeholder group would elect an equal number of representatives.
This executive council would be required to ratify all decisions of the grand coalition by
consensus. If consensus could not be achieved, the objecting stakeholder group or groups
would eﬀectively thus exercise their power of veto.
Although this could be seen as elitist for removing direct power from the grand coalition to a
meritocracy, the advantage of doing so is that it would enable the grand coalition to deliberate
more freely and less strategically, knowing that ultimate political power lay at a higher level,
541
whilst at that higher level, formal decisions could be made more quickly.
542 By analogy, the
grand coalition would become the public sphere of the Habermasian model, and the executive
council its parliament.
Another possible objection to the above model of a consociational Internet governance net-
work is that it is not deliberatively democratic, at any of three levels: within the grand
coalition where decisions are made, within the executive council where they are ratiﬁed, or
in the process by which the executive council is elected.
This objection is however quite easily answered, as there is no reason why Lijphart’s ideal type
could not be adapted to incorporate deliberative democratic principles in the process by which
decisions are made by the grand coalition. It has even been said that deliberative democratic
principles are already “embedded in the very structure of consociational democracies,” since
the process of forging consensus between stakeholder groups is naturally much closer to that of
democratic deliberation than the process of majoritarian rule in a representative democratic
539. Skelcher, Chris, Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance (2005)
540. See Section 4.2.3.2.
541. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia (2005)
542. See Section 4.2.2.
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parliament.
543
The consensus of the executive council on whether to ratify a proposal could also be facilitated
by democratic deliberation, though it is less important that it should be, since the executive
councillors would already have participated in the process of deliberation within the grand
coalition, and the role of the executive council is a more limited one simply designed to
institutionalise the stakeholder groups’ right of mutual veto. As for the process by which the
councillors are elected, it would be cumbersome to attempt to do so by any other method
than voting, however it would be possible for a multi-stakeholder nominating committee to
deliberate upon a shortlist of candidates to be presented to the grand coalition for election.
This model of a consociational governance network has much in common with the variant
of consociationalism found in the European Union. The European Parliament, containing
multiple directly-elected MEPs for each country in rough proportion to their size, is the
equivalent of the grand coalition. The Council of the European Union, containing only one
minister from each country, equates to the executive council. To pass an EU law using the
co-decision procedure, the Council is required to reach agreement on the proposed text with
the Parliament, much like the process of ratiﬁcation proposed here. Depending on the issue
area in question, it is required to do so either by unanimous consensus, or by the “rough
consensus” of qualiﬁed majority voting.
544
Thus the option of consociation for a multi-stakeholder governance network, although rela-
tively novel, is certainly not untested; the ILO with its sharing of power between governments,
employers and workers provides another example,
545 and yet another is found in the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC); a non-governmental forum responsible for the development of
standards for sustainable forestry.
546 It also accords with the conclusion of the discussion
of hierarchical organisational forms at Section 4.2.6, that a meritocracy established by a
543. Steiner, J¨ urg, B¨ achtiger, Andr´ e, & Sp¨ orndli, Markus, The Consociational Theory and Deliberative Politics.
A Conceptual Framework for a Cross-National Analysis (2002), 77
544. See Section 3.2.1.4.
545. See Section 3.2.1.3.
546. Although the FSC (see http://www.fsc.org/) does not conform to Lijphart’s ideal type of consocia-
tionalism, it follows similar principles that reinforce the equality of all stakeholder groups and the mutuality
of their endeavour (see generally Lipschutz, Ronnie D & Fogel, Cathleen,“Regulation for the Rest of Us?” Global
Civil Society and the Privatization of Transnational Regulation (2002), 136 and Schmidt, Eleonore, The Forest
Stewardship Council: Using the Market to Promote Responsible Forestry (1998) ).
Its stakeholders are categorised into three chambers according to their predominant interest: Social, Environ-
mental, or Economic. Each chamber is then further sub-divided into North and South for members from the
developed and developing worlds respectively. These meet together once every three years as the General Assem-
bly, where any motions for new or amended statutes, by-laws, principles or policies of the FSC are debated and
voted upon.
Votes are weighted to give each chamber an equal third of the vote regardless of the number of members it has,
and similarly within each chamber’s voting bloc, half is allocated to each of North and South. In order to pass,
a motion must achieve consensus, which “is deﬁned as the absence of sustained opposition but does not require
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democratic or consensual process could be the most eﬀective and legitimate structure for the
organisation of a governance network, if only an appropriate such process by which for the
meritocracy to be established and supervised could be found.
Such a process having been found in deliberative democracy, the resulting meritocrat-
ic/democratic/consensual hybrid—the consociational governance network—may be the fulﬁl-
ment of that earlier prediction. Better yet, it also oﬀers a solution to the problem of govern-
ment unilateralism that deliberative democracy alone cannot provide.
4.4.2. Deliberative consensus
It next falls to consider various consensual decision-making procedures that preserve the
deliberative quality demanded by deliberative democracy. These procedures are not to be
considered at a macroscopic level as in the preceding subsection of this thesis—that is, focusing
on the design of political institutions required to support consensus decision-making—but
rather at the level of process: how the pursuit of consensus can best be measured, facilitated
and managed within any facilitative institutional framework.
Although these questions overlap with those already dealt with in the discussion of delib-
erative democracy, by stepping outside that paradigm we may ﬁnd new and more speciﬁc
insights developed in the practice of other consensual decision-making processes, that are
also compatible with the pursuit of consensus within a deliberative democratic framework.
Conversely, some other pitfalls to avoid may also be revealed.
4.4.2.1. Oﬄine consensus
Just as there are a variety of implementations of deliberative democracy such as the 21st
Century Town Meeting, Deliberative Poll and citizen’s jury, so too there are various im-
plementations of consensus-based processes; indeed, there is much overlap between the two.
Three examples applicable in an oﬄine setting, that are compatible with democratic deliber-
ation yet not explicitly derived from liberal democratic theory, will be brieﬂy outlined here:
unanimity”: FSC, By-laws (2005), Article 15.
The Board of Directors of the FSC contains three members from each chamber, including at least one from each
sub-chamber, who are elected by the General Assembly by postal ballot for three year terms. These are chosen
from a slate of candidates put forward by a nominating committee headed and appointed by the Chair of the
Board, which is in turn made up of one member from each chamber, including at least one each from the North
and the South.
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Formal Consensus, Saint and Lawson’s private sector model of consensus, and the Consensus
Workshop.
Formal Consensus is a consensus-based process developed by Butler and Rothstein for
decision-making within a civil society organisation, which is compatible with the ideals of
deliberative democracy as applied in such a setting, but without sharing the same roots in
liberal theory.
547 It was formerly known as “Secular Consensus,” to diﬀerentiate it from the
process used by the Quakers at their meetings, with which it shares a number of similarities.
548
The process begins with an introductory phase in which the facilitator clariﬁes the process to
be used, presents the proposal or issue, and facilitates the resolution of any questions put by
the group for the limited purpose of clarifying the proposal or issue presented. Discussion of
the proposal then takes place, and if it appears that it has the general approval of the group,
a call for consensus is made immediately.
If it does not, then the process enters the next phase in which all concerns the group has with
the proposal are listed, and related concerns are grouped together. This sets the stage for the
following phase in which the concerns (or groups of concerns) are discussed in turn by the
group with the objective of resolving them. Once all concerns have been resolved, a call for
consensus is made.
If consensus still cannot be reached, then the group has three choices: to declare the proposal
blocked, or for the objectors to stand aside and allow the decision to be adopted with their
concerns noted, or to send the proposal to a committee which can endeavour to generate
additional options to be brought back to the larger group at a later time.
Saint and Lawson have also developed a formal method for consensus-based decision-making,
very similar to that of Formal Consensus, but from a private sector perspective. The four
stages of the process they put forward are as follows:
￿ Preconsensus (determining the group’s membership and agreeing on its purpose, values and
authority, settling on a deﬁnition of consensus, and setting standards for interpersonal
behaviour);
￿ Understanding the proposal (stating and clarifying the proposal, stating any objections or
concerns, and making an initial call for consensus);
547. Butler, C T & Rothstein, Amy, On Conﬂict and Consensus: A Handbook on Formal Consensus Decision-
making (2004), 11–15
548. Snyder, Monteze, Gibbs, Cheryl, Hillmann, Susan A, Peterson, Trayce N, Schoﬁeld, Joanna, & Watson,
George H, Building Consensus: Conﬂict And Unity (2001)
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￿ Resolving concerns (an iterative process based around discussion of the each of the expressed
concerns with reference back to the group’s purpose and values, followed by further calls
for consensus); and
￿ Closing options (which include extending the time for discussion and perhaps engaging
a mediator to assist the group, withdrawing the proposal or the outstanding objections,
allowing the proposal to be agreed by a supermajority, or even excluding the minority from
the group).
549
Similar again but with a slightly diﬀerent focus is the Consensus Workshop, one of a pack-
age of complementary techniques for participatory decision-making called the Technology of
Participation or ToPﬁ, developed by the Institute of Cultural Aﬀairs (ICA).
550 A Consensus
Workshop breaks the process of seeking consensus into ﬁve stages:
￿ Contexting (preparing for discussion by ensuring that all are aware of the purpose of the
workshop and the process to be followed);
￿ Brainstorming (generating new ideas to address the issue or dispute under discussion,
without yet passing judgment on any of them);
￿ Ordering (identifying relationships amongst the ideas and grouping them into related clus-
ters—this is normally done by rearranging cards on which the ideas are written, but a
ﬂip-chart can also be used);
￿ Naming (giving each cluster a name, and then discussing them in turn beginning with the
largest cluster); and
￿ Evaluating (once agreement is reached, the resolution is conﬁrmed, and the signiﬁcance
and implications of the consensus and the next steps to be taken are discussed).
551
None of these three processes are prescriptive of the exact manner in which discussion of
the proposal or objections must proceed, leaving the facilitator with some discretion in this
regard. However there are a variety of common techniques upon which the facilitator can
draw for various purposes.
For example, to determine who is entitled to speak, the facilitator’s choices range from the
formal such as the use of Robert’s Rules of Order
552 (although taking care that its strict
application does not provoke division rather than fostering cooperation and open discus-
549. Saint, Steven & Lawson, James R, Rules for Reaching Consensus (1994)
550. See http://www.ica-international.org/.
551. Spencer, Laura, Winning Through Participation (1989), 57–76
552. Robert, Henry M & Robert, Sarah C, Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised (2000)
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sion),
553 through to the informal such as allowing participants to engage in uninterrupted
storytelling,
554 depending on the size and composition of the group.
To provide a quick, non-binding overview of the group’s overall position on an issue, straw
polling can be conducted,
555 using methods ranging from the conventional such as a show of
hands or the use of coloured cards (holding up green to indicate agreement, red to object,
and yellow to abstain or stand aside), through to the unconventional such as the use of
humming to indicate agreement. This latter option, which has been used within the IETF,
carries the beneﬁt that the group can discern whether there is broad or narrow agreement
upon a proposal, without the need for a vote or the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc objectors.
556
Finally to creatively overcome objections and generate solutions, techniques ranging from the
relatively unstructured such as brainstorming or mind mapping,
557 through to more highly
structured tools such as Dialogue Mapping,
558 policy Delphi and the Nominal Group Tech-
nique can be employed.
559 As noted above, the Consensus Workshop also incorporates a
structured brainstorming session, which draws from the Delphi technique.
4.4.2.2. Online consensus
There is again much overlap between the tools available to facilitate online deliberation and
those for online consensus, especially since the tools most often used for either purpose, such
as discussion boards and mailing lists, are generic in design.
For example, the coloured cards technique for straw polling has been implemented by an
open source software project called Monit simply by means of its developers’ mailing list, to
which votes of +1, 0 or -1 may be posted as the equivalents of green, yellow and red cards
respectively.
560
There are however also a few tools that have been developed speciﬁcally for the purposes
of facilitating online consensus. These can be divided in turn into those that implement
553. Susskind, L, A Short Guide to Consensus Building. An Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order for Groups,
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies that Want to Operate by Consensus (1999)
554. Stitt, Allan J, Mediation: A Practical Guide (2004), 69
555. Butler, C T & Rothstein, Amy, On Conﬂict and Consensus: A Handbook on Formal Consensus Decision-
making (2004), 44; Saint, Steven & Lawson, James R, Rules for Reaching Consensus (1994) , 45
556. IETF, IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures (1994)
557. Stitt, Allan J, Mediation: A Practical Guide (2004), 87
558. Conklin, Jeﬀ, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems (2005)
559. Delbecq, Andre L, Van de Ven, Andrew H, & Gustafson, David H, Group Techniques for Program Planning:
A Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi Processes (1975)
560. See http://www.tildeslash.com/monit/who.php, and compare ASF, How the ASF Works (2003).
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the equivalents of oﬄine techniques, and those unique and perhaps speciﬁc to the online
environment.
In the former category, there are online implementations of each of the three structured tech-
niques for consensus decision-making noted at the end of the discussion of oﬄine consensus
above. Dialogue Mapping, which is a method of visually representing deliberative process-
es, can be implemented using a free product called Compendium
561 or a proprietary one
called Decision Explorer.
562 Policy Delphi, which is a moderated, consensus-oriented decision-
making method based upon the use of questionnaires, is implemented by the DEMOS (Delphi
Mediation Online System) Project.
563 Finally the Nominal Group Technique is a method of
discussion and brainstorming in which participants individually rank the group’s ideas, and
those rankings are aggregated with the aim of isolating an alternative that meets with the
group’s consensus. This has also successfully been implemented online, in a form that incor-
porates both synchronous and asynchronous participation.
564
An example of a technique for facilitating online consensus that is unique to the online
environment is Consensus Polling.
565 As presently implemented, Consensus Polling takes place
in three main stages:
￿ Framing the issue (settling upon an agreed form of the question or problem to be addressed);
￿ Concurrently developing:
￿ Concerns and interests (in a forum where participants discuss the interests they wish to
be met by whatever solution is adopted, and the concerns they wish it to address); and
￿ Background information (the compilation of a comprehensive and accurate archive of
relevant background information, which can inform the listing of concerns and interests);
￿ Concurrently developing:
￿ Solution pieces (various possible approaches for addressing the issue in question that are
evaluated against all of the concerns and interests that were isolated in the preceding
stage); and
￿ Solution (assembling these into a composite solution upon which consensus can be
reached).
561. See http://www.compendiuminstitute.org/.
562. See http://www.banxia.com/dexplore/.
563. See http://demos-project.org/.
564. Tseng, Kuo-Hung, Using Online Nominal Group Technique to Implement Knowledge Transfer (2006)
565. See http://consensuspolling.org/ and http://www.aboutus.org/Portal:ConsensusPolls.
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At each stage, a“Yes meter”is used which records each participant’s state of agreement with
the current articulation of the solution being considered in that stage: either “yes, or “not
yet.” Consensus can be deemed to be reached when all reach “yes,” or when some other high
standard of agreement, such as 90%, is reached. Since participants can change between“yes”
and“not yet”at any time, there must also be a deﬁned period for which a consensus must be
maintained, and a deﬁned minimum number of participants. These variables are all settled
upon before the poll begins.
The ICANN community has established an experimental Consensus Poll on the question,
“What should ICANN policy with respect to new TLDs be?”,
566 utilising a customised version
of MediaWiki.
4.4.3. Consensus in Internet governance
As will be recalled from Chapter 2, consensus is the dominant method for the internal gov-
ernance of the existing institutions of Internet governance that preceded the IGF, including
ICANN, the IETF and the W3C. A signiﬁcant factor in this is that the decentralised norms
of consensus decision-making are more compatible than those of hierarchical decision-making
structures with the Internet’s cultural norms of decentralisation, interactivity, openness, egal-
itarianism and cosmopolitanism.
567
However, as foreshadowed by the introduction to this section, there is considerable variation
in each organisation’s conception of consensus, including the degree of agreement required,
the processes by which it should be fostered, and how and by whom it is declared.
Here, the diﬀerent conceptions of consensus held by three of the major institutions of Internet
governance—ICANN, APNIC, and the IETF—will be brieﬂy compared, without retreading
ground already covered when analysing their organisational structures.
568
4.4.3.1. ICANN
In July 1999, then ICANN Chair Esther Dyson testiﬁed before the United States House of
Representatives that
ICANN is nothing more or less than the embodiment of the Internet community as a whole. It
reﬂects the participation of a large and growing number of technical, business, public-interest,
566. See http://www.icannwiki.org/Consensus:New_TLDs.
567. See Section 2.2.1.3.
568. See Section 2.1.2.1 and Section 2.2.1.
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academic, and other segments of the Internet community. It is this collection of diverse interests
and experiences that produces ICANN policies and decisions, as a statement of the consensus
of the participants.
569
Taking this statement at face value, it implies the existence of something like an online public
sphere within which consensus on ICANN policies and decisions is developed, along with
mechanisms by which for that consensus to be transmitted to its Board of Directors and
implemented.
570 As such, it provides a simple but conceptually sound model of a governance
network that draws upon the consensus of all stakeholders both to ground its legitimacy and
to structure its decision-making processes.
Unfortunately however, it is quite ﬁctitious.
571 None of its assumptions were fulﬁlled by
ICANN in 1999, and they are still yet to be fully realised today, with the result that ICANN re-
mains closer to an oligarchy than any other organisational form.
572 Even so, it is possible to
isolate four basic assumptions behind Dyson’s aspirational claim for ICANN, and to sketch
ICANN’s progress towards fulﬁlling them:
￿ If the consensus of the Internet community is to be reﬂective at all, there must exist a public
sphere within which for it to be formed and articulated through public discourse. Although
this is the promise of Internet democracy and is found in microcosm within certain virtual
communities, there is no persuasive evidence that it exists on a large scale.
In an endeavour to provide a forum for outreach and informal consensus-building amongst
the Internet community at large, ICANN holds regular open meetings in various cities
around the world,
573 and hosts asynchronous online fora.
574 Open meetings are webcast,
and beginning with the S˜ ao Paulo meeting in December 2006, a Web site designed to
facilitate remote participation, based on that developed for the ﬁrst meeting of the IGF,
was also made available.
575 The limitation of these fora is that any consensus developed
within them does not feed directly into ICANN’s governance processes.
A more direct link exists between ICANN’s Board and the narrower, more manageable
segments of the Internet community represented by its three Supporting Organisations,
569. Dyson, Esther, Prepared Testimony (1999)
570. Compare Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (1996), 380
571. See Section 2.1.3.
572. See Section 4.2.2.1.
573. See http://www.icann.org/meetings/.
574. See http://forum.icann.org/.
575. See http://sp.icann.org/, and subsequently http://public.icann.org.
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which still encompass a fairly broad cross-section of the Internet community through their
constituency groups.
576
However in general, ICANN does not require the SOs or their constituencies to reach
consensus (indeed, on one view these top–down structures have been “gerrymandered to
prevent emergence of true consensus”.)
577 In fact, the only mention of consensus at all in
ICANN’s current Bylaws applies to the process by which the CCNSO is to build consensus
within the community of ccTLD managers over ccTLD-related issues. Consensus is said to
exist where at least 14 of the 18 voting members of its Council are in agreement.
578
None of the other SOs are charged to operate by consensus at all, and neither is there is any
mechanism to broker consensus between them. The GNSO Council uses a system of voting
based on Robert’s Rules of Order, save that the gTLD registries and registrars exercise half
of the vote, and the other constituencies share the other half.
579 The Address Council of the
ASO follows a similar but simpler procedure.
580 As for the constituency groups—too many
to go into individually
581—they are left to devise their own means of making decisions.
￿ Assuming that there were eﬀective fora in the public sphere within which for consensus
on ICANN’s policies to be formed, ICANN would also require the means to discern this
consensus. This is straightforward in the case of the SOs which are represented on ICANN’s
board, but less so for those other stakeholder groups which are not. This is where ICANN’s
ﬁve Advisory Committees could come in. Unlike the SOs, the ACs are not stakeholders in
themselves (and thus do not have voting power within ICANN), but rather act as conduits
for the transmission of the views of speciﬁed classes of external stakeholders to ICANN’s
board.
Thus the Operating Principles of the GAC state that it is “not a decision making body,”
and simply provide for the Chair to summarise the views expressed by its participants when
reporting to the ICANN Board.
582 Similarly, the ALAC’s main role is to coordinate the
activities of the RALOs, which in turn serve the purpose of drawing in input from their
constituent At-Large Structures, and to transmit this to ICANN’s Board.
583 However, in
576. In the ASO’s case these are the RIRs, in the CCNSO’s case are organisations for each of the ﬁve geograph-
ic regions recognised by ICANN, and in the GNSO’s case are commercial and business users, gTLD registries,
ISPs, non-commercial users, registrars and intellectual property owners: see http://gnso.icann.org/ for links
to their respective Web sites.
577. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, What’s Wrong With ICANN—And How to Fix It (2000)
578. ICANN, Bylaws (2006), Article IX, Sections 1 and 4(11)
579. GNSO Council, New Rules of Procedure (2003), Articles 3.6, 5.4
580. ASO, Memorandum of Understanding (1999)
581. But see Section 4.4.3.2.
582. GAC, Operating Principles (2005), Principles 2 and 40
583. See generally ALAC, Charter (2005)
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the absence of an eﬀective online public sphere, there is no particular reason why such
input would or even should amount to consensus.
￿ Third, but following from the second point, if there exist both eﬀective fora within which
for consensus to be formed, and the means of discerning that consensus, there should also
be a process for ICANN to document it. Thus earlier in ICANN’s history, both Post,
584
and Johnson and Crawford,
585 suggested that ICANN be required when purporting to take
actions by consensus, to table a report demonstrating that this was so.
According to Johnson and Crawford, the report should include amongst other matters an
analysis of all substantial impacts of the proposal in question, a description of outreach con-
ducted to those potentially aﬀected, a summary of the arguments made for and against the
proposal by impacted parties, and an analysis of why opposition to the proposal is believed
to be limited, unreasoned, or arising only from those not impacted by its implementation.
A process broadly similar to this is now enshrined in Annexes A and B to ICANN’s Bylaws,
which set out a detailed Policy Development Process (PDP) for the development of new
policies by the GNSO and CCNSO respectively.
￿ Finally, ICANN must have both the will and ability to act upon any consensus that has
developed amongst its stakeholders and that it has discerned and documented. Its will is
limited only by the fact that its Board always retains the discretion not to act upon the
consensus of the community, whether expressed informally at public meetings or online
fora, or formally through a PDP.
ICANN’s ability to give eﬀect to the consensus of the Internet community is also restricted
by institutional limitations on the scope of its activities that are required to be conducted
consensually. In fact, a CCNSO PDP, requiring the approval of a two-thirds majority of
CCNSO members, is the only means by which ICANN’s activities are formally subjected
to a consensual test, and a loose one at that.
It may be that there are certain matters—such as the Board’s dealings with registries—that
ought not to be governed by consensus, because reliance upon other forms of gover-
nance, such as markets, is more legitimate or eﬀective in those circumstances.
586 How-
ever, ICANN cannot truly live up to the claims made of it by Esther Dyson in 1999 while
the scope of application of consensus decision-making within ICANN is as limited as it
584. Post, David G, ICANN and the Consensus of the Internet Community (1999)
585. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, What an ICANN Consensus Report Should Look Like (2000)
586. See Section 4.1.2.
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presently is. An organisation cannot accurately be said to be governed by consensus un-
less it is so governed at all levels of policy development, from agenda-setting through to
decision-making.
587
4.4.3.2. APNIC
Less time needs to be spent on discussing APNIC, the RIR for the Asia Paciﬁc region and a
constituent of ICANN’s ASO, as its procedures for decision-making by consensus are much
simpler and more open than those of ICANN.
APNIC’s policy development process is self-described as one in which policies are“developed
by the membership and the broader Internet community through a bottom–up process of
consultation and consensus.”
588
The main forum in which this process takes place are the twice-yearly APNIC Open Policy
Meetings (OPMs), held in various locations within the region, and which are open to AP-
NIC members and non-members alike. For those from developing countries who could not
otherwise attend an OPM in person, APNIC grants a number of fellowships. Remote partici-
pation is also facilitated using video streaming, audio streaming, live transcripts, Jabber chat
software and podcasts.
589
The other fora for the policy development process are the mailing lists of APNIC’s Special
Interest Groups (SIGs), of which there are currently seven on topics ranging from National
Internet Registries (NIR) to DNS operation, routing and IPv6. These are also open to non-
members, and are publicly archived.
A proposal for the adoption or amendment of an APNIC policy begins by tabling notice of
the proposal to the relevant SIG mailing list and the SIG Chair at least four weeks prior to
an OPM at which it is intended to be agreed. At the OPM, the proposal must meet with
consensus both at the relevant SIG session, and also at the plenary Member Meeting. For this
purpose,“consensus”is simply deﬁned as“general agreement”as observed by the Chair of the
meeting. If consensus is not reached at either stage, the SIG may resolve that the proposal
should be amended for submission at a following OPM, or be withdrawn.
Following an OPM at which a proposal meets with consensus, an eight-week comment period
begins, during which the proposal remains open for discussion on the relevant SIG mailing
587. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 223
588. Tseng, Kuo-Hung, Using Online Nominal Group Technique to Implement Knowledge Transfer (2006)
589. See http://www.apnic.net/meetings/remote/.
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list. At the expiry of this period, the SIG Chair and co-chairs will determine whether any
substantial objections to the proposal have been made. If so, then the proposal fails, and
again the SIG may determine to amend it before it is proposed again, or to withdraw it.
A proposal that survives the comment period then goes to the Executive Council of APNIC,
which will normally simply endorse the proposal as formal APNIC policy, but may refer it back
to the SIG for further discussion if the Executive Council itself is unable to agree upon the
proposal by majority vote, or may require a majority vote of endorsement by APNIC members.
This introduces the possibility that the APNIC policy development process may not remain
purely consensual throughout, as the last stage of decision-making may employ a hybrid of
consensus and democracy.
4.4.3.3. IETF
The process for decision-making by consensus within the IETF has more in common with that
of APNIC than that of ICANN. The movement of a speciﬁcation through the IETF standards
track from an Internet draft agreed within a Working Group, to a Proposed Standard (and
thence a Draft Standard and eventually an Internet Standard) accepted by the community
as a whole, has already been described in some detail at Section 2.2.1.1.
The IETF process requires consensus to a proposal to be formed at three levels within each
stage of this standards track process. It must ﬁrst achieve consensus within its originating
Working Group. Once a rough consensus appears to have been reached, the Chair makes a
“last call” for comments from the Working Group that normally lasts for two weeks, before
forwarding the speciﬁcation to the IESG.
The IESG then publishes the speciﬁcation to an IETF-wide mailing list where a further“last
call”for comments is made, lasting another two weeks for speciﬁcations that originate within
an IETF Working Group, or four weeks for those submitted from outside the IETF.
The third and ﬁnal level within which consensus must be obtained to the speciﬁcation before
it passes that stage of the standards track process is the IESG itself. The IESG may approve
the document and request the RFC Editor to publish it, send it back to the Working Group
for revision, or even reject it outright.
590
The IETF’s deﬁnition of consensus, such as it is, is found in RFC 1603 which states:
590. IETF, The Internet Standards Process—Revision 3 (1996), para 6.1
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IETF consensus does not require that all participants agree although this is, of course, preferred.
In general the dominant view of the working group shall prevail. (However, it must be noted
that “dominance” is not to be determined on the basis of volume or persistence, but rather a
more general sense of agreement.) Consensus can be determined by balloting, humming, or any
other means on which the Working Group agrees (by rough consensus, of course).
591
Allowing Working Groups the ﬂexibility of devising their own means of establishing rough
consensus is naturally empowering, and limits the scope for the process to be subverted
through strategic games. On the other hand, it places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders
of Working Group Chairs, leaving them open to challenge if they should declare a rough
consensus of the Working Group as a whole over the objections of a small minority.
592
In the case of disputes such as this that cannot be resolved within the Working Group, nor by
the relevant Area Director, the IESG steps in to adjudicate. The IESG will also conduct an
internal review when a decision of its own is challenged. These appeals and reviews may be
further appealed to the IAB whose decision is ﬁnal. Only in cases where the above procedures
are insuﬃcient to fairly and openly address the concerns of all parties, ISOC’s Board of
Trustees may also hear an appeal, resolving it by whatever means it sees ﬁt to adopt.
593
It can be seen from this that the IETF standards process also displays hybrid qualities; being
consensual at the grass roots level, but remaining subject to the judicious use of hierarchi-
cal power at higher levels of governance when the pursuit of rough consensus has failed. But
then, this is only a reﬂection of the fact that as open and inclusive as the IETF may be, it is
fundamentally a meritocracy in practice.
594
4.4.4. Criticisms
It has been seen that even within the sometimes idealistic Internet technical community, it
is rare to ﬁnd a form of organisation that is governed solely by consensus. This is not so
much because the cultural norms of the Internet are any less compatible in principle with
consensual than with anarchistic ordering, as because consensus is an ideal case of anarchism,
the conditions for which are diﬃcult to realise in a pluralistic world.
This is particularly so in certain issue areas, and for certain types of dispute. These most
notably include deep seated culture clashes that Dryzek refers to as “mutually contradictory
591. IETF, IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures (1994)
592. The same observation applies to chairs of APNIC SIGs, who are placed in the same position.
593. IETF, The Internet Standards Process—Revision 3 (1996), para 6.5
594. See Section 4.2.3.1.
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assertions of identity,”
595 and clashes between competing claims of right, in which it is in
neither party’s interests to agree to a consensual resolution. These two areas of diﬃculty will
be dealt with in turn, before concluding with a brief look at some of the other deﬁciencies of
consensual ordering.
4.4.4.1. Consensus and culture
It is a commonly expressed view that the “rough consensus” approach of the IETF is only
suited to a largely technical organisation, that is capable of resolving disputes that arise
between its members by applying principles that are, if not entirely objective, then at least
widely shared. Whilst it may have been so in the past, the stakeholders of today’s Internet
are no longer such a group.
596 As Lemley observes:
Even a brief look at the Net should dispel any notion that netizens are a homogenous group
with a strong community of interest. White supremacists, libertarians, communitarians, and
communists all coexist on the Net; so do rich and poor, black and white, nerds and literati. If
we brought them all together in a room, virtual or real, it is doubtful they would reach even a
rough consensus on virtually any subject.
597
This is not a view conﬁned to Internet cynics. Rather, it can be seen as an application
of the broader and more venerable political theory of agonism, which holds that in any
pluralistic community, conﬂict is inevitable and unending. The agonist spurns attempts to
broker consensus within such communities, in favour of the accommodation of “a vibrant
clash of democratic political positions.”
598 Mouﬀe contends:
We have to accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony,
as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion. The idea that
power could be dissolved through a rational debate and that legitimacy could be based on pure
rationality are illusions, which can endanger democratic institutions.
599
Bearing out the view that the scope for a pluralistic organisation to make decisions by con-
sensus is very limited, Koﬁ Annan has described the case of the General Assembly of the
United Nations:
In recent years, the number of General Assembly resolutions approved by consensus has increased
steadily. That would be good if it reﬂected a genuine unity of purpose among Member States
in responding to global challenges. But unfortunately, consensus (often interpreted as requiring
unanimity) has become an end in itself. It is sought ﬁrst within each regional group and then
at the level of the whole. This has not proved an eﬀective way of reconciling the interests of
595. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia (2005),
218–219
596. Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 163–164
597. Lemley, Mark, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms (1998), 1270
598. Mouﬀe, Chantal, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism (2000), 15–16
599. Mouﬀe, Chantal, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism (2000), 17
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Member States. Rather, it prompts the Assembly to retreat into generalities, abandoning any
serious eﬀort to take action. Such real debates as there are tend to focus on process rather than
substance and many so-called decisions simply reﬂect the lowest common denominator of widely
diﬀerent opinions.
600
This does not imply that a more substantive consensus could not be achieved by a more
eﬀective process, involving prior deliberation about principles, norms, and rules rather than
just bargaining.
601 However the root diﬃculty that remains is that to even begin to resolve
a dispute communicatively requires what Habermas calls a “shared lifeworld”; a background
consensus which provides the participants with resources for managing the conﬂict and reduces
the scope of issues in dispute.
602 In a transnational and cross-cultural context, it may be that
even this is lacking,
603 and that the only commonality between the parties will be their
agreement to a minimal set of fair procedures.
604
Dryzek, while frankly acknowledging that“[i]n a pluralistic world, consensus is unattainable,
unnecessary, and undesirable,”
605 still maintains that democratic deliberation oﬀers the best
prospect of facilitating the development of substantive consensus from such a minimal shared
base of agreement on procedural norms. In comparison to agonism which oﬀers no solutions
to the diﬃculties of reaching agreement in the face of clashes of culture and identity, Dryzek
maintains that such contentious issues can be engaged deliberatively within a public sphere
at some distance from the state, using appropriate communicative forms.
606
Even granting this, it does not completely address the potential for cultural diﬀerences to
impair deliberation. A speciﬁc case that illustrates just how intractable these diﬀerences can
be is that of cross-cultural communication.
607 Cognitive linguists have determined that those
who speak diﬀerent languages actually think diﬀerently as well. In his pioneering work on
linguistic relativity, Whorf wrote that
each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the
shaper of ideas, the program and the guide for the individual’s mental activity, for his analysis
of impressions.
608
Empirical research has supported this observation, for example demonstrating that all lan-
guages have lexical gaps in which it is literally impossible to express a thought that can
600. Annan, Koﬁ, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All (2005), 40
601. Risse, Thomas, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics (2000), 20-1
602. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), xvi
603. See Section 3.4.3.3.
604. Cohen, Joshua, Democracy and Liberty (1998), 193
605. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (2002), 170
606. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia (2005)
607. Kymlicka, W, Citizenship in an Era of Globalization (1999)
608. Whorf, Benjamin L, Language, Thought and Reality (1956), 212
277Chapter 4. Designing a governance network
be expressed in in other languages, and that attempting to ﬁll these gaps by paraphrasing
generates extraneous implications not present in the original.
609 Such deep problems of cross-
cultural communication are troublesome for Habermas, who makes three idealising assump-
tions in his model of conﬂict resolution on the basis of reasoned agreement: that participants
can assume that they each mean the same thing by the same words and expressions, that
they each consider themselves rationally accountable, and that once agreement is reached
the assumptions underlying their consensus (for example as to its truth or justice) will not
subsequently prove mistaken. As he acknowledges, to the extent that these assumptions are
not realised, agreements reached are open to challenge.
610
There is no simple solution to such problems, though in general they point to the need for
mechanisms by which participants in deliberation are encouraged (or forced) to become more
linguistically and epistemologically cosmopolitan.
611 Needless to say, this is potentially an
ambitious programme, which although capable of being pursued by deliberative means, may
be time-consuming and require expert facilitation.
Having said that, the same sorts of problems are endemic to our multicultural world in many
other contexts beyond that of deliberative democratic and consensual decision-making. In
particular, there is no reason to think that an hierarchical or anarchistic form for a transna-
tional governance network could overcome them to any greater extent than the deliberative
democratic or consensual forms.
4.4.4.2. Consensus and rational choice
An additional limitation of which consensual forms of organisation are accused is that there
are some issues that it would not be rational for participants to agree on by consensus. As this
is essentially the same criticism as made of anarchistic ordering,
612 it will not be reiterated
in full here.
613
Instead, particular attention will be given here to one speciﬁc instance in which it is said that
submission to consensual ordering would be irrational and indeed inappropriate: where there
609. Levinson, Stephen C, From Outer to Inner Space (1997), 16–18
610. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), xv
611. Hilde, Thomas C, The Cosmopolitan Project: Does the Internet Have a Global Public Face? (2004), 120–122
612. See Section 4.1.3.
613. Though one response to that charge, the capacity for norms to support consensual processes, will be dealt
with under the next heading.
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are (in Weinberg’s words) competing claims of right, for example between multiple applicants
to ICANN for the right to manage new gTLDs.
614
This criticism has both a narrow application and a broader one. In its narrow application, it
holds that the determination of particular competing claims of right, or the distribution of
wealth among particular parties, cannot be conducted by consensus. This much is doubtless
correct. Certainly, Network Solutions did not consent to the admission of new entrants into
its formerly monopolistic market for domain name registration—why should it have?
However, this charge can be accepted without derogating from the use of consensus as an
organising principle for ICANN as a governance network. This is because the place of con-
sensus within ICANN is at a policy development, not an operational level. Unlike under an
anarchistic regime in which ordering always remains voluntary, it is possible for a consensual
governance network to institutionalise the bureaucratic application of consensually agreed
policies. Thus for ICANN, whereas policies covering gTLD issues in general are formed by
consensus, the grant of custodianship of individual gTLDs by reference to these policies is
an operational matter to be decided bureaucratically (or by some other consensually agreed
or otherwise legitimate mechanism of governance, such as through markets—or better yet, a
hybrid which corrects for market deﬁciencies).
Although the bureaucratic determination of competing claims of right will necessarily result
in wealth being distributed between stakeholders unevenly (an outcome which the aﬀected
stakeholders probably could not reach consensus upon antecedently), this does not delegit-
imize the outcome. After all, for the liberal, consensus is not an end in itself but a means
of pursuing the democratic principle. Thus a majority cannot deny a minority beneﬁts that
they have gained through a consensual process. Johnson and Crawford put this by saying
that although“[t]he creation of new TLDs will have an eﬀect on existing registries, registrars,
registrants and various other parties like trademark owners ... [it] will not require any of these
actors to implement or abide by a new set of rules.”
615
The second and broader sense of the above criticism of Weinberg implies that consensus
could never develop even around the domain name policies that underlie the determination of
competing claims of right, due to the intervention of strategic interests. However, this is far
from a foregone conclusion. If the procedures by which ICANN developed policy by consensus
614. Weinberg, Jonathan, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy (2000), 252; and see Mueller, Milton, Ruling
the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002) , 216.
615. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, Why Consensus Matters: The Theory Underlying ICANN’s Mandate
to Set Policy Standards for the Domain Name System (2000)
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were more deliberative and its structures were more open, there is no reason why a consensual
balance between the interests of all stakeholders could not be reached.
As it stands, ICANN’s stakeholders do not for the most part engage with each other in
the policy development process, and therefore have no occasion to even attempt to reach
such a compromise discursively. The process of seeking consensus by consulting stakeholders
separately, aggregating their views, and attempting to balance them by executive ﬁat, is
indeed open to criticism, but such criticism does not extend to decision-making by consensus
in general.
4.4.4.3. Consensual deﬁcits
The ﬁnal group of criticisms of consensus-based decision-making to be discussed here relate
to its potential to become dysfunctional even where complicating factors such as cultural dif-
ference and competing claims of right are absent.
One such dysfunction, the phenomenon of “groupthink,” is ironically most prevalent in more
cohesive groups, because their members are reluctant to break the group’s consensus, giv-
ing them a propensity to make decisions rashly.
616 Conversely, consensus-based decision-
making can lead to polarisation and deadlock,
617 whereby the views with which participants
enter the discussion become entrenched in more extreme forms, so that consensus becomes
more diﬃcult and takes much longer to achieve. This phenomenon is most evident where the
views in question run along stakeholder lines and the stakeholder groups are separated,
618 as
occurs in a segmentally autonomous consociation, in ICANN’s SOs, and amongst members
of self-selecting virtual communities.
These problems may be countered by the use of deliberative democratic techniques designed
to introduce participants to a range of viewpoints other than their own (by requiring them
to actively engage with other participants, and through the provision of factual background
materials), and by requiring them to justify their views against these other perspectives
through public reason. As these techniques have been described at length, no more time need
be spent on them here.
A much more problematic dysfunction that is inherent to consensual decision-making is that
minorities are granted disproportional power over the process. This enables them to abuse
616. McCauley, Clark, The Nature of Social Inﬂuence in Groupthink: Compliance and Internalization (1987)
617. Isenberg, D J, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis (1986)
618. Dryzek, John S, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia (2005)
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their eﬀective right of veto by engaging in blocking tactics and other strategic games rather
than seeking mutually satisfactory outcomes in good faith. A common solution to this is to
allow for “rough consensus” in place of unanimity, though this can exacerbate the problems
of limited deliberation and lack of accountability inherent in some forms of decision-making
by consensus.
619
Another common solution, which as we have seen is often used in conjunction with the
ﬁrst, is to structure the organisation as a hybrid between consensual and democratic or
hierarchical decision-making, wherein either a majority, or a meritocratic elite (who should
be consensually or democratically selected), have the institutional power to resolve internal
disputes and deadlocks.
A third means to dissuade participants from the abuse of their right of veto is through the
development of supportive norms that constrain the use of that power except where it is
essential to protect deeply-held interests of the blocking party that the interests of the group
ought not to be able to override.
620
According to Butler and Rothstein, the applicable norms are trust, respect, unity of pur-
pose, nonviolence, self empowerment, cooperation, conﬂict resolution, commitment to the
group, active participation, equal access to power, and patience.
621 For Skelcher, the norms
of cooperation and recognition of the equality of all parties are most central.
622
There is no template by which such norms can be inculcated, but they tend to develop
spontaneously when members of the network cooperate towards mutually beneﬁcial outcomes,
and also tend to be self-reinforcing.
623 This process of building social capital can be “kick-
started” by the use of designs for deliberation that encourage participants to ﬁnd mutually
acceptable outcomes rather than to adopt adversarial positions.
But at the end of the day, perhaps the best defence of decision-making by consensus in the
context of a transnational governance network is that the failure of consensus is a strong
indication that it was not appropriate for the issue in question to be dealt with through the
soft power of a governance network anyway, and that it should instead fall through to be
dealt with by some other mechanism. Johnson and Crawford write:
619. Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 216
620. Skelcher, Chris, Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance (2005),
105
621. Butler, C T & Rothstein, Amy, On Conﬂict and Consensus: A Handbook on Formal Consensus Decision-
making (2004), 20–23
622. Skelcher, Chris, Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance (2005),
103
623. Uphoﬀ, N, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation (1999)
281Chapter 4. Designing a governance network
Failure to reach a global consensus may be a success rather than a failure, however, because
it leaves undisturbed the power of many diverse and decentralized actors to make their own
decisions. These actors may ﬁnd even better ways to proceed than might have emerged from a
compromising committee.
624
It can thus be considered that a consensual governance network is merely one supplier in
a competitive market of governance solutions, and as in the case of the open source soft-
ware development model, it is freedom of exit—the ability for participants to vote with their
feet—that makes these suppliers accountable. The W3C has also conceptualised the process
of seeking consensus as being market-driven, stating:
Groups strive to reach consensus in order to provide a single solution acceptable to the market
at-large. If a group makes a decision that causes the market to fragment—despite agreement by
those participating in the decision—the decision does not reﬂect a single market and therefore
the group has failed to reach true consensus.
625
In practice, the achievement of consensus between stakeholders will be central to the success
of a transnational governance network no matter which of the four forms of organisation
examined in this chapter it adopts. The main beneﬁt of adopting the consensual form is that it
also reﬂects this reality institutionally in the organisation’s design, thereby both providing an
early gauge of the likely ultimate adoption of the network’s soft law output by its participants,
and also ensuring in accordance with the democratic principle that those who are to be
governed by that law are those responsible for writing it.
4.5. Multi-stakeholder public policy development
Previous chapters introduced governance by network as the only mechanism capable of bring-
ing together multiple stakeholder groups to address public policy issues in concert. Since gov-
ernments are amongst these stakeholders, the network may determine that they should address
a policy issue through domestic legislation or intergovernmental agreement. If a market-based
solution is more appropriate, private sector stakeholders will be in a position to ﬁll it. If an
issue is better addressed through norms, civil society can explicate these norms publicly.
Or all three groups may act together, by collaboratively developing an independent body of
transnational law for the guidance of their respective constituents.
624. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, The Idea of ICANN (2001)
625. W3C, Process Document (2005), and compare also the stand-oﬀ between the competing SPF and Sender
ID speciﬁcations referred to at Section 2.2.1.1.
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What had not been discussed until this chapter was exactly how they ought to make those
sorts of collective decisions. In a sense, consensus is the archetypal decision-making structure
for governance networks, since the organisation’s internal structure in that case mirrors the
relationship of the organisation to its stakeholders. However this chapter has revealed elements
from each of the four broad types of organisation structure for decision-making which are
instructive for the design of a transnational governance network developing Internet related
public policy.
From anarchism, it was found that the most empowering structure for participants in any
organisation may in fact be the lack of structure—or rather, the lack of constraint as to the
structures they may voluntarily organise themselves, through the non-coercive mechanisms
of markets, norms and architecture. Whilst the resulting network is often more eﬃcient, and
more consonant with Internet culture than hierarchical alternatives, this very lack of control
also makes it diﬃcult to ensure the network’s adherence to liberal democratic values such as
accountability and transparency. The hybridisation of anarchistic with hierarchical ordering
was suggested as a possible method of addressing this deﬁciency.
From hierarchical ordering, it was found that meritocracy could provide an eﬀective structure
for a governance network, being designed to ensure that those most qualiﬁed to rule did so,
rather than the most powerful or privileged. Perhaps unexpectedly, it was also found to exist
prominently on the Internet, within the IETF (in a hybrid consensual form) and many open
source software projects. However, in order for it to accord with the democratic principle, it
was necessary either that the criteria for selection of the meritocracy be agreed by consensual
or democratic means (as in the IETF’s case), or that freedom of exit and a number of other
conditions found in the case of open source software be fulﬁlled.
From democracy, liberal theory was identiﬁed as the source of the democratic principle, that
any interference with an individual’s liberty requires their consent. However, it was found
that pure direct democracy, or representative democracy that simply mirrored the majority’s
preferences, could lead to illiberal outcomes including the tyrannical trampling of minority in-
terests. Rather than compelling the majority to respect those interests by hierarchical means,
a mechanism was found in deliberative democracy to enable the demos to develop its own
capacity to produce fairer and more reasoned outcomes. Similarly digital democracy was
found to oﬀer the potential to extend the accessibility and improve the eﬃciency of these
deliberative democratic fora.
Thus we return to consensus, which also has a long track record of use in within institutions of
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Internet governance, usually in hybrid form. Otherwise largely intersecting with deliberative
democracy, the unique insight gained from consideration of consensual decision-making was
its application at larger scales, through consociationalism. This can allow groups insistent
upon retaining their independent power yet wishing to collaborate in governance, to do so
in the knowledge that they and the other participating groups share the power of mutual
veto over any decision of collective concern.
Drawing together these insights, it can be concluded that an appropriate structure for a
transnational network for Internet governance could consist of an open and transparent forum
within which members of all stakeholder groups deliberate with the aim of reaching consensus,
led by a meritocratic executive council to which each group appoints its representatives using
consensual or democratic means, and which would be required to ratify all decisions of the
forum by consensus. Such a body would bear much resemblance to the IETF or APNIC,
overlaid with a consociational structure closer to that of the EU or the FSC.
This is all very well, except that of course the question of an appropriate design for such a
multi-stakeholder governance network is not an abstract one; it has been already asked and
answered in the process that led to the establishment of the IGF. As will be seen, the IGF
in fact happens to bear very little resemblance to the network outlined above. To outline the
structure of the IGF as it now exists and the process from which it emerged is the principal
purpose of the next chapter.
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The IGF, obviously, is the beginning
of something. Yesterday I actually
said it wasn’t the beginning of some-
thing. I said we were mid-process.
But clearly if we are in mid-process,
we are in the start of that middle
process.
Kenneth Cukier
At this point, the theoretical background required to assess the legitimacy and likely eﬀec-
tiveness of present and future arrangements for Internet governance is in place. In Chapter 2
the institutions and main issue areas of Internet governance up to the date of establishment
of the IGF were described, in Chapter 3 the international context in which Internet-related
public policy-making takes place was laid out, and from Chapter 4 an understanding was
given of the organisational forms suitable to this endeavour.
What has not yet been touched upon is how the institutions of Internet governance as out-
lined in Chapter 2 have been and are being reformed—most importantly, but not exclusively,
through the establishment of the IGF—and the context in which this process sits with al-
ternative proposals. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to describe these matters, while
the purpose of the next will be to assess the prevailing Internet governance regime as thus
outlined against the theoretical background developed over previous chapters.
5.1. WSIS
Although the process of Internet governance reform has been a continual one, marked by
occasional milestones such as the foundation of ICANN, a natural point at which to be-
gin discussion of the present regime is with the World Summit on the Information Society,
as it was at this summit that the requirement that Internet governance be conducted on a
multi-stakeholder basis was ﬁrst clearly expressed, arguably setting a new norm of custom-
ary International law.
1 This marked a departure from the earlier prevailing norm—expressed
even by some governments (most notably the United States)—that Internet governance was
1. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 48. Mueller, Mathiason and Klein posit an extension of
this multi-stakeholder principle as one of six norms for a proposed Internet governance regime, without adverting
to its status as a foundational principle of the extant Internet governance regime: Mueller, Milton, Mathiason,
John, & Klein, Hans, The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms for a New Regime (2007) .
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predominantly a private sector responsibility.
2
As a summit, rather than a permanent intergovernmental organisation, the only power that
WSIS had to make decisions was to make them by consensus. Some of the implications
of consensual decision-making that have already been observed, such as the tendency for
negotiations to be protracted, and the empowerment of minority groups,
3 were very much
in evidence at WSIS, with negotiation sessions being extended time and again, and with
the focus of its substantive agenda on development issues having been largely shaped by
developing country governments.
Even in comparison to other United Nations summits conducted on the same basis, WSIS took
place on a very large scale and over a lengthy period. Its genesis was at the ITU’s 1998
Plenipotentiary Conference in Minneapolis, at which it was originally resolved that such a
summit should be convened by the ITU. Interest from other UN agencies in the proposed
subject matters of the summit soon led to it being broadened into a larger scale event under
the umbrella of the UN.
Thus it was that in 2001, the Council of the ITU endorsed a proposal of its Secretary-
General to hold the summit in two phases in Geneva in 2003 and Tunisia in 2005, which
proposal was endorsed later that year by a United Nations Resolution calling for the full
involvement of other agencies and stakeholders.
4 The task of organising the summit was shared
by all major UN agencies within a High-Level Summit Organizing Committee (HLSOC),
chaired by the Secretary-General of the ITU.
The Geneva phase of WSIS was to focus on principles, and the Tunis phase on implementation
of those principles and follow-up mechanisms.
5 In more concrete terms, the output of each
phase was contained in two documents. For the ﬁrst phase, these were a Declaration of
Principles and a Plan of Action, that were adopted by 175 countries after being agreed
in a succession of preparatory conferences. As the ﬁrst phase of WSIS could not resolve
diﬀerences on (most notably) Internet governance, WGIG was set up by United Nations
Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan to report to the second phase of WSIS on that issue.
The Tunis Commitment and the Tunis Agenda were the output documents produced at the
conclusion of the second phase, which presented the summit’s conclusions on the issues such
2. Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang, Global Governance in the Information Age: GBDe and ICANN as “Pilot Projects”
for Co-regulation and a New Trilateral Policy? (2001), 18
3. See Section 4.4.4.3.
4. General Assembly of the United Nations, World Summit on the Information Society (2001)
5. See generally Souter, David G, Whose Information Society?: Developing Country and Civil Society Voices in
the World Summit on the Information Society (2006).
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as Internet governance that were outstanding from the ﬁrst phase, as well as reinforcing the
content of the two earlier output documents and outlining follow-up steps to be taken.
Preceding each formal phase of WSIS, meetings of the intergovernmental Preparatory Com-
mittee (“PrepCom”) were held at which the process of intergovernmental negotiation took
place,
6 as were a series of regional conferences.
7
Finally, in the lead-up to each phase and alongside it, there were a range of private sector and
civil society events. The WSIS Secretariat rather poetically described the relationship between
these events and the high level sessions of the ﬁrst phase in the following terms:
To reﬂect its tripartite nature, the Summit could be pictured as a ﬂower, where the central
part represents the meeting of Heads of States and the petals represent civil society and private
sector events.
The section of the petals that is rooted onto the core of the ﬂower represents the participation
of civil society and private sector representatives in the meeting of Heads of States. This is the
space where they would present the positions of their constituencies on the outcomes of the
Summit and take an active part in adopting the Plan of Action and ﬁnal Declaration.
The remaining part of the petals represents the various events organized at the initiative of civil
society and private sector during the Summit. ... they could take the form of debates, agora,
colloquia, showcasing of projects, training sessions, etc.
8
5.1.1. Processes
The most direct relevance of WSIS to the IGF is of course that the Tunis Agenda is essen-
tially the IGF’s constitutional document, and for that reason this and the other three output
documents will be outlined in the next subsection. However the structure and processes of
WSIS are also highly relevant to the IGF’s endeavour, in that they provide the closest previ-
ous example of an attempt to apply multi-stakeholder governance principles to the Internet
governance regime.
This is evident from the output documents of the ﬁrst phase, which establish the so-called
“process criteria” for international Internet governance arrangements, specifying that they
6. Five were held in Geneva prior to the ﬁrst phase between July 2002 and December 2003 (including the
originally unscheduled PrepCom 3A and 3B, also known as 3bis and 3bis+, or 3 resumed and 3 resumed II),
along with an intersessional meeting in Paris. For the second phase, the PrepCom 1 was held in Tunis in June
2004, PrepCom 2 and 3 in Geneva, and a reconvened PrepCom 3 in Tunis in November 2005, immediately
preceding the formal Tunis summit.
7. Five were held ahead of the Geneva Phase between May 2002 and February 2003, being for the WSIS regions
of Africa, Europe, the Asia-Paciﬁc, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Asia. For the Tunis Phase, the
regional conferences took place between November 2004 and June 2005 (with the European regional conference
being dropped in favour of subregional conferences in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt).
8. WSIS Secretariat, Civil Society & NGO Open Ended Bureau Proposal (2003)
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should be “multilateral, transparent, democratic, and with the full involvement of govern-
ments, the private sector, civil society, and international organizations.”
9
It is also reﬂected in the resolution of the UN General Assembly by which WSIS was en-
dorsed, which “encourages eﬀective contributions from and the active participation of all
relevant United Nations bodies, ... international and regional institutions, non-governmental
organizations, civil society and the private sector [and invites them] to contribute to, and
participate in, the intergovernmental preparatory process of the Summit and at the Summit
itself.”To this end the resolution recommended the establishment of the PrepCom to“decide
on the modalities of the participation of other stakeholders in the Summit.”
10
In this context, civil society’s confoundment at being refused the full access, speaking and
voting rights that many of its members (together with some private sector representatives)
expected to be aﬀorded, is understandable.
11 Instead, civil society and the private sector found
themselves at the periphery of the WSIS process, consigned to oﬀering suggestions to the
governmental negotiators who maintained authority over the process of drafting the output
documents.
The WSIS Rules of Procedure that governments developed at the ﬁrst PrepCom meeting
stated:
1. Non-governmental organizations, civil society and business sector entities accredited to
participate in the Committee may designate representatives to sit as observers at public
meetings of the Preparatory Committee and its subcommittees.
2. Upon the invitation of the presiding oﬃcer of the body concerned and subject to the
approval of that body, such observers may make oral statements on questions in which
they have special competence. If the number of requests to speak is too large, the non-
governmental organizations, civil society and business sector entities shall be requested to
form themselves into constituencies, such constituencies to speak through spokespersons.
12
The eﬀect of this was that civil society’s participation in intergovernmental negotiations,
for example on the text of the output documents, was allowed only on an ad hoc basis at
the discretion of government delegates. It took little time for civil society representatives to
discover how that discretion would be applied, when they were excluded from discussions
during the PrepCom 1 meeting on arrangements for their own accreditation to participate
further in WSIS.
13 As one civil society observer described it:
9. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 48
10. General Assembly of the United Nations, World Summit on the Information Society (2001)
11. Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang & Stauﬀacher, Daniel, Introduction (2005), 3
12. WSIS Secretariat, Final Report of PrepCom1 (2003), 20. The rules applying to the distribution of written
statements from civil society were to similar eﬀect: WSIS Secretariat, Final Report of PrepCom1 (2003) , 21.
13. Bloem, Renate, Multi-Stakeholderism and Civil Society (2005), 99
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While the WSIS was mandated to be a multistakeholder process, its actual conduct called into
question the precise nature of this commitment. The modalities of participation gave Govern-
ments and session Chairpersons a good deal of discretion in their treatment of observers, and
the private sector and civil society frequently found themselves to be on a yo-yo string—in one
moment allowed into the room with sharply limited speaking opportunities, in the next told to
sit silently, and in the next thrown out entirely.
14
This phenomenon continued throughout the preparatory processes, becoming even more pro-
nounced as the summit dates approached.
15 For example, during PrepCom 3 in September,
some governments ejected civil society members who were blogging live from the group ses-
sions. At PrepCom 3b in December, even ICANN President Paul Twomey was excluded from
the negotiation room.
16
Even when civil society was not formally excluded from negotiations, its input was often
aﬀorded little weight. One estimate put it that only 25% of civil society contributions were
included in the text of the Plan of Action in some form, with 15% otherwise taken into account
and the balance disregarded.
17 In the words of Markus Kummer, now of the IGF Secretariat,
“[i]t was not surprising therefore that the summit failed to produce what might be termed ‘a
solution.’”
18
5.1.1.1. Stakeholder institutions
Making the most of the limited and variable input they had into the summit, the non-
governmental stakeholders took the initiative of organising themselves into more eﬀective
groupings, including what were eﬀectively the“constituencies”referred to in the WSIS Rules
of Procedure. The private sector’s constituency was the Coordinating Committee of Business
Interlocutors (CCBI), chaired by the ICC.
The structures into which civil society organised itself were rather more complex, largely
because of its relative heterogeneity and also its much greater numbers than the private sector.
Its peak body at WSIS was the Civil Society Plenary group, constituted by all members of
civil society present whenever WSIS was convened for a PrepCom or summit meeting. There
was also a“virtual plenary”based on an electronic mailing list, which existed to facilitate the
conduct of intersessional work, rather than for decision-making.
19
14. Drake, William J, Why the WGIG Process Mattered (2005), 249
15. Bloem, Renate, Multi-Stakeholderism and Civil Society (2005), 99; Stauﬀacher, Daniel, A Tribute to Those
Who Made it Happen (2005) , 85
16. Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang, A New Diplomacy for the 21st Century?: MultiStakeholder Approach and Bottom-Up
Policy Development in the Information Society (2005), 112
17. Civil Society Working Group on Content & Themes, Does Input lead to Impact?: How Governments treated
Civil Society Proposals in Drafting the 19 September 2003 Draft Plan of Action (2003)
18. Kummer, Markus, Introduction (2005), 2
19. See http://mailman.greennet.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/plenary.
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The Civil Society Plenary was sub-divided into self-organised regional, multi-stakeholder and
thematic caucuses and working groups. There was a regional caucus for each of the seven
WSIS regions, two multi-stakeholder caucuses for gender and youth issues, and twenty-three
thematic caucuses and working groups organised along thematic lines, such as education and
academia, health, human rights, media and IPRs. The civil society caucuses and working
groups made much use of online tools in their activities, including open electronic mailing
lists which were all accessible from a community-run Web site,
20 and the use of another com-
munity Web platform, set up at the initiative of the Swiss hosts, to highlight their activities.
21
The caucus of most relevance to the IGF is the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus (CS-
IGC),
22 which was formed during PrepCom 2 of the ﬁrst phase of WSIS in February 2003, as
the civil society caucus for Internet governance issues within WSIS.
23 Its signiﬁcance lies not
only in its role as a forum for the development of civil society contributions to the discussion
of Internet governance during WSIS (for example by successfully nominating WGIG’s civil
society representatives), but in that it remains active in representing civil society on these
issues at the IGF today. In fact as at 2008, its electronic mailing list contains more members
than it did during WSIS.
From PrepCom 2 of the ﬁrst phase, the Civil Society Plenary and the caucuses and working
groups were supplemented by two other bodies formed by a resolution of the Civil Society
Plenary and reporting to it: the Civil Society Content and Themes group
24 and the Civil
Society Bureau (CSB).
25 Both of these were based in some measure on the equivalent inter-
governmental subcommittees of the PrepCom.
The Content and Themes Group was a coordinating body for the caucuses and working
groups, which endeavoured to generate and present a uniﬁed position on behalf of civil soci-
ety on substantive issues, for the purpose of drafting papers and statements for presentation
to the summit.
26 Its membership was open and its coordinators were consensually appointed.
In between PrepCom meetings at which it convened in person, its activities took place on a
public and open mailing list.
27
The CSB was its procedural counterpart, charged with managing organisational aspects of
20. See http://www.wsis-cs.org/caucuses.html.
21. The site at http://www.wsis-online.net/ is no longer functional, but a previous version of the site can be
found at http://web.archive.org/web/20050323233954/http://wsis-online.net/.
22. See http://www.igcaucus.org/
23. CS-IGC, Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report (2005)
24. Also known as the Subcommittee on Content and Themes, or WSIS-SCT.
25. See http://www.csbureau.info/.
26. WSIS-SCT, Final Report on Prepcom-2 Activities of the Civil Society on Content and Themes (2003)
27. See http://www.wsis-cs.org/content.htm.
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civil society’s participation in the WSIS and preparatory processes, including the distribution
of funding from the donor-supported Civil Society Facility Fund. The executive positions on
the Bureau were ﬁlled by one organisational member from each of various “families” of civil
society groups. There were 22 such families at the time of the Bureau’s creation, divided
along broadly similar thematic, demographic and regional lines as the caucuses and working
groups, with the addition of some catch-all categories such as“social movements”and“multi-
stakeholders partnerships.”
5.1.2. First phase
The Geneva phase of WSIS took place from 10 to 12 December 2003, attended by almost 50
heads of state, 175 national delegations and approximately 12 000 participants. In addition
to the formal plenary sessions, almost 300 other events took place during the Geneva phase
from 5 December, including three multi-stakeholder round table discussions.
None of these events will receive further consideration here. Rather, our attention will be
limited to the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, drafting of which was complete
before the Geneva phase of the summit oﬃcially even opened. Although the IGF was not con-
ceived until the Tunis phase of the summit, a brief analysis of the Geneva output documents
is important not only to set the scene, but because the principles agreed in Geneva remain
one of the few ﬁxed points of reference by which any reforms that may be proposed for the
IGF will be judged by the international community of states.
5.1.2.1. Declaration of Principles
The core of the Declaration of Principles is contained in eleven“key principles for building an
inclusive Information Society.” Only two of these call for examination here, but the subjects
of the others may be gleaned from the headings they are given in the Declaration which are
as follows:
￿ The role of governments and all stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for development;
￿ Information and communication infrastructure: An essential foundation for the Information
Society;
￿ Access to information and knowledge;
￿ Capacity building;
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￿ Building conﬁdence and security in the use of ICTs;
￿ Enabling environment;
￿ ICT applications: beneﬁts in all aspects of life;
￿ Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content;
￿ Media;
￿ Ethical dimensions of the Information Society; and
￿ International and regional cooperation.
The need for multi-stakeholder involvement in Internet governance is enshrined in the very
ﬁrst of these principles, which provides in full:
Governments, as well as private sector, civil society and the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations have an important role and responsibility in the development of the In-
formation Society and, as appropriate, in decision-making processes. Building a people-centred
Information Society is a joint eﬀort which requires cooperation and partnership among all stake-
holders.
28
This theme recurs in the paragraphs on Internet governance within the explication of the
“Enabling environment”principle, which deals with the need for an international and national
legal and economic environment to support the development of the Information Society. It
deﬁnes the agreed roles of the stakeholder groups as they were brieﬂy referred to in the
Introduction and will be repeated in the Tunis Agenda:
We reaﬃrm that the management of the Internet encompasses both technical and public poli-
cy issues and should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international
organizations. In this respect it is recognised that:
a. Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States.
They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues;
b. The private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the development
of the Internet, both in the technical and economic ﬁelds;
c. Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community
level, and should continue to play such a role;
d. Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to have a facilitating role in
the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues;
e. International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in
the development of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.
29
The Declaration of Principles continues by calling for the establishment of WGIG, and states:
28. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 20
29. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 35
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The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public and its governance should
constitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda. The international management of
the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of
governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations. It should ensure
an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure
functioning of the Internet, taking into account multilingualism.
30
5.1.2.2. The stakeholder groups revisited
Already, some lack of clarity in the deﬁnitions of the stakeholder groups has appeared, which
is something of a hallmark of the WSIS output documents. In some paragraphs, either inter-
governmental organisations
31 or international organisations
32 appear to be treated as separate
stakeholder groups. Even more problematically, the two occasionally seem to be conﬂated.
33
Except in such cases where intergovernmental and non-governmental international organisa-
tions are treated together, the phrase “international organisations” is generally used in the
WSIS output documents to refer to the institutions of the Internet technical community. This
much is clear from the deﬁnition of their role as a stakeholder group: “the development of
Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.”
34
Although there is no entirely satisfactory basis upon which to reconcile these conﬂicts, it will
be taken that the authoritative statement of stakeholder groups in post-WSIS Internet gover-
nance is limited to governments, the private sector and civil society. This is largely consistent
with the terms of the WSIS output documents; for example, in that the deﬁnition of the roles
of stakeholders refers to “all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international
organizations”
35 which suggests that intergovernmental and international organisations are
not to be considered as stakeholders in their own right.
It can also be justiﬁed on the conceptual basis that, as already observed, the legitimacy of
intergovernmental organisations as a stakeholder group is purely derivative in nature,
36 and
by the same token the legitimacy of non-governmental international organisations is, or is
drawn from, that of civil society and/or the private sector. It is also consistent with the view
of WGIG, which took it that there were only three distinct stakeholder groups
37 (after having
30. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 48
31. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 73
32. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 48
33. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 20; WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society
(2005) , para 52
34. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 35
35. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 35
36. See Section 3.4.1.1.
37. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 8–10
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speciﬁcally considered adding the technical community as a fourth).
38
This certainly does not mean that intergovernmental and other international organisations
should be excluded from multi-stakeholder governance processes. On the contrary; their par-
ticipation is important on instrumentalist grounds, respectively because of their centrality to
the existing international system and to the present architecture of the Internet. For example,
even if all stakeholders, including all aﬀected governments, reached agreement on a reform
to intellectual property law, it would not be possible to eﬀectuate that reform without also
securing the involvement of WIPO; and neither would it be possible to eﬀectuate reforms to
the technical architecture of the Internet without the involvement of the IETF.
However, this does not require those institutions to be treated as separate stakeholders rather
than as observers,
39 advisers, or as members of one or more of the other stakeholder groups as
appropriate. For example, ICANN’s GAC could participate as an intergovernmental organisa-
tion, the ALAC as civil society, and the GNSO’s commercial and business users constituency
as a member of the private sector.
5.1.2.3. Plan of Action
Much less time needs to be spent discussing the Geneva Plan of Action, which builds upon
the Declaration of Principles by setting out a range of general objectives to be achieved by
the application of those principles. These are categorised into eleven action lines, one for
each of the principles, that have been referred to in follow-up documents and activities by
their identiﬁers “C1” to “C11.” There are also eight subsidiary lines under C7, “ICT appli-
cations: beneﬁts in all aspects of life,” namely e-government, e-business, e-learning, e-health,
e-employment, e-environment, e-agriculture and e-science.
Most of the objectives are very general, leaving speciﬁc targets to be determined on a national
level, and making no prescription of the means by which they are to be accomplished. By
way of example, action line C5 (“Building conﬁdence and security in the use of ICTs”) simply
states in respect of spam that parties are to “[t]ake appropriate action on spam at national
and international levels.”
40 These do not require further consideration here.
One of the more speciﬁc action lines is C6 (“Enabling environment”), which requests the UN
Secretary-General to establish the WGIG “to investigate and make proposals for action, as
38. Doria, Avri, WSIS, WGIG, Technology and Technologists (2005)
39. As they do within the IGF’s Advisory Group: see Section 5.2.1.4.
40. WSIS, Geneva Plan of Action (2003), para 12(d)
294Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
appropriate, on the governance of Internet”[sic].
41 It was originally expected that governance
of the Internet would be dealt with in the Geneva output documents themselves, but when
agreement could not be reached, even when PrepCom 3 was twice extended to PrepCom 3A
and 3B, the deferral of this issue pending the report of a smaller task force was a compromise
reached around 24 hours before the oﬃcial opening of the summit.
42
Internet governance was not the only issue so deferred. Another section of the Plan of Action,
following the eleven action lines, established a Digital Solidarity Agenda, with the aim of
“putting in place the conditions for mobilizing human, ﬁnancial and technological resources
for inclusion of all men and women in the emerging Information Society.”
43 As part of this
Agenda, calls were made by developing country governments for the establishment of a Digital
Solidarity Fund (DSF) for ﬁnancing ICT infrastructure development.
As agreement on this issue could not be reached within the Geneva phase either, the Plan
of Action called for it too to be reviewed by a dedicated task force, which became the Task
Force on Financing Mechanisms (TFFM). As it transpired, the DSF was established outside
the WSIS process altogether in March 2005, as an independent multi-stakeholder network.
44
This largely disposed of the issue prior to PrepCom 3 of the Tunis phase, and no further
discussion of it will be necessary here either.
5.1.3. WGIG
The contention over Internet governance within the Geneva phase that led to the estab-
lishment of WGIG can be considered fortuitous, in that as will be seen, WGIG much more
faithfully embodied the multi-stakeholder principle than its parent had (or would again, in
the Tunis phase). WGIG also considered the issues of Internet governance in a much broader
context than would likely have occurred if those issues had remained within the mainstream
of WSIS.
Within WSIS, discussion of Internet governance was focused upon a single issue: the control
that the United States was seen to unilaterally possess over what WGIG came to call“infras-
tructure and the management of critical Internet resources,”
45 such as the DNS system, the
41. WSIS, Geneva Plan of Action (2003), para 13(b)
42. Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang & Stauﬀacher, Daniel, Introduction (2005), 4
43. WSIS, Geneva Plan of Action (2003), para 27
44. See http://www.dsf-fsn.org/.
45. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 8
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root servers, and IP address allocation, through its oversight of the administration of those
functions by a Californian corporation, ICANN.
Whilst the United States naturally supported the status quo, and many of its close allies
including Australia and New Zealand were content to make evolutionary changes to it, de-
veloping countries in particular were implacable in their opposition to the prevailing regime.
China and Brazil, for example, pushed for more direct international involvement in ICANN’s
processes, whilst others such as Pakistan went further and sought that these functions be
transferred outright away from ICANN to the ITU.
46 The United States characterised this as
a power-play “by those governments who are not very happy with the rapid and innovative
changes on the internet, both economically and also with regard to speech, [to prevent those
changes] by threatening a veto.”
47
It was in this context that the Secretary-General of the ITU and WSIS, Yoshio Utsumi, urged
WGIG to focus on that speciﬁc issue, concluding his welcoming address “with a plea; that
we do not reopen all of the issues that were already extensively discussed in the ﬁrst phase.
But instead, let us focus on those few issues of substance that were not resolved during the
negotiations; namely on the future reform of ICANN.”
48
He soon found that WGIG had other ideas.
5.1.3.1. Processes
The ﬁrst task of Markus Kummer, appointed as Executive Coordinator of WGIG’s Secretariat
in July 2004, was to recommend a multi-stakeholder panel of candidates for the working group
to the UN Secretary-General. He set about this task over the succeeding months through a
programme of informal discussions with stakeholders, together with an open two-day consul-
tation that was held on 20–21 September and chaired by Nitin Desai, Special Advisor to the
Secretary-General for the WSIS. He also received a slate of nominations from the CS-IGC,
selected through an open process it had devised.
49
The WGIG eventually formed on 11 November comprised forty members, with a balance
of all stakeholder groups and geographical regions, and a reasonably broad demographic
and gender distribution. Amongst those selected were all but one of those that had been
46. Hedquist, Ulrika, WYSIWYG Guide to WSIS (2005)
47. Wu, Tim, Dyson, Esther, Froomkin, Michael, & Gross, David, On the Future of Internet Governance (2007),
2
48. Utsumi, Yoshio, First Meeting of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) (2004), 2
49. de la Chapelle, Bertrand, WSIS: The First Summit of the Internet Age? (2005), 281
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nominated by the CS-IGC, and Nitin Desai as Chair.
50 Interestingly no representative of
the United States government was selected, though in any case, governmental members were
selected in a personal rather than a representative capacity, so that there would be no need
for them to refer questions back to their ministries before committing to a position.
WGIG met four times in Geneva between November 2004 and June 2005, for a duration
of three or four days. Every meeting of the group included an open consultation session at
which both written and oral submissions were received from the public. From the second
meeting in February 2005, the proceedings of these consultations were transcribed in real-
time into the six oﬃcial UN languages
51 and streamed over the Internet.
52 In addition to the
open consultation sessions, one of WGIG’s private meetings was open to observers, and at
the others intergovernmental observers were permitted to attend and speak. Documentary
submissions received from the public were also posted to the WGIG Web site, and all of these
contributions fed into the WGIG’s Background Report.
53
Between meetings, WGIG members communicated using an email mailing list.
54 Limited
use was also made of a Web site site which provided members with an asynchronous online
discussion forum and a wiki.
55 At its ﬁrst meeting, WGIG divided into smaller working groups
to deal with speciﬁc issues, which had their own mailing lists, and which published working
papers to the WGIG’s Web site for public comment.
56 At its ﬁnal meeting WGIG divided
again into smaller working groups to write sections of its ﬁnal report, reassembling in plenary
to review and consolidate these sections, with ﬁnal editing of the text being conducted in
real-time on a computer-projection screen.
57
5.1.3.2. Mandate
WGIG’s mandate was set out in the Plan of Action which suggested that it should:
i. develop a working deﬁnition of Internet governance;
ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet governance;
50. See http://www.wsis-si.org/wgig.html.
51. Though only for the ﬁnal meeting in June was this transcript archived on the WGIG Web site: see http:
//www.wgig.org/Meeting-June.html.
52. That is “webcast”: see the links to each meeting from http://www.wgig.org/.
53. WGIG, Background Report (2005)
54. MacLean, Don, A Brief History of WGIG (2005), 12–13 and see http://wgig.org/mailman/listinfo/
wgig-discuss_wgig.org.
55. MacLean, Don, A Brief History of WGIG (2005), 17 and see http://www.wgig.org/Plone-instructions.
html.
56. See http://www.wgig.org/working-papers.html.
57. MacLean, Don, A Brief History of WGIG (2005), 20–21
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iii. develop a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of governments,
existing intergovernmental and international organizations and other forums as well as the
private sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries; [and]
iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity to be presented for consideration and appro-
priate action for the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.
58
To take the WGIG’s response to each of the four requests in turn, the ﬁrst was its proposal of
the deﬁnition of Internet governance that was ﬁrst cited in the introduction to Chapter 2.
59
One of the most signiﬁcant achievements of WGIG was that its deﬁnition was incorporated
into the Tunis Agenda verbatim at para 34. The deﬁnition is broad enough to cover the
full gamut of Internet governance issues—technical coordination, standards development and
public policy governance. Extending far beyond the limited issues of Internet naming and
numbering to which the ITU had urged the WGIG to restrict its attention, the adoption of
this deﬁnition alone was enough to frustrate those who would have put forward the ITU,
or for that matter ICANN, as the peak body of Internet governance, as clearly neither were
competent to adopt such a mantle.
WGIG then proceeded to identify thirteen broad public policy issues that its deﬁnition of
Internet governance encompassed, which have already been referred to in some detail at
Section 2.3.1. For each of the thirteen broad issues, WGIG’s Background Report analysed the
main sub-issues involved, described the existing institutions and mechanisms of governance
already engaged in respect of those issues, and assessed the extent to which those institutions
and mechanisms conformed with the WSIS process criteria of being multilateral, transparent,
democratic and inclusive.
With this background in place, WGIG proceeded to make ten basic policy recommendations
in its main report. Much along the lines of the recommendations in the Geneva Plan of Action,
these were rather broad in scope and vague in content; for example,“Ensure that all measures
taken in relation to the Internet, in particular those on grounds of security or to ﬁght crime,
do not lead to violations of human rights principles.”
60 These recommendations do not call
for further discussion here.
The third request made of WGIG in the Plan of Action was that it attempt to develop a
common understanding of the respective roles of stakeholders in relation to Internet gover-
nance. As already noted, WGIG recognised three distinct groups: governments, the private
sector and civil society. As to the roles of these stakeholder groups, WGIG was less limiting
58. WSIS, Geneva Plan of Action (2003), para 13(b)
59. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), para 10
60. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 18
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than the Geneva Declaration of Principles had been in its deﬁnitions of stakeholder roles,
which would be repeated in the Tunis Agenda.
For example, the WGIG report acknowledged that all stakeholder groups have a role to
play in policy development. For governments, their role is in “[p]ublic policymaking and
coordination and implementation.”The private sector’s role is in the“[d]evelopment of policy
proposals, guidelines and tools” as well as “participation in national and international policy
development”(rather than merely an“important role ... in the technical and economic ﬁelds”
as allowed by the Declaration of Principles). Civil society has a role in “[e]ngaging in policy
processes” and “[c]ontributing to policy processes and policies that are more bottom–up,
people-centred and inclusive”(rather than just“an important role ... at community level”).
61
Although not a consensus document, WGIG’s Background Report, in particular, takes a more
progressive view of the new post-Westphalian international order than the Geneva output
documents:
This emerging new“tri-stakeholderism”involving governments, the private sector and civil soci-
ety, would suggest the need for a new conceptual framework which is on the one hand embedded
in the existing system of international law, but on the other hand goes beyond this, bringing oth-
er type [sic] of norms (for example, “soft law,” self-regulation) to global governance concepts.
62
The fourth and ﬁnal part of WGIG’s mandate was the open suggestion that it produce
proposals for action. In addition to the ten issues in respect of which substantive policy
recommendations were made as referred to above, and of more relevance than these for present
purposes, WGIG made recommendations for future Internet governance mechanisms. These
recommendations were in turn subdivided into four clusters:
￿ the establishment of an Internet governance forum;
￿ mechanisms for global public policy and oversight;
￿ the need for improved institutional coordination; and
￿ the need for regional, subregional and national coordination.
The last two recommendations above were dealt with scantly in a paragraph each, simply
recommending in the ﬁrst instance that the secretariats of existing intergovernmental or-
ganisations and other organisations of Internet governance improve the coordination of their
activities and their exchange of information. In the second, WGIG recommended that the
multi-stakeholder approach be replicated at regional and subregional levels of Internet gov-
61. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 8–9
62. WGIG, Background Report (2005), 66
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ernance, and that governments establish a multi-stakeholder national Internet governance
steering committee or similar body.
63
Much more attention was given to the ﬁrst two recommendations above, which will be dis-
cussed next in turn.
5.1.3.3. An Internet governance forum
Correctly noting that there was“no global multi-stakeholder forum to address Internet-related
public policy issues,”
64 the WGIG report proposed the establishment of a multi-stakeholder
Internet governance forum linked to the United Nations,
65 which would:
￿ Interface with intergovernmental bodies and other institutions on matters under their
purview which are relevant to Internet governance, such as IPR, ecommerce, trade in ser-
vices and Internet/telecommunications convergence.
￿ Identify emerging issues and bring them to the attention of the appropriate bodies and
make recommendations.
￿ Address issues that are not being dealt with elsewhere and make proposals for action, as
appropriate.
￿ Connect diﬀerent bodies involved in Internet management where necessary.
￿ Contribute to capacity-building for Internet governance for developing countries, drawing
fully on local sources of knowledge and expertise.
￿ Promote and assess on an ongoing basis the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet
governance processes.
66
As will be seen, these six suggested functions made their way into the Tunis Agenda in subtly
altered form.
5.1.3.4. Global public policy and oversight
An Internet governance forum alone, however, could not easily provide all that was required
to bridge the gap between the existing Internet governance regime as it had evolved, and
a future regime that would fulﬁl a more expansive range of possible Internet governance
63. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 16
64. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 10
65. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 11
66. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 11–12
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functions. These more expansive functions are referred to as as “global public policy and
oversight” in the WGIG report, which more speciﬁcally suggests that they may include the
roles of audit, arbitration, coordination, policy-setting and regulation.
67
The WGIG report correctly observes that a consensual network such as the proposed Internet
governance forum may not be suﬃciently well adapted to fulﬁl all of these potential functions.
However, there was no consensus within WGIG about the need for all of these roles to be
fulﬁlled, nor as to how they should be; one point of view within WGIG being that“[t]here is
no need for a speciﬁc oversight organization.”
68
The abstract manner in which this question is considered in the WGIG report seems obscure
until it is understood that its implicit context is the issue area of Internet naming and number-
ing. The real question, therefore—although never stated so baldly in the WGIG report—was
whether by making the management of infrastructure and critical Internet resources subject to
greater public oversight than exists under the ICANN regime, concerns over US unilateralism
would be addressed.
In the end, the only consensus that could be reached on this question was that any new
mechanism proposed to fulﬁl the global public policy and oversight functions should adhere
to the following principles:
￿ No single Government should have a pre-eminent role in relation to international Internet
governance.
￿ The organizational form for the governance function will be multilateral, transparent and
democratic, with the full involvement of Governments, the private sector, civil society and
international organizations.
￿ The organizational form for the governance function will involve all stakeholders and rele-
vant intergovernmental and international organizations within their respective roles.
69
Since no agreement could be reached on a single model for institutional reform of existing
Internet governance mechanisms that would accord with the above three principles, WGIG in-
stead presented in the alternative four possible organisational models that its members had
67. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 12. Compare the ﬁve potential roles
for multi-stakeholder governance networks put forward in Martens, Jens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future
Models of Multilateralism? (2007) , 21: advocacy, standard setting, ﬁnancing, implementation and coordination.
68. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 14 and see Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang,
De-Mystiﬁcation of the Internet Root: Do We Need Governmental Oversight? (2005) , 221
69. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 12, drawing in the case of the second
and third points from para 48 and 49 of the Declaration of Principles.
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considered, without recommending any of them. These ranged from the mere enhancement
of ICANN’s GAC to address concerns of US unilateralism in the control of critical Internet
resources, through to the establishment of a strongly hierarchical Global Internet Coun-
cil (GIC) anchored in the United Nations, in which non-governmental stakeholders would
participate only in an advisory capacity, and which would supersede the roles of both the
ICANN GAC and the NTIA.
70
WGIG’s report was presented to PrepCom 3 of the second phase in July 2005, following a
preliminary report to PrepCom 2 in February. Notwithstanding the equivocation on global
public policy and oversight, the report had been adopted by its members by consensus, a
feat attributed by one member of the secretariat to its clear sense of direction, the consensus
based approach fostered by the appointment of members in their individual capacities rather
than as representing factional interests, and its eﬃcient working method that combined face
to face meetings with ongoing online discussion.
71
5.1.4. Second phase
The high level segment of the second phase of WSIS was held from 16 to 18 November 2005
in Tunis.
72 Again, there were numerous associated private sector and civil society events held
in the lead-up to and alongside the high level segment that do not call for discussion here.
Again also, the actual process of negotiation was over by the time the summit oﬃcially
reopened—although not long over, with more last-minute compromises being thrashed out
during the ﬁnal hours of an extended PrepCom 3. In the process, there had been a regression
from the open and inclusive working methods of WGIG, with attempts by many govern-
ments to exclude civil society and private sector representatives from PrepCom 3 drafting
sessions.
73
Of the two outcome documents from the Tunis phase, only the Tunis Agenda calls for treat-
ment here, as the Tunis Commitment, the shortest of the four outcome documents, was largely
conﬁned to conﬁrming the parties’ agreement to the Declaration of Principles and reaﬃrming
their commitment to pursuing the initiatives set out in the Plan of Action.
70. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 13–16
71. Cheniti, Tarek, The WGIG Process: Lessons Learned and Thoughts for the Future (2005), 31
72. See http://www.smsitunis2005.tn/.
73. Drake, William J, Why the WGIG Process Mattered (2005), 250
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Neither does all of the Tunis Agenda require to be dealt with here. It is divided into an intro-
duction and three substantive parts. The ﬁrst two substantive parts deal with the two issues
omitted during the Geneva phase—ﬁnancing and Internet governance. The third deals with
implementation and follow-up, building on the eleven action lines and the eight subsidiary
lines of the Geneva Action Plan.
Of these, only the second substantive part on Internet governance requires our attention. It
begins by adopting without further comment the working deﬁnition of that term developed
by WGIG, yet repeats unaltered the more restrictive description of the respective roles of
the stakeholder groups from the Declaration of Principles.
74 It recognises the academic and
technical communities as cutting across the other stakeholder groups—an insight inherited
from WGIG
75—and aﬃrms the importance of adopting a multi-stakeholder approach “as far
as possible, at all levels.”
76
The Tunis Agenda then proceeds to record the resolve of the parties to address many of the
Internet governance issues isolated by WGIG, as set out in tabular form at Section 2.3.1, in
very general terms similar to those of the Plan of Action; for example, on spam:
We resolve to deal eﬀectively with the signiﬁcant and growing problem posed by spam. We
take note of current multilateral, multi-stakeholder frameworks for regional and international
cooperation on spam, for example, the APEC Anti-Spam Strategy, the London Action Plan,
the Seoul–Melbourne Anti-Spam Memorandum of Understanding and the relevant activities of
OECD and ITU. We call upon all stakeholders, to adopt a multi-pronged approach to counter
spam that includes, inter alia, consumer and business education; appropriate legislation, law-
enforcement authorities and tools; the continued development of technical and self-regulatory
measures; best practices; and international cooperation.
77
The more signiﬁcant paragraphs of this part of the Agenda however are those relating to
the reform of Internet governance institutions. This topic is addressed in two ways: through
setting in place a process of “enhanced cooperation,” and by establishing the Internet Gov-
ernance Forum that WGIG had recommended. As these were by far the most divisive issues
discussed during negotiations at the Tunis PrepCom meetings, some more background of
these negotiations is required before discussing the eventual agreement which found form in
the Tunis Agenda.
74. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 34 and 35
75. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 8, 10; Doria, Avri, WSIS, WGIG,
Technology and Technologists (2005)
76. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 36 and 37
77. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 41
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5.1.4.1. Enhanced cooperation
The WGIG report had not been received with such consensus within WSIS at large as within
WGIG itself. Perhaps predictably, the most dissent in respect of its recommendations for a
new regime for global public policy and oversight came from the United States, which, along
with private sector representatives such as the CCBI, responded to the report by arguing that
no signiﬁcant changes to the status quo were necessary.
78 They also expressed concern that
in outlining the respective roles of stakeholders, the role of governments had been overstated
and that of the private sector and civil society diminished.
79
On the other hand, it could be taken that the ITU was not particularly pleased with the
WGIG report either (though it did not publish an oﬃcial response). Although its Secretary-
General had painted the ITU as“a multilateral organization with greater international legit-
imacy and democratic processes” than ICANN, WGIG had found that in fact the ITU was
far from this. Relatively few Internet businesses were members, and the ITU’s exclusion of
civil society from its processes prevented it from fulﬁlling the multi-stakeholder principle
demanded by the Geneva principles.
80
Thus although three of the oversight options proposed by WGIG proposed new intergovern-
mental oversight mechanisms for the ICANN function, none of them considered the ITU a
serious candidate. Only at its 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference in Antalya did the ITU begin
to investigate whether there was scope “to draft any possible amendments to the ITU basic
texts that might be needed in order to facilitate the participation of all relevant stakeholders
in the activities of ITU related to WSIS.”
81
If neither the United States nor the ITU were particularly happy with WGIG’s recommenda-
tions, most of the rest of the world was, with a coalition of developing countries speciﬁcally
supporting the GIC model for oversight of naming and numbering functions.
82 Although
conducted the following year, a 2006 review of ICANN conducted by the NTIA supported
WGIG’s view that that no single government should have a pre-eminent role in international
Internet governance, with over 87 percent of respondents in favour of the transition of naming
78. WSIS Secretariat, Compilation of Comments Received on the Report of the Working Group on Internet
Governance (2005), 3, 36–43
79. WSIS Secretariat, Compilation of Comments Received on the Report of the Working Group on Internet
Governance (2005), 29–30
80. Utsumi, Yoshio, First Meeting of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) (2004), 257
81. ITU, Study on the Participation of All Relevant Stakeholders in the Activities of the Union Relat-
ed to the World Summit on the Information Society (2006) and see http://www.itu.int/council/groups/
stakeholders/.
82. Drake, William J, Why the WGIG Process Mattered (2005), 261
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and numbering functions to an international model.
83
Thus in the lead-up to its third meeting of the Tunis phase, PrepCom faced essentially two
choices on the global public policy and oversight issue: the status quo, which was the only
option acceptable to the United States, or some measure of internationalisation of the NTIA’s
oversight function as most of the rest of the international community demanded.
In the end, the United States forced the issue. Following the completion of the WGIG report,
but pre-empting its publication, the NTIA issued a statement in June 2005 aﬃrming its resolve
to“maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modiﬁcations to the authoritative root
zone ﬁle.”
84 This eﬀectively ruled out each of the four models WGIG had put forward, save
for the status quo, with possible “enhancement” of the GAC.
The reaction both from civil society
85 and many governments
86 was immediate and negative.
But it was not until PrepCom 3 had commenced in September that the EU made what the
United States described as“a very shocking and profound change,”
87 proposing the following
text to a drafting session:
In reviewing the adequacy of existing institutional arrangements for Internet Governance and
policy debate we agree that adjustments need to be made and we propose accordingly: ...
The new model for international cooperation ... should include the development and application
of globally applicable public policy principles and provide an international government involve-
ment at the level of principles over ... naming, numbering and addressing-related matters ...
.
88
Although this left the United States isolated, it was in a strong position to maintain its stand.
First, the only alternative to the cooperation of the US in reform of Internet naming and
numbering was the establishment of a new internationally-administered alternative DNS root,
which although technically feasible, was still a radical step that had not yet been seriously
considered at an intergovernmental level.
89
Second, given the United States’ record of exceptionalism in other contexts,
90 the prospect
that the US could stymie the achievement of a WSIS resolution on Internet governance was
83. McCarthy, Kieren, US Government Told to Take Its Hands Oﬀ Internet (2006)
84. NTIA, US Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (2005)
85. CS-IGC, Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report (2005), 12
86. Most vocally those of Russia, Brazil, Iran and China: McCullagh, Declan, Power Grab could Split the Net
(2005); Wright, Tom, EU Tries to Unblock Internet Impasse (2005) .
87. Wright, Tom, EU Tries to Unblock Internet Impasse (2005)
88. EU, Proposal for Addition to Chair’s Paper Sub-Com A Internet Governance on Paragraph 5“Follow-up and
Possible Arrangements” (2005)
89. Although certain countries had begun to supplement the ICANN root with their own independent TLDs;
see Section 2.3.1.7.
90. Such as its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and its failure to accede to the Kyoto Protocol
on climate change or to endorse the International Criminal Court: Mayer-Schoenberger, Viktor & Ziewitz, Malte,
Jeﬀerson Rebuﬀed: The United States and the Future of Internet Governance (2006), 35.
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seen as very real. As aptly noted in another context (that of reform to the UN Security
Council),“the idea that the remaining superpower will continue to participate—politically or
ﬁnancially—in an institution whose purpose has become to limit its power has no precedent.”
91
Thus PrepCom 3 ended its scheduled term in September in deadlock, with only the days
preceding the Tunis Summit available for further negotiation. The outcome of those last-
minute negotiations was that the status quo would indeed be preserved for the time being, on
the strength of an undertaking from the US that it would not interfere with other countries’
ccTLDs, and with the inclusion in the Tunis Agenda of a tip of the hat towards the EU’s
“new cooperation model,”in the form of the promise of“enhanced cooperation in the future.”
The Tunis Agenda introduces this topic by acknowledging the success of the existing Internet
governance regime in adapting to a dynamically changing Internet, largely led by the private
sector and civil society, but also facilitated by the enabling environment fostered by govern-
ments. The Agenda acknowledges the importance of preserving the “security and stability”
of these arrangements, which was also the language used in the NTIA’s June 2005 statement
on Internet naming and addressing when referring to the desirability of maintaining a single
authoritative DNS root.
92
The Tunis Agenda then however notes that Internet governance extends beyond naming and
numbering issues, to include a wide variety of social, economic and technical issues many
of which are not addressed by current mechanisms.
93 This points to the need for a new
transparent and democratic multilateral process involving all stakeholders, that balances the
importance of maintaining an enabling environment for an adaptive and evolving Internet,
with the legitimate interests of states in controlling their own ccTLD space and the desire to
strengthen cooperation among stakeholders in public policy making for the gTLDs.
94
This sets the stage for the request that the UN Secretary-General convene a new forum for
multi-stakeholder policy dialogue in which governments can take an equal role and responsi-
bility for Internet governance and policy making in consultation with all other stakeholders.
Although in doing this they are not to intervene in“the day-to-day technical and operational
matters” of existing bodies such as ICANN and the RIRs, those bodies must in turn provide
a role for governments to lead the development of globally applicable public policy principles
and to also safeguard national and regional interests in management of their own Internet
91. Weiss, Thomas G, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform (2003), 153
92. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 54–57
93. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 58–60
94. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 61–64.
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resources.
95
At ﬁrst glance, it might be assumed that the IGF is being spoken of here; and, indeed, it
clearly is in part. After all, there is no other existing forum within which for governments to
consult with all stakeholders on Internet policy issues. Neither is there any reason to assume
that the enhanced cooperation process is to be limited to the issue of Internet naming and
numbering to the exclusion of other public policy issues.
96 Moreover, there is no textual
division between the discussion of enhanced cooperation and discussion of the IGF.
However on a closer reading, the Agenda speaks more broadly of a“process towards enhanced
cooperation” between all “relevant organisations,” to be commenced by the end of the ﬁrst
quarter of 2006 (whereas the IGF was to be established by the second quarter), and requests
that each such organisation publish an annual performance report on its progress towards
this end.
97
Thus the preferable view is that the enhanced cooperation process is a broader initiative that
includes, but is not limited to, the establishment of the IGF. Whilst the IGF has an initial
ﬁve-year mandate, enhanced cooperation is a model of multi-stakeholder governance for the
future, based upon bottom–up coordination subject to a framework of general principles.
Even so, whilst there is conceptually a degree of separation between the two processes, there
is no reason why they might not interweave, should the IGF become a permanent forum
following the completion of its mandated term.
In March 2006, the UN Secretary-General requested Nitin Desai to begin informal consulta-
tions on how to start the process of enhanced cooperation,
98 pursuant to his mandate in the
Tunis Agenda. In response to this, Desai commenced informal bilateral consultations with
governments in May 2006 in a closed process, of which no documentary record was published.
No such similar discussions are known to have taken place with civil society or the private
sector.
At a consultation meeting organised by the Secretariat of the IGF in February 2007, Desai
indicated that he had, at some time following his consultations, submitted a report on them
to the then Secretary-General, describing the respondents’ expectations of a process leading
to enhanced cooperation. Desai thus considered that his own mandate had been fulﬁlled, and
that the matter had been left in the Secretary-General’s hands.
95. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 67–70 and 38
96. See paras 58, 59, 60 and 61, though contra para 70.
97. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 71
98. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Preparations Begin for Internet Governance Forum (2006)
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In the meantime, the ITU commenced its own process towards enhanced cooperation, resolv-
ing at its 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference in Antalya “to take the necessary steps in ITU’s
own internal process towards enhanced cooperation on international public policy issues per-
taining to the Internet,” and “as a concrete step, to organize consultations on these issues
among the ITU membership and other relevant stakeholders, in order to prepare and submit
proposals ... to the 2007 session of the Council.”
99
5.1.4.2. The Internet Governance Forum
In comparison to the wrangling over enhanced cooperation, agreement upon the establishment
of the IGF could almost have been described as smooth. Following the report of WGIG,
most governments had expressed their favour for the formation of the forum by the time of
the September session of PrepCom 3. The United States was again a notable exception. In
the same statement in which it reasserted its authority over the root DNS, and pointedly
addressing the WGIG report, it stated:
Dialogue related to Internet governance should continue in relevant multiple fora. Given the
breadth of topics potentially encompassed under the rubric of Internet governance there is no one
venue to appropriately address the subject in its entirety. While the United States recognizes that
the current Internet system is working, we encourage an ongoing dialogue with all stakeholders
around the world in the various fora as a way to facilitate discussion and to advance our shared
interest in the ongoing robustness and dynamism of the Internet.
100
A possible compromise suggested by the United States during the resumed PrepCom 3 in
November was that the IGF should become an activity of ISOC; a proposal that was supported
by Australia, but rejected by developing country governments. Eventually, the US and the
other OECD governments came around to the idea of an IGF independent of ISOC by the
inclusion of language to make it clear that it would be a multi-stakeholder body (rather than
just a “multilateral” one), that it would not be bound by UN procedures, and that it would
not be empowered to create binding obligations.
101
The private sector was also initially dubious about the merit of an IGF, as was ISOC.
102 In fact
by the conclusion of the ﬁrst round of PrepCom 3, ISOC was one of only two WSIS participants
99. ITU, ITU’s Role With Regard to International Public Policy Issues Pertaining to the Internet and the Man-
agement of Internet Resources, Including Domain Names and Addresses (2006)
100. NTIA, US Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (2005)
101. Heinrich-B¨ oll Foundation, Negotiations Closer to Agreement: Consensus on Internet Governance Forum
and—Almost—ICANN Oversight (2005)
102. WSIS Secretariat, Compilation of Comments Received on the Report of the Working Group on Internet
Governance (2005), 31–35
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on record as opposing the creation of the IGF.
103
Most of the balance of civil society had long supported the proposal, although the CS-IGC for
one would have preferred that it be established as a legally free-standing entity rather than
being anchored in the United Nations.
104 Its view of the role of the IGF was that:
The forum should not by default have a mandate to negotiate hard instruments like treaties or
contracts. However, in very exceptional circumstances when the parties all agree that such in-
struments are needed, there could be a mechanism that allows for their establishment. Normally,
the forum should focus on the development of soft law instruments such as recommendations,
guidelines, declarations, etc.
105
This was largely consistent with how the proposal eventually found form in the Tunis Agenda.
It requested the UN Secretary-General to form an Internet Governance Forum for multi-
stakeholder policy dialogue, with the full involvement of all stakeholders, and with a mandate
that is to be set out in full below.
106
The Secretary-General was directed to invite all stakeholders to participate at the IGF’s
inaugural meeting, giving consideration to the need for balanced geographical representation,
and drawing on resources from all interested stakeholders. An eﬀective and cost-eﬃcient
bureau was to be established to support the forum, ensuring multi-stakeholder participation.
The Secretary-General was also directed to review whether the forum should continue in
operation within ﬁve years of its creation, and to report on its operation to UN members
periodically.
107
The Tunis Agenda states that the IGF should be multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic
and transparent in its working and function, with a lightweight and decentralized structure
that is subject to periodic review. It is not to replace other relevant fora in which Inter-
net governance issues are discussed or to exercise oversight over them or have any binding
decision-making power. In particular, it would have no involvement in day-to-day or technical
operations of the Internet, but would work in parallel with those organisations that do, taking
advantage of their expertise.
108
103. The other was WITSA; the World Information Technology and Services Alliance, which had been a co-
founder of the CCBI. The ICC had already dropped its opposition by this time.
104. CS-IGC, Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report (2005), 3
105. CS-IGC, Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report (2005), 3
106. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 72 and 74 and see Section 5.2.
107. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 75, 76 and 78
108. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 73, 77 and 79.
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5.2. IGF
The Internet Governance Forum’s mandate is as set out in paragraph 72 of the Tunis Agenda,
which provides:
We ask the UN Secretary-General, in an open and inclusive process, to convene, by the second
quarter of 2006, a meeting of the new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue—called the
Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The mandate of the Forum is to:
a. Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster
the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet;
b. Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with diﬀerent cross-cutting international public
policies regarding the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall within the scope of any
existing body;
c. Interface with appropriate inter-governmental organizations and other institutions on mat-
ters under their purview;
d. Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, and in this regard make full use
of the expertise of the academic, scientiﬁc and technical communities;
e. Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to accelerate the availability and
aﬀordability of the Internet in the developing world;
f. Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or future Internet
governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries;
g. Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general
public, and, where appropriate, make recommendations;
h. Contribute to capacity building for Internet governance in developing countries, drawing
fully on local sources of knowledge and expertise;
i. Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet
governance processes;
j. Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet resources;
k. Help to ﬁnd solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet, of
particular concern to everyday users;
l. Publish its proceedings.
This is an expansion of WGIG’s suggestions as to the content of the IGF’s mandate, which
contained six points.
109
Subparagraph (c) above was derived from the ﬁrst point in the WGIG list, but omitted the
qualifying words,“which are relevant to Internet governance, such as IPR, ecommerce, trade
in services and Internet/telecommunications convergence.”Although not a substantive change
on its face, this amendment reﬂected the exclusion of IPR and trade issues altogether from
the Tunis Agenda by governments wishing for those issues to be reserved to WIPO and the
WTO.
110
109. See Section 5.1.3.3.
110. Accuosto, Pablo, WSIS Wraps Up With Mixed Emotions (2005)
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The second point in the WGIG list became subparagraph (g), but in this case with two ad-
ditions: the words“and the general public”after“appropriate bodies”(which adds a measure
of transparency to its mandate), but also the proviso that it would only make recommenda-
tions “where appropriate” (which arguably narrows the scope of the IGF’s mandate to make
recommendations).
The substance of the third and fourth points in the WGIG list can be found in subparagraph
(b) above, but in weakened form: the forum is only to“discuss”rather than to“address”issues
not being dealt with elsewhere, and there is no longer any reference to it making proposals for
action. It is therefore arguable that the IGF has no mandate to make recommendations for
action in respect of issues that are not being dealt with elsewhere, unless they also fall within
another head of its mandate (for example, because the issues are “emerging”).
111
The ﬁfth and sixth points of the WGIG list are the only ones to be reproduced verbatim in
the Tunis Agenda, at subparagraphs (h) and (i). This leaves subparagraphs (a), (d), (e), (f),
(j), (k) and (l) as new additions to the IGF’s mandate in the Agenda.
The IGF’s mandate is to be reviewed by the UN Secretary-General pursuant to the Tunis
Agenda in 2011. Thus, there may be only ﬁve meetings of the IGF. The choice of Athens as
a venue for the ﬁrst meeting was made in accepting an oﬀer of the Greek government made
at WSIS. The oﬀers of the Brazilian, Indian and Egyptian governments made respectively
at public consultations in February and May and at the Athens meeting to host the second,
third and fourth meetings were accepted by the IGF Secretariat without public consultation.
The possibly ﬁnal meeting, to be held in 2010, was the subject of competing bids from both
Lithuania and Azerbaijan in Athens.
5.2.1. Preparations
The ﬁrst action taken by the UN Secretary-General towards the establishment of the IGF was
the appointment of Markus Kummer, formerly of the WGIG Secretariat, to head its interim
Secretariat. In January 2006, Kummer established an IGF Web site and wrote an open letter
to stakeholder representatives from WSIS, inviting them to attend an open consultation ses-
sion in Geneva in February and requesting them to submit written contributions as inputs
into the consultations.
112
111. See Section 6.2.1.1.
112. See http://www.intgovforum.org/inv_letter.htm.
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In response to this request, nineteen contributors from civil society and the private sector pro-
vided written submissions.
113 In the interim, Kummer also posted a questionnaire to the IGF
Web site which provided the opportunity for comments to be provided in a more structured
form.
114 The questionnaire received a limited response, being completed by seven govern-
ments (including Australia, but neither the United States nor the EU), three individuals,
twelve civil society and private sector organisations, and the ITU.
115
5.2.1.1. Submissions
Since respondents prepared their submissions to these ﬁrst two requests for contributions in
isolation, without the opportunity to engage with each other’s views, the submissions showed
little development from the positions that the stakeholders had taken at WSIS, and indeed
some largely repeated their responses to the proposal for the formation of a forum in the
WGIG report.
It is not necessary to go into each of them here, but a brief overview will be given, focusing
on three key procedural issues: the role of the IGF, its structure, and its processes. The
substantive public policy issues that some submissions also addressed will not be outlined
here.
Taking ﬁrst the role of the IGF, what would prove to be a recurrent division can already be
seen between those preferring a restrictive interpretation of its mandate, which downplayed
or refuted its capacity to make policy recommendations, and those who took an expansive
view of its mandate, who saw that capacity as the forum’s raison d’etre.
The former group largely consisted of those who had opposed the establishment of the IGF at
ﬁrst; the technical community (such as Nominet which stated, “[i]t should not be a decision-
making body”),
116 the private sector (such as the CCBI and ICC which stressed “the IGF
will not have decision-making powers”),
117 and OECD governments (such as Canada which
wrote that “the IGF is to provide a platform for policy discussion, not for the development
of policy”).
118
The latter camp was dominated by civil society (such as the APC which saw the IGF pro-
ducing “[s]peciﬁc recommendations where there is suﬃcient consensus”),
119 and developing
113. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributionsg.htm.
114. See http://www.intgovforum.org/questionnaire.htm.
115. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions_questionnaire_responses.htm.
116. Nominet, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1
117. CCBI & ICC, CCBI/ICC Questions and Further Input on the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2
118. Government of Canada, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1
119. APC, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1
312Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
country governments (such as Azerbaijan, which wrote that the Forum should produce “rec-
ommendations that ... are not legally binding but could be a very good source for policy-
making and decision-making”).
120
Moving to the IGF’s structure, there was widespread agreement that the“eﬀective and cost-
eﬃcient bureau” referred to in the Tunis Agenda should have a narrow mandate limited to
setting the agenda for plenary meetings, subject to bottom–up consultation
121 (though some
civil society stakeholders would have assigned it a more substantial role).
122 The need for a
separate lightweight Secretariat was also accepted by many.
Beyond that however, the ﬁrst camp referred to above (for convenience, “Forum doves”)
123
were more likely to de-emphasise structure, as illustrated by the statement that “Aus-
tralia does not support the IGF establishing a range of sub-groups or subcommittees,”
124 and
ISOC’s claim that it was important to “[l]imit Forum-related organizational structures.”
125
A more substantial structure tended to be supported by those in the second group referred
to above (“Forum hawks,” let us call them). For example, Saudi Arabia recommended the
formation of “virtual working groups” which would coordinate online,
126 and the Internet
Governance Project ﬂeshed this idea out with a comprehensive proposal to structure the IGF
rather along the lines of the IETF.
127
Turning ﬁnally to the IGF’s processes, the divide already observed continued along much
the same lines, between Forum doves who viewed the IGF as principally a meeting (as for
example Canada which did“not envisage the establishment of ongoing work programs for the
IGF”),
128 and Forum hawks who viewed it as“a process, punctuated by an annual meeting”,
129
120. Government of Azerbaijan, Proposed Answers to the Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Gover-
nance Forum (2006), 1
121. For example, Government of Canada, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum
(2006), 3; Government of Azerbaijan, Proposed Answers to the Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet
Governance Forum (2006) , 2; CCBI & ICC, CCBI/ICC Questions and Further Input on the Internet Governance
Forum (2006), 5–6; IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum (2006) , 5
122. IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum (2006); MMWG, Internet Governance Forum Input Statement
(2006)
123. From the Internet Governance Project’s summary of a forum held by the Oxford Internet Institute on 1
September, found at http://www.internetgovernance.org/events.html.
124. Government of Australia, Response to Questionnaire on Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1
125. ISOC, The Internet Society’s contribution on the formation of the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2
126. Government of Saudi Arabia, Response to Questionnaire on Convening the Internet Governance Forum
(2006), 2
127. It recommended a twelve-person bureau containing ﬁve representatives of governments, and two each from
the private sector, civil society and the academic and technical communities, plus a chair. This proposed IGF
Bureau would elect a chair for the Forum at large and set the agenda for its plenary sessions, driven by proposals
of IGF working groups. It would also approve the formation of such working groups, and exercise oversight of the
Secretariat: IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum (2006), 5. Compare also MMWG, Internet Governance
Forum Input Statement (2006) , 3.
128. Government of Canada, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 5
129. APC, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2
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and who were concerned with how it might arrive at the recommendations that it was to make
pursuant to its mandate.
Perhaps the extreme position from the Forum doves came from the ITU, which suggested
in its response to the questionnaire that “the WSIS rules of procedures themselves could be
considered as the starting point for the IGF processes and procedures”
130—referring to the
same rules that had notoriously consigned civil society to the sidelines during WSIS.
As for the hawks, Vittorio Bertola, a member of the CS-IGC (though not writing in that
capacity), drew upon the model of the IETF in suggesting that working groups of the IGF
should develop their recommendations on a rough consensus basis, before presenting these to
the plenary body as policy proposals for adoption.
131 The APC largely agreed, and suggested
that it should then fall to the Chair to rule on the existence of rough consensus within the
plenary meeting.
132
5.2.1.2. Open consultations
The ﬁrst open consultations on the establishment of the IGF were held in Geneva on 16
and 17 February 2006, and were chaired by Nitin Desai.
133 Around 300 attended, including
approximately 40 governments, along with those who observed the proceedings remotely via
webcast. The proceedings were simultaneously translated into the oﬃcial UN languages, with
the webcast being available in English and French.
The consultations were not structured as an interactive discussion, but rather a moderat-
ed round table event at which most interventions were read from prepared statements, many
of which were also tabled as documents and later made available from the IGF Web site.
134 In
consequence, there was little opportunity for consensus-building, and in many cases the par-
ticipants’ views expressed in response to the questionnaire or the WGIG report were simply
reiterated.
Even so, there was enough common ground between participants that Desai was able to
declare the existence of a broad consensus that the IGF should be an annual event of about
130. ITU, Preliminary Response to the Questionnaire on the Convening of the Internet Governance Forum (2006)
131. Bertola, Vittorio, An Implementation Proposal for the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2; and see also,
from another CS-IGC member, Doria, Avri, The IETF as a Model for the IGF (2006) .
132. APC, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1–2, 8
133. See http://intgovforum.org/meeting.htm.
134. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions_interventions_1CIGF.htm. Except where one of these
papers is cited, the source for this section of the thesis is the transcript of the meeting found at http://www.
intgovforum.org/meeting.htm.
314Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
four days, open to representatives of all stakeholder groups, with a focus on about three
themes.
Beyond this, the areas of diﬀerence largely reﬂected those that had been seen in the earlier
written submissions as outlined above—that is, in respect of the three key procedural issues
of the role of the IGF, its structure, and its processes—with further disagreement about the
substantive issues that should form the agenda for the IGF’s ﬁrst meeting. These will be
brieﬂy dealt with in turn.
On the role of the IGF, there had been no progression from the views expressed in response
to the initial call for contributions and the questionnaire. From the Forum doves, the CCBI
reiterated that “[t]he Tunis Agenda is clear that the IGF does not have decision-making or
policy-making authority,”and the NRO emphasised that the“IGF must be a multi-stakeholder
forum without decision-making attributions.”
135 Again, the hawks insisted otherwise, with El
Salvador expressing hope “that the Internet Governance Forum will come up with recom-
mendations built on consensus on speciﬁc issues,” and Brazil even characterising its ﬁrst
meeting as “an excellent opportunity to initiate negotiations on a framework treaty to deal
with international Internet public policy issues.”
136
On the structure of the IGF, although a broad consensus was declared on need for a lightweight
multi-stakeholder bureau, which respondents also variously described as a “Programmatic
Committee,”
137 “Programme Committee”
138 or “steering group,”
139 there was no consensus
on what its size, composition or mandate should be. Desai therefore held this issue over for
further written input by 28 February. Twelve responses were received, including ﬁve from
governments.
140
Most of these respondents, from across both camps and all stakeholder groups, recommended
a body of between ten and twenty-ﬁve members. The proposal that deviated most sharply
from this was that of the Group of 77 and China (the G77).
141 Their proposal was for not
one but three bureaus, much as there had been at WSIS,
142 which would have a combined
total of forty members—half of those to be governmental.
143
135. NRO, Input on the Internet Governance Forum (2006)
136. Government of Brazil, Discurso IGF Meeting Fev 2006 (2006), 2
137. NRO, Input on the Internet Governance Forum (2006)
138. MMWG, Internet Governance Forum Input Statement (2006)
139. Bertola, Vittorio, An Implementation Proposal for the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 3
140. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions_MSG.htm.
141. Despite the name, the G77 at the time represented 133 developing country governments.
142. That is, a Governmental Bureau, Civil Society Bureau and the CCBI for the private sector.
143. G77, G77 & China Paper on the Proposed Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2–3
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Moving on the third and ﬁnal procedural issue, the IGF’s processes, the February consulta-
tions more clearly illustrated a diﬀerence of approach between the Forum doves and hawks
on an issue that has not already been traversed in discussion of the written submissions: that
of online participation.
Almost all stakeholders from both camps expressed general support for the use of online
working methods; for example, the CCBI arguing that the IGF should “[u]tilize online tools
to make it more inclusive with no stakeholder group excluded from the discussions,” and
Canada noting that “[b]y building a signiﬁcant online presence, the IGF can also facilitate
ongoing discussion between its physical meetings.”
144
However some Forum doves were less enthused of the idea of using online tools for interses-
sional work. ISOC said, “It is unrealistic to expect all stakeholders to be able to participate
in multiple-layered list-based exchanges on a realtime basis. Many stakeholders do not have
the resources or time to spend managing or participating in ongoing discussions.”
145 Aus-
tralia echoed this concern, saying:
A key concern is the actual human resources such processes would require on an ongoing basis if
all stakeholders are to participate in them in a meaningful way. ... We tend to see, in contrast, a
focused annual meeting as a more resource eﬃcient and eﬀective means of proceeding. As such,
we do not see online processes being mandated from above as an integral part of the IGF, but
rather being encouraged as bottom–up initiatives.
146
The ﬁnal area of diﬀerence between stakeholder representatives attending the February con-
sultations was as to the substantive issues that ought to be included on the agenda of the
IGF’s ﬁrst meeting. This question too was held over by Desai, pending the receipt of written
submissions which he invited stakeholders to provide by 31 March.
147
In the meantime, a short synthesis by the Secretariat of the written contributions and dis-
cussions to date produced a list of the ten most frequently mentioned public policy issues,
and claimed to identify an emerging consensus that the activities of the IGF should have an
overall development orientation, with an overarching priority of capacity building to enable
meaningful participation in global Internet policy development.
148
A somewhat diﬀerent picture was painted by the submissions on substantive issues that were
eventually received and posted on the IGF Web site. Contrary to the report of the Secretariat
that capacity building was the issue addressed most frequently, if equal weight was given to
144. Government of Canada, Canadian Statement, IGF Consultations Feb 16 2006 (2006), 2
145. ISOC, ISOC Statement, Internet Governance Forum Meeting 17 February 2006 (2006), 2
146. Government of Australia, Second Intervention by the Government of Australia (2006), 2–3
147. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions_sa.htm.
148. IGF Secretariat, The Substantive Agenda of the First Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (2006)
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each issue nominated, then as the chart below illustrates, the issues nominated most often
were:
￿ e-security and cybercrime;
￿ spam;
￿ privacy and digital identity; and
￿ freedom of expression and access to knowledge.
149
Together these amounted to almost half of the total, as against the development issues of ca-
pacity building, the digital divide, multilingualism and interconnection costs and connectivity,
which constituted around a third.
Figure 5-1. Substantive issues for the IGF
E-security and cybercrime
Spam
E-commerce/consumer 
protection
Privacy/digital identity
Freedom of expression/A2K
Human rights
Open standards/OSS
Principles and process issues
Network neutrality
Critical Internet resources
Capacity building
Digital divide
Multilingualism
Interconnection 
costs/connectivity
149. Submissions were excluded from analysis if they nominated more than three issues (even if these were grouped
into clusters), unless three primary issues could be discerned. Also excluded were submissions listed on the IGF
Web site together with those on substantive issues, but which were actually on other topics. This excluded six
respondents: the Group of 77 and China, African Civil Society, the Association for Progressive Communications,
the German Foundation for Law and Informatics, David Allen and John Mathiason (these latter two actually
being submissions for the May consultations), along with additional submissions of the ICC/CCBI and North
American Consumer Project on Electronic Commerce (NACPEC). Further details of the method used to produce
the chart are on ﬁle with the author.
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A second round of consultations was held, also in Geneva, on 19 May 2006, immediately pre-
ceding the ﬁrst meeting of the Advisory Group.
150 The IGF’s Web site described the purpose
of these consultations as to“focus on the substantive preperation [sic] of the inaugural meet-
ing of the IGF.”As before, further written contributions were also solicited in advance of the
meeting, though as only two respondents (David Allen and John Mathiason, both academics)
saw ﬁt to provide them, these do not call for separate treatment here. The consultations were
also once again translated and webcast.
The interventions at the May consultations were broadly congruent with those that had
been made in February, so detailed analysis of them is unnecessary. However if anything, a
strengthening of the views expressed then could be discerned three months later. One notable
respect in which this was so is that the broad agreement that development should be made
an overarching priority for the IGF’s substantive agenda was now more clearly in evidence.
5.2.1.3. Secretariat
The Secretariat of the IGF was formally established by the UN Secretary-General in March
2006.
151 In contrast to the Secretariat of WGIG in which Markus Kummer managed a staﬀ
of up to ten, he was initially assisted in the IGF Secretariat by a sole consultant, and an
intern from the host nation.
152 As Chair of the Advisory Group, Nitin Desai also worked very
closely with the Secretariat and often referred to himself as a member of it.
153
The Secretariat was not funded by the United Nations, but relied upon voluntary donations
to a trust fund. Its early donors included the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
which contributed CHF 500 000 (on the proviso that the Secretariat was to be based in
Geneva), ICANN which gave US$200 000, and Nominet which donated ¤15 000.
154 Each
host nation was also a major donor, covering all the costs it incurred in hosting an IGF
meeting.
As might perhaps be expected from a Secretariat with such limited resources, its services
to stakeholders were much more limited than those of the WSIS Secretariat. For example,
the IGF’s oﬃcial Web site was very rudimentary, and it was diﬃcult to obtain a response
to enquiries and requests directed to the Secretariat. The transparency of the Secretariat’s
150. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions_18May.htm for copies of interventions from three stake-
holders and http://www.intgovforum.org/meeting.htm for the full transcript.
151. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Preparations Begin for Internet Governance Forum (2006)
152. As at 2008 they have been joined by another intern and two more part-time consultants.
153. See for example the ﬁrst passage cited at Section 6.3.1.3.
154. See http://www.intgovforum.org/funding.htm.
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activities was also very limited, as ﬁrst and most clearly exempliﬁed by the process by which
the Advisory Group was appointed.
5.2.1.4. Advisory Group
The bureau referred to in the Tunis Agenda, and the multi-stakeholder group referred to
following the February consultations, eventually became the Advisory Group, also known as
the Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG). It was announced on the IGF’s Web site in
March that it was to be established as a group of“about forty”members, and—although not
openly stated—half of those forty were to be government representatives, with the balance
to be divided, not necessarily equally, between civil society and private sector positions.
155
The written submission of the G77 and China on the multi-stakeholder group, which had
proposed almost exactly this structure, had been sent under cover of a letter expressing the
groups’ hope that Desai would “give the requisite weight to this input.”
156 Evidently that is
what he did, since a group of forty members was far larger than any other stakeholder had
suggested would be appropriate.
A call for nominations for membership of the Advisory Group was made on 16 March 2006
with a deadline of 18 April. Nominations were not acknowledged by the IGF Secretariat,
and the ﬁrst that unsuccessful nominees heard of the outcomes of their nominations was the
Secretariat’s announcement of the successful candidates on 17 May.
157 The forty-six originally
listed as successful included the Chair, Nitin Desai, and forty representatives of stakeholder
groups, with fairly even geographical distribution. In addition a regional coordinator was
appointed from each of the ﬁve WSIS regions, and initially ﬁve special advisors personally
appointed by the Chair, who have been referred to in their own right as the Special Advisory
Group (SAG).
158
Intergovernmental organisations, not being otherwise represented in the Advisory Group,
were invited to participate as observers; however in practice they exercised much the same
speaking rights as other delegates.
159
155. Mueller, Milton, The Forum MAG: Who Are These People? (2006)
156. G77, G77 & China Paper on the Proposed Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1
157. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Secretary-General Establishes Advisory Group to Assist Him
in Convening Internet Governance Forum (2006)
158. In May 2006 the number rose to forty-seven when an additional regional coordinator was appointed for an
unspeciﬁed African sub-region. As of February 2008 there were twelve special advisors: six appointed by each of
the now two co-chairs.
159. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Discussion 30 January to 3 February 2008 (2008), 2
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The non-governmental positions on the Advisory Group were dominated by those with a
connection to the Internet naming and numbering regime, including ﬁve current or former
board members and one staﬀ member of ICANN, one of the IGF’s major sponsors.
160 Even so,
the technical community was not recognised as a distinct stakeholder group, as ICANN had
requested most recently at the February consultations. Rather, in referring to “civil society,
including the academic and technical communities,”the Secretariat treated these communities
as part of civil society.
161
The greatest discontent at this decision came from broader civil society, as it left room for only
a relatively small number of stakeholders from civil society outside the technical community
to be appointed to the Advisory Group. In particular, the CS-IGC had put forward ﬁfteen
nominees for appointment, of which only three were selected by the Secretary-General.
162
The Advisory Group met twice in Geneva before the inaugural IGF meeting in Athens, ﬁrst
following the May open consultations, and again following another open consultation meeting
in September. Advisory Group members attended these meetings at their own expense, save
that the Swiss government oﬀered in February to reimburse the travel expenses of members
from developing countries.
Meetings of the Advisory Group were closed, and no reports or minutes of them were released
during the preparations for Athens. The Advisory Group also operated an electronic mailing
list, but this too was closed, and not publicly archived.
163 Consequently, the detail of the
operations of the Advisory Group ahead of the ﬁrst IGF meeting were known only to its
members.
What is known is that the Advisory Group possessed little formal authority; for the most
part operating as a forum for discussion akin to the open consultations, at which those
in attendance expressed and debated their views, but without the object of taking formal
decisions. Instead, the views expressed on the issues discussed were summarised by the Chair
in a report to the UN Secretary-General, on the basis of which the Secretary-General made
a formal decision in due course.
164 What few decisions the Advisory Group did make on its
160. Mueller, Milton, The Forum MAG: Who Are These People? (2006)
161. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Secretary-General Establishes Advisory Group to Assist Him
in Convening Internet Governance Forum (2006)
162. See the CS-IGC’s contribution to the post-Athens consultation session at Section 5.2.3.2.
163. This remains the case, although in February 2008, following considerable criticism of the Advisory Group’s
transparency, consideration was given to opening the mailing list archives. As this was resisted by certain stake-
holders, no changes were made: IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Discussion 30 January to 3 February 2008
(2008), 9.
164. See Section 6.3.1.3.
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own behalf on matters such as as the selection of panelists for the plenary sessions were made
by rough consensus as declared by the Chair.
165
5.2.2. The First Meeting
The inaugural meeting of the Internet Governance Forum was held in Athens from 30 October
to 2 November 2006. According to the Greek hosts,
166 it was attended by 1350 participants
(including 152 media), from 97 countries. Approximately 40% of these were from civil soci-
ety, about 35% governmental or intergovernmental, and another 25% divided fairly equally
between the private sector and the media.
167 There was no cost to register for the event, with
all venue expenses being covered by the hosts.
At the Advisory Group’s meeting on 22 and 23 May, and as foreshadowed following the
February consultations, an overall theme“Internet Governance for Development”was selected
for the Athens meeting, with capacity building as a “cross-cutting priority.” Within this
framework, four themes for discussion were chosen, being described on the IGF Web site
as follows:
￿ Openness (freedom of expression, free ﬂow of information, ideas and knowledge);
￿ Security (creating trust and conﬁdence through collaboration, particularly by protecting
users from spam, phishing and viruses while protecting privacy);
￿ Diversity (promoting multilingualism, including IDN, and local content); and
￿ Access (Internet connectivity: policy and cost, dealing with the availability and aﬀordability
of the Internet including issues such as interconnection costs, interoperability and open
standards).
The breadth of these themes was such that almost all of the public policy issues previously
raised by stakeholders in their interventions and written contributions could be shoehorned
into one or more of them, although the omission of explicit reference to Internet naming and
numbering issues was notable.
168
165. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Discussion 6 December 2007 to 15 January 2008 (2008), 2
166. At the February 2007 follow-up consultations; see Section 5.2.3.2.
167. See http://www.intgovforum.org/Athens_stats_stakeholder.php. It is assumed that the “technical and
academic communities” shown here may be treated as from civil society.
168. And was indeed noted by the Russian Federation (see Russian Federation, Proposals of the Russian Fed-
eration to the Agenda of the Internet Governance Forum (2006)), the Brazilian government (see Government
of Brazil, Comments to the “Programme Outline” Document (2006) ) and the Internet Governance Project (see
IGP, Contribution to the Internet Governance Forum Athens Meeting (2006)) in their substantive submissions
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5.2.2.1. Submissions
Following publication of the agenda, submissions were again solicited, with those received by
2 August being included in another synthesis paper that was prepared by the Secretariat as
an input into the inaugural meeting. 79 submissions were received from 45 contributors by
this deadline,
169 and were reﬂected in the Background Paper that was released in all oﬃcial
UN languages one week before the commencement of the Athens meeting.
170 It dealt ﬁrst
with submissions on general aspects of Internet governance, then those that could be grouped
under one of the four themes, followed by those that looked at the IGF as an institution.
Rather than summarising their content here, as the Background Paper did, the submissions
will instead be considered as products of a process initiated by the Secretariat to fulﬁl the
IGF’s role as a forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue. On this basis, the process was
characterised by three deﬁciencies: in the substantive moderation or facilitation of the dis-
cussion, in the level of deliberation by the participants, and in the orientation of submissions
towards the fulﬁlment of the IGF’s mandate. Taking these in turn:
￿ The Secretariat provided no guidance to stakeholders as to how their submissions should be
structured or what they should address. This had both a positive and a negative impact. On
the positive side, the submissions displayed much more diversity than those that had been
made to the open consultation meetings; ranging from a Swiss civil society proposal for the
development of“Internet Quality Labels”
171 through to a primer on Trusted Computing.
172
The other side of this coin was that, without guidance on what was expected, many sub-
missions lacked any connection to the IGF’s mandate. Some for example, such as those of
the OECD and ICC/BASIS, simply provided background material summarising their own
activities, without addressing whether those activities fulﬁlled the WSIS process criteria or
what part the IGF might have to play in them in the future.
173
￿ As respondents developed their submissions in isolation, without any mechanism by which
to address each others’ contributions or to review or provide feedback on them ahead of the
meeting, it was inevitable that they would speak at cross purposes to each other, rather
to the meeting.
169. See http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions_for_1st_IGF.htm, where fourteen submissions from
eight other contributors who missed the deadline can also be found.
170. IGF Secretariat, Inaugural Meeting Background Report (2006)
171. Swiss Internet User Group, Internet Quality Labels (2006)
172. Bertola, Vittorio, An Introduction to Trusted Computing (2006)
173. This was particularly true of the ITU, which submitted fourteen generic reports on its activities, many of
which it had also earlier submitted by way of response to the WGIG report: see WSIS Secretariat, Compilation
of Comments Received on the Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 5.
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than seriously engaging with each others’ views as a step in the process of democratic de-
liberation or consensus-building. The Background Paper masks this by declaring superﬁcial
areas of consensus, such as, on the theme of openness, the
wide spread recognition of the fact that the distributed nature of the Internet whereby control
is placed at the ends, or in the hands of users, rather than at a centralized point, is a key
architectural feature of the Internet that has ensured that freedom of expression and the free
ﬂow of information.
174
However it also notes that there was little consensus amongst stakeholders on speciﬁc public
policy issues impacted by this architectural openness, such as the extent to which it calls
for reform to the existing legal regime of IPRs, and if so whether an expansion, contraction,
or fundamental reconsideration of that regime is called for. As an example of this, concerns
expressed by some respondents (including EFF and IP Justice) about the potential for
technologies such as DRM to undermine the free ﬂow of information were contrasted with
the contentions of others (such as WIPO) that DRM is of central importance in preserving
incentives to create and innovate.
175
￿ In other areas, there happened to be a greater convergence of views on policy objectives
amongst the contributions received, but a lack of consensus on the strategies by which those
agreed objectives should be pursued. For example, on the theme of security, the Background
Paper notes a broad awareness of the problems of spam, phishing, malware and Internet
security,
176 and on the theme of diversity there was yet greater consensus on the substantive
issues of multilingual content, internationalised domain names and keyword systems. Yet
there was next to no awareness of the possible role of the IGF in addressing these issues
as a governance network. Instead, suggestions on how they should be addressed focused on
a single layer of governance such as memoranda of understanding between governments
177
or a self-regulatory approach led by the private sector.
178
One notable exception came from the Council of Europe, which argued that there was an
important role for the Forum in developing substantive answers to unanswered questions
regarding the interpretation of human rights as applied in online settings.
179
174. IGF Secretariat, Inaugural Meeting Background Report (2006), 6
175. IGF Secretariat, Inaugural Meeting Background Report (2006), 6. For the contribution of WIPO, not specif-
ically cited in the synthesis, see WIPO, Statement of the World Intellectual Property Organization (2006) .
176. IGF Secretariat, Inaugural Meeting Background Report (2006), 8; though still with some divergences on
issues of spam, privacy and “trusted computing”: IGF Secretariat, Inaugural Meeting Background Report (2006)
, 10.
177. ITU, Report of Meeting of ITU Membership on Mechanisms for Cooperation on Cybersecurity and Combating
Spam (2006), 2
178. ICC, ICC Policy Statement on “Spam” and Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Messages (2004), 2
179. Council of Europe, Council of Europe Submission to the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2
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The limitations of these submissions and the process by which they were solicited should be
understood in the light that they were intended only as an input into the discussions that
would take place in person in Athens, which had the potential to be far more deliberative
and, through expert facilitation, to be directed more closely towards the fulﬁlment of the
IGF’s mandate. Whether this potential would in fact be realised will shortly be seen.
5.2.2.2. Plenary sessions
The programme of the inaugural meeting of the IGF included nine plenary sessions:
￿ the opening ceremony;
￿ Multistakeholder Policy Dialogue—Setting the Scene;
￿ a session devoted to each of the themes of Openness, Security, Diversity and Access;
￿ Conclusions and The Way Forward;
￿ Emerging Issues; and
￿ the closing ceremony.
Each session bar the last was three hours in duration, and beneﬁted from simultaneous transla-
tion into all oﬃcial UN languages, using eight translation booths staﬀed by twenty translators.
In addition, the text of each session appeared in English on a large projection screen within
moments of its translation or transcription, and was subsequently posted to the IGF’s Web
site.
180
The four thematic sessions, along with the Multistakeholder Policy Dialogue and Emerging
Issues sessions, were structured as panel presentations with between eleven and ﬁfteen pan-
elists, and were professionally moderated.
181 No formal process of consultation was conducted
by the Advisory Group in selecting the panelists or moderators, although the Group did en-
deavour to ensure that there was a balance of stakeholder groups and geographical diversity
amongst the speakers.
182
Although notionally all plenary sessions were to focus on the developmental dimension of
their themes, and to promote capacity building as a cross-cutting priority, this was adhered
180. See http://www.intgovforum.org/IIGF.htm.
181. As for the other sessions, the opening and closing ceremonies were taken up by prepared speeches, whereas
the session on “The Way Forward” was conducted in a more open format, whereby rather than interrogating a
panel and taking occasional questions from the ﬂoor, the moderator gave the entire session over to the ﬂoor.
182. It was somewhat limited in its ability to do this by reason that no budget was available to fund the attendance
of speakers who were not already intending to attend the meeting.
324Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
to by few speakers from outside civil society, and few workshops other than those devoted to
development issues. Thus Rikke Frank Jorgensen acknowledged during the security panel in
Athens, “we are still rather weak when we talk about this link and what it actually means
and how security play [sic] into the development agenda.”
As the plenary sessions comprised about 25 hours of discussion in all, it lies beyond the scope
of this section to attempt even a cursory summary of them. For this reason, the substantive
issues under discussion in the plenary sessions will not be dealt with at all here. Instead, our
attention will be conﬁned to three speciﬁc issues discussed during the plenary sessions that
highlight the IGF’s own view of its role, structure, and processes, as had previously been the
focus of the two open consultation meetings in Geneva.
These issues are ﬁrstly whether the IGF’s role should include the making of recommendations,
secondly whether some structural evolution of the IGF would be required for the development
of such recommendations, and thirdly what procedures could be employed to bring the IGF
closer to a consensus of stakeholders on the issues before it. The discussion of each of these
issues will be outlined in turn.
First, as to whether the IGF’s role extended to the making of recommendations, this was
accepted most readily by the Forum hawks of civil society
183 and developing country gov-
ernments,
184 and resisted most strenuously by the Forum doves of the OECD governments
185
and the private sector and technical community.
186 A representative exchange between the
two camps on this issue occurred on the ﬁrst day during the session on “Multistakeholder
Policy Dialogue—Setting the Scene.”
ISOC’s President Lynn St Amour aﬃrmed ISOC’s reluctance to cede a role in governance to
the IGF, even if its multi-stakeholder model were fully realised, on the grounds that “that’s
actually embedding today’s political models and trying to put it on top of a development
that just doesn’t naturally ﬁt.” She stated frankly:
183. For example, civil society’s representative during the opening ceremony, Natasha Primo, gave the striking
image of the Athens meeting as “the beginning of a process that grows teeth at the same time it ﬁnds its feet,”
and saw the IGF as an institution that would come to “provide leadership and guidance.”
184. For example Tariq Badsha of Pakistan, speaking during the ﬁnal day’s session on“The Way Forward,”under-
lined the need for the IGF to develop the capacity to produce tangible outputs and concrete recommendations in
order to fulﬁl those paragraphs of its mandate that had yet to be addressed.
185. For example Viviane Reding from the European Commission maintained,“The IGF does not replace negoti-
ation between governments or the enhanced cooperation model;”a contentious statement given that the enhanced
cooperation model as outlined in the Tunis Agenda speciﬁes a multi-stakeholder process: see Section 5.1.4.1.
186. For example, Yoshio Utsumi from the ITU, for which the IGF’s very formation was a result of the WSIS ne-
gotiations on Internet governance taking an unfavourable turn, stressed during the opening ceremony that “the
future of Internet governance is inevitably local rather than global. This is because the best approach is diﬀerent
for each society and economy.”
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I don’t think the Internet Governance Forum is a place for decisions or for recommendations.
I don’t think the process is nearly inclusive enough. I don’t think it’s got the right level of
participation. ... I think it needs to go back to national level, local level, participation in the
forums that are available to you, that are important to you as an individual.
Karen Banks from the Association for Progressive Communications took issue with this,
saying that
to make the connection between the national and the global is a really, really tough task, and
it requires a lot of work. And I think if the IGF is going to add value, that this is one of the
ways that it can. I think there are deﬁnitely issues that need to be addressed here that aren’t
addressed in other spaces adequately, in line with the mandate. ... [W]e can look at the IGF
... as something where we not only have a good discussion, but we think about leaving ... with
some sense of working forward around concrete activities and possibly ... recommendations.
As for the second issue of note from the plenary sessions, regarding the compatibility of the
IGF’s structure with a recommendation-making role, there were three basic views expressed;
in this instance, not running cleanly along the lines of the hawk and dove camps. The ﬁrst view
was that since the IGF did not have the structural capacity to pursue a work programme, this
should instead be taken up by other institutions in the regime who did possess that capacity.
Thus for example Jean-Jacques Massima Landji from Gambon cautiously agreed with Karen
Banks that “We can start perhaps drawing up recommendations on the various points com-
monly approved,” but saw considerable diﬃculty in bringing the stakeholders to that point,
since merely by“discussing this in a forum, you can’t actually come to a ... common position.”
He suggested instead that
UNESCO, as a specialized body, certainly can deal with this, would ﬁnd the time to come to
some sort of compromise and arrangement which would suit all parties. But a forum like this,
which cannot take any sort of binding decisions, well, we can’t have a recommendation here.
The same suggestion was made independently during the session on diversity by Divina Frau-
Meigs of the University of Paris, who called for the formation of a multi-stakeholder working
group on issues of cultural diversity and IDNs, not within the IGF, but instead within an
intergovernmental body such as UNESCO.
Those who took the second view agreed that the IGF lacked the capacity to take forward
a substantive work programme, but for them the solution was diﬀerent: it should forthwith
develop that capacity, through the formation of dedicated working groups. Thus, for example,
Rikke Frank Jorgensen of the Danish Human Rights Institute suggested during the panel on
security that the IGF should form a multi-stakeholder task force on security and privacy; and
in the ﬁnal day’s session on “The Way Forward,” former French diplomat Jean-Jacques Sub-
renat was amongst those who suggested that a structure based on the IETF model could be
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employed by the IGF, implying the creation of formal working groups within which decision-
making would take place by rough consensus.
The third view on this issue was ﬁrst voiced during the session on access, at which Georg Greve
announced the formation of the IGF’s ﬁrst multi-stakeholder “dynamic coalition,” on open
standards.
187 Such dynamic coalitions could work towards producing some of the concrete
outcomes sought by Forum hawks, yet being voluntary and self-organised, would require
neither the assent nor the participation of other IGF participants.
188 This view soon came to
draw broad support, with a number of participants in “The Way Forward” session speaking
for the use of dynamic coalitions (possessing, as Thomas Schneider of the Swiss government
underlined, “not formal links but very narrow links with the IGF”), in the place of formal
working groups.
189
The third and ﬁnal issue which has been isolated for mention from the discussions in the
plenary sessions of the Athens meeting is the question of what procedures might be required
to bring the IGF’s diverse stakeholders closer to consensus on the substantive issues before
it. As Carlos Alfonso of the Information Network for the Third Sector, a Brazilian civil
society organisation, put the problem during the plenary session on openness,“We know that
child pornography is a consensus, but what are other aspects of freedom of information ...
which can be accepted universally?”
Andrew Puddephatt, also of civil society, gave a speciﬁc example of the kinds of diﬃculties
likely to be encountered:
there are countries where the state and symbols of the state and nation are protected. And ...
if you attack or criticize that country or nation, you’re accused and tried for defamation. That
would be unacceptable in many other jurisdictions where defamation only applies to individuals’
personal reputation. The idea that you could develop a standard on defamation as an agreement
among states at the moment I think would be extremely fraught.
Regrettably this was one issue in respect the plenary body could divine no answers. Vittorio
Bertola, former WGIG member, simply oﬀered his experience of that multi-stakeholder body
which had managed to produce its report by consensus on issues so contentious that they had
confounded the governmental delegates at WSIS. He said:
The only thing we can do in a true Internet spirit is to bring everyone at the same table and
have an agreement, in the end, for [that’s] the way that the Internet works. The agreement
187. Curiously, open standards were dealt with as a topic under the access theme in the Athens meeting (and
dominated the treatment of submissions on the digital divide and the cost of access in the Secretariat’s Back-
ground Paper: IGF Secretariat, Inaugural Meeting Background Report (2006), 12). Perhaps for this reason the
same topic was shifted to the openness theme for the Rio meeting.
188. See Section 5.2.3.1.
189. See Section 6.3.1.5
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is beneﬁcial to all the people who participate in it. And that’s the way the Internet has been
growing since the beginning. The technical standards of the Internet were never decided, were
never formally adopted or binding either. They are just there and everyone abides by them
because it’s beneﬁcial for everyone to be able to talk to everyone. And that’s what we can get
in this forum.
At the closing ceremony, the ﬁnal statements of representatives of the stakeholder groups
evidenced few signs of development in their views since the Athens meeting had opened.
David Appasamy from ICC/BASIS observed:
Some have asked where the action is, and what tangibles have been achieved. Well, the wisdom
and experience gained are of great value in and of themselves. If we go to plant these seeds at
the national level and cultivate them by working with all stakeholders at this level, they are
certain to bear fruit.
Jeanette Hoﬀman on the other hand, as the closing speaker from civil society, said it was
“vital that all stakeholders recognise and adopt this new venue as an innovative place of
policy making”and suggested that the forum should“encourage the development of practical
solutions, both in workshops but also in dynamic coalitions that are about to form. Such
practical solutions should be put on public record of the forum.”
5.2.2.3. Workshops
Despite Hoﬀman’s entreaty, in Athens the output of the 36 self-organised workshops that
were held there could not be received into the oﬃcial report of the meeting, though individual
workshop reports were published verbatim on the IGF Web site.
190
A call for proposals for these workshops accompanied the publication of the agenda, with a
deadline of 24 August 2006.
191 The call speciﬁed the following selection criteria:
￿ Relevance to the overriding themes and topics. Priority will be given to proposals for
workshops related to the main themes.
￿ Demonstratively proposed and organized through multistakeholder collaboration.
￿ Capacity to improve understanding of the IGF themes and topics.
￿ Proven expertise and experience to manage the staging of the workshop, including raising
the funds necessary to do so.
The process by which workshops were selected pursuant to these criteria was a closed one.
As workshop proposals were not listed on the IGF Web site as they were made, many work-
190. See http://www.intgovforum.org/Workshop_reports.php.
191. See http://www.intgovforum.org/workshops.html.
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shops on the same topics were proposed independently. The Advisory Group did not seek to
amalgamate these, but in the end simply approved all of them, releasing its ﬁnal schedule
of workshops in October.
192 No opportunity was provided for public comment on the work-
shops selected, nor on their scheduling, which saw them being held concurrently with each
other and with the plenary sessions.
Thus for example the topic of multi-stakeholder participation in Internet governance was
the subject of no fewer than four workshops, each led by a diﬀerent stakeholder group
or sub-group. On the second day in Athens, both the Internet technical community and
non-technical civil society held separate workshops on the topic, respectively organised by
ICANN, ISOC and representatives of the RIRs and ccTLDs, and by the Conference of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations (CON-
GO).
193 Also on that day, a similar workshop “Enhancing Multi-Stakeholder Participation
in ICT Policy Making” was held by private sector stakeholders, and on the following day, a
workshop titled “Building Meaningful Participation” took place that had been co-organised
by the government of Canada.
The sheer number of workshops precludes any attempt being made here to summarise the
discussion that took place within them, even on procedural issues. However, some of the
content of “Exploring a Framework Convention” organised by IT for Change and others,
which was perhaps the workshop that examined institutional and process issues in the most
depth, will be reviewed later in this chapter.
194
5.2.2.4. Remote participation
As noted above, a recurring theme of the submissions to the consultation sessions that pre-
ceded the Athens meeting was that eﬀective use should be made of online mechanisms for
participation in the activities of the IGF. In practice, less eﬀective use was made of such
mechanisms than many stakeholders may have hoped.
In September 2006 an SMF-based Web forum was created on the IGF Web site by its Sec-
retariat, however it was conﬁgured so that new discussion topics could only be created by
administrators. At ﬁrst there was only one such topic, “Remote Participation,” with subse-
quently the four themes of the Athens meeting being added two weeks later, and another for
“Taking stock and the way forward” after the Athens meeting had concluded.
192. See http://www.intgovforum.org/wksshop_program.htm.
193. See http://www.ngocongo.org/.
194. See Section 5.4.4.
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By October, it became apparent that the suggestions being made on this board on mechanisms
that should be put in place for remote participation were not going to be implemented by the
Secretariat, or at least not in suﬃcient time for the Athens meeting. No response was received
to direct oﬀers of assistance, such as an oﬀer by the developers of the Dialog Dashboard
195 to
host a free public synchronous and asynchronous discussion forum for the IGF’s use, just as
no response had been made to an oﬀer made by Geneva Net Dialogue during the February
consultations to build an interactive Web site for the IGF.
The only such suggestion eventually taken on board, on 19 October, was the establishment
of an electronic mailing list for those attending the Athens meeting, equivalent to that which
had been established for the Advisory Group. However those who had registered to attend
the meeting were not informed of the existence of the requested“plenary”mailing list and no
mention of it was made on the IGF Web site, so it was not utilised,
196
Once it had become became clear that the suggestions being made on remote participa-
tion would not be taken forward by the Secretariat, the two most active participants in the
discussions on this topic, then-journalist Kieren McCarthy and the author, decided to imple-
ment them independently. Launched on 11 October, the Drupal-based IGF Community Site
featured synchronous and asynchronous discussion fora, a wiki, and the facility to conduct
informal polls, amongst other features. It gained the tacit endorsement of the Secretariat, but
no funding or publicity.
197
The IGF Community Site was announced on various civil society mailing lists and Web sites
and by the distribution of printed ﬂyers at the Athens meeting itself. It soon proved to be far
more popular than the IGF’s oﬃcial Web forum, with over 200 users registering on the site
during or within one week of the conference, and more than a dozen of those posting to their
own blogs on the site.
Although having had little to no involvement in this initiative, the Secretariat and host
country did provide certain other facilities to link remote participants in with the plenary
sessions and workshops, namely:
￿ Free wireless Internet access was provided at the venue, allowing those present to discuss the
proceedings with those outside using tools such as instant messaging and blogs. The quality
195. See Section 4.3.4.3.
196. See http://intgovforum.org/mailman/listinfo/plenary_intgovforum.org.
197. The Web site was located at http://igf2006.info/, but is no longer operational at that address.
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of the wireless access was variable, ranging from almost entirely absent in the workshop
rooms, to weak and intermittent in the plenary sessions.
￿ The plenary sessions were webcast, though in a proprietary Microsoft format that was
no longer supported even on the Microsoft Windows operating system at the date of the
meeting. Recordings of the plenary sessions were subsequently archived on the IGF Web
site in the open standard MPEG4 format.
198
￿ During plenary sessions, the administrators of the IGF Community Site monitored
email mailboxes and chat fora hosted on that site and forwarded the comments received
to the session moderators. In later sessions, mobile phones were also monitored for text
messages by Advisory Group members.
This fulﬁlled the Secretariat’s earlier promise that “[p]rovisions will be made for remote
participants to use instant messaging to send comments into the meetings. It is hoped that
volunteers will monitor IM channels and will serve as proxies for the remote participants
in making interventions.”
199
On the other hand there were some initiatives that the Secretariat had indicated would be in
place for the Athens meeting, that never eventuated. For example, the IGF’s Web site had
also stated:
Participants can submit a recorded ﬁve minute statement that will be made available on the
IGF Web site and also broadcast at the venue on in a loop on three plasma screens for partic-
ipants to hear. Those who are interested are encouraged to provide these statements both in
video (speciﬁcation: DVD format .vob ﬁles (region 2) or .wmv format (384x288 resolution for
streaming)) and in written document form.
In fact video statements provided to the Secretariat were neither broadcast at the venue, nor
made available on the IGF Web site. Also unfulﬁlled was the statement, “The blogs being
written about the IGF will be monitored and will be reported on during the recap and review
sessions in a daily blog report.”
5.2.3. Outcomes
The outcomes of the ﬁrst IGF meeting had been predetermined by the Secretariat and Ad-
visory Group before the meeting opened, and were stated on the IGF’s Web site:
198. See http://www.intgovforum.org/IIGF_webcasts.htm.
199. See http://www.intgovforum.org/athens_outline.htm.
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The outcome of the meeting will be the reports of the individual sessions as well as of the
meeting as a whole. There will be no negotiated texts such as decisions or resolutions. The
Chairman may also wish to make a summing-up of the meeting. The report of the meeting will
be submitted to the Secretary-General and made available on the website.
In addition, all the material that was used as input into the meeting will remain on record on
the IGF Web site.
As a third possible outcome, there may be “dynamic coalitions” emerging from Athens, ie a
group of institutions or people who agree to pursue an initiative started at the inaugural IGF
meeting.
200
The report of the meeting referred to here was published as an“informal summing up,”
201 and
was a brief precis of the six panel sessions only. Although it identiﬁed a“broad convergence of
views” or “a widely held view” on several substantive issues, such as the need for multi-
stakeholder cooperation in addressing issues of Internet security, the report did not attempt
to draw any overall conclusions from the discussions that had taken place.
5.2.3.1. Dynamic coalitions
The emergence of dynamic coalitions as another possible outcome of the Athens meeting
became a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, with the announcement of several such coalitions at the
meeting itself, and a number of others shortly afterwards. As at 2008 eleven dynamic coalitions
claim to be active.
202
Save that the mission and contact details of each of these dynamic coalitions is listed on the
IGF Web site, as matters stand they have no formal institutional aﬃliation with the IGF,
nor any access to the resources of the IGF Secretariat. As such, there are no strictures upon
the objects, structure or processes of dynamic coalitions claiming association with the IGF.
Probably the most obvious consequence of this
203 is the diversity that the dynamic coalitions
display in these respects, to the extent that the groups currently sharing the appellation of
dynamic coalition can be divided into three quite distinct types. These may be described for
convenience as networks, working groups, and BOFs.
204
The StopSpamAlliance is currently the only dynamic coalition in the ﬁrst category. It is
essentially a coordinating body for the existing programmes of its members, including the
200. See http://www.intgovforum.org/athens_outline.htm.
201. IGF Secretariat, The Inaugural Session of the Internet Governance Forum (2006)
202. They are those on Spam (the StopSpamAlliance), Privacy, Open Standards (IGF DCOS), Access and Con-
nectivity for Remote, Rural and Dispersed Communities, The Internet Bill of Rights, Diversit´ e Linguistique
(Linguistic Diversity), Access to Knowledge (A2K@IGF), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Media
on the Internet (FOEonline), Online Collaboration, Gender and Internet Governance (GIG), and Framework of
Principles for the Internet.
203. Others will be noted at Section 6.3.1.5.
204. During the September 2007 open consultations, France distinguished “between groups that are advocacy
group or facilitation groups,” which approximately equate to BOFs and networks respectively.
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London Action Plan (which as already noted, is a multi-stakeholder governance network in
its own right), as well as APEC, the ITU, the OECD, the Seoul–Melbourne MOU group and
the EU’s CNSA (Contact Network of Spam Authorities). As self-described at its meeting in
Rio, it allows its members to reduce duplication of work between themselves, and allows them
to speak with a single voice to the international community when they are in accord. However
the StopSpamAlliance does not currently have an independent programme of its own.
A second type of dynamic coalition is exempliﬁed by the Internet Bill of Rights Dynamic
Coalition. It provides a structure within which for its members to collaborate on a joint
programme of work; in this case, the deﬁnition of an Internet Bill of Rights that could be
promulgated either through the informal moral authority of the IGF, or through intergov-
ernmental and/or other mechanisms, to improve the recognition and enforcement of human
rights online. Already that dynamic coalition has made progress to this end, having secured
the agreement of Brazilian and Italian oﬃcials “to facilitate together the process of deﬁning
an Internet Bill of Rights with a view to frame and enforce fundamental rights in the Internet
environment.”
205
The third type of dynamic coalition are the BOFs, which are open fora for those sharing an
interest in a particular issue area, but which have not yet adopted a joint programme of work.
As in the case of their namesakes within the IETF and APNIC, groups that begin as BOFs
may later develop into working groups, and indeed there is some overlap between the two
categories. The FOEonline dynamic coalition, which brings together those with an interest
in freedom of expression and freedom of the media on the Internet, is a good example of a
BOF.
206
5.2.3.2. Follow-up
In the week following the conclusion of the Athens meeting, the Secretariat called for written
comments on what had worked well, and what should be done in preparation for the Rio
meeting to address what had worked less well. Thirteen documentary submissions, and ten
others submitted using an online questionnaire form, were summarised by the Secretariat in
another synthesis paper that was released a few days ahead of a public consultation on the
205. Moreira, Gilberto P G & Vimercati, Luigi, Joint Declaration on Internet Rights by the Minister of Culture
of Brazil and the Undersecretary for Communications of Italy (2007). Also in this category are the dynamic coali-
tions on Access to Knowledge, Framework of Principles for the Internet, Online Collaboration, Open Standards
and Privacy.
206. Those on Access and Connectivity for Remote, Rural and Dispersed Communities, Diversit´ e Linguistique,
and Gender Equality also currently best ﬁt into this category.
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same topic that was held in Geneva on 13 February 2007.
207 The public consultation itself
was again translated and webcast, and a transcript later posted to the IGF’s Web site.
208
In both the written submissions and the interventions at the open consultation, there were
certain aspects of the IGF’s ﬁrst meeting that met with a broad positive or negative consensus.
There was, for example, general agreement that the meeting had succeeded in creating a
valuable space for discussion across stakeholder groups, and that the real-time transcription
service and unrestricted seating arrangements had been amongst the factors contributing to
this success; but on the other hand that the plenary sessions had been too long, that there
had been too many panelists, and that there had been excessive overlap between the plenary
sessions and the workshops (many of which themselves overlapped in content).
But beyond these broad areas of agreement, many fundamental gulfs remained. These can
again be usefully grouped into the three procedural issues of the role of the IGF, its structure,
and its processes. In addition, one substantive issue—that of Internet naming and number-
ing—drew strong comment, with the Third World Network amongst those who were partic-
ularly critical of the exclusion of this issue from the agenda of the ﬁrst meeting.
209
As to the procedural issues, there was no perceptible relaxation of the restrictive stance of the
Forum doves as to the role of the IGF. For example, ICC/BASIS maintained its position that
“[t]he emphasis on discussions without negotiated conclusions is an essential principle for the
Forum. It avoids the pressure to reach consensus, establish strict criteria for representation,
or spend time on what could be protracted political negotiations and wordsmithing.”
210
However the Forum hawks (civil society and developing country governments) had a diﬀerent
perspective. For example, the government of Brazil said:
we also believe that it is important for us to envisage some kind of written conclusions, be
it a reporting, recommendations, or concluding statement, that would be a reference of the
meeting. In fact, the mandate that was given to the IGF on [paragraph] 72, item g of the Tunis
Agenda refers to the possibility of making recommendations where appropriate. And we should
have that in mind. We are aware that the format that has been used on the ﬁrst meeting, while
it allows for the wider discussion, it may not be the best format in order to negotiate texts. And
I don’t think that we are aiming at a binding negotiated text, but we should consider having
some kind of reporting for the fact that the IGF is not an isolated path.
211
207. IGF Secretariat, Stock-taking Session Synthesis Paper (2007)
208. See http://www.intgovforum.org/Feb_igf_meeting/13_February_Consult_2007.txt.
209. Third World Network, Statement for the Preparatory Session for the Internet Governance Forum (2007), 1
210. ICC, ICC/BASIS Feedback on First Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Athens, Greece (2007). ETNO
(the European Telecommunications Network Operators), the ITAA and ISOC spoke to similar eﬀect: see ISOC,
From Athens to Rio de Janeiro: Building on the Success of the First Internet Governance Forum (2007) , 1.
211. Similar remarks were made by IT for Change, an India-based civil society group: see IT For Change, Taking
Stock and the Way Forward (2007), 1–2.
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Even Nitin Desai acknowledged for the ﬁrst time that“there is language in paragraph 72 which
talks of recommendations as appropriate, and we still do not have a process for ﬁguring out
how to get to those recommendations. But these are things which will evolve.” The CS-
IGC recommended that a “meta-governance” theme be included in the Rio agenda to deal
with such issues as these in a more overt and open fashion.
One simple and practical way in which the IGF could fulﬁl its mandate in sub-paragraph 72
(c) to “[i]nterface with ... other institutions on matters under their purview” was suggested
by IT for Change: that those other organisations be invited to present their own sessions at
the next IGF meeting. The ITU, at least, indicated at the open consultation that it would in
principle be likely to accept such an invitation.
Leading into discussion of the second main procedural issue, the structure of the IGF, the
dynamic coalitions were now becoming widely accepted as a ﬁrst step for the IGF towards
developing the capacity to produce recommendations. Thus the EU (through Germany) stat-
ed,“we feel that Athens has provided an opportunity for a concrete outcome, not least in the
form of dynamic coalitions. We welcome this development, and we hope to see it continued in
the meeting in Rio de Janeiro, providing the diﬀerent dynamic coalitions with an opportunity
to present their work.” Switzerland and Australia spoke to similar eﬀect.
The other main issue that was discussed in relation to the structure of the IGF is what should
become of the Advisory Group. The two main opposing views were that it should be retained
in its present form with new members only brought in to replace those who have departed, or
that it should be reconvened in a more inclusive and democratic manner, to address charges
of lack of transparency in its appointment and operations that were acknowledged in the
synthesis report.
The ﬁrst view was most strongly represented by the Forum doves (including the United States,
Canada, ITAA and SIDN), and the second by the Forum hawks (such as the CS-IGC and
the governments of Egypt and the Russian Federation). The CS-IGC for example decried the
under-representation of civil society, and said:
We think that clear terms and rules should be established for the Advisory Group between
now and Rio, through an open process involving all the participants in the IGF, as a shared
foundation for our common work. We further consider that if these rules and the quotas for
representation from each stakeholder group were openly established, it would be possible for the
Secretary General to delegate the actual process of selection of Advisory Group members to the
stakeholder groups themselves.
The ﬁnal procedural issue dealt with in the post-Athens submissions and consultation session
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was as to the IGF’s processes. It was argued by many, for example France,
212 that more use
should have been made of online tools. Indeed, this deﬁciency had already been noted within
the Advisory Group, with Desai acknowledging, “[i]f we are talking of Internet governance,
if you do not use the capacities of the Internet to allow people to connect and interact with
one another, then, in a sense, we are failing in our duty.”The Online Collaboration Dynamic
Coalition was one of four coalitions that presented a report to that open consultation meeting,
and it announced its resolve to help redress this deﬁcit.
Other suggestions made for the improvement of the IGF’s processes were based around devel-
oping more creative formats to increase the interactivity of the discussion, as ICC/BASIS put
it at the consultation. For example, the CS-IGC suggested that workshops could be broken
into table groups, or could use online tools to engage with those outside, and ISOC was
amongst those who suggested that the opportunity should be provided for sharing of national
best practices.
213
Another issue directly raised by the Secretariat for discussion was as to the eﬀectiveness of the
use of input papers for the Athens meeting, and more speciﬁcally the synthesis paper which
attempted to summarise them. There was no disagreement that a synthesis paper, translated
into the UN languages, was potentially invaluable in providing participants, especially those
who did not speak English, with background brieﬁng material covering a variety of perspec-
tives, which could in turn allow the discussions at the plenary sessions to be more focused,
in-depth and practical.
However, several respondents, including the ITAA, noted that this had not happened in
Athens.
214 Not only did moderators fail to draw upon the synthesis paper as a base for
questioning panelists, but in fact no reference was made to it during the plenary sessions in
Athens at all, which left several potentially valuable proposals hanging. Part of the reason for
this may well have been because the paper was distributed so late, as a number of respondents
also noted.
Nothing more was heard from the Secretariat or Advisory Group on any of these sugges-
tions until May, when their consultations shifted from a focus on taking stock of Athens, to
preparing in earnest for Rio.
212. Government of France, Lessons From the Inaugural Meeting of the IGF in Athens and Recommendations
for the Second Annual Meeting (2007)
213. ISOC, From Athens to Rio de Janeiro: Building on the Success of the First Internet Governance Forum
(2007), 3
214. ITAA, ITAA IGF Comments (2007), 3
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5.2.4. The Second Meeting
The second meeting of the IGF was held in Rio de Janeiro between 11 and 14 November
2007. It was attended by 1363 participants; similar to the number in Athens and similarly
broken down by stakeholder group.
215
A draft programme for the IGF’s second meeting in Rio de Janeiro was released by the
Secretariat on 1 May 2007.
216 It addressed certain of the most widespread criticisms made of
the format of the Athens meeting during the follow-up process, notably by reducing the size
of the panels in main sessions by about half to a maximum of six, and reducing the length of
those sessions from three to two hours.
However there were other criticisms, both procedural and substantive, that the programme
overlooked. Foremost amongst the former were criticisms of excessive overlap between parallel
sessions,
217 since rather than reducing the number parallel events, they were increased from
four in Athens to as many as seven for Rio. The most glaring substantive omission from this
initial agenda was the continued absence of Internet naming and numbering.
The main changes to the agenda for Rio in this draft programme were:
￿ Each plenary session would be preceded by a two-hour speed dialogue session which would
feature a succession of three round-table discussions to be held in groups of ten to twenty
on issues relating to the theme of the plenary session;
￿ There would again be three concurrent streams of workshops, but these would now be
divided into thematic workshops on the main themes of openness, security, access and
diversity, and open workshops that would be available for any Internet governance topic
proposed by the workshop’s organisers, as in Athens;
￿ The second of two additional concurrent streams would alternate between an“open forum”
and a “best practices forum.” The former would provide an opportunity for other Inter-
net governance organisations to present and discuss their activities, essentially as IT for
Change had suggested in February. The latter would be moderated sessions designed to
allow stakeholders to present their own experiences of best practices in Internet governance
at a regional and local level.
215. IGF Secretariat, Second Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum: Chairman’s Summary (2007), 1
216. The original is no longer available, but is on ﬁle with the author. The version as most recently revised before
the Rio meeting is at http://www.intgovforum.org/Rio_Schedule_final.html.
217. IGF Secretariat, Stock-taking Session Synthesis Paper (2007), 5
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￿ The ﬁnal new stream was to be set aside for meetings of dynamic coalitions, and other
meetings that stakeholders might wish to arrange.
Not all of these changes were to be reﬂected in the meeting that eventually took place.
218
Written comments on the draft programme were received during a period of consultation that
commenced on 3 April, ahead of the following open consultation meeting in May.
5.2.4.1. Consultations
Two open consultation meetings were held to seek input from stakeholders on the agenda
and programme for the Rio meeting. The ﬁrst was held on 23 May 2007 in Geneva, and like
previous meetings was webcast.
219 A document synthesising nineteen written contributions
to the meeting was prepared and released one day in advance.
220
The contribution most notable in its inﬂuence on the discussion over the substantive pro-
gramme for Rio was that of China, whose voice now joined those of others
221 in recommending
that“the Second IGF meeting should discuss the critical Internet resources issues such as the
DNS root servers and IP Address, as these issues are the core of Internet governance and just
because of which that the IGF was founded” [sic].
222 Even Forum doves such as Canada and
Australia conceded for the ﬁrst time at the May consultation that the discussion of critical
Internet resources was now inevitable.
Besides agreeing that a session on “core Internet resources and their current governance
institutions”was required, the CS-IGC recommended the inclusion of three other new plenary
sessions for the Rio meeting, including one on the role and mandate of the IGF, and another on
issues and institutions of global Internet public policy more generally.
223 However the position
of the Forum doves on the IGF’s role in global public policy development had not changed,
with ICC/BASIS and Canada both referring with approval at the May consultation to the
contribution of ISOC that claimed:
218. Similarly, the promise that prepared video statements would be shown in a loop at the venue and made
available on the IGF’s Web site again failed to eventuate: IGF Secretariat, Draft Programme Outline for the
Second Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (2007), 2.
219. A transcript of the proceedings is available at http://www.intgovforum.org/May_contributions/
IGF-23May07Consultation.txt.
220. IGF Secretariat, Open Consultations Geneva, 23 May 2007: Summary of Contributions Prepared by the IGF
Secretariat (2007)
221. Including El Salvador, Brazil, Argentina, Iran and the Russian Federation at the consultation meeting.
222. People’s Republic of China, Comments on the Draft Programme Outline for the Second Meeting of the
Internet Governance Forum (IGF) (2007), 1
223. CS-IGC, Input into the Open Round of Consultations on 23 May 2007 to Discuss Program and Agenda for
the Second Meeting of the IGF in Rio de Janeiro (2007)
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IGF Athens worked because ... it was an open environment free of the intergovernmental pres-
sures of negotiated texts and political maneuvering. Suggestions that might change the structure
and nature of the IGF for Rio or future meetings need to be approached with great caution.
224
On the structure of the IGF, ENSTA and EUROLINC ampliﬁed their argument made at the
February 2007 consultation that the limitations of the Advisory Group were signiﬁcant enough
to warrant its replacement by a multi-stakeholder bureau, which should include segments
for government, civil society, the private sector and the Internet technical community.
225
Although others from civil society (such as the APC) received this proposal coolly, as did the
Forum doves (such as ICC/BASIS, Canada and Australia), support for the establishment of
a “multi-stakeholder bureau oﬃce” was also voiced by Brazil, which linked it to the need for
the IGF to develop non-binding recommendations:
As in many other international fora, there is always the possibility of, for instance, a chairman’s
report. But the chairman alone would not have the required legitimacy to prepare such a report
without the help of a representative, multi-stakeholder, and regionally balanced group. So how
do we call such group? Friends of the chair? Bureau? Supporting committee? I think that there
are many options. What we believe is that we need to have this kind of support. Otherwise, the
chairman alone will not be able to deliver to the expectations that are already created by the
international community.
Little new was said during the May consultation meeting on the IGF’s working procedures,
save that Nitin Desai ironically expressed doubt as to the wisdom of the Secretariat’s own
proposal to conduct speed dialogue sessions at the Rio meeting.
Although the mandate of the existing Advisory Group had been fulﬁlled with the conclusion
of the Athens meeting, the decision as to whether to renew that mandate or to restructure
the group was oﬃcially one for the UN Secretary-General, who had not yet made a decision
by the date of the May consultations. Consequently the private Advisory Group meetings
planned for 24 and 25 May were belatedly declared open to all parties (although this was not
announced ahead of their commencement, and the meetings were not webcast or transcribed).
During the ﬁrst of these meeting days, there was general acceptance that it would be necessary,
after all, for the IGF to develop the capacity to develop a set of agreed recommendations in
order to fully comply with its mandate. The desperation of the Forum doves to avoid this
reform was made clear when Chris Disspain of auDA wrote to Markus Kummer and Nitin
Desai, copying the private Advisory Group mailing list,
226 stating:
224. ISOC, Contribution to the Internet Governance Forum Consultations May 2007 (2007), 1
225. EUROLINC, Thoughts for Rio: a Bureau for the IGF (2007); Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the
Internet Governance Forum Process (2007) , 21
226. And subsequently leaked: copies of the message and Kummer’s reply are on ﬁle with the author.
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[W]e are concerned that there appear to be fundamental changes being mooted which are un-
acceptable to and may lead to the withdrawl [sic] of some non government and perhaps even
government participants. ...
Chief amongst our concerns is the concept, that seems to have been“agreed”in today’s session, of
ﬁnal recommendations arising from the igf. In eﬀect, a negotiated document. This is way outside
of the mandate of the igf and is, simply, unacceptable to the majority of non government people
here. ...
There is a grave danger that ﬁnancial support and general involvement of non government
participants will be withdrawn.
When a revised programme was released in June 2007,“Critical Internet resources”had been
added as a new plenary session to be held on the ﬁrst day, and the speed dialogue sessions had
been quietly removed. By August, the Advisory Group had also been re-appointed by the new
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, largely with the same composition as the previous group,
but now with two co-chairs; Nitin Desai being joined by Hadil da Rocha Vianna of Brazil’s
Ministry of External Relations. In September, the Advisory Group met again following a
second open consultation meeting that does not call for speciﬁc discussion here.
For the ﬁrst time, the Advisory Group released an agenda and a brief report of its pri-
vate meeting shortly after it had concluded, pursuant to a communique from the Secretary-
General which“asked [it] to enhance the transparency of the preparatory process by ensuring
a continuous ﬂow of information between its members and the various interested groups.”
227
However, at the same meeting, it was determined not to open the meeting to observers.
The report of the Advisory Group meeting referred to two papers that had been tabled by
Everton Lucero, a special advisor to the Brazilian co-chair.
228 The ﬁrst, dealing with the role
and procedures of the Advisory Group itself, was presented“as a starting point for preparing
the session entitled ‘Stock taking and the way forward’ at the 2nd IGF in Rio de Janeiro,”
and asked for comments of Advisory Group members to be incorporated into a synthesis
paper that would be used in that session. Amongst the paper’s recommendations were that
“[e]ach stakeholder group shall appoint their representatives to the AG according to its own
procedure, which should be transparent, democratic and inclusive.”
229
Lucero’s second paper dealt with the substance, structure and outcomes of the Rio meeting.
It recommended that as well as considering the role of the Advisory Group, the stock-taking
session should“be devoted to a discussion on the structure for future meetings,”and that the
meeting’s outcomes should include a “Rio message on Internet Governance” prepared by the
227. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Advisory Group to Prepare for Internet Governance Forum
Meeting in Rio de Janeiro (2007)
228. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Meeting Summary Report (2007)
229. Lucero, Everton, Elements to be Considered for Structuring the IGF (2007)
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Chairman as a summary of the meeting, along with reports of all the workshops, dynamic
coalition meetings and other events as attachments to that summary.
230
No discussion of Lucero’s papers was recorded in the report of the Advisory Group’s meeting,
and their recommendations were not carried forward.
5.2.4.2. Submissions
The paper synthesising the substantive contributions made for the Rio meeting was released
in English towards the end of September 2007, about a month sooner than that for the Athens
meeting had been, but at the cost that just over a third as many submissions, by fewer than
a third as many contributors, were received in time to be included.
231 Of the twenty-eight
submissions that were summarised, nine of them, from BASIS, were identical to those it had
submitted for Athens. In view of the paucity of source material, the Secretariat also drew
upon a handful of posts to its Web forum and some contributions to the intervening open
consultation meetings in the synthesis paper.
The paper was divided into sections on each of the themes of the substantive agenda, followed
by consideration of the role and functioning of the IGF. Only the latter need be considered
here.
Firstly as to the role of the IGF, the Forum doves such as the ITAA and ETNO continued to
oppose a recommendation-developing capacity for the IGF; ENTO speciﬁcally commending
the Secretariat for dropping speed dialogues from the agenda, and even asserting that it was
important “that IGF itself does not sponsor nor recommend any best practice” highlighted
during Best Practice Forums.
232 Amongst the Forum hawks of civil society, IT For Change
found this attitude confounding, and noted:
The sudden position of antipathy among many actors—many of whom were represented in the
WGIG—to any recommendation-making role for the IGF is diﬃcult to understand, or logically
defend. WGIG also had the exact same role of giving policy recommendations to a legitimate
policy-making body, the Summit, in that instance. In this light, it seems illogical to hold that
WGIG was worthwhile but a recommendation providing-IGF is not.
233
In respect of IGF’s structure, the hawks were largely content with the status quo; ETNO
simply recommending some ﬁne-tuning to the composition of the Advisory Group, and the
NRO suggesting that the non-governmental stakeholder groups should be given greater rep-
230. Lucero, Everton, A “Package” Deal for Rio (2007)
231. IGF Secretariat, IGF Second Meeting Synthesis Paper (2007)
232. ETNO, ETNO Reﬂection Document in Reply to the Consultation “Preparing for the Second Meeting of the
IGF” (2007), 2–3
233. IT For Change, Four Critical Issues for the IGF, Rio, from a Southern Perspective (2007), 10
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resentation.
234 IT For Change on the other hand was amongst the doves who continued to
push for more major reform; in its case, that the Advisory Group should be supplemented by
a WGIG-like standing committee.
235
However in one respect, a consensus on the need for reform to the IGF’s structures had
now developed: namely on the need to develop some criteria for the recognition of dynamic
coalitions. This proposition, that originated with civil society,
236had been repeated by Mar-
cus Kummer at the September 2007 consultations where it also met with the agreement of
the ICC and WITSA, and was ﬁnally recorded in the synthesis paper as possessing general
support.
237
5.2.4.3. Plenary sessions
As demanded in the open consultations that followed the Athens meeting, the panels of the
plenary sessions of the Rio meeting were smaller, comprising between four and seven members,
who were selected by the Secretariat on the advice of the Advisory Group from a slate of
nominees. No formal call for speakers had been made to produce this slate; rather it was the
outcome of the private solicitations of the Secretariat and Advisory Group and of nominations
made by recognised stakeholder representative groups such as the CS-IGC and the ICC.
The reduction in the number of panelists seemed to make little diﬀerence to the extent of
interaction between the panel and the audience. This was for a number of reasons. First,
the sessions had also been shortened by one hour, and other than during the ﬁnal session
on“Emerging Issues,”in which the professional moderator strictly limited both the panelists
and the ﬂoor to brief statements, panelists often overran their allotted time. For example, the
plenary session on security was one in which the panelists’ presentations took up more than
half of the allotted time of the session.
The other main reason why there remained only limited scope for interaction with the ﬂoor
during the panel sessions was that despite the reduction in the number of panelists, the
Secretariat had also selected for each panel a similar number of “discussants” from amongst
those who had been nominated for but missed out on a seat on the panel, to be given
234. IGF Secretariat, IGF Second Meeting Synthesis Paper (2007), 14 (recorded as being a submission of
AfriNIC).
235. IT For Change, Four Critical Issues for the IGF, Rio, from a Southern Perspective (2007), 11
236. It was originally made of working groups for the IGF (for example MMWG, Internet Governance Forum
Input Statement (2006), 3), and later of dynamic coalitions (for example during the session on Taking Stock and
The Way Forward by the writer, and at the February 2007 open consultations by the CS-IGC).
237. IGF Secretariat, IGF Second Meeting Synthesis Paper (2007), 15
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preference in making statements or questions. The position of discussant was not one that
had been raised during open consultations.
Most of the plenary sessions were attended by fewer participants than in Athens. On the
second and third days in particular, the plenary sessions attracted smaller audiences not only
than the workshops overall, but even than some individual workshops. Some attributed this to
the fact that the content of the plenary sessions had developed little from Athens.
238 However
the limited impact of the plenary sessions even extended to the new and potentially divisive
subject of critical Internet resources.
During the opening ceremony, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Brazilian Extraordinary Minister
for Strategic Aﬀairs, had explicitly called for ICANN ”to pass on its power to a more inclusive
organisation,”which he called upon global civil society to form in a participatory democratic
process. But none of those selected to form the panel on critical Internet resources made a
similar call. The most radical views on the panel were those of Milton Mueller, who simply
questioned the primacy of the GAC amongst ICANN’s Advisory Committees but without
proposing that a successor body was required, and Carlos Alfonso, who outlined his modest
programme for ICANN to attain independence from the US government.
5.2.4.4. Workshops, open fora and best practices fora
As in Athens, many of the workshops proposed for the Rio meeting covered quite similar
themes, since the Secretariat had provided no institutionalised mechanism for stakeholders
to coordinate their proposals. However on this occasion, an even greater number of work-
shops were put forward than the venue could accommodate. By 4 July 2007 when sixty
proposals had been made, the Secretariat issued a request to proponents “to contact poten-
tial organizers of similar workshops and initiate discussions on how to merge them. ... In
parallel, the Secretariat will contact workshop proponents to seek clariﬁcations and/or to
make suggestions.”
239
In the end, there were 36 workshops in the Rio meeting, along with 23 best practice fora (most
of which were eﬀectively indistinguishable from workshops), eight open fora and sundry other
meetings (including those of the dynamic coalitions to be separately treated below).
The most signiﬁcant new events amongst these were the open fora, which opened the Rio
meeting to other participants in the Internet governance regime, potentially thereby address-
238. APC, APC Statement on the Second Internet Governance Forum (2007)
239. See http://info.intgovforum.org/wsl2.php.
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ing the disconnect between the IGF and the other institutions with which its mandate required
it to interface.
240
However few signs of this potential being realised were evident in Rio. For example, in
ICANN’s open forum, its Chairman Peter Dengate Thrush merely outlined the history of
the organisation, took reports from some of its constituent bodies, and invited discussion of a
few of the current issues on its agenda, but without considering questions such as the organi-
sation’s performance against the WSIS process criteria, or the IGF’s role in the development
of public policy principles on matters under ICANN’s purview.
5.2.4.5. Dynamic coalitions
Each of the dynamic coalitions held a meeting in Rio. However no mechanism had been
developed since the Athens meeting by which their ﬁndings and recommendations could be
considered by the plenary body, other than that they could present a summary of their
meetings during a subsequent reporting back session.
Ironically rather than addressing this omission, the Advisory Group intended on further
limiting dynamic coalitions’ access to the plenary forum, having resolved at its meeting of
September 2007 that “in future no Dynamic Coalition should have an automatic right to
report to the main session.”
241 However neither had the Advisory Group begun to consider
the development of any criteria pursuant to which the dynamic coalitions could earn such a
right.
The Advisory Group’s position contrasted with the view, expressed by William Drake and
Bertrand de la Chapelle amongst others during the last day’s session on“The Way Forward,”
that the plenary sessions could be more productively used to receive and consider the dynamic
coalitions’ output. In Drake’s words:
After two years of the conﬁguration of openness, access, security, diversity, one could argue that
doing the same thing again the next year might be of relatively limited value, whereas ... what
we could do is try to have essentially the dynamic coalitions and the workshops ... [bring] some
of the ideas, some of the key points that have come out of their work ... to the larger community
for discussion in a plenary setting. ... In this manner, also, those ideas might feed back, then,
into other institutions and back to the national level.
Even Nitin Desai, when summarising the session, acknowledged the view that the connection
between the main sessions and the workshops and dynamic coalitions would need to be
addressed for future meetings.
240. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(c)
241. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Meeting Summary Report (2007)
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5.2.4.6. Remote participation
Despite the criticisms that had attended the limitations of the facilities provided by the
Secretariat for remote participation in the Athens meeting of the IGF, these were developed
very little for the Rio meeting. In some respects they actually regressed, for example in that
questions for the ﬂoor of plenary sessions were only received from remote participants in two
languages rather than the four promised, and the email addresses at which they were to be
received were not published until after the ﬁrst day’s sessions had commenced, with the result
that they were even less used than in Athens.
One of the most signiﬁcant improvements that was planned was developed by a team from the
Brazilian Ministry of Culture led by Jose Murilo Junior, a member of the Online Collaboration
Dynamic Coalition. This combined chat and webcast facility would have allowed remote and
in-person participation to be integrated much more closely by displaying online discussion
on the plenary session in near real-time on a large projection screen at the venue, subject to
light moderation for inappropriate content.
242 Although completed, the use of this facility for
projection into the venue was quietly vetoed by the Secretariat at the last minute.
The OCDC itself also had limited success in improving upon the facilities that its founders
had provided for the Athens meeting through the IGF Community Web site. It was originally
intended to expand the facilities of this site using a dedicated server that a member had
pledged to donate in February 2007, but one month ahead of the date of the Rio meeting this
donation had yet to eventuate. Even so, shortly before the Rio meeting opened a successor to
the Athens IGF Community site was rapidly assembled and launched.
243 Although it carried
several improvements to the original, including a ribbon menu at the top of each page that
linked between all of the oﬃcial and community sites, the Secretariat once again declined to
publicise the availability of the site to IGF participants, with the result that it was also less
used than in Athens.
5.3. Regional initiatives
Having surveyed the reforms to the regime of Internet governance wrought by WSIS and the
242. This would have implemented suggestions of the author that were recorded in the synthesis paper for the
May 2007 open consultation meeting: IGF Secretariat, Open Consultations Geneva, 23 May 2007: Summary of
Contributions Prepared by the IGF Secretariat (2007), 8.
243. See http://igf-online.net/.
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IGF, it still remains in this chapter to touch on a couple of the most signiﬁcant regional and
sub-regional multi-stakeholder initiatives that have accompanied those larger reforms.
Since the main concern of this thesis is international and transnational governance, only a cur-
sory survey of regional developments will be given, but they cannot be overlooked altogether.
For one thing, international and regional cooperation was the ﬁnal key principle for building
an inclusive Information Society speciﬁed in the WSIS Declaration of Principles, and also
the subject of a key recommendation in the WGIG report.
244 In the Asia-Paciﬁc region, an
Open Regional Dialogue on Internet Governance (ORDIG) took place during 2004 and 2005
as a project of UNDP’s Asia-Paciﬁc Development Information Programme (UNDP-APDIP)
to feed into the WGIG and the broader WSIS processes.
245
Although not speciﬁcally contained in the IGF’s mandate, IGF participants have also long
called for the development of supportive regional processes. At the ﬁrst open consultation in
February 2006, Morocco and the Dominican Republic were amongst those recommending the
initiation of regional IGF events. Nitin Desai summed up these calls in saying:
I think one aspect of it which may require a little advanced work is a message I have heard
very strongly from many people here, and that is the need for some type of regional process
to contribute to this. And that’s not something which can be done at the last minute. You
can’t just say suddenly, you know, three months or four months before, “Oh, please get oﬀ the
ground.”So ... I would suggest, to the UN that they may wish to get in touch with the regional
commissions to see how, within the resources that the regional commissions have, they could
start thinking about what sort of regional contribution they could make to this process.
However aside from the appointment of designated “regional coordinators” to the Advisory
Group, any further regional programmes were left to emerge through bottom–up coordination.
This occurred only to a very limited degree ahead of the Athens meeting; mainly through
limited public consultation processes conducted by delegations attending the WSIS summit
246
and the IGF.
247
A few new regional programmes were announced between the Athens and Rio meetings. First
came the launch of Nominet’s Best Practice Challenge, which invited UK civil society and
the private sector to nominate themselves as demonstrating best practice in the categories
of openness, security, access or diversity, with selected nominees to be showcased in Rio.
248
244. WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), 16
245. See http://www.apdip.net/projects/igov/ and Butt, Danny, The Open Regional Dialogue on Internet
Governance (2005).
246. Such as that of Australia’s DCITA in August 2005: DCITA, World Summit on the Information Society and
Internet Governance Public Forums (2005).
247. Such as that of the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry in January 2006: Department of
Trade & Industry, Points Raised at the Internet Governance Forum Consultation Meeting (2006).
248. See http://www.nominet.org.uk/about/bestpracticechallenge/.
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There were also two preparatory seminars held in Brazil during July and September 2007
by CGI.br,
249 and one in Tokyo organised by Nippon Keidanren in May.
250 Finally a one-
day Dialogue Forum on Internet Rights was hosted by the Italian government in Rome in
September.
251
Following the Rio meeting, a so-called United Kingdom Internet Governance Forum was held
in March 2008, though in fact it was simply a two-hour seminar.
252 Finally in January 2008 the
European Parliament passed a resolution to encourage“the organisation of a ‘European IGF’
before mid-2009 to reinforce the European dimension of the whole IGF/WSIS process.”
253
5.3.1. CGI.br
A more advanced model of sub-regional reform in multi-stakeholder Internet governance is
exempliﬁed by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br).
254 Established in May
1995 by Interministerial Ordinance, this national multi-stakeholder body is unusual in that its
responsibilities span the realms of both technical coordination and public policy governance.
That is, CGI.br coordinates and exercises oversight over the activities of the national IP
address and ccTLD registries (NIC.br and registro.br respectively), as well as operating the
local computer emergency response team CERT.br,
255 but also has a role in the development
of policies and procedures for the regulation of the Internet in Brazil.
Since last reconstituted as a legal entity by Presidential Decree in 2003,
256 CGI.br has been
composed of twenty-one members, including:
￿ nine federal government representatives, with one representative from each of nine relevant
ministries and agencies;
￿ four private sector representatives, with one representative each of ISPs, telecommunica-
tions infrastructure providers, the hardware and software industries, and general private
sector Internet users;
￿ four representatives of civil society;
257
249. See http://www.nupef.org.br/atividade_IGF_seminarios_pre1.htm and http://www.nupef.org.br/
atividade_IGF_reuniao_2.htm.
250. See http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/iccbdeda/index.html.
251. See http://www.dfiritaly2007.it/.
252. See Dutton, William H, UK’s Internet Governance Forum: Civil Society Needs to Get On-board (2008)
253. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on the Second Internet Governance Forum, held in
Rio de Janeiro from 12 to 15 November 2007 (2008)
254. Comitˆ e Gestor da Internet no Brasil; see http://cgi.br/.
255. Centro de Estudos, Resposta e Tratamento de Incidentes de Seguran¸ ca no Brasil; see http://www.cert.br/.
256. Decree No 4,829 of 3 Sep 2003 (Brazil), DOU of 4 Sep 2003, Section I, p 24
257. Or “the third sector” as it is known within CGI.br.
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￿ three representatives of the scientiﬁc and technical community; and
￿ one non-voting Internet expert nominated by the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Each of these constituencies democratically elects its own representatives for three year terms,
save for the governmental constituency whose representatives are appointed. For this purpose,
the constituency is represented by an electoral college (or in the case of the private sector,
one electoral college for each segment) on which any relevant representative bodies that have
existed for at least two years prior to the election are eligible to be enrolled. Each qualifying
representative body is entitled to nominate one candidate for election, and to vote for as many
candidates as there are places in its constituency or segment. The elections are conducted
using a secure Web portal.
There are also three working groups of CGI.br, respectively dedicated to network engineering,
computer security and capacity building, which meet in person as well as operating electronic
mailing lists. Aiming to act by consensus, they provide recommendations to the full group
on issues within their areas of expertise. CGI.br also endeavours to act by consensus, but
falls back to voting where this cannot be achieved. Minutes of the meetings of CGI.br are
published on its Web site.
258
5.4. Other proposals
The process that led to the establishment of the IGF at WSIS did not take place in a vacuum.
It was rather the outcome of the convergence of pre-existing forces driven by diverse actors
seeking to reform existing Internet governance arrangements, and produced a compromise
that adequately accommodated the heterogeneous interests of the most powerful of those
actors. Some of those interests may have been addressed by the IGF’s establishment, but
others were not; as seen in the continued pressure for movement on “enhanced cooperation,”
from the Forum hawks in particular.
Many of the actors involved in the WSIS process had, and some still have, their own agenda
for Internet governance reform, and some of these will be brieﬂy discussed here. The purpose
of doing so is not to provide a catalogue of other proposals for Internet governance reform,
but simply to take the opportunity, before drawing the thesis’s ﬁnal conclusions, to consider
258. See http://www.cgi.br/acoes/realizadas.htm.
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whether any other proposals contain pearls of wisdom missing from all other alternatives
considered before now.
Although there is insuﬃcient space to mention all such proposals, the selection of those that
are of most interest is made easier by the fact that previous chapters have established ﬁrstly
that Internet public policy governance must, particularly in some issue areas, be conducted
on a global basis, and secondly that governance by network should exist at the core of any
Internet governance regime, although other mechanisms of governance such as rules, norms,
markets and architecture will also come into play.
That being so, the typology that will be adopted here, drawing from Chapter 4, considers
proposals not according to which mechanism of governance they favour, since most will require
the use of several mechanisms of governance (and should therefore be broadly consistent with
a core of governance by network), but rather according to the form that the institutions
utilising or embodying those mechanisms are most likely to take: anarchistic, hierarchical,
democratic or consensual.
5.4.1. Anarchistic
A plausible model of anarchistic self-governance of the Internet is one of governance through
networks of consensual arrangements between Internet stakeholders at various levels, poten-
tially incorporating the use of any other mechanisms of governance besides rules. To relate
this to the relevant layers of the Internet’s network stack, these may include the use of inter-
connection agreements between ISPs at the network layer (an example of governance through
markets), the application of IETF standards at the transport layer (utilising governance by
architecture), and the promulgation of AUPs (Acceptable Use Policies) and netiquette at the
application layer (demonstrating governance by norms).
But because these existing mechanisms leave gaps in the sphere of public policy governance
of the Internet, comprehensive anarchistic proposals for reform cannot simply be arguments
for the status quo, but should call for or at least accommodate a superadded Internet public
policy governance network (if a very loose and decentralised one).
Even in John Perry Barlow’s utopian vision of an anarchistic Internet, he understood its self-
governance as a regime under development, rather than one fully-formed; thus writing, “We
are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions
349Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
of our world, not yours.”
259
Writing in the same year, Johnson and Post sought to explain how such a regime of inde-
pendent self-governance for the Internet might come into being, in an international system
already populated with governmental and intergovernmental authorities. They argued that
the role of states in such a regime is simply to grant comity to the decentralised, emergent
governance of Internet stakeholders,
260 just as medieval governments recognised and accorded
independent status to the law merchant. Essentially, governments are called upon to regard
cyberspace as a distinct jurisdiction of its own.
261
Reidenberg provides more detail of how such a regime might function in practice, noting
that since ISPs and computer network administrators wield signiﬁcant control over cy-
berspace, they provide a convenient locus of control for an Internet governance regime, with
each network essentially taking the place of a state in the international public policy gov-
ernance regime.
262 This is already seen in some issue areas, such as the extent to which
AUP terms imposed by ISPs and content providers are used to regulate spam, cybercrime and
even IPRs.
However, to the extent that the public policy choices embodied in these terms are made by
the private sector unilaterally, they may not reﬂect broader public values.
263 It is on this basis
that the Council of Europe has argued at the IGF that in delegating governance authority
to a non-state body such as ICANN, states are not excused from their duty of oversight to
ensure that human rights are protected, and should ensure that they maintain some way to
make such bodies ultimately answerable to the international community.
264
The same problem applies to the reliance upon architecture as the foundation of an anar-
chistic governance network. Although certain core values embedded in the architecture of the
Internet cannot be modiﬁed without fundamentally reconstituting the network, the code that
shapes the end user’s Internet experience is distributed throughout all layers of the network
259. Barlow, John P, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), emphasis added.
260. Johnson, David R & Post, David G, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace (1996), 1391–94
261. This is a concept that Zittrain derides as “Internet separatism,” describing Johnson and Post’s article as
“now thoroughly dated”: Zittrain, Jonathan, Be Careful What You Ask For: Reconciling a Global Internet and
Local Law (2003), 22. See also Reidenberg, Joel R, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction (2005) .
262. Reidenberg, Joel R, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace (1996); Reidenberg, Joel R, States
and Internet Enforcement (2003)
263. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 219. Since these may also vary from one computer network to another, there is also the potential for a
“race to the bottom,”whereby users are attracted to the network enforcing the least stringent standards, though
this outcome is diﬃcult to avoid in any anarchist model: see Section 3.4.2.3.
264. Council of Europe, Council of Europe Submission to the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 10. On the other
hand to the extent that, being developed in the shadow of the law, AUPs simply reﬂect underlying governmental
regulation, they are also deﬁcient.
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stack, and there are various points at which it can more easily be reshaped to accord with
alternative sets of values.
265
Biegel provides more detail of how architectural or“code-based changes”in this broader sense
can be actively used as a mechanism of public policy governance for the Internet, rather than
merely acting as such by default in disseminating the core values of the hacker ethic.
266
What is required in order for the anarchist programme to become consistent with democratic
principles is that the public policy choices underlying the contractual regulation of Internet
usage by ISPs and content providers, and those embedded in the Internet’s architecture and
other code by any of the means identiﬁed by Biegel, be consensually developed within a multi-
stakeholder forum, rather than unilaterally by the private sector or the technical community.
Even for the anarchist, there is no reason why the IGF could not be that forum. However, it
would be an IGF which substantially diﬀers from that which exists now.
267
5.4.2. Hierarchical
Other proposals for reform to Internet governance arrangements take issue with anarchis-
tic models on the basis that they are, by nature, voluntary, which is a signiﬁcant limitation
in certain issue areas such as cybercrime, in which antisocial behaviour cannot be suﬃciently
curtailed through norms, markets or architecture. Thus Rony and Rony list authority amongst
the criteria to be considered in selecting a new Internet governance regime.
268
There are three main hierarchical models of Internet governance that are consistent with
governance by network in some measure. The most radical of these is for an extensive au-
tonomous body of Internet-speciﬁc international law to be developed by an intergovernmental
authority (in consultation with other stakeholders), which would in one stroke solve many of
the most acute jurisdictional issues to which the Internet gives rise. As Goldsmith and Wu
write, it would mean“no conﬂicting laws, no worries about complying with 175 diﬀerent legal
systems, no race to the bottom.”
269
265. Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), 43–44
266. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 193–207
267. See Section 6.2.2.
268. Together with stability, accountability, security, priority (that is, accommodating the ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served
principle), structure, and harmonisation (that is, integration with domestic law on issues of international property
and privacy: Rony, Ellan & Rony, Peter, The Domain Name Handbook: High Stakes and Strategies in Cyberspace
(1998), 10–11.
269. Goldsmith, Jack L & Wu, Tim, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (2006), 26
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Neither would it be without precedent: international maritime law in fact provides a close
analogy for what is proposed.
270 In an online context, though on a less comprehensive scale,
the UDRP also oﬀers an example of this model in action, in that case with WIPO acting as the
relevant intergovernmental authority, being the progenitor of the scheme and the dominant
provider of UDRP arbitration services.
On a larger scale, this model would require a legal framework for the Internet to be devel-
oped under the auspices of either a new intergovernmental entity established to do so,
271
or an existing intergovernmental authority. The WTO has been proposed by some for this
purpose,
272 given that it oﬀers a ready-made mechanism of enforcement lacking in current
Internet governance institutions. However at least some commentators, in anticipation of
the WSIS principles, have acknowledged the need for multi-stakeholder participation, which
would count quite strongly against the selection of the WTO as a forum for the development
of a legal regime for the Internet. Schuler for example stated in 1998:
Although government needs to assume a stronger role in this area, its objectives must not be
accomplished through edicts or heavy-handed bureaucracies, but through innovative, ﬂexible
experiments conducted in partnerships with citizen groups, NGOs, and, perhaps, business.
273
Kobayashi and Ribstein concur,
274, proﬀering instead a second model of hierarchical Inter-
net governance based not around a single regulatory regime but a multiplicity of networked
regimes. This would limit “the extent to which powerful interest groups can control regu-
lation and secure ineﬃcient rules that transfer wealth from weaker interest groups,” whilst
oﬀering a variety of regulatory approaches to “suit diﬀerent sets of preferences, including a
preference for no regulation,” and thereby promoting “an evolutionary process as individuals
and ﬁrms choose the laws under which they prefer to operate.”
275 This roughly equates to the
model of competition between hierarchically-organised networks described at Section 4.2.5.
However in order for this to work, freedom of exit from each jurisdiction would be required.
Although exit from a jurisdiction’s reach can, at least for purposes of trade and commerce, be
as simple as the exercise of a contractual choice of law clause, it is a more formidable obstacle
in other issue areas, particularly for those whose geographical roots are ﬁrmly planted, as
270. See Johnson, David R & Post, David G, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace (1996), although
the authors do not concur with the view that the body of law should be developed by an intergovernmental
authority.
271. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 74; Zittrain,
Jonathan, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private—Comments Before Congress (1999)
272. Weber, Rolf H, Regulatory Models for the Online World (2002), 78; Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?:
Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace (2001) , 182
273. Schuler, Doug, How Do We Institutionalize Democracy in the Electronic Age? (1998)
274. Kobayashi, Bruce H & Ribstein, Larry E, Multijurisdictional Regulation of the Internet (2003), 214
275. Kobayashi, Bruce H & Ribstein, Larry E, Multijurisdictional Regulation of the Internet (2003), 176
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are most individual Internet users. This model therefore works better where the competing
regulatory regimes include a range of governance mechanisms other than the rule of states,
between which Internet users, no matter where situated, actually have a meaningful choice.
However, so modiﬁed, the model loses its hierarchical quality.
The third model of hierarchical Internet governance is something of a compromise between
the ﬁrst two, in that it calls for an intergovernmental authority to assume responsibility for
public policy issues that are speciﬁcally impacted by existing Internet governance processes
and institutions, but without seeking to establish a broader regime of governance for all
Internet-related issue areas, which are left to be dealt with by diverse other mechanisms.
This model is exempliﬁed by the early support of commentators for direct involvement of the
ITU and WIPO in addressing the disconnect between the DNS and trademark law.
276
In more recent times it is the ITU that has most vocally advocated the position that an
intergovernmental authority would be more legitimate and eﬀective than a hotchpotch of
civil society and private sector organisations in dealing with public policy issues arising in
the administrative and technical governance of the Internet, and that the ITU in particu-
lar, representing all national telecommunications regulatory authorities, would be the most
appropriate intergovernmental authority to assume this role.
277
The ITU’s position is that it is diﬃcult for governments to participate in processes that are
not formally intergovernmental, such as those of ICANN which is formally a US company and
therefore subject to the control of its domestic authorities. Whilst governments can (and do)
still participate informally in bodies such as ICANN and the IETF, the Director of the ITU’s
TSG contended ahead of the Tunis summit of WSIS that “there is a big diﬀerence between
the legitimacy that comes from formal participation, as compared to informal participation,”
and stated:
Concretely, it might be helpful to build on ITU’s unique position as an intergovernmental orga-
nization that has private sector members—especially since those active ITU members are also
major players in providing Internet infrastructure—and to consider relying on ITU (and other
IGOs as appropriate) to provide appropriate public policy frameworks at the international level
for what concerns Internet matters.
... it is preferable to have existing inter-governmental organizations under the UN system to
take care of issues that require inter-governmental coordination, while recognizing the role of
existing international and private sector organizations with respect to technical and operating
matters. It would be cost-eﬀective to charge existing UN family organizations with this task.
278
276. Foster, W A, Registering the Domain Name System: An Exercise in Global Decision-Making (1997)
277. Huston, Geoﬀ, ICANN, the ITU, WSIS, and Internet Governance (2005)
278. Zhao, Houlin, ITU and Internet Governance (2004), 12–13
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Since the Tunis phase of WSIS, the ITU’s ambitions in this regard have of course been dealt
a serious, and probably fatal setback. However the ideal of “enhanced cooperation” to which
they have given way can be regarded as the successor of this hierarchical model for Internet
governance. Exactly what it is to entail in practice however, and the extent to which the IGF
will have a role to play in it, remain very open questions.
5.4.3. Democratic
Although the division between democratic and consensual models of Internet governance
reform is somewhat arbitrary, for present purposes democratic models of Internet governance
may be deﬁned as those in which representation is applied as a key criterion. Most notable
of these is the NTIA’s Green Paper on the future ICANN, that speciﬁed the four criteria of
stability, competition, private sector coordination and representation.
279
The high water mark in ICANN’s pursuit of the principle of representation was in the method
by which ﬁve At-Large representatives on the ICANN board were selected in 2000,
280 prior
to the development of the RALO model in 2002.
281 This experiment in large-scale online
democracy followed the recommendations of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard Law School, in a report to ICANN’s Membership Advisory Committee (MAC).
In response to that report, ICANN formed a Membership Implementation Task Force to
build a broadly constituted base of at least 5000 individual members to participate in the
inaugural elections. Registration of members required a name, email address and veriﬁcation
by postal mail (the cost of which was defrayed by a public grant). In the end, 143 806 members
registered, 76 183 of whom were authenticated by postal mail, and 34 035 of whom actually
voted.
Following a review by yet another ICANN-formed committee, the At-Large Study Committee,
in 2001, this direct election model was abandoned, on grounds that “such an approach is
administratively and ﬁnancially unworkable on a global scale for a sizeable electorate, and
fraught with potential dangers ranging from capture to outright fraud.”
282 In the place of
direct election, the committee recommended a model that would have seen only the holders
of domain names as at-large members of ICANN.
279. NTIA, Request for Comments on the Registration and Administration of Internet Domain Names (1997).
These distilled six “appropriate principles” earlier speciﬁed in the NTIA’s Notice of Inquiry.
280. See ICANN, Membership Implementation Task Force: Call for Expressions of Interest (1999).
281. ICANN, Evolution and Reform Committee’s Final Implementation Report and Recommendations (2002)
282. At-Large Study Committee, Final Report on ICANN At-Large Membership (2001)
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This recommendation was however trumped by the still more damning comments of ICANN’s
then President M Stuart Lynn,
that the concept of At Large membership elections from a self-selected pool of unknown voters
is not just ﬂawed, but fatally ﬂawed, and that continued devotion of ICANN’s very ﬁnite energy
and resources down this path will very likely prevent the creation of an eﬀective and viable
institution.
However Karl Auerbach, the director chosen to represent North America in those 2000 elec-
tions, considers that democratic election remains a model worthy of serious consideration by
Internet governance bodies. He states:
We could easily model elections for representatives on internet governance bodies on the elections
that are held among shareholders of publicly held corporations. These are usually done over the
internet or via paper mail. These are inexpensive and technically easy to administer.
283
The problem is that the shareholders of a corporation are a ﬁxed and ascertainable class of
electors, but the stakeholders of a governance network are not. This opens the door to mischiefs
such as the manipulation of a large bloc of voters who, although formally qualiﬁed, would
not otherwise have voted, to support a particular candidate. This, and more rudimentary
methods of election fraud such as multiple voting under false identities, were suspected of
having occurred in the ICANN elections.
284
The way in which CGI.br has tackled such problems in the elections for its constituencies is
through the use of an electoral college constituted by relevant representative organisations.
Although a better solution than individual direct election, this does have a distorting eﬀect in
that the votes of organisations with large memberships are not weighted diﬀerently to those
of small organisations. Unless accountablity is strictly maintained, it also introduces the
danger of democratic deﬁcits emerging through the interpolation of layers of representation
that distance the polity from the grass roots. Finally there is also still some potential for
electoral fraud, illustrated by the fact that the use of GONGOs and other front NGOs within
intergovernmental fora, including WSIS, is notorious.
285
Despite these problems, at worst ICANN and CGI.br“can be seen as ‘pilot projects’ to explore
the feasibility of new policy mechanisms which go beyond the traditional governmental top-
down system,”utilising“new principles in global policy-making like bottom–up coordination,
rough consensus, openness and transparency.”
286 Beyond adherence to these principles, all
283. Auerbach, Karl, Stakeholderism—The Wrong Road For Internet Governance (2006), 4
284. At-Large Study Committee, Final Report on ICANN At-Large Membership (2001)
285. Cukier, Kenneth N, The WSIS Wars: An Analysis of the Politicization of the Internet (2005), 161
286. Kleinw¨ achter, Wolfgang, Global Governance in the Information Age: GBDe and ICANN as “Pilot Projects”
for Co-regulation and a New Trilateral Policy? (2001), 3
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else that is really needed to constitute them as democratic governance networks is a structure
that adequately fulﬁls the democratic principle of consent. In the absence of a sound method
of representing stakeholders proportionally in their policy development structures, this means
the development of adequate mechanisms for democratic deliberation within those structures.
5.4.4. Consensual
For present purposes, consensual models of Internet governance are those that are more
likely to emphasise consensus than authority or representation as a key design criterion for
the reform of Internet governance institutions. This is, for example, the view of Biegel who
writes that“consensus among the various stakeholders will be an essential component”of any
programme of Internet governance reform.
287
Although there is some overlap with both anarchistic and democratic proposals, the consen-
sual model may be diﬀerentiated from them in that it more closely reﬂects the underlying
dynamics of governance by network. Unlike in the democratic model, such a network can only
operate with the consent of all its participants; yet unlike in the anarchistic model, it also
requires the processes by which consensus is reached to be institutionalised by some, per-
haps hierarchical, mechanism. Thus Vedel claims that governance by network (or“associative
regulation”in his terms) rarely exists or is maintained in the absence of state intervention.
288
Speciﬁc proposals for Internet governance reform that fall into the consensual class may be
further subdivided into two categories. First are those that are situated within the existing
international law paradigm, thus anchoring the institutions and processes of Internet gover-
nance in the international system. Second are consensual governance networks placed outside
or parallel to the international system, and which require it to accommodate their autonomous
operation, much in the same way as ICANN’s regime of Internet naming and numbering has
been accommodated within the international system.
5.4.4.1. Anchored in the international system
The ﬁrst proposal in the former category is one that emerged from within civil society at
WSIS for the establishment of a new specialised agency of the United Nations to be called
287. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 360
288. Vedel, Thierry, Four Models for Internet Governance (2005), 65
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UNMSP (United Nations Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships).
289 It would essentially act as a
bridge between new multi-stakeholder governance networks and the existing international
system, by streamlining the process by which such networks are formed and by facilitating
states’ participation in them.
290
The proposed new agency would contain a separate assembly for each stakeholder group,
including a General Assembly for governments and Conferences for the private sector and
civil society. Conferences would be subdivided by topic, each with a President whom it would
elect or appoint, and could convene virtually rather than meeting in person. Conference
members would submit proposals for resolutions or recommendations for approval by the
General Assembly.
A proposed new multi-stakeholder network formed between participants in the UNMSP would
be entitled to receive the UNMSP’s formal imprimatur of endorsement once it had a charter
and the sponsorship of at least two states. There would be no need for a treaty to formalise
the involvement of these or other states in the network, because this would be covered by the
umbrella UNMSP treaty.
Along somewhat similar lines is the proposal for a Framework Convention on Internet Gov-
ernance,
291 following the model of the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
292
Such a Framework Convention could be thought of as a constitutional document that would
establish the facts, principles and norms of the Internet governance regime,
293 and delineate
the respective roles of both intergovernmental and non-governmental institutions of Internet
governance.
294 As a practical example of the application of such a Framework Convention,
it could supplant the JPA between the NTIA and ICANN in providing a mechanism of
international oversight of the management of Internet naming and numbering.
The Tunis Agenda seems to anticipate the development of such an instrument as an element
of the programme of enhanced cooperation, stating that the“process could envisage creation
of a suitable framework or mechanisms, where justiﬁed, thus spurring the ongoing and active
289. See http://www.unmsp.org/ and Civil Society Scientiﬁc Information Working Group, Substantive Contri-
butions as Material to Synthesis Papers in View of the First Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (2006),
18.
290. Compare the Partnership Development Unit recommended by the Cardoso Report: Cardoso, Fernando H,
Cardoso Report on Civil Society (2004), 38.
291. Mathiason, John, A Framework Convention: An Institutional Option for Internet Goverance (2004), 1–2
292. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1994 ATS No 2 (entry into force 21 Mar 2004)
293. Mueller, Milton, Mathiason, John, & Klein, Hans, The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and
Norms for a New Regime (2007)
294. Holitscher, Marc, Internet Governance Revisited: Think Decentralization! (2004), 6
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evolution of the current arrangements in order to synergize the eﬀorts in this regard.”
295
This need not necessarily be a hard law instrument; for example Anriette Esterhausen of
APC suggested at a Best Practice Forum on public participation in Internet governance held
in Rio that the Aarhus Convention could be used as the basis for a soft law agreement on
Internet governance to which diﬀerent institutions, both public and private, could become
signatories.
The third proposal that seeks to situate multi-stakeholder Internet governance in the inter-
national system is really a group of related proposals for the establishment of an Internet Bill
of Rights. These proposals include:
￿ the APC’s Internet Rights Charter;
296
￿ the “Tunis Mon Amour” initiative from the Tunis phase of WSIS that evolved into the
Internet Bill of Rights dynamic coalition of the IGF; and
￿ the Declaration of Lima 2003 drafted by Latin American civil society at the Geneva phase
of WSIS, which endeavoured to develop a set of principles for cyberspace akin to those
enshrined in international law for the high seas and outer space.
297
Although an Internet Bill of Rights would not, in the same manner as the previous two
proposals, provide a meta-structure for a multi-stakeholder Internet governance network, it
could, if all stakeholders were involved in its development, provide a baseline of protection for
consensually agreed individual rights and interests against incursion from future state (and,
indeed, private) action.
A shortcoming of the Bill of Rights proposal is its limited responsiveness to change, since
it crystallises the interests of those involved in its development, assuming that the general
principles they develop in a speciﬁc set of circumstances will remain applicable (or even
comprehensible) across heterogeneous issue areas as the Internet continues to evolve.
More fundamentally, for this or indeed the other two proposals noted above to seek to place
Internet governance within the existing international system, can be seen as an unprincipled
concession to state hegemony that undervalues the legitimacy of the independent role of the
other stakeholders in governance. In other words, it reduces transnational law to international
law.
295. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 61
296. APC, Internet Rights Charter (2006)
297. GIC, Declaration of Lima (2003)
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5.4.4.2. Autonomous transnational law
In contrast are those proposals for Internet governance reform that are situated apart from
the international system. Being divorced from intergovernmental authority does not neces-
sarily mean that these lack an institutionalised structure or process. However it does beg the
question, if a governance structure is not anchored in the superstructure of the international
system, does it (and, indeed, does it need to) draw upon some other hierarchical source?
Generally, if the Internet governance regimes put forward in these proposals are anchored
anywhere else at all, it is in other institutions of Internet governance. Thus Gould suggests
that an unwritten constitutional framework could emerge from existing Internet governance
institutions, with the addition of an “Internet regulator” which could be ultimately respon-
sible to the Internet Society.
298 Similarly, Stuckey talks of the passage of a constitution for
cyberspace, explicating the roles of its existing governance institutions, and providing a base
for the development of its own corpus of law and self-regulation.
299 More recently, the self-
described Working Group on Constitutional Internet Governance (WGCIG) has inaugurated
an online Constitutional Convention alongside the IGF.
300
An apparent problem with such proposals is that they seek to pull the Internet governance
regime up by its own bootstraps, by establishing a transnational legal framework for con-
sensual governance through institutions such as ISOC whose authority only exists as part
of that same regime, in a chain of paradoxical self-reference. However, this is not so much
of a problem as it may seem: it is possible for a transnational legal regime to establish a
self-supporting superstructure, in the same way that the adjudication of international trade
disputes occurs pursuant to a system of international commercial arbitration that is itself the
product of contract.
301
However by the same token, it is also possible for a consensual Internet governance network to
exist entirely autonomously, supported by nothing other than the inherent force of its own
“running code.”
302 This alludes to the famous maxim of David Clark from MIT, which became
the credo of the IETF: “We reject kings, presidents and voting. We believe in rough consen-
sus and running code.”
303 In other words, on this account, the institutions and processes of
298. Gould, Mark, Governance of the Internet: a UK Perspective (1997), 58
299. Stuckey, Kent D, Internet and Online Law (1996), xxiii
300. See http://www.wgcig.net/.
301. Teubner, Gunther, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society (1997)
302. Steﬀerud, Einar, Image Online Design, Inc comments on the Registration and Administration of Internet
Domain Names (1997), 515
303. See Reagle, Joseph, Why the Internet is Good: Community Governance That Works Well (1999) for an
extended analysis of the maxim.
359Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
a consensual Internet governance network gain nothing from being anchored in any external
authority, so long as their output has been tested in practice and proven eﬀective.
And indeed, it is from the IETF that a number of such initiatives have drawn inspiration.
These include the Internet Law and Policy Forum (ILPF)
304 and the Internet Societal Task
Force (ISTF).
305
Originally known as the Internet Law Task Force, the ILPF was established in 1993. It
was a private sector organisation divided into six working groups on substantive issue areas,
ranging from content regulation to privacy and spam. New working groups could be formed
by consensus of the membership, and were responsible for carrying out the ILPF’s work
programme, including the production of reports and the development of Consensus Principles.
The ILPF also held workshops on speciﬁc topics along with an annual conference. The ILPF
appears to have become inactive since 2003, having been largely superseded by the CCBI and
subsequently BASIS at WSIS.
The ISTF was a project of ISOC formed in 1997 as a complement to the IETF and IRTF. The
ISTF was based around a series of working groups and open mailing lists that endeavoured
to produce white papers, analogous to the IETF’s RFCs, on public policy issues such as
accessibility, privacy and content regulation. Prophetically, Vint Cerf acknowledged in 1999
that this was“taking up a challenge which governments ought to take up.”
306 By the time the
ISTF was eventually disbanded in 2002, this is exactly what governments had begun to do,
leaving the ISTF’s eﬀorts sidelined.
The weakness of the ISTF, as with the ILPF before it, was that despite the acknowledgement
from Vint Cerf that they were seeking to usurp a traditionally public function, and given that
Internet governance cannot legitimately be regarded as the domain of the private sector and
technical communities alone,
307 there was still no clear understanding of the process by which
the participation of states could be attracted without formal intergovernmental sponsorship.
In this respect, ICANN provides a better possible model. ICANN has long been recognised
by commentators as a “private corporation that is sculpting itself to perform public-interest
functions.”
308 More recently, it has also begun to acknowledge this itself. The last of eleven
core values listed in its bylaws, added to that document in the wake of WSIS, states, “While
remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authori-
304. See http://www.ilpf.org/.
305. See http://istf-docs.norrnod.se/.
306. McCluskey, Alan, The Future of the Internet (1999)
307. At least, it cannot in the post-WSIS era; the proposition was more arguable in 1997.
308. Franda, Marcus F, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (2001), 76
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ties are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments’ or public
authorities’ recommendations.”
309
Having said that, ICANN itself (apart from its other problems) has too narrow a mandate to
have ever been seriously proposed as a body for generalised Internet public policy governance,
as People for Internet Responsibility (PFIR) noted in their prescient proposal of 2000 for
the formation of a multi-stakeholder Representative Global Internet Policy Organization.
Although this proposal was not taken up, its themes would recur strongly in the WGIG report
some ﬁve years later. PFIR argued at the time:
Attempts to keep the Internet policymaking process free of government input have often resulted
in governments swooping in later, frequently with what might be characterized as ”knee-jerk”
reactions, often to the detriment of the Internet and its global community. It would be far better
to deﬁne the participatory role of governments in the ﬁrst place, and have them as part of the
team, rather than as an after-the-fact“spoiler”kept on the sidelines for most of the deliberations
process. They deserve to be involved, and they should be involved.
310
But there is a thin line to tread here. On the one hand, it is necessary to secure the par-
ticipation of states in any consensual governance network, which will require that they are
comfortable with its structure and processes. But on the other, there is no warrant for such a
network to submit to the authority of states either as an entr´ ee into the international system
(which may compromise the network’s consensual form), or to confer legitimacy upon its
output (which state hegemony would only weaken rather than enhance). It is unclear that
ICANN, or any other institution of Internet governance, has yet struck the most appropriate
balance.
5.5. The need for further reform
The purpose of this chapter has been to return focus to the implementation of Internet
governance in practice, following the abstraction of the preceding two chapters. The chapter
began by surveying the recent processes of reform to the existing regime of Internet governance
outlined in Chapter 2. It was seen that the reforms that began in earnest at WSIS, partially
implementing the recommendations of the WGIG report, led both to the establishment of the
IGF for a term of at least ﬁve years, and to the promise of a longer term model of enhanced
multi-stakeholder cooperation in policy development.
309. ICANN, Bylaws (2006), Article 1, section 2
310. Weinstein, Lauren, PFIR Statement on Internet Policies, Regulations, and Control (2000)
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But it was also clear that the Tunis Agenda’s mandate for each of these initiatives has yet
to be fulﬁlled. In fact, agreement has been lacking even as to whether and how it should
be fulﬁlled, with the role of the IGF, its structure, and its processes remaining the subject
of contention throughout the entire process. Interestingly, the division between stakeholder
groups was less signiﬁcant in this regard than that between the cross-cutting camps of Forum
“hawks” and “doves.” Susan Crawford of ICANN was not understating the point when she
described the IGF as “highly political.”
311
The purpose of the next chapter is to make a more detailed assessment of the success of
the IGF and to propose whatever reforms are required to enable it to fulﬁl not only its
express mandate in the Tunis Agenda, but also—if the political will were to exist for it to
do so—a broader mandate more consistent with the recommendations of the WGIG report,
that acknowledges the legitimate role of non-state actors in the development of public policy
as transnational law.
This assessment of how closely the IGF approximates a legitimate and eﬀective multi-
stakeholder Internet governance network will be conducted by two parallel methods: ﬁrstly
by reference to best practices of other organisations that have been observed throughout this
thesis, and secondly by applying the theoretical principles that were developed principally in
chapters 3 and 4.
Foreshadowing this approach, the preceding section of this chapter began to compare the
IGF against a number of other proposals for reform, mostly from outside the WSIS process,
to determine what they could add to the background of theory developed over the preceding
chapters that will be used in assessing the IGF.
Consolidating the ﬁndings of Chapter 4, it was found that proposals that would require states
to accommodate the decentralised governance of an anarchistic network of Internet stakehold-
ers carry no assurance of multi-stakeholder participation or democratic accountability unless
conducted within a more formal structure. On the hierarchical account, this is where the
need for oversight and coordination comes in, which is the essence of the “process towards
enhanced cooperation”; however, the need to ensure freedom of exit from the network limits
the legitimate use of governmental or intergovernmental power in any such structure.
312
Also in accord with previous ﬁndings, little promise was found in democratic models of gover-
nance that sought to implement a system of representative elections, unless they also incorpo-
311. Noyes, Andrew, Biggest Threat to Internet Could Be a Massive Virtual Blackout (2007)
312. Though it may well not limit its application in practice: see Section 4.3.5.3.
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rated a deliberative process, which would make them a special case of the consensual model.
But even such consensual networks presented a diﬃcult question: whether they should be
anchored to the international system through a treaty of some kind, or exist as autonomous
transnational legal institutions.
In the former option lay the danger that the network would become beholden to government,
but the latter carried the perhaps even more acute risk that states would refuse to participate
in the network, signiﬁcantly curtailing its legitimacy and eﬀectiveness. On balance, it would
be perverse to refuse to countenance a thin link between any consensual network of Internet
governance and the existing international system, at least until the network builds up suﬃcient
social capital across all stakeholder groups to break free and become fully autonomous.
Such a network does not exist in any of the alternative models of Internet governance reform
that were examined in this chapter, but it does describe the IGF of the Tunis Agenda quite
well. It describes the IGF as it actually exists somewhat less well; however the required
theoretical and factual background is now in place to enable us to identify the deﬁciencies of
the IGF as it stands, and to make the necessary recommendations for its reform.
363Chapter 5. Reform of Internet governance
364Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
In managing, promoting and pro-
tecting [the Internet’s] presence in
our lives, we need to be no less cre-
ative than those who invented it.
Clearly, there is a need for gover-
nance, but that does not necessarily
mean that it has to be done in the
traditional way, for something that
is so very diﬀerent.
Koﬁ Annan
The purpose of this ﬁnal chapter is to recommend how the Internet Governance Forum may
be reformed to improve its legitimacy and eﬀectiveness as a governance network. Before
commencing to do so, it will be useful to review how the chapters preceding this have helped
to set the ground for that exercise.
The thesis began by developing a taxonomy of ﬁve available mechanisms of governance, and
describing the object of their application, the Internet, in terms of seven persistent features of
its technical and social architecture: decentralisation, interactivity, openness, egalitarianism,
anonymity, cosmopolitanism and resilience. It was posited that the mechanism of governance
by network, which brings together each of the other mechanisms and the stakeholders by
whom they are used, may be the most legitimate and eﬀective mechanism for the governance
of that domain.
Chapter 2 illustrated that most existing institutions of Internet governance in the spheres of
technical coordination and standards development were based upon the non-hierarchical forces
of norms, markets, and architecture, whereas the bodies seeking to exercise public policy gov-
ernance tended to be governmental or intergovernmental and thus to rely upon the hierarchi-
cal power of rules; a mechanism much more at odds with many of the architectural features
of the Internet that had earlier been identiﬁed.
As Chapter 3 described, this clash of cultures was indicative of a deeper deﬁciency of the inter-
national system, that was beginning to be recognised and addressed systemically through the
increasing incorporation of civil society and private sector participation in the development of
hard and soft international law, but also extra-systemically through the development of par-
allel transnational legal orders for public policy governance, such as international commercial
arbitration and the ICANN regime.
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However whilst this“new medieval”system addressed the exclusion of transnational non-state
interests from the dominant international order by admitting of a more pluralistic conception
of law, it oﬀered in itself no greater assurance of the legitimacy and eﬀectiveness of governance
by such non-state actors and networks.
The challenge of Chapter 4 was therefore to examine possible structures and processes for a
governance network that would be as legitimate and eﬀective as possible across the contexts of
both the international system and cyberspace. In particular, it should be more legitimate than
alternative models of reform based around international law or private sector leadership, and
more eﬀective than the prevailing models of domestic law and decentralised collective action.
On both counts, the key was to be found in the facilitation of multi-stakeholder participation.
This would enable the governance network to draw from the legitimacy of all stakeholder
groups, and also improve its eﬀectiveness over the two alternatives of an hierarchical in-
ternational legal regime shoehorned into the decentralised and egalitarian architecture of
cyberspace, or a private transnational legal regime seeking an autonomous role within an
international system still shackled to its Westphalian past.
Although this still left many details unspeciﬁed, Chapter 4 drew elements from anarchistic,
hierarchical, democratic and consensual organisational models in attempting to strike an
appropriate balance between the pursuit of the democratic principle of consent (already well
illustrated within“native”Internet governance institutions such as the IETF) and the stability
and accountability of the liberal democratic model (better exempliﬁed by institutions of the
existing international system).
It was suggested that an appropriate balance could be found in an open and transparent
multi-stakeholder forum whose members would deliberate upon public policy issues with the
objective of reaching consensus, subject to the oversight of an executive council to which each
group would appoint representatives using consensual and/or democratic means, and which
would have the responsibility of ratifying any decisions of the larger group by consensus.
However as Chapter 5 revealed, this is by no means a description of the Internet Governance
Forum as it exists today. In tracing the progress of recent reforms to the Internet governance
regime, that chapter accentuated the very real inﬂuence of political forces on the role, structure
and working processes of the IGF, to the extent that it is yet unclear whether it will even be
in a position to fulﬁl its mandate in the Tunis Agenda. Does this mean that the theoretical
model of a legitimate and eﬀective multi-stakeholder Internet governance network, that was
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settled upon in Chapter 4, may after all prove too idealistic to consummate in practice?
This chapter aims to address that question, drawing together the insights gained in the
preceding chapters to examine the extent to which the Internet Governance Forum presently
falls short of its ideal, and to propose how the gap between theory and practice might be
bridged. This undertaking is to begin at the macroscopic and end at the microscopic level.
That is, maintaining the method of Chapter 5, we will begin by looking at the roles in which
the IGF legitimately acts, before moving on to discuss the eﬀectiveness of its structure and
its processes in the conduct of those roles.
6.1. Other organisations as models
It will be helpful to make reference back to the models and experiences of some of the
other organisations discussed throughout this thesis, which will provide anecdotal evidence
of prevailing best practices in Internet governance to corroborate the conclusions drawn from
theory. The diﬃculty with this is that over two hundred organisations have been referenced
in this thesis, making it impractical to refer to all or even a signiﬁcant fraction of them in
this concluding chapter.
To narrow the scope of the endeavour, but in a principled rather than an entirely arbitrary
way, the following method will be used to highlight a small number of organisations most
likely to provide useful lessons for the IGF:
￿ An initial shortlist of forty organisations will be nominated based upon the author’s sub-
jective perception of their likely relevance. This produces the following list: APNIC, the
ASF, auDA, the CA/Browser Forum, CGI.br, CONGO, the CS-IGC, the CSB, the De-
bian project, ECOSOC, the EFF, the EU, the FSC, GAID,
1 the GKP, the gTLD-MoU, the
IAB, ICANN, the ICC, ICPEN, the IETF, the ILO, the IPC, the ISO, ISOC, the ISTF, the
ITU, the LAP, the OECD, TRUSTe, the UN, UNCITRAL, UNICTTF, the Ubuntu project,
the VGT, the W3C, WGIG, WIPO, the WTO and the Wikimedia Foundation.
1. GAID (the Global Alliance for ICT and Development; see http://www.un-gaid.org/) has not yet been
discussed, but will be at Section 6.4.1.1. GAID was formed in April 2006 as the successor to UNICTTF whose
mandate had expired at the end of 2005. Its cross-cutting mission is to provide“a platform for an open, inclusive,
multi-stakeholder cross-sectoral policy dialogue on the role of information and communication technology in
development”: United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Global Alliance for Information Technologies and
Development to be Launched (2006).
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￿ In order to narrow this shortlist of forty down further, we will specify some more objective
criteria drawn from earlier chapters, relating to the macroscopic issues of the organisation’s
role and structure. Such a list of criteria relating to the role of the organisation is as follows:
￿ Regime (whether the organisation ﬁts within the Internet governance regime, or some
quite separate regime, such as the FSC which exists within the regime of forest manage-
ment);
￿ Sphere (whether the organisation predominantly practises in the sphere of standards
development, technical coordination or public policy governance);
￿ Region (whether the organisation’s primary focus is international, regional or local in
scope);
￿ Operations (whether the organisation administers a substantive work programme of its
own, outside of its governance functions; for example, capacity building or software de-
velopment);
￿ Policy-setting (whether the organisation’s role includes the development of public policy
norms or technical standards, other than position statements simply intended for input
into other governance fora);
￿ Audit (whether the body’s functions include the oversight of another organisation or
institution);
￿ Arbitration (whether the body performs any arbitral functions for its members or stake-
holders);
￿ Coordination (whether the body is engaged in coordinating other institutional processes
within its regime, which may include regional processes); and
￿ Regulation (whether the body is engaged in the development of rules of general applica-
tion, other than internal administrative rules).
2
The second set of criteria against which the shortlist of organisations will be assessed are
those relating to their structure, namely:
3
2. These last ﬁve criteria are drawn from the WGIG report: WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet
Governance (2005), 12.
3. Compare Martens’ much simpler categorisation of multi-stakeholder bodies into low, medium or high levels
of institutionalisation: Martens, Jens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of Multilateralism? (2007),
23.
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￿ Mechanism (whether the organisation governs principally through one of the mecha-
nisms of rules, norms, markets, architecture or networks—granted that in some cases the
nomination of a principal mechanism is somewhat subjective);
￿ Oversight (whether the organisation is responsible to some other body);
￿ Publicity (the extent to which the organisation is intergovernmental, governmental or
otherwise linked to the international system);
￿ Composition (whether the organisation is explicitly multi-stakeholder, open to all stake-
holders but without classifying them into groups, or limited to particular stakeholder
groups);
￿ Membership (whether membership is open—and if so whether it is also free—or whether
it is closed or otherwise subject to signiﬁcant restrictions other than cost);
￿ Representation (whether members participate in the organisation in a direct individual
capacity or as representatives of their employers or aﬃliated organisations);
￿ Executive (how the organisation’s council or other executive body is selected); and
￿ Secretariat (how the secretariat of the organisation, if any, is selected; for these purposes
“hierarchical” appointment implies that the secretariat is appointed by the executive
body).
The result of the application of these criteria to the forty shortlisted organisations is found
in Appendix A. Before these results can be used to narrow down the shortlist into a ﬁnal list
of organisations most likely to hold lessons for the IGF, the same criteria noted above need
to be applied one more: this time, to the IGF itself.
The IGF obviously falls within the Internet governance regime, in the sphere of public policy
governance, and acts internationally. Its main operational role is that of capacity building,
4
and its main governance roles are those of policy-setting and coordination,
5 rather than audit,
6
arbitration or regulation. It acts as a governance network, under the oversight of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, which also provides its link with the international system.
It is multi-stakeholder in composition, with membership being open and free of charge, and
4. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005) paras 72(d), (e), (f), (h), and at some remove see
para 72(k) which mandates the IGF to “[h]elp to ﬁnd solutions to issues arising from the use and misuse of the
Internet.”
5. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005) paras 72(a), (b), (c), (g) and (j)
6. But see WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005) para 72(i).
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held in an individual capacity. Its executive, if the Advisory Group can be described as such,
and its Secretariat, are both appointed in a hierarchical fashion by the UN Secretary-General.
It is now possible to begin the ﬁnal step in the process of narrowing down the shortlist of
forty other organisations, by identifying a minimal set of key criteria that such organisations
should share with the IGF to establish that they are close enough in role and structure to be
meaningfully and usefully compared with it.
Although this is again a somewhat subjective task, enough ground has been covered already
to make short work of it. In order to qualify as closely comparable to the IGF, an organisa-
tion should exercise the same governance roles (policy-setting and coordination), should be
of multi-stakeholder or open composition, should act as a governance network, and its mem-
bership should be open. There is no other existing organisation from the shortlist that meets
each of these ﬁve criteria. However there are eight that meet at least four of the criteria:
Figure 6-1. Organisations comparable to the IGF
Policy-setting Coordination Mechanism Composition Membership
APNIC Yes Yes Rulesa Open Openb
auDA Yes Yes Rulesc Multi-stakeholder Open
CGI.br Yes Yes Networks Multi-stakeholder Democratic
GAID No Yes Networks Multi-stakeholder Open, free
GKP No Yes Networks Multi-stakeholder Open
gTLD-MoU Yes Yes Networks Open Open, free
ICANN Yes Yes Networks Multi-stakeholder Restrictedd
UNICTTF No Yes Networks Multi-stakeholder Open, free
Notes:
a. Although its policy processes are consensual, its control over IP addresses is
hierarchical.
b. Although not free, membership is not required to participate in its policy development
process.
c. The same argument expressed in footnote a. applies to auDA’s control over domain
names.
d. Participation in the organisation is only possible indirectly through its ACs and SOs,
which deﬁne static constituencies and provide varying levels of representation within the
larger structure.
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Other than sharing similar attributes to the IGF according to the ﬁve key criteria, these
eight organisations are highly diverse. National, regional and international organisations are
all represented. Their executive bodies are constituted through the full range of consensual,
consociational, democratic, and oligarchical means. Other than coordination, they do not even
perform a common role, although they do fall into two identiﬁable clusters; those involved
in technical coordination (along with policy governance in the case of CGI.br), and those
(namely GAID, GKP and UNICTTF) involved in ICT for development.
These“exemplar organisations,”as they will be referred to for convenience, therefore provide
a usefully various, but also more comfortably delimited, set of case studies to which reference
will periodically be made in the course of analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the IGF
in its current form.
6.2. Role
The Tunis Agenda recognises “that there are many cross-cutting international public policy
issues that require attention and are not adequately addressed by the current mechanisms.”
7
The deﬁciencies of each of these current mechanisms were ﬁrst noted in the introduction to
this thesis.
8 This does not mean that there is no place for the use of each of these mechanisms
of governance. Quite the contrary; the use of all of them in concert is likely to be necessary
to achieve policy objectives in many issue areas.
9 But in order for their legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness to be maximised, they should be employed in a coordinated rather than an ad
hoc manner, whereby not only the policy objectives to be achieved, but also the means by
which they are to be achieved, are the subject of democratic deliberation amongst all aﬀected
stakeholders.
This is the essential advantage of the use of the mechanism of governance by network. Such
a governance network does not so much incorporate all the other mechanisms of governance,
as transform them, synergistically increasing both their legitimacy and eﬀectiveness. They
are endowed with greater legitimacy by being subjected to multi-stakeholder democratic
oversight, and with greater eﬀectiveness because they can be deployed through the network,
either alone or in combination, in an adaptive manner.
7. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 60
8. See Section 1.4.
9. See Section 2.4.
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Governance by network can thus be understood as a meta-mechanism, in that it provides the
means by which for the use of other mechanisms of governance themselves to be governed.
To put this in practical terms applicable to the case of the IGF:
￿ If all stakeholder groups within the network reach consensus at the level of principle on
a hierarchical approach to a particular issue of governance, governments can give eﬀect
to those collaboratively developed principles by coordinating their use of domestic and/or
international legal rules (perhaps within other intergovernmental fora);
￿ Alternatively (or additionally), if it is considered appropriate to address an issue through
the use of norms, the network can develop a soft law statement of those norms which civil
society stakeholders can take the lead in disseminating through their own domestic and
transnational networks;
￿ If an issue can be eﬀectively addressed through the use of markets, the IGF’s private
sector members can create or enter such markets, whilst with all other stakeholders they
monitor for any market failures that may need to be corrected by other mechanisms;
10 and
￿ If the use of architecture is considered an eﬀective approach in a particular issue area, it
will fall to all stakeholder groups to develop a statement of public policy principles to be
transmitted to the relevant body (such as the IETF) responsible for the development of
standards and protocols in reference to that framework of principle.
The roles that are inherent in the IGF’s function as such a governance network are twofold, and
have been described above as the organisational roles of policy-setting and coordination. The
former role is that which allows its stakeholders to collaboratively decide upon the objectives
to be achieved, and the latter includes the process of establishing how and by whom they are
to be achieved.
As already noted, these two roles of policy-setting and coordination are found in the express
mandate of the IGF in the Tunis Agenda. However as also noted, that document also ar-
guably places some limitations upon the IGF’s policy-setting role in established rather than
“emerging” issue areas,
11 to which there has been only further accretion through the subse-
quent narrow interpretation of the IGF’s mandate by the Advisory Group and Secretariat,
which they have institutionalised in its structure.
10. In principle, this is much like a domestic co-regulatory framework, only with a network rather than a gov-
ernment in the regulator’s position.
11. See Section 5.2.
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The following two subsections will discuss what is involved in the roles of policy-setting and
coordination in more detail, and will consider the extent to which the IGF’s ability to carry
out those roles, and thereby to fulﬁl its function as a multi-stakeholder governance network,
is prejudiced by the limitations that have been placed upon it either constitutionally in the
Tunis Agenda or institutionally by the Advisory Group and Secretariat.
But before moving on, it should also be noted that policy-setting and coordination are not
the only two roles of the IGF noted in its mandate. The Tunis Agenda also assigns the IGF an
operational role in contributing to capacity building,
12 and as the previous chapter illustrated,
this has been very strongly emphasised by the Advisory Group and other Forum doves, at
the expense of the IGF’s policy-setting role. A third subsection will therefore address this
role and consider whether it too constitutes a core function of a governance network that has
somehow been overlooked until now.
6.2.1. Policy-setting
One of the fundamental issues about the role of the IGF that has divided the Forum hawks and
doves is as to whether it has a decision-making role. Perhaps the strongest denunciation of this
prospect has come from Nitin Desai himself, who said shortly before the inaugural meeting,
“It’s not a decision-making body. It cannot be a decision-making body. It does not have a
membership, so who is going to author a decision? So there’s no way it can ever become a
decision-making body.”
13
To some extent, the division can be blamed on an unfortunate choice of terminology. Decision-
making, after all, is a process, not an event. This process is sometimes divided into the separate
acts of decision-shaping (or decision-recommending) and decision-taking, in recognition of the
fact that these may involve quite diﬀerent parties.
14
If decision-making simply meant decision-taking, then Desai would be quite correct, as this
phase of the process will often take place outside the IGF, depending on the mechanism
of governance employed. In particular, governance by rules will continue to be centred in
national parliaments and intergovernmental organisations, no matter how much weight they
may give to the IGF’s recommendations. To the extent that talk of a decision-making role
12. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(h)
13. The speech in question is referred to at Waters, Darren, Warning Over “Broken Up” Internet (2006), but
Desai’s actual words are misreported there. The words transcribed above, which are stronger than those re-
ported in the article, are taken from the audio recording available at http://kierenmccarthy.co.uk/mp3s/
nominet-igf-9oct06/nitin-desai-combined.mp3.
14. Smith, G, Taking Deliberation Seriously: Institutional Design and Green Politics (2001), 85
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for the IGF seems to imply otherwise, and particularly if it is also assumed that the decisions
being spoken of are to be binding, the doves’ objections are understandable.
However on closer analysis, the division between Forum hawks and doves on the role of the IGF
is more than simply one over terminology. Many doves have been quite explicit that besides
not taking decisions, the IGF should not even not make recommendations, and indeed should
not be a forum for policy development at all, in spite of the express words of its mandate.
15
This goes far beyond a simple objection to the notion of the IGF making binding decisions
(which, by deﬁnition, involves governance by rules), but would appear also to proscribe its
participation in the development of norms and architecture and in the operation of markets.
Indeed, in these cases, there is no real decision-taking phase of the decision-making process.
Even in the case of governance by rules, the division between decision-shaping and decision-
taking (or between policy development and policy-setting) is quite an artiﬁcial one. Rather
than separate acts, they are more of a continuum, along which power is apportioned between
those endowed with formal authority and those from whom their authority is derived. At one
end of the continuum (with APNIC providing a good example), the authority of the decision-
taker is little more than formal, with its constituents retaining the substantive power to set
policy. At the other end, those in authority reserve full discretion to disregard or override
any recommendations made by the organisation’s stakeholders.
16 Participatory democracy is
usually taken to represent an intermediate position, in which the decision-taker is required
or expected to demonstrate that the recommendations of stakeholders have been taken into
account and given due weight in the ﬁnal decision.
17
6.2.1.1. Recommendations
What, then, is the appropriate point along that continuum for the IGF? The notion that
it should be at the most restrictive extreme—that the IGF ought not make decisions or
recommendations at all—is diﬃcult to sustain, because the eﬀect of this would be to deny
its role in providing input to other institutions in the Internet governance regime, in outright
contradiction of its express mandate in the Tunis Agenda.
18
15. Government of Canada, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (2006), 1
16. There is no good example of this from amongst the exemplar organisations, but the WTO is an example
from the earlier shortlist of forty.
17. See Section 4.3.2.1.
18. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(c) (which calls upon the IGF to“[i]nterface
with appropriate inter-governmental organizations and other institutions on matters under their purview”), and
para 72(g) (which requires it to “[i]dentify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies
and the general public, and, where appropriate, make recommendations”).
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Moreover despite the ardour of the Forum doves on this point, the idea that the IGF ought
not to make recommendations is quite a novel one. It was certainly not the view of WGIG,
which saw the forum they proposed as one in which“all stakeholders will be represented and
feel free to discuss and make recommendations.”
19 Even WGIG, however, was unsure as to
the exact point along the continuum of decision-recommendation and decision-taking that
the IGF would occupy, saying:
Whether such multistakeholderism can be extended beyond consultations, agenda setting, and
technical operations into actual policy decision making, or into extant and exclusionary inter-
governmental and private sector bodies, of course remain open questions.
20
It has been speculated that the motive of the doves in seeking to disempower the IGF can be
traced to the investment of these powerful actors in other, less open and transparent institu-
tions and processes, such as the investments of stakeholders such as ISOC, the US government
and its allies in the ICANN regime, and those of the private sector in the WIPO intellectual
property regime.
21 But the politics behind the doves’ position are of less relevance for present
purposes than their arguments.
22
As the previous chapter’s detailed account of preparations for and follow-up from the ﬁrst
two IGF meetings illustrated, the arguments of the Forum doves for limiting the role of the
IGF in making recommendations follow two recurrent themes:
￿ That delegates will not participate freely and frankly at the IGF if they are under pressure
to make decisions.
23
￿ That because the IGF has no ﬁxed membership, it is not a body capable of making deci-
sions.
24
As to the ﬁrst of these objections, it is true that strategic behaviour and back-room deals
are a hallmark of the participation of governmental delegates in intergovernmental negotia-
tion processes. WSIS is as good an example of this phenomenon as any, and there is no reason
to think that it would not be replicated within the IGF if its decision-making apparatus were
to be modelled on that of a traditional intergovernmental forum.
19. Sha’ban, Charles, Proposal for the Establishment of an Internet Governance Forum (2005), 235
20. Drake, William J, Why the WGIG Process Mattered (2005), 251
21. Mueller, Milton,“A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum...”: Multistakeholderism, International
Institutions and Global Governance of the Internet (2006), 10
22. Though see Section 6.3.2.1 for further analysis of their underlying motives.
23. ICC, ICC/BASIS Feedback on First Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Athens, Greece (2007)
24. Waters, Darren, Warning Over “Broken Up” Internet (2006)
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However, there are two answers to this objection: ﬁrst, there is no reason that the IGF
should make decisions in the manner of a traditional intergovernmental forum; indeed, this
is one suggestion that nobody has made. As Chapter 4 illustrated, there are techniques from
the literature on deliberative democracy, and others from that on consensual decision-making,
that are designed to avoid strategic decision-making in favour of the collaborative development
of a rational consensus through a process of deliberation amongst equals. This is a matter
that will fall for fuller discussion under the treatment of the IGF’s processes, rather than that
of its role.
25
Second, it is diﬃcult to see how the tendency of governmental (or indeed other) delegates to
engage in dysfunctional behaviour, could possibly detract from the mandate of the IGF as
expressed in the Tunis Agenda. It is doubtless that IGF meetings will proceed more smoothly
without the requirement to adhere to that mandate, but if the smooth running of meetings
were an overriding criterion, the mandate ought never to have been drafted to include a
policy-setting role for the IGF in the ﬁrst place. As William Drake pointedly observed dur-
ing the afternoon of the ﬁrst consultations on the convening of the IGF in February 2006,
“Presumably, when governments carefully negotiated this text, they meant what they said.”
In answer to the second objection of the Forum doves, that it is impossible for a body without
a ﬁxed membership to make decisions, this was also addressed in Chapter 4, when it was shown
to ﬂow from the misconception that democratic decision-making requires adherence to the
principle of “one vote, one value.”
26 In fact, it was shown that the democratic principle can
also be legitimately and eﬀectively institutionalised in alternative forms that do not require
numerically proportional representation, so long as they engage all aﬀected viewpoints and
perspectives in a process of rational deliberation.
27 The diﬃculties of reconciling this theory
with the hegemonic practices of governments have also already been acknowledged,
28 and will
be revisited when considering questions of the IGF’s structure below.
29
Although the two arguments most often expressed as to why the IGF ought not to make
25. See Section 6.4.
26. The objection also contradicts the experience of WSIS. Ralf Bendrath, from the University of Bremen and
the Privacy Dynamic Coalition, pointed out at the February 2007 consultation, “I wouldn’t say just because
we don’t have a deﬁned membership it’s not possible to agree on anything. If I look back on the—to the
WSIS process, where I participated in civil society, there was no clear membership on who was a member of
civil society, who can decide and vote and whatever on our joint documents. But we still managed to come up
with a lot of joint documents, a lot of joint statements, and even with two large, about 20 pages each, civil
society declarations for the two summits. That was possible. And we just used maybe more innovative, more
open, more tolerant mechanisms instead of the diplomatic negotiation mechanism. There are mechanisms like
the IETF is using, rough consensus, things like that.”
27. See Section 4.3.2.5.
28. See Section 4.3.5.3.
29. See Section 6.3.
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non-binding decisions or recommendations have thus been addressed, there is also a third
argument that has not been so prominent. This is the fact that the Tunis Agenda makes
mention of the IGF making recommendations only in respect of“emerging issues.”Whilst the
meaning of this phrase is not deﬁned (in fact, no clear understanding of it had even emerged
by the time of the Emerging Issues session in Athens), it can be taken to be narrower than
the full gamut of public policy issues that the IGF is called upon to discuss.
30
There are two responses to this apparent limitation of the IGF’s decision-making role. The
ﬁrst is that the capacity to make recommendations in respect of other issues is inherent in
other paragraphs of the IGF’s mandate. In particular, the IGF is charged to“[d]iscuss public
policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance,”but not simply in the abstract; it
is to do so“in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development
of the Internet.”
31
This clearly envisages that the discussions that take place at the IGF will have a ﬂow-on eﬀect
into existing Internet governance arrangements. Indeed, the mandate explicitly states as much,
requiring the IGF to“[i]nterface with appropriate inter-governmental organizations and other
institutions on matters under their purview.”
32 Even Marcus Kummer has acknowledged
that the IGF is to “prepare the decisions that will be taken into consideration by other
organizations that do have the decision-making power.”
33 However the IGF’s discussions could
not foster the objectives laid out in its mandate if they were to be left irresolute, and neither
would there be any purpose in interfacing with other organisations if they were not to be
provided with any tangible input.
The second response is that the Tunis Agenda’s omission to empower the IGF to make rec-
ommendations other than on emerging issues does not prevent it from doing so, as it is
not from the Tunis Agenda that that power stems to begin with. For one thing, although
the IGF is a multi-stakeholder network, the Tunis Agenda cannot fairly be described as a
multi-stakeholder agreement. As Chapter 5 revealed, for all the claims of the WSIS process
to incorporate “the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society, and in-
ternational organizations,”
34 non-governmental stakeholders were permitted only very limited
30. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(g)
31. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(a), and see also paras 72(b) and 72(j)
respectively regarding the discussion of issues not falling within the scope of any existing body, and of issues
relating to critical Internet resources.
32. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(c)
33. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Internet Governance Forum This Month Will Be Wide-
Ranging, Says UN Oﬃcial (2007)
34. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 48
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involvement in the process of drafting the output documents. As such, the Tunis Agenda can
only be regarded as an intergovernmental agreement, which carries no legitimate authority
over transnational non-state actors and networks.
35
As for states, the WSIS outcome documents do draw from the supranational authority of UN
bodies and agencies such as the General Assembly that have been charged with exercising
oversight over their follow-up and implementation. However, the Tunis Agenda does not
purport to limit states’ power to make recommendations or other soft law in issue areas
besides those speciﬁed in paragraph 72, either within the structure of the IGF, or indeed
in any other venue of their choosing. In fact, the Declaration of Principles states explicitly
that“[n]othing in this Declaration shall be construed as impairing, contradicting, restricting or
derogating from ... any other international instrument or national laws adopted in furtherance
of these instruments.”
36
If the Tunis Agenda is not competent to limit the participation of non-state actors within the
IGF, and is not intended to limit the autonomy of states in pursuing parallel initiatives, then
it can present no obstacle to all stakeholders collaborating within the IGF on the consensual
development of public policy recommendations in any issue area they see ﬁt. Naturally in
practice, this will depend upon the willingness of states to engage in this process on an equal
footing with other stakeholders, and on this point, more will be said at Section 6.3.
6.2.1.2. Transnational law
Making recommendations to other bodies is one aspect of policy-setting, but the IGF is
also directed to “discuss issues that do not fall within the scope of any existing body.”
37
What is to be the outcome of these discussions, where no appropriate organisation exists to
receive any recommendations that may ﬂow from them? Or, indeed, where there is an existing
organisation to receive the IGF’s output, does the making of recommendations to that body
mark the end of the matter, even if those recommendations are ignored?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to more precisely place the IGF’s position along
the continuum from decision-shaping to decision-taking. In summary, it will be argued that:
￿ in respect of issues not falling within the scope of any existing body with a legitimate claim
to exercise governance over them, the IGF should exercise essentially a decision-taking (or
35. See Section 3.4.1.1.
36. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 18
37. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(b)
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to be more accurate a policy-setting) role; and
￿ in other issue areas, the normative force of the IGF’s recommendations will vary, as they
must be balanced with the parallel policy-setting activities of one or more other bodies,
which may also have a measure of legitimacy of their own.
It is the ﬁrst case that is to be discussed here, with the second to be dealt with under the
following heading.
38
To state that the IGF should set policy on its own account in issue areas not being dealt
with by other bodies is hardly a radical proposition. It implies nothing more than that as
a governance network whose structure and processes are demonstrably legitimate for the
performance of its assigned role (assuming this to be the case, for now), its policy recommen-
dations carry normative force in their own right, and do not require the imprimatur of any
other body. It does not mean that the IGF’s recommendations will become formally authorita-
tive (at least not in the short to medium term); rather as Held argues,“it needs to be stressed
that any global legislative institution should be conceived above all as a ‘standard-setting’
institution.”
39
Like other standards-setting institutions, those of the IGF that prove successful will tend
to be adopted and promulgated at domestic and local levels using the mechanisms of rules,
markets or architecture; indeed this may be necessary in some issue areas for their eﬀective
realisation. However the normative status of its recommendations is derived not from whether
or how they have been adopted by stakeholders, but from the multi-stakeholder structure and
democratic processes by which they were developed.
Although the success of the IGF’s recommendations is not the source of their legitimacy, it
does serve as a kind of“running code”test of their eﬀectiveness
40 that could, in time, serve to
further anchor the IGF and its free-ﬂoating norms in transnational society, in much the same
way as the success of the Incoterms and the international commercial arbitration regime has
consolidated the transnational legal force of the new law merchant.
41 The result could be the
development of the IGF’s recommendations from mere norms into an independent body of
transnational law.
42
To put this into context, consider if the IGF were to develop an Internet Bill of Rights by
38. See Section 6.2.2.
39. Held, David, Models of Democracy (1996), 356
40. See Section 5.4.4.2.
41. See also Section 4.2.5.
42. See Section 3.5.
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consensus amongst its stakeholders, without the intention that it be delivered to an intergov-
ernmental body for formal signature and ratiﬁcation. Such a document could still have eﬀect
as an instrument of governance by norms, to the extent that it informed the decentralised
collective action of its stakeholders, who would tend to act in accordance with it or be judged
by reference to it. After some time, it might be the Internet Bill of Rights had become suﬃ-
ciently ubiquitous amongst stakeholders in Internet governance, perhaps even being referred
to in legislative instruments in the same way that Internet standards are today,
43 that it could
be described in its own right as an instrument that “people identify and treat through their
social practices as law.”
44 At this point, the Internet Bill of Rights would eﬀectively have
passed into transnational law, and the IGF become a transnational lawmaker.
In order to even commence along this path and thereby build up a track record of “running
code,” the authority of the IGF to develop transnational law must not only be formally
legitimate, but must also be seen as such by all participants and stakeholders in the Internet
governance regime.
45 As noted above, this in turn requires that the IGF possess a multi-
stakeholder structure and democratic processes (for example, that its output is the product of
open, reasoned deliberation, and that it incorporate mechanisms of democratic accountability
and transparency). A further prerequisite of the IGF acting as an autonomous transnational
lawmaker is that its legitimacy to set policy in a given issue area is not shared with any other
body. If it is, then the development of transnational law will engage the IGF not only in its
role of policy-setting, but also in the role of coordination with that other body.
6.2.2. Coordination
As described above, the IGF’s role of coordination includes the process of establishing how
and by whom the objectives that were determined during the policy-setting phase should
be pursued.
46 For example, this may involve the IGF forwarding its recommendations to
appropriate other bodies to be implemented through some other mechanism of governance
such as rules, when they cannot be eﬀectively implemented through the political and moral
force of the IGF’s self-developed norms.
If the IGF’s independent policy-setting role has been controversial, then its coordination
43. See Section 3.3.2.3.
44. Tamanaha, Brian Z, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (2001), 194
45. See Section 3.4.1.
46. Though in cases where policy-setting authority is shared with another body, the two phases overlap: see
Section 6.2.2.3.
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role has been accepted much more readily. For example, the opening remarks of the UN
Secretary-General that were transmitted to the Athens meeting noted that“while the Forum
is not designed to take decisions, it can identify issues that need to be tackled through formal
intergovernmental processes.”
47
Apart from intergovernmental organisations, the IGF also has a role to play in coordinating
with non-governmental actors; most notably the other specialised Internet governance insti-
tutions that preceded the IGF. Although only ICANN and the RIRs are referred to in the
Tunis Agenda in this regard (and then only obliquely rather than by name), other notable
organisations in this category are those involved in the standards development sphere, which
has been largely isolated from any public policy oversight to date.
The role of coordination is also broader than the making of recommendations, particularly in
that the Tunis Agenda makes it clear that the process is to be two-way; speaking of it in terms
of“discourse between bodies,”“engagement,”and the need to“interface”and“exchange.”Thus
in appropriate cases, just as the IGF can forward its output to other organisations, so other
organisations can provide material to the IGF as an impetus for or an input into multi-
stakeholder deliberation. For example, the OECD could submit its Anti-Spam Toolkit
48 for
multi-stakeholder endorsement by the IGF (which in fact it did, in a sense, by submitting it
as a contribution to the Athens meeting).
49
Whether the IGF makes a recommendation to another body on its own initiative, or in
response to input submitted by that body, the case where only one such other body is involved
will be discussed under the heading of subsidiarity below, because in both cases the purpose
of coordination between the two organisations is to ensure that the relevant governance roles
(such as that of policy-setting and rule-making) are taken at the most appropriate level.
A slightly more complex case is that in which the implementation of policy requires several
stakeholders to engage in coordinated collective action. Since the stakeholders participating
in such a programme thereby form a governance network in their own right, this case will be
discussed below under the heading of network building.
It is also useful to distinguish a third aspect to the role of coordination, though it is inherent
in the other two. It was determined above
50 that there is no reason why the IGF should
47. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, The Secretary-General’s Message to the Internet Governance
Forum (2006); and see Cerf, Vinton, Does the Internet Need to be Governed? (2004) .
48. OECD, Anti-Spam Toolkit (2006)
49. Unfortunately this fell rather ﬂat, as the IGF had not developed the procedures necessary for it to deliberate
upon or respond to the input.
50. See Section 6.2.1.2.
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be precluded from making recommendations in any issue area of Internet governance not
already inhabited by an existing body of comparable democratic design and multi-stakeholder
composition. However, the analysis of forty other organisations earlier in this chapter suggests
that that proviso is likely to apply to few other organisations. This leaves the IGF at the centre
of a network of other actors that make up the Internet governance regime, most of which lack
the IGF’s legitimacy in dealing with public policy issues.
Does this mean that these other organisations present no limitation upon the IGF’s legitimate
policy-setting role? If so, how can this be reconciled with the political reality of those organi-
sations’ existence and claims of authority? These vexed questions will be discussed under the
heading of meta-governance below.
6.2.2.1. Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity reﬂects the facts that governance incorporates a number of
distinct roles, including those of policy-setting, audit, arbitration, coordination and regula-
tion that were used to categorise the organisations short-listed earlier in this chapter, and
that diﬀerent organisations may be more eﬀective in performing certain of these roles than
others.
51
This understanding is inherent in the Tunis Agenda’s constitution of the IGF as “a neutral,
non-duplicative and non-binding process”
52 that is to “have no involvement in day-to-day or
technical operations of the Internet.”
53 It also underlies the deﬁnition of the separate roles of
stakeholders in the Geneva Principles.
54
This principle of subsidiarity will thus be engaged by recommendations of the IGF whenever
another organisation can legitimately exercise one or more of the governance roles associated
with the implementation of that recommendation more eﬀectively than the IGF alone, either
because it operates using another mechanism of governance (such as rules), in another sphere
of governance (such as standards development), or at another level of governance (such as
the domestic level).
This will likely be so in all cases other than those where norms alone are a suﬃcient mech-
51. Some may also be more legitimate than others; a question to be dealt with at Section 6.2.2.3.
52. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 77
53. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 63 and 77.
54. Although rather than focusing on which organisations should perform which roles, it simply attempts to
allocate the roles between the stakeholder groups, whilst recognising that no individual stakeholder group is
competent to assume overall responsibility for Internet governance: WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles
(2003), paras 35 and 20.
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anism for the implementation of the recommendation,
55 and where no other organisation is
legitimately involved in the development or promulgation of norms in that issue area.
As well as being a key principle of transnational democracy,
56 EU law, and indeed the very
concept of federalism, the principle of subsidiarity has also long been evident in Internet
governance.
57 Although decentralisation is the more general value around which the Internet
architecture was designed, where hierarchy is found on the Internet, it tends to be qualiﬁed
by subsidiarity. For example, in the sphere of technical coordination it is inherent in the
structure of the DNS system, whereby each level of a domain name is separately administered.
Similarly in standards development it has been observed that the IETF formally abnegated
responsibility for the development of standards for the World Wide Web in favour of a more
specialised body, the W3C.
58
The principle applies in a similar manner to the public policy sphere of governance inhabited
by the IGF. Thus in simple cases, where the IGF’s recommendations require application
at a level of governance beyond its competence (such as rules), and where there is only
one legitimate body exercising authority at that level of governance in the issue area in
question (such as ICANN or WIPO), the eﬀect of the IGF’s mandate is that it should make
recommendations to that body so that it in turn can take the appropriate further action.
This is how WGIG foresaw the IGF’s role, with one of its members recording the view that:
In the event that an issue may currently be addressed to an established entity, this fact shall
not preclude the forum from discussing the issue in question and passing recommendations to
the competent responsible entity.
59
Even in cases where there is no existing body to take the IGF’s recommendations forward, for
the IGF to call for action to be taken at an intergovernmental level can still be seen as exercis-
ing a coordinating role in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Thus WGIG expected
that the IGF“may also invite—or recommend that the United Nations invites—member states
to discuss a certain issue in an oﬃcial capacity, or via a vote in the United Nations General
Assembly.”
60
There are, of course, cases in which the application of the principle of subsidiarity raises
greater practical diﬃculties than acknowledged above. These include the case in which there
55. Or at least, where consensus cannot be reached upon the need for any other mechanism to be employed.
56. See Section 4.3.1.4.
57. Subsidiarity is one of six cross-cutting principles for eﬀective Internet governance in the Asia-Paciﬁc region
as recommended by the UNDP-APDIP: APDIP, Internet Governance in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region (2005), 64.
58. IETF, The “text/html” Media Type (2000)
59. Sha’ban, Charles, Proposal for the Establishment of an Internet Governance Forum (2005), 236
60. Sha’ban, Charles, Proposal for the Establishment of an Internet Governance Forum (2005), 236
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is more than one relevant existing body to which the IGF’s recommendations might be ad-
dressed, and that in which the other existing body and the IGF both purport to exercise
policy-setting authority in the same issue area. The ﬁrst of those cases will be dealt with
next, and the second under the following heading of meta-governance.
6.2.2.2. Network building
Where the eﬀective governance of a particular issue requires the collaboration of multiple
bodies, coordination between them requires more than the unilateral process of transmitting
a recommendation or the bilateral process of dialogue; it requires multilateral interaction
between stakeholders such as is only possible within a governance network incorporating
deliberative democratic or consensual processes.
Since the IGF is (let us continue to assume for now) such a network, and is open to all
stakeholders, the ideal case would be for all such bodies to participate in the processes by
which the IGF builds consensus upon the issues to be addressed and the means by which they
are to be addressed. However, without preempting the discussion on the IGF’s structure or
processes, if this entails participation in plenary meetings, the overhead involved in developing
the norms of trust and cooperation that a diverse plenary group requires to function may
deter some stakeholders from participating. Thus the very open and consensual nature of the
IGF may work against its eﬀectiveness.
A possible solution to this is for the IGF to act in the coordinating role of facilitating the
decentralised collective action of its members, through their own, self-organised smaller net-
works. Its particular mandate to do this is found in the call to“[f]acilitate discourse between
bodies dealing with diﬀerent cross-cutting international public policies regarding the Inter-
net.”
61 This is also the model of the GKP, whose motto is “Sharing Knowledge, Building
Partnerships,” and which has facilitated the formation of a number of smaller global and
regional multi-stakeholder networks.
62
Another example of an Internet governance issue around which which a smaller multi-
stakeholder network has come together is that of private sector involvement in governmental
Internet ﬁltering and surveillance.
63 The IGF’s contribution to debate on this issue occurred
during the Openness panel in Athens, when panelists Fred Tipson from Microsoft and Art
61. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(c)
62. For example, the Youth Social Enterprise Initiative (YSEI); see http://www.ysei.org/.
63. See Section 2.3.1.4 and Section 4.3.4.1.
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Reilly from Cisco Systems, and from the ﬂoor, Vinton Cerf of Google, were interrogated over
their companies’ participation in Internet content regulation in China.
Assuming that the IGF had the structural and procedural capacity to deliberate on public
policy issues of any kind, the polarisation of the debate in Athens
64 demonstrated that this
particular issue would likely be a very diﬃcult one to begin with. Absent a strong culture of
trust, equality and cooperation to provide a bedrock for deliberation, the likelihood of a
consensus position being developed on it within the plenary forum could only have been
described as remote.
65
Thus the Athens meeting ended without any attempt having been made at conciliation of
the opposing views on this issue, let alone deliberation upon how they might be balanced
in, say, a code of conduct on private sector involvement in national Internet regulation. And
yet, less than three months later, it was announced that Microsoft, Google and Yahoo were
amongst the members of a new multi-stakeholder network that aimed to produce just such a
code.
66 Bringing together an academic initiative,
67 the work of private sector group Business
for Social Responsibility and that of civil society’s Centre for Democracy and Technology, the
network has no aﬃliation with the IGF.
If more focused networks such as this can be formed in particular issue areas without reference
to the IGF, does this make the latter superﬂuous? Certainly this was the view of the ITU prior
to the IGF’s formation, with the Director of its TSB, Houlin Zhao, stating in 2005 that
“if ICANN, ITU, UNESCO and WIPO see each other as complementary and try to work
together, we don’t need to have a special agency.”
68
However, whilst there is nothing to prevent any stakeholders from forming their own net-
works, the IGF will retain a legitimate role in receiving and deliberating upon the output
of any such networks that do not fulﬁl the same criteria of multi-stakeholder composition
64. At one extreme, a Chinese government delegate, Yang Xiokun, denied that there even were any restrictions
on access to Internet content in China, to the surprise of panelists who had been personally aﬀected by such
restrictions. At the other extreme, Amnesty International presented a petition of 50 000 signatures later that
week containing a “call on governments to stop the unwarranted restriction of freedom of expression on the
Internet—and on companies to stop helping them do it.”
65. See particularly Section 4.4.4.3, Section 4.3.2.2 and Section 4.2.4.4, and also Section 6.4 below. This was one
basis upon which the IGF was justiﬁed in focusing on less divisive issues ﬁrst, in order to leave room to develop
such norms and build the social capital upon which it would need to draw in later tackling more contentious
issues such as critical Internet resource management: Allen, David, The Role of Intellectual/Academic Work in
a Policy Forum (2006), 7.
66. CDT, Companies, Human Rights Groups, Investors, Academics and Technology Leaders to Address Interna-
tional Free Expression and Privacy Challenges (2007)
67. The OpenNet Initiative; see http://opennet.net/.
68. McCullagh, Declan, The UN Thinks About Tomorrow’s Cyberspace (2005), and see Zhao, Houlin, ITU and
Internet Governance (2004) , 10
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and democratic process as the IGF itself. This includes the (yet-unnamed) network described
above, which apart from having no Chinese members, contains no governmental representa-
tives either (other than a Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General).
The appropriate role for the IGF, then, in order to balance the ﬂexibility and eﬀectiveness
of smaller networks with the legitimacy of a larger and more open group, is to foster the
formation of networks between its members, but also to ensure that their output is subjected
to multi-stakeholder deliberation, both within those smaller networks if possible, and ﬁnally
within the IGF at large. One possible framework within which for this to be accomplished is
through the IGF’s dynamic coalitions, as will be discussed below.
69
6.2.2.3. Meta-governance
It has been concluded that the legitimacy of the IGF’s policy-setting role ﬂows (or rather,
should ﬂow) from its multi-stakeholder structure and democratic processes. Many of the
organisations and networks it must coordinate its activities with do not share those virtues,
yet assume a role preeminent to that of the IGF. How is the IGF to relate to these other
bodies and reconcile their governance programmes with its own?
Two possible answers to this question can be dismissed in short order. The ﬁrst is that
the claims of other institutions with lesser legitimacy than the IGF to exercise authority in
Internet governance should be denied, and that the IGF should purport to act as the sole
legitimate policy-setting body for the regime. This answer fails on three counts. First, it
contradicts the Tunis Agenda, which prohibits the IGF from duplicating the work of any
existing body. Second, were the IGF to make such an audacious claim, it could no longer
expect the impugned institutions to continue to participate in the network. The third reason,
which underlies the others, is that even in the new medieval age, formal authority still matters.
To elucidate, the IGF is a microcosm of the mythical greater public sphere in which democratic
deliberation takes place. This public sphere does not take decisions on its own account, but
must be linked with formal decision-making bodies such as parliaments and courts.
70 So it
is too with the IGF, whose role it is to coordinate with bodies holding formal authority,
such as domestic governments and international organisations, not in order to usurp their
function, but in order to elevate them to greater levels of democratic legitimacy. Therefore
they cannot be regarded merely as functional appendages to implement or enforce the IGF’s
69. See Section 6.3.1.5.
70. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 371
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recommendations, but rather as the formal policy-setting authorities that can give force to
those recommendations in the international system.
To give an example, the IGF might seek that its recommendations in a particular issue
area—say on the Internet Bill of Rights, to return to an earlier hypothetical case—be given
force in the international system. In order for this to be achieved, it could petition the General
Assembly to resolve that a new treaty or convention on this topic be drafted. States would, as
always, formally take the leading role in this process, but there is no reason why they could
not utilise a document prepared by the IGF as their ﬁrst draft; indeed, they would have every
reason to do so if they participated in the process by which it was prepared within the IGF.
The IGF could also be consulted during the intergovernmental negotiation process (much
as, imperfectly, civil society was consulted during the WSIS negotiations), with the result
that the ﬁnal treaty, although de jure intergovernmental, would de facto be a document of
multi-stakeholder ownership.
Lest this example be thought far-fetched, it closely describes the process by which the Mine
Ban Treaty, and more recently the Disability Convention,
71 were prepared largely at the
initiation and with the integral involvement of civil society.
72
If the ﬁrst possible response of the IGF to the involvement of less legitimate bodies in Internet
governance was to oppose their claims, and this response has been rejected, then the second
and contrary response is to yield to those claims, and thereby for the IGF to allow its own
recommendations to be accorded only the weight that other institutions would accord them.
In this case, if WIPO should insist that it remain the sole venue for policy-setting in relation to
intellectual property issues, and the WTO the only proper forum in which for the development
of international trade policy, then the result would be the IGF’s recommendations carrying
little if any weight within those bodies.
This response is also clearly problematic, for two reasons. First, along the continuum between
decision-shaping and decision-taking, whilst the IGF is not to act as a decision-taker in place
of existing governance bodies that exercise that role, neither can it be relegated to the position
of just another stakeholder submitting input into higher-level policy-setting processes.
To do so would be to deny the individual autonomy of its participants who have delegated
to the IGF the function of expressing their collective interests. This makes its recommenda-
71. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 6 Dec 2006, A/61/611 (not yet in force)
72. Cameron, Maxwell A, Global Civil Society and the Ottawa Process: Lessons From the Movement to Ban
Anti-Personnel Mines (1999); Lord, Janet E, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Voice Accountability and NGOs in
Human Rights Standard Setting (2004) and see Section 3.2.3.1.
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tions more than the expression of individual preferences such as would be received as input
into a“participatory democracy-style”open consultation, and having a purely advisory status,
but rather the culmination of a policy development process that is democratically legitimate
in its own right.
73
Second, it would signiﬁcantly weaken the IGF’s policy-setting role if its capacity to make
recommendations and have them implemented were left to the whim of other bodies without
regard to those bodies’ legitimacy. Although the IGF is directed to be non-duplicative in
its operation, this cannot be taken to be merely a reference to duplication of the substan-
tive issues being addressed, but also that of the procedures by which they are addressed.
Where the IGF’s recommendations are developed through multi-stakeholder, democratic de-
liberation and those of another body addressing the same issues are developed through a
less inclusive and legitimate process, it is not accurate to describe the IGF’s activities as
duplicative.
So if the IGF is not to reject the parallel claims of authority of less legitimate organisations,
but nor to automatically accede to them, what is the IGF’s responsibility when faced with a
clash between existing bodies’ authority and its own? The Tunis Agenda suggests the answer.
It states that the IGF is to “[p]romote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of
WSIS principles in Internet governance processes.”
74
This means that in interfacing with “appropriate inter-governmental organizations and oth-
er institutions on matters under their purview,” the IGF is to assess the extent to which
they satisfy the WSIS process criteria that“international management of the Internet should
be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the
private sector, civil society and international organizations.”
75
The result of this assessment will then inform the IGF’s relationship with these other organi-
sations. If an external body adequately fulﬁls the WSIS process criteria in its own right, then
in order to remain non-duplicative, the IGF’s role will be narrower than in the case of a body
that does not fulﬁl those principles. In the latter case, the IGF’s role of coordinating with
that body will require it to provide an overarching multi-stakeholder democratic framework
by which to augment the body’s structures and processes so that the WSIS principles are
fulﬁlled for that issue area within the governance regime as a whole. An implication of this is
that the IGF is not precluded from participating in any area of Internet-related public policy
73. See Section 3.4.1.3.
74. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72 (i)
75. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003), para 48
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unless the body by which such issues are already being dealt with is adequately democratic
and multi-stakeholder in composition, such that the IGF’s involvement would be redundant.
Interestingly, much the same concept was raised during the plenary session on security of the
Athens meeting of the IGF, in which the moderator Ken Cukier asked the panel whether
the IGF had a role to play in putting forward technical standards designed to address public
policy issues, into bodies such as the IETF. Gus Hosein of the London School of Economics
was amongst those who responded that there was a legitimate role for the IGF here, but
that it was at the level of establishing general principles that standards bodies and other
organisations of Internet governance could take into consideration in their work, rather than
in assuming responsibility for that work directly.
76
Of course, the IGF has no authority to enforce its assessment of another body’s compliance
with the WSIS process criteria, but that is where its mandate to “promote” those principles
comes in. One way in which to do so is for the IGF to hold bodies that do not adequately
fulﬁl the process criteria accountable for their implementation of the IGF’s recommenda-
tions through a public follow-up process. Another is to discuss the structure and processes of
other Internet governance organisations and to make recommendations for their reform. This
could be done through the open forum sessions that made their debut at the Rio meeting,
77
if these were appropriately facilitated to achieve this end.
Thus the meta-governance role of the IGF is to promote, assess and where necessary provide,
a common standard of governance for interconnected governance organisations, analogous
to the common TCP/IP protocols by which Internet hosts are interconnected. This is a
programme that would fulﬁl the transnational democratic ideal at its most ambitious: to
extend the principles of democracy on a transnational basis across all applicable levels of
governance.
78
It is also, inevitably, a highly charged political process, and therefore one that the IGF has
perhaps naturally been slow to embrace. For example, although ICANN purports to be a
democratic and multi-stakeholder forum in its own right, because it is not yet adequately
democratic according to the reckoning of this thesis, there remains a legitimate role for the
IGF in setting policy for the management of critical Internet resources. Yet this is clearly not
a role that ICANN will be inclined to accept, nor that the IGF has yet sought.
79
76. Compare also Katz, Eddan & DeNardis, Laura, Best Practices for Internet Standards Governance (2006), 5.
77. Drake, William J, Encouraging Implementation of the WSIS Principles on Internet Governance Procedures
(2007)
78. See Section 4.3.1.4.
79. However in February 2008 the IGP suggested that it should do so, in putting to the NTIA “that a new
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As contentious as the process will be, the appropriate way forward is for the extent of the
IGF’s role in setting policy for critical Internet resource management, and other grey areas
of the IGF’s mandate such as the divide between public policy and technical issues in this
area,
80 to be discussed between ICANN and the stakeholders of the IGF in an agenda-setting
process that is itself conducted on a democratic, multi-stakeholder basis.
81
6.2.3. Development
A number of paragraphs of the IGF’s mandate in the Tunis Agenda require the IGF to direct-
ly engage in the promotion of development objectives such as capacity building. Thus it will
be recalled that the IGF is directed to“[f]acilitate the exchange of information and best prac-
tices,”to“[a]dvise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to accelerate the availability
and aﬀordability of the Internet in the developing world,” to strengthen the engagement of
stakeholders particularly from developing countries “in existing and/or future Internet gov-
ernance mechanisms,” and to “[c]ontribute to capacity building for Internet governance in
developing countries.”
82
The inclusion of these paragraphs on development in the IGF’s mandate may be largely
attributed to the forum’s origin in WSIS, a summit which by the nature of its consensu-
al process was strongly inﬂuenced by developing country interests.
83 What is most notable
about these paragraphs is that unlike the balance of the IGF’s mandate which requires it
to perform the Internet governance functions of policy-setting and coordination across a
range of substantive Internet governance issues, they entreat the IGF to address particular
development-related Internet governance issues such as capacity building itself. In fact, only
one of the development-related paragraphs in the IGF’s mandate requires it to engage in any
of the governance roles recognised in this chapter; namely the call to“strengthen and enhance
external oversight arrangement for ICANN be set up by leveraging the innovation and experimentation of the
Internet Governance Forum”: IGP, Comments of the Internet Governance Project on The Continued Transition
of the Technical Coordination and Management of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System: Midterm
Review of the Joint Project Agreement (2008), 5.
80. It is adequately clear that the IGF could provide recommendations to ICANN on, for example, the priva-
cy implications of its WHOIS database, the ramiﬁcations of IPR and A2K policy on the UDRP, and the relevance
of the WSIS principles to the introduction of multilingual domain names. But what about the introduction of
new gTLDs into the global root—is this a purely administrative function, or, as the GAC would have it, one that
engages public policy interests (see GAC, GAC Principles and Guidelines on Public Policy Issues Regarding the
Implementation of New gTLDs (2006))?
81. Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
(2001), 223
82. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 72(d), (e), (f) and (h)
83. See Section 5.1.
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the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or future Internet governance mechanisms,”
84
which can be regarded as a coordination role.
Although these paragraphs do not specify roles of governance for the IGF to undertake in the
procedural sense used in this chapter, this does not mean that they are not still appropriate
functions for a democratic governance network to address. After all, the programme of sub-
stantive democracy is to ensure that all have an equal opportunity as well as an equal right
to participate in governance, and it has already been noted the digital divide is one of the
most signiﬁcant impediments to this objective for the Internet governance regime.
85
The inclusion of a development programme within the IGF’s mandate also puts it in good
company with other of the exemplar organisations, namely the GKP, GAID and UNICTTF,
all of which are also linked with the WSIS process, and also with ISOC whose motto is“The
Internet is for Everyone.”
Even so, it is perhaps unfortunate that this programme, as important as it is to the devel-
opment of a democratic transnational Internet governance regime, should be intermingled
with the quite distinct procedural governance roles assigned to the IGF in the balance of
its mandate, particularly since there are many other speciﬁc issues that are of equal impor-
tance to the development of a substantively democratic Internet governance regime, which
the mandate omits to include.
86
As the focus of this thesis is on procedural rather than substantive issues, no further attention
will speciﬁcally be given to the operational roles in the IGF’s mandate, which include those
relating to development noted above, and also the mandate to “[h]elp to ﬁnd solutions to
the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet, of particular concern to everyday
users.”
87 The analysis that follows as to the eﬀectiveness of the IGF’s structure and processes
to fulﬁl its mandate should therefore be understood as being subject to this limitation.
6.3. Structure
Having set out the speciﬁc roles of policy-setting and coordination that are inherent in the
84. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 72(f)
85. See Section 4.3.5.2 and Section 4.3.1.3.
86. The most obvious example is the importance of upholding human rights, as appears to have been acknowl-
edged by both the CS-IGC and A2K@IGF when they proposed during the May 2007 open consultations that
human rights should join capacity building as a“cross-cutting priority”for the IGF (though this was blocked by
China during the following meeting of the former Advisory Group).
87. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(k)
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IGF’s function as a governance network, as well as being mandated by the Tunis Agenda, it
is now necessary to assess whether an appropriate institutional structure exists to support
the fulﬁlment of those roles.
In making this assessment, both too little structure and too much structure are to be avoided.
As will be seen, the case of too little structure bears much resemblance to the IGF in its
present form, which is essentially that of an annual conference on Internet governance, and
a banner under which stakeholders may engage in decentralised collective action through
dynamic coalitions. The problem with such a lack of structure is that multi-stakeholder policy
development does not “just happen” without a degree of institutionalisation:
Without roles and rules for decision-making and resource mobilization, collective action becomes
more diﬃcult and thus less likely. Facilitating communication among persons, as well as resolving
any conﬂicts that may arise among them, is likewise needed for getting and keeping people
together to accomplish things that are beyond the capability of individuals who are seeking just
their own well-being.
88
On the other hand, worse still than a lack of structure is a surfeit, especially when the
structure is ill-matched to the eﬀective and legitimate fulﬁlment of the network’s roles. This
too can be seen in the IGF, for example in the juxtaposition of the hierarchical leadership
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Secretariat (at least in relation to
questions of the IGF’s role and structure) with what is notionally an open, consensual and
multi-stakeholder network of equals.
Thankfully the deﬁciencies of the IGF’s present structure are neither inevitable nor irre-
mediable, since the IGF was expressly established to “have a lightweight and decentralised
structure that would be subject to periodic review.”
89 It is only to be expected that such
review might entail a radical overhaul of the IGF’s preliminary structure, which after all was
established in a short space of time in accordance with the mandate of the Tunis Agenda,
thereby limiting the practicality of extensive advance consultation and the development of
adequately transparent processes for the convening of the inaugural meeting.
The longer such review is delayed or minimised, however, the more likely it is that structural
inertia will set in and the IGF’s preliminary structure will become calciﬁed.
90 Kenneth Cukier
writes:
88. Uphoﬀ, N, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation (1999),
228
89. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 73
90. Colombo, Massimo G & Delmastro, Marco, The Determinants of Organizational Change and Structural
Inertia: Technological and Organizational Factors (2002)
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What is needed is more concentration on designing an organization that is capable of changing
for new circumstances. It should have the seeds of its own diminishment or dissolution within it.
It must have a separation of powers, and checks and balances—the one thing that every attempt
at Internet governance, oddly, has lacked.
91
These are the hallmarks of democratic forms of ordering, as discussed in detail in Chapter
4. In that chapter it was concluded that a democratic organisational form, in conjunction
with a consensual deliberative process, provided a suitable balance between the poles of
anarchistic ordering (which is decentralised and adaptable, but copes poorly with strategic
behaviour and imbalances of power), and hierarchical design (which can be more eﬀective,
accountable and transparent, but is by deﬁnition non-consensual).
More speciﬁcally, it was suggested that a suitable such democratic structure for transnational
Internet public policy governance would consist of a plenary body open to participation by all
stakeholders, which would be responsible for building consensus on public policy issues, under
the guidance of a multi-stakeholder executive council to which nominees would be appointed
on the basis of merit through a consensual or democratic process, and which would have the
responsibility of assessing and ratifying the consensus of the plenary body.
How does this ideal compare with the IGF as it exists, and what is required to reform its
structure to accord with the ideal more closely? These are the questions to which this section
is addressed. They will be addressed ﬁrst in the context of the existing structures that have
been developed for the IGF, before a broader view is taken that allows for more radical
reforms to be considered.
6.3.1. Existing structures
The existing structures that are to be considered here are the annual plenary meetings of the
IGF, the Secretariat, the Advisory Group, the open consultation meetings, the workshops and
dynamic coalitions organised by stakeholders, and ﬁnally the open fora that were ﬁrst held
in Rio.
6.3.1.1. Plenary
The application of the democratic principle to the Internet governance regime requires that
all stakeholders impacted in respect of a given issue should be empowered to participate in
the policy development process. However exactly which stakeholders are so impacted will vary
91. Cukier, Kenneth N, Slouching Towards Geneva: Ten Unappreciated Axioms of Internet Governance (2005),
5
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from one issue to another, and therefore the weight that should legitimately be accorded to
the input of each of those stakeholders will vary accordingly.
92
To manage this, there are two basic templates for designing a democratic Internet governance
institution that relates the participation of stakeholders in policy development to how directly
and how often their interests are engaged by the issues within its remit. These templates can
be understood as being drawn from the theory of representative democracy and that of
deliberative democracy respectively.
The representative democratic approach is to determine antecedently which stakeholders are
impacted by the issues within the organisation’s mandate and to what extent, to divide
them into stakeholder groups on that basis, and to institutionalise the representation of those
groups within the organisation in a ﬁxed structure. An example of this approach is found
in auDA, whose supply-side and demand-side members each vote only for representatives
of their own stakeholder groups to serve on the body’s board of directors, thus preserving
a balance of the presumed diﬀerent interests of suppliers and consumers of domain names
in ﬁxed proportions within the organisation’s decision-making organ. Other examples of the
representative democratic approach from the exemplar organisations include CGI.br (with
its governmental, private sector, civil society and technical stakeholder representatives) and
ICANN (with its three Supporting Organisations and their various constituency groups).
93
In addition to the more general shortcomings of representative democracy discussed at Section
4.3.1.2, such an approach suﬀers from the following problems:
￿ the determination of who will be impacted by the issues within the organisation’s mandate,
and their division into groups according to their (presumed or actual) interests in those
issues, are themselves matters which ought to be determined through an inclusive and
transparent democratic process rather than by what has been described as“top–down ger-
rymandering”:
94 this presents a chicken-and-egg dilemma;
95 and
￿ such a structure is inﬂexible, in that novel issues may arise that impact upon stakeholders
not already included within the organisation’s deﬁned constituencies, from whom it cannot
92. See Section 4.3.5.3.
93. Although not one of the exemplar organisations, an even clearer example of the representative democratic
approach is given by the ILO, with its division between governmental, employer and worker representatives.
94. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, What’s Wrong With ICANN—And How to Fix It (2000)
95. The only exception is in the case where stakeholder groupings can be determined objectively, but the only
common such case is that of geographical division. Even then, the determination can be incorrect or over-
simplistic, as in ICANN’s case: Centre for Global Studies, Enhancing Legitimacy in the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (1992), 4.
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easily receive formal input without being restructured. Or as in the IGF’s case, there may
be so many issues requiring of the input of diﬀerent groupings of aﬀected stakeholders, that
it is impracticable for all of those groupings to be institutionalised in the organisation’s
structure.
The second, deliberative democratic approach overcomes these problems. Central to this
approach is to structure the organisation’s plenary decision-making body as an open forum to
which all interested stakeholders have access,
96 and to determine the weight that particular
stakeholders’ input into that forum should be accorded subsequently rather than antecedently,
by subjecting that input to a process of reasoned public deliberation.
97
On the surface, this may seem to suggest that the structure of the IGF’s plenary body ac-
cords quite closely with the deliberative democratic ideal. It is open to all stakeholders,
including—uniquely for a UN body—unaﬃliated individuals. Stakeholder groups are not seg-
regated. There is no cost to attend, other than travel and accommodation costs or the costs of
obtaining Internet access through which to participate remotely.
98 However, where the plenary
structure of the IGF falls down is in its disempowerment to perform its policy-setting roles,
such as the making of recommendations.
This shortcoming is of course not the result of oversight, but design. Nitin Desai has consis-
tently argued, as he did again at the open consultations in May 2007:
If you are going to have agreed recommendations, who are the people who will have a right to
sit at that table? To recite this [agreement]? Because we do not have a membership deﬁned for
IGF, because we only deﬁned it as an event. And in a multi-stakeholder environment, there is
a genuine problem in talking in terms of membership. Are you going to say all those who are
present [decide]? Then let’s be very realistic. With the under-representation that you will always
have, [and] continue to have from developing countries, all those present will probably give you
a geographically unbalanced mix. It will also vary depending on where the meeting is held.
The appropriate response to this line of argument depends on how strongly it is taken.
In its strongest form, it implies not merely that the plenary body of the IGF cannot make
recommendations in its present, imperfectly-constituted form, but that no open plenary body,
however constituted, is capable of fulﬁlling a policy-setting role. This is an objection that goes
to the heart of the IGF’s mandate, and has been answered earlier in this chapter, when it was
reiterated that although such a body may be unsuited as a representative democratic forum,
96. This does not exclude the need for outreach to disadvantaged stakeholders, however: see Section 4.3.5.2.
97. This does not mean that stakeholder groupings may not be used within the organisation, as such groupings
serve more than one purpose. Their purpose for the IGF as theorised in this thesis is to ensure that the legitima-
cy of the organisation as a governance network is drawn from a balance of each of the sources that the various
stakeholder groups contribute. Importantly the IGF’s plenary body, however, acts as an amalgam of all four
groups.
98. But see Section 6.4.4 regarding the limitations of the latter.
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it can be perfectly well suited for democratic deliberation, provided that the perspectives of
all those signiﬁcantly aﬀected are able to be voiced during the discussion.
99
If on the other hand the above argument is taken simply as pointing to the fact that many
stakeholders who would otherwise participate in the IGF will be precluded by cost and dis-
tance from attending its annual plenary meetings in person, then it should be understood
that this disadvantage impacts upon each of the roles in the IGF’s mandate, not merely its
policy-setting role. The appropriate response to this disadvantage is therefore not to disregard
the most inconvenient paragraphs of the IGF’s mandate, but rather to attempt to address
the underlying causes of the problem. Indeed, this itself falls within the IGF’s mandate to
“[s]trengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or future Internet
governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries.”
100
There are a number of speciﬁc strategies by which the disadvantage of those who cannot
attend annual meetings of the IGF can and should be redressed, such as:
￿ Structuring the IGF less as a monolithic annual event, and more as a process made up of a
number of coordinated events and activities including intersessional regional meetings and
parallel fora for online participation.
101
APNIC provides a good model of such a structure, in that although it holds regular Open
Policy Meetings for those with the capacity to attend in person, policy proposals put
forward for decision at such a meeting must be tabled in advance on one of APNIC’s open
mailing lists, and if passed at the meeting (by rough consensus) may still be overturned by
objections subsequently lodged online.
102
To compare this to the IGF, selecting one example only for now,
103 although a “plenary”
mailing list was established for the use of IGF members at large, it has been near-dormant
since then, largely because it was never advertised by the IGF Secretariat.
104 As for sup-
portive regional meetings, whilst a handful have been convened through the decentralised
action of stakeholders,
105 the Secretariat has neither coordinated nor promoted these ad
hoc events.
99. See Section 6.2.1.1.
100. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(f)
101. Both of these deﬁciencies have been well noted by stakeholders. The need for regional meetings was discussed
at the February 2006 and 2007, and May 2007 open consultation meetings, and criticisms of the IGF’s lack of
support for online participation have been referred to at Section 5.2.3.2.
102. See Section 4.4.3.2 and compare also the similar case of the IETF: Froomkin, A M, Habermas@discourse.net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace (2003), 803.
103. But see also Section 6.4.4.
104. See Section 5.2.2.4.
105. See Section 5.3.
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￿ Online participation should be facilitated not only as a parallel process (whereby discus-
sion and deliberation takes place in online fora that are separate from the annual oﬄine
meeting), but also as a channel for communication between the annual meeting and remote
participants. This means both that the proceedings at the annual meeting should be ac-
cessible to remote participants, and also that the contributions of such participants should
be received by the meeting much as they are received by those present in person.
APNIC also provides a model of this, by using synchronous discussion software (Jab-
ber chat) to transmit live transcripts of meeting sessions and to allow for the receipt of
input from remote participants. A fuller assessment of how the IGF fares in comparison
will await later treatment,
106 but for now it suﬃces to note that whilst, like APNIC, it pro-
vides video and audio webcasting of plenary meetings, its failure to provide an equivalent
real-time transcript to APNIC’s Jabber service excludes many participants from developing
countries whose Internet access speed is limited.
￿ If it is taken as a given for now that full participation in the process of policy development
within the IGF requires attendance at its annual plenary meetings, the fulﬁlment of the
IGF’s mandate will depend upon those from developing countries being provided with
additional assistance to attend those meetings.
APNIC once again provides a model of this, through the fellowships that it oﬀers members
from developing countries to attend its OPMs. A slightly diﬀerent model is the establish-
ment of a specialised bureau dedicated to ensuring that the interests of less well-resourced
groups are represented, such as the Economic and Social Committee of the EU, or the Civil
Society Bureau of WSIS. In comparison to these initiatives, the IGF, having been provided
with no funding by the United Nations, relies upon its stakeholders to provide fellowships
to disadvantaged stakeholders.
107
In summary then, the basic structure of the IGF’s plenary body as an open forum has
been found to be well-suited to the fulﬁlment of its policy-setting roles through appropriate
deliberative democratic processes,
108 and although the argument that it is improper for such
a body to engage in policy development at all has been rejected, this argument has drawn
attention to the need for the IGF to foster fuller participation by disadvantaged stakeholders,
through a number of strategies including the development of regional and online fora that
106. See Section 6.4.4.
107. The largest of these has been Canada’s contribution of $100 000 for fellowships for developing country
experts announced during the May 2007 open consultation meeting. Japan also announced in September 2007
its contribution of 10 million yen for this and related purposes.
108. The nature of which are to be discussed separately at Section 6.4.
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can be coordinated with the main plenary forum, the facilitation of dialogue between the
plenary meeting and remote participants, and the provision of support to those who wish to
participate in the plenary forum but are otherwise unable to do so.
Despite all this, it may still be that the IGF’s plenary body ought not become its peak
decision-making organ. Whilst it cannot be questioned that the IGF has a mandate to perform
policy-setting roles, those roles might in practice be more eﬀectively distributed between the
open plenary body and more highly institutionalised organs of the IGF. It has already been
noted that, regardless of how sound the conceptual justiﬁcation may be for policy development
to be conducted by a body of indeterminate size and composition, governments will be loathe
to concede any more than the weakest advisory authority to such a body,
109 and that a more
substantial connection to the existing international system is likely to be required if the IGF
is to progress any further along the continuum from decision-shaping to decision-taking.
Were the plenary body therefore to delegate the formal part of its policy-setting authority
to some form of subcommittee with a more tightly deﬁned membership, the balance of the
plenary’s own activities would draw it somewhat closer to the role espoused by the Forum
doves: it would become less of an assembly, like the General Assembly of the United Nations,
and more of a think tank or a public policy institute. Its principal function would remain to
engage in democratic deliberation, with the aim of reaching consensus on issues of Internet-
related public policy, but it would no longer be called upon to declare its own consensus, nor
to draw the output of that discursive process together into an agreed form suitable for input
into other organisations. Those functions would instead lie elsewhere.
The question then becomes, where? If the plenary meeting is not to act as the peak body
for policy development within the IGF, who else is to do so: the Secretariat, the Advisory
Group, or some other organ or organs altogether?
6.3.1.2. Secretariat
The suggestion that the Secretariat should take on these substantive functions, or a subset of
them, may seem diﬃcult to countenance of an institution that traditionally carries out only
clerical duties, and in the case of the IGF, is appointed unilaterally by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations rather than by a multi-stakeholder process.
109. See Section 4.3.5.3 and Section 5.4.4.
398Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
But in fact it is na¨ ıve to imagine that the clerical duties of the Secretariat could be neatly
separated from underlying substantive issues relating to the role of the IGF, its structure
and processes, even if responsibility for those substantive issues were institutionalised in
another body. Rather, just as in the regime of Internet governance public policy issues are
often engaged in the notionally value-free spheres of technical coordination and standards
development, so too the responsibilities of the IGF’s Secretariat have engaged it in making
deeply political decisions.
To illustrate this, consider three of the most visible functions the IGF Secretariat has per-
formed for the Athens and Rio meetings:
￿ the preparation of synthesis papers and reports summarising the contributions and discus-
sions of stakeholders;
￿ recommending appropriate structures and processes for the IGF to the UN Secretary-
General based upon the views of stakeholders expressed during open consultation meetings;
and
￿ the preparation of a draft agenda for IGF meetings.
110
If it were even possible to perform such functions with neutrality as to the substantive content
of the IGF’s mandate, then a case can be made that the IGF Secretariat has in each case
failed to do so:
￿ Certain of the synthesis papers it has prepared have been criticised for their partiality in
the views they record.
111
￿ Similarly the Secretariat’s assessment of the“emerging consensus”expressed by stakeholders
has appeared to privilege certain interests, particularly those of governments, over others;
as evidenced for example by the appointment of an Advisory Group far larger than any
other stakeholders besides the G77 and China had suggested.
112
￿ It also prepared a draft agenda for the Rio meeting that omitted to make provision for the
discussion of Internet naming and numbering in a plenary session (once again, until de-
manded by China), in the face of strong and sustained criticism from numerous stakeholders
over its omission from the Athens programme.
110. This was done in conjunction with the Advisory Group for the Athens meeting, but for the Rio meeting
there was no Advisory Group when the ﬁrst draft agenda was prepared.
111. For example, ETNO criticised the post-Rio synthesis paper as unbalanced at the February 2008 open
consultations.
112. See Section 5.2.1.2.
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The Secretariat’s apparent partiality should be understood in the context that Marcus Kum-
mer and Nitin Desai are both veterans of WSIS. In fact their programme for the IGF can
be seen as the continuation of that of WSIS: a development-focused summit at which civil
society’s proposal for an Internet Governance Forum, put forward through WGIG, was part
of a political bargain struck to postpone the clash between developing countries and the US
government over Internet naming and numbering.
It should not therefore be particularly surprising that the Secretariat may have its own agenda
for the IGF rather than being a neutral organ for the implementation of policy developed by
stakeholders; indeed, this is almost a truism, as one commentator explains:
a “real” or “pure” international bureaucracy, in the sense of being politically neutral, must
be viewed as imaginary in many if not most of the various agencies of the United Nations
system. The reality more closely approximates the highly politicized bureaucracies of most of the
member-states. Just as it is often true that the national bureaucracies are viewed as bearing the
responsibility of ensuring the continuation in power of the dominant political party or perhaps
military faction, and not as ready to serve any other parties or factions that may be standing in
the wings, it may equally be more“real”that, at best, international bureaucracies inevitably are
intended to preserve the current political mandates of their organizations and thus inevitably
are vulnerable to accusations of political partiality (as well as laziness, corruption, etc) by those
elements of the membership opposed to the status quo.
113
However as inevitable as it may be that the Secretariat should privately hold preferences
of its own, it is unacceptable that it should be allowed to appear to shape the structure
and processes of the IGF to favour particular substantive positions and thereby to inﬂuence
the content and direction of the IGF’s work programme. As a multi-stakeholder governance
network, the task of setting its agenda, structure and processes can only legitimately be
performed on a multi-stakeholder, democratic basis.
This has two implications for the IGF’s Secretariat. First, regardless of whether its partiality
is real or only apparent, its technical roles should be separated from its substantive roles.
Indeed, there is no reason why both should be performed by the same body, and every
reason why the latter should not be performed by a UN-appointed Secretariat unilaterally.
While the Secretariat continues to be appointed by the UN, it should thus be limited to
the role of a technical secretariat like that of WSIS, and deal only with organising meetings,
coordinating stakeholders and the like, while a separate substantive secretariat carries out
activities such as reviewing and synthesising contributions and drafting brieﬁng documents
to focus discussion.
114
113. Jordan, Robert S, “Truly” International Bureaucracies: Real or Imagined? (1998), 438
114. Mathiason, John, The Distributed Secretariat: Making the Internet Governance Forum Work (2006), 1
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The second implication for the IGF Secretariat is that it must be made accountable to the
stakeholders at large. Presently, its lack of accountability stems not only from its appointment
solely by the UN Secretary-General, but from the fact that it has gone about its role with very
limited transparency, which has limited stakeholders’ ability to supervise the Secretariat’s
activities.
115
One proposal to address the above concerns was made early on by the Internet Governance
Project in a submission by which it suggested that“stakeholder groups, especially the academ-
ic community, should be considered part of a ‘Distributed Secretariat’ to the extent that they
facilitate forum activities and are willing to undertake the substantive support functions.”
116
Such a distributed secretariat would also oﬀer the ﬂexibility of allowing diﬀerent conﬁgura-
tions of stakeholders to support the IGF in diﬀerent ways, much as diﬀerent groupings of
stakeholders come together in dynamic coalitions covering diﬀerent issue areas.
117
A limitation of the Distributed Secretariat proposal is that it does not solve, but in fact
multiplies, the problems of ensuring the Secretariat’s impartiality on substantive matters and
its accountability. Even accepting the IGP’s suggestion that the academic community is more
likely to be politically neutral then other stakeholders (as well as being likely to be technically
competent), it would not intrinsically be any more accountable for this neutrality than other
stakeholders or the UN-appointed Secretariat.
The only eﬀective way in which to ensure both the legitimacy and the accountability of a
substantive secretariat is for it to be appointed by and accountable to the stakeholders; that
is, the IGF at large. But this also raises practical diﬃculties, in that the plenary body of
the IGF, as noted under the last preceding heading, has been designed without any decision-
making capacity. The IGP’s proposal is therefore for the Advisory Group to be entrusted
with the role of approving applications from groups of stakeholders to act as nodes of a
Distributed Secretariat. However this is not a satisfactory solution either, as it will be seen
that the Advisory Group has signiﬁcant problems of its own.
6.3.1.3. Advisory Group
The Advisory Group was established with a narrow mandate “to prepare the substantive
agenda and programme for the ﬁrst meeting of the Internet Governance Forum.”
118 It might
115. See Section 6.4.3.1.
116. IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum (2006), 4
117. Mathiason, John, The Distributed Secretariat: Making the Internet Governance Forum Work (2006), 4–5
118. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Secretary-General Establishes Advisory Group to Assist Him
in Convening Internet Governance Forum (2006)
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therefore reasonably be assumed, particularly given the group’s size and multi-stakeholder
structure, that it had eﬀectively been established to act as a meritocratically-appointed pro-
gramme committee for the IGF, as a number of stakeholders had suggested in the consulta-
tions prior to its formation.
119
However following the completion of its mandate for the inaugural meeting, Nitin Desai made
a decisive move to downplay the signiﬁcance of the Advisory Group and to conﬁne it to its
formal role of advising the UN Secretary-General. At the May 2007 open consultation, he
urged those present “to keep a sense of balance” about the Advisory Group’s role, which he
described as mere “ﬁne tuning” of the structure and the parameters of the IGF’s meetings.
He asserted that:
We could have done everything that we did without a formally constituted Advisory Group,
simply by consulting those individuals individually as a UN secretariat. But we chose to con-
stitute it as an Advisory Group precisely because we felt that it was important to get people
involved in the process who were connected with the broader community from which they came.
In either case, the fundamental problem with the structure of the Advisory Group is that it
lacks legitimacy.
120
In the ﬁrst case given above, where the Advisory Group is conceived as a meritocratically-
selected executive committee for a multi-stakeholder governance network, its illegitimacy aris-
es from the undemocratic manner in which it was convened. It will be recalled from Chapter
4 that the only legitimate means by which a meritocracy can be selected are consensual or
democratic.
121 In no sense could the Secretariat’s selection of candidates for the Advisory
Group, in a closed process pursuant to criteria that were never published, be described as
consensual or democratic.
Neither was this a shortcoming only of the initial selection process, as the same deﬁciencies
were repeated in the Advisory Group’s reappointment. At the open consultation in May 2007,
Nitin Desai assured those present that “fairly extensive consultations have taken place, with
missions, with stakeholder groups, before the Secretary-General takes a decision,”but without
identifying who had been consulted, by what means, or how those who were not fortunate
enough to have been consulted could participate in the process or put their names forward
for selection.
119. See Section 5.2.1.1 and Section 5.2.1.2.
120. There are also problems with the working processes of the Advisory Group, including its lack of account-
ability and transparency, but these will be dealt with separately at Section 6.4.
121. See Section 4.2.3.2.
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If on the other hand the Advisory Group is eﬀectively powerless in its own right, merely serving
as a focus group to be consulted for its opinions on the substantive agenda and programme
of the IGF before the UN Secretary-General and the Secretariat make their own decisions
independently, then the deﬁciencies of the process of its appointment become secondary, and
the illegitimacy of the Advisory Group reﬂects that of the hierarchical power lying behind it.
Whilst the most accurate characterisation of the Advisory Group—whether as an empowered
multi-stakeholder programme committee or a weak instrument of the Secretary-General—is
to some extent a matter of perspective, one factor tending to institutionalise it in the latter
mould is its sheer size. In the absence of an eﬀective deliberative process, this“empowers the
Secretariat of the Forum, run by Markus Kummer and Nitin Desai; this group will be too
large and diverse to do much on its own and will rely quite heavily on the Secretariat for
organization, agenda-setting, and results.”
122
It is illegitimate for the United Nations thus to exercise leadership of a multi-stakeholder gov-
ernance network, because the UN remains fundamentally an intergovernmental organisation,
which allows for only limited participation in certain of its activities by civil society and the
private sector, and is not accountable to them as it is to states.
123 It is for the same reason
that it was argued above that the Secretariat should be limited to performing technical roles.
But an additional reason for excluding the UN from maintaining hierarchical control over the
Advisory Group is that the Tunis Agenda itself appears to limit the Secretary-General’s role
to the establishment of that group, providing no warrant for the continuing role that he has
assumed.
124 The only ongoing roles provided for the Secretary-General by the Tunis Agenda
are to periodically report back upon the IGF’s progress to the General Assembly, and to
re-assess the IGF’s mandate following its ﬁfth meeting.
125
Therefore, reform of the Advisory Group is necessary. The most pressing reforms are twofold.
First, like the Secretariat, it must be appointed by multi-stakeholder, democratic means,
though as also noted in respect of the Secretariat, this implies a parallel reform that would
provide the means for the stakeholder groups each to nominate or appoint their own rep-
resentatives to smaller committees of the IGF. Whilst this reform is yet to be discussed in
detail,
126 it would hardly be much of an innovation, as it was in like manner that civil society’s
122. Mueller, Milton, The Forum MAG: Who Are These People? (2006)
123. See Section 3.4.1.1.
124. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005) paras 72, 74, 78 and 82; Muguet, Francis, A Legal
Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007) , 5; IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum
(2006), 5
125. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005) paras 75 and 76
126. See Section 6.3.2.1.
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representatives were appointed to WGIG.
127
At the September 2007 open consultation, Nitin Desai acknowledged this possibility for the
ﬁrst time, explaining the UN’s current leadership of the IGF on the basis that
the United Nations itself is not a player in Internet governance directly. And to that extent, the
Secretary-General is a disinterested party. And to some extent I suppose somebody like me, who
is his representative, is also seen as a disinterested party. Not a representative of any particular
stakeholder group. But we have never thought of that as anything more than an interim measure
till the thing stabilizes.
The second required reform is not so much one for the Advisory Group, as one that the
limitations of the Advisory Group make necessary. It is the need for another body to take
up functions that exceed the mandate of the Advisory Group and Secretariat. Some of these
are functions that they have taken upon themselves regardless of this being in excess of
their mandate; such as setting the structure and working methods of the IGF.
128 Others are
functions that they have not attempted to address at all, such as facilitating the development
of recommendations, as Brazil emphasised during the May 2007 open consultations in pressing
for the establishment of an IGF bureau.
129
6.3.1.4. Open consultations
Nitin Desai’s response to the discussion of a bureau during those consultations was to argue
that there was no need for another such body, because in addition to the purely supportive
or facilitative role of the Advisory Group, the IGF already had another body whose function
was to address the substantive preparatory process; namely, the open consultation meeting
itself. Desai described this as “the most inﬂuential body” in deﬁning “the structure and the
parameters of the meeting, including the themes.” Importantly, he also acknowledged the
enhanced legitimacy lent to this process by the use of an open, multi-stakeholder group, in
saying:
The real role is of this large body which meets regularly. And that is why we always persisted
with the process of this open consultation. ... We had it for the Working Group [on Internet
Governance] and we always had it after that, because this is our substitute for the [bureau]
process. In the [scil that] sense, this is what lends it a certain legitimacy and credibility.
What is interesting about this is that the large body of which Desai speaks is essentially in-
distinguishable from the IGF’s plenary body: both are open, multi-stakeholder meetings, free
to attend, unsegregated, and held in person with some (albeit limited) accessibility for those
127. de la Chapelle, Bertrand, WSIS: The First Summit of the Internet Age? (2005), 281
128. Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007), 6
129. See Section 5.2.4.1.
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wishing to participate remotely. As the Greek delegate put it at the ﬁrst open consultation in
February 2006,“The cornerstone of the forum is basically everyone represented in this room.
We are the forum.”
In this light, Desai’s acknowledgment of the legitimate authority of the open consulta-
tion meetings in shaping policy for the development of the IGF’s structure and processes
makes a striking contrast to his denial of the capacity of what is essentially the same plenary
body to develop substantive recommendations when it convenes at annual meetings of the
IGF.
130
The distinction however is that the open consultation meetings have a hidden layer of hierar-
chical structure that the plenary meetings do not: the former, like meetings of the Advisory
Group, in most cases generate a range of views, which it falls to the Secretariat to decide
between or to forward in a report to the UN Secretary-General for his decision. Thus the
consultation meetings, although open and bearing the trappings of participatory democracy,
are not truly democratic, because ultimate decision-making authority is vested in those who
are not democratically accountable.
Furthermore, the consultation meetings suﬀer from all of the other limitations of the plenary
body of the IGF, and in some cases to an even greater extent. Thus, those who cannot aﬀord
to attend annual meetings of the IGF are also disadvantaged in their ability to attend open
consultation meetings; but even more so, given that less funding is available to assist them.
Similarly, the lack of attention that has been paid to the provision of online mechanisms
to facilitate remote participation in the IGF’s plenary meetings equally aﬀects the open
consultations.
Finally, whilst none have argued that the open consultations ought to be precluded from
making recommendations on the structure and process of the IGF, these meetings are no
better equipped than the plenary meetings with the procedural means of developing such
recommendations. That is, the meetings are not designed to foster democratic deliberation.
131
In summary then, the structure of the open consultation meetings lies somewhere in be-
tween that of the plenary body of the IGF and the Advisory Group. Like the IGF in ple-
nary session, the greatest strength of the open consultations meetings is that their open and
multi-stakeholder composition potentially provides them with greater legitimacy than the
UN-appointed Advisory Group to shape decisions about the structure and processes of the
130. Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007), 7
131. See Section 5.2.1.2 and Section 6.4.
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IGF. However this potential is undermined by the subordination of the meeting’s recommen-
dations to the hierarchical power of the United Nations (much as in the case of the Advisory
Group), and also by the failure of the meeting’s chair to make use of deliberative democratic
or consensual processes.
In addressing the shortcomings of the Advisory Group and Secretariat, it was suggested
that another body should be formed to take up functions that exceed their mandate, with a
more deﬁned membership than the plenary body which would be appointed by democratic or
consensual means. The existence of such a multi-stakeholder subcommittee of the IGF could
also overcome the limitations of the open consultation meetings in their present form, were
those meetings to make their recommendations to that body, rather than to the UN-appointed
Secretariat or the Advisory Group. This in itself would be suﬃcient to constitute the open
consultation meeting as a participatory democratic institution (or a deliberative democratic
institution if its own processes were simultaneously reformed).
Alongside this reform, the disadvantage of those unable to attend open consultation meetings
should be addressed by the same means as it was suggested above should be adopted to
reform the plenary body of the IGF.
132
6.3.1.5. Workshops and dynamic coalitions
Another important institutional structure of the IGF are its dynamic coalitions. These are
to be treated here together with the IGF’s workshops, because the group of stakeholders
that comes together to organise a workshop can be regarded as a short-term dynamic coali-
tion formed for that speciﬁc purpose, and a successful workshop can also serve as a precursor
to the formation of a dynamic coalition with an ongoing work programme, just as in the
IETF a successful BOF session is required before a new working group may be formed.
133
Having said that, there is no need here to discuss the workshops themselves, as distinct from
the groups that coordinate them, as these form part of the programme of the IGF’s annual
plenary meeting rather than part of its structure, and in that context will be discussed further
in the section on the IGF’s processes.
It was noted above that dynamic coalitions include three quite diﬀerent types of group,
which were described as networks, working groups and BOFs. Each of these serves a diﬀerent
132. See Section 6.3.1.1.
133. See Section 2.2.1.1.
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purpose for the IGF as a governance network, and accordingly they are served diﬀerently by
the existing institutionalisation of dynamic coalitions (or the lack thereof) within the IGF.
Taking them in turn, networks have the capacity to further the IGF’s mandate of coordination.
It is the network that may in fact have inspired the choice of the term “dynamic coalition,”
which was not known to scholars before it was invented for the IGF, but which carries echoes
of the concept of a “governing coalition”; an informal emergent form of “civic cooperation
based on mutual self-interest between government and non-governmental actors.”
134
The second type of dynamic coalition, the working group, can conveniently be thought of as
one which broadly meets the IETF’s deﬁnition of that term:
a group of people who work under a charter to achieve a certain goal. That goal may be the
creation of an Informational document, the creation of a protocol speciﬁcation, or the resolution
of problems in the Internet. Most working groups have a ﬁnite lifetime. That is, once a working
group has achieved its goal, it disbands.
135
Similar bodies exist in most of the exemplar organisations.
136 Early on, it was anticipated
by the Forum hawks, particularly those from civil society,
137 that the IGF too would form
working groups that would provide reports or recommendations to the plenary body. However
as the establishment of such groups as formal subcommittees of the IGF was strongly opposed
by the Forum doves,
138 dynamic coalitions were the resulting compromise. Dynamic coalitions
as working groups have the potential to serve the IGF’s role of policy-setting.
Third and ﬁnally, dynamic coalitions as BOFs are those that do not yet have an explicit
programme to contribute to the fulﬁlment of the IGF’s mandate, but which may still provide
a deliberative space within which interested stakeholders may discuss policy issues, thereby
contributing indirectly to the IGF’s policy-setting roles.
The lack of institutionalisation of dynamic coalitions within the IGF creates two problems,
the ﬁrst of which aﬀects each of the three types of dynamic coalitions in much the same way,
and the second of which is speciﬁc to working groups.
First, dynamic coalitions are entirely self-organised, with no procedure by which to be recog-
nised or accredited so as to attain a formal aﬃliation to the IGF (save that they may informally
request the Secretariat to list their contact details on its Web site). This contrasts with the
134. MacLeod, Gordon & Goodwin, Mark, Restructuring an Urban and Regional Political Economy: On the
State, Politics and Explanation (1999), 701
135. IETF, Internet Users’ Glossary (1996)
136. Including APNIC (as SIGs), auDA (as panels and committees), CGI.br, GAID (as Communities of Expertise
or CoEs), the GKP (as Working Committees), and UNICTTF.
137. IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum (2006), 6; Bertola, Vittorio, An Implementation Proposal for
the Internet Governance Forum (2006) , 2
138. See Section 5.2.1.1, Section 5.2.1.2 and Section 5.2.3.1.
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case of workshops, which are required to be approved by the Advisory Group and must com-
ply with speciﬁc selection criteria directed to their relevance, capacity and multi-stakeholder
structure.
139 It also contrasts with other organisations, including GAID whose Steering Com-
mittee is required to approve proposed CoEs by reference to an open set of criteria,
140 and
ICANN’s RALOs which approve the participation of their constituent At-Large Structures.
In consequence, there are no institutional checks and balances to ensure that the structure of a
dynamic coalition is (and remains) multi-stakeholder and democratic, nor that its procedures
are accountable and transparent. In the absence of such democratic safeguards, dynamic
coalitions will tend towards oligarchy,
141 becoming narrow interest or advocacy groups,
142
inclined to fragment into competing coalitions in the same issue areas.
143 Whilst there is
nothing wrong with stakeholders forming such groups, the problem is that without some
criteria to distinguish them from more open and diverse deliberative fora, the plenary body of
the IGF is to have no way of knowing whether to treat any recommendations that they might
make as mere advocacy statements, or as the outcome of a deliberative democratic process.
The second signiﬁcant problem caused by the under-institutionalisation of dynamic coalitions,
which speciﬁcally aﬀects working groups, is that there is no formal mechanism by which their
reports or recommendations may be received by the IGF’s plenary body as an input to its
policy-setting role. In contrast the working groups of other organisations such as APNIC and
UNICTTF
144 support and are coordinated with the programme of their plenary bodies; for
example, an APNIC policy proposal that meets with consensus at the level of its originating
SIG is then required to be tabled at a plenary Open Policy Meeting and reach consensus
there also.
145
In contrast, the activities of the IGF’s dynamic coalitions are quite divorced from those of
the annual plenary meeting, with no occasion other than the brief daily “summing-up” (for
139. See Section 5.2.2.3.
140. GAID, Business Plan for 2006--2007 (2006), Annex B
141. See Section 4.2.2.
142. As in the case of the A2K@IGF dynamic coalition, which includes only members with a programme of liber-
alisation of IPRs, and none with a balancing—even if reactionary—perspective such as Microsoft, the MPAA or
WIPO. In contrast the Dynamic Coalition on Open Standards announced at its formation that“divergent view-
points on topics of study are welcomed. Should the IGF DCOS not be able to reach a rough consensus, our goal
will be to provide clarity around the argument, the divergence and its origins (who has diﬀerent views and why)
so that more informed decisions can be made”: DCOS, IGF Dynamic Coalition on Open Standards (2006), 2.
143. This does not mean that multiple dynamic coalitions in the same issue area should be prohibited, since this
would exclude the potential beneﬁts of regulatory competition (see Section 3.4.3.1). However only if competing
recommendations are the output of equally multi-stakeholder and democratic processes can the plenary assess
them on a level footing.
144. UNICTTF, Strategic Plan (2002), 8
145. With the superadded requirement of ratiﬁcation by APNIC’s Executive Council: see Section 4.4.3.2.
408Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
Athens) or “reporting back” (for Rio) sessions available for them to informally present their
output to the meeting, and no means for that meeting to deliberate upon the output in turn.
The eﬀective outcome is that deliberation within dynamic coalitions, and the development of
policy within the plenary body, ﬂow in separate streams.
146 Thus following the Rio meeting,
APC
147 and even the Swiss Government
148 were still calling for the convening of working
groups of the IGF to develop policy recommendations.
Both of the problems noted above point to the need for stronger institutionalisation of the
relationship between the IGF and its dynamic coalitions. This initially requires a mecha-
nism for dynamic coalitions proposed by stakeholders to be recognised by their parent body,
which would again most conveniently fall to a multi-stakeholder subcommittee of the IGF
to be charged with that task. This was foreshadowed by the Internet Governance Project,
amongst others, in proposing during the earliest open consultations in February 2006 that a
multi-stakeholder bureau should approve the formation of working groups and appoint their
facilitators, whilst consideration of their output would remain the responsibility of the plenary
body:
The Plenary has the following role:
￿ It deliberates and discusses general issues and Working Group products, guided by the Chair
and the Agenda;
￿ Any accredited participant or group of them can petition the Bureau to create a Working
Group
￿ It reviews, discusses and approves or refuses to approve Working Group reports. Approval is
based on“rough consensus”called by the Chair after suﬃcient deliberation. Approved reports
are issued and publicized as IGF reports.
149
By the date of the Rio meeting, this proposal had re-emerged in reﬁned form, with support
being widely expressed in the closing“Way Forward”session for the IGF’s policy development
function to be devolved to its specialist multi-stakeholder dynamic coalitions, much as the
decentralised design of the Internet locates its intelligence at the edges of the network rather
than at the centre. Ultimately however, the output of the dynamic coalitions must still be
endowed with democratic legitimacy through the endorsement of the plenary body at large,
and be cast in written form suitable for promulgation into other fora by a body such as the
IGP’s proposed bureau.
146. Allen, David, The Role of Intellectual/Academic Work in a Policy Forum (2006), 8
147. APC, APC Statement on the Second Internet Governance Forum (2007)
148. Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Communication, Swiss Comments on the Second IGF Held in Rio de Janeiro in
November 2007 and Recommendations for Future IGF Events (2008), 3
149. IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum (2006); and see MMWG, Internet Governance Forum Input
Statement (2006) , 2.
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Whilst it is a given that such a bureau must be appointed by democratic or consensual means
(as will be discussed under the following heading), its operation must also be democratic,
which means that it must be accountable and transparent in the process by which it recognis-
es new dynamic coalitions on the plenary’s behalf. Central to this is that the process should be
conducted by reference to a set of criteria that are cast in general terms, are public, not retro-
spective, are intelligible, not contradictory or impossible, relatively stable, and administered
as proclaimed—in short, that fulﬁl Fuller’s deﬁnition of the rule of law.
150
In order for dynamic coalitions to legitimately contribute towards the fulﬁlment of the larger
IGF’s mandates of policy-setting and coordination, it is necessary that the criteria by which
such coalitions are recognised include a minimal set of key principles mirroring those that
apply to the IGF itself, including a subset of the structural criteria distilled at Section 6.1
along with some of the basic procedural principles that will be discussed at Section 6.4. These
will include:
￿ multi-stakeholder (or open) composition;
￿ open membership;
￿ possibly a number of measures of accountability and transparency; and
151
￿ a deliberative democratic or consensual decision-making process.
There is much room for more detailed criteria, consistent with these basic requirements, to
be speciﬁed by multi-stakeholder, democratic or consensual means.
152
6.3.1.6. Open fora
The ﬁnal existing institutional structures of the IGF that are to be brieﬂy examined are the
open fora that made their debut in Rio.
One of the shortcomings of these open fora was that the subject organisations were not
required to design them so as to support the fulﬁlment of the paragraphs of the IGF’s mandate
that had prompted the establishment of open fora in the ﬁrst place. Speciﬁcally, the IGF
150. See Section 4.3.3.
151. See Section 6.4.3.1.
152. More broadly, Martens has suggested that the increasing importance of multi-stakeholder networks involving
private sector actors, of which dynamic coalitions are an example, requires that “the United Nations should
develop an eﬀective regulatory and institutional framework for its relations to the private sector” which would
include not only the positing of criteria for the formation of such networks, but also the appointment of a UN
ombudsman as a contact point for complaints ( Martens, Jens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of
Multilateralism? (2007), 6). The establishment of the proposed UNMSP discussed at Section 5.4.4 could be one
manner of eventually realising this recommendation.
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is called upon to “[i]nterface with appropriate inter-governmental organizations and other
institutions on matters under their purview,”
153 and to “assess, on an ongoing basis, the
embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet governance processes.”
154 These form part of the
IGF’s role of coordination, and in particular that of meta-governance.
155
The fulﬁlment of this mandate will require more than a one-way channel of communication
from the other organisation to the IGF, yet because that organisation alone currently de-
termines the content of its open forum, and because there is no formal interface between its
session and those of the plenary body, there are no means by which the IGF and the other
organisation can engage in dialogue with the object of fulﬁlling the above paragraphs of the
Tunis Agenda.
To address this, an open forum should be conducted not by a single stakeholder seeking to
defend its position in the Internet governance regime, but by a multi-stakeholder panel similar
to those that organise workshops, and accredited in a similar manner. If no such panel can
be organised through the decentralised action of stakeholders, it is appropriate that one be
appointed, just as the Advisory Group currently appoints panels of speakers for the plenary
sessions.
156
The working processes appropriate to an open forum, and to workshops more generally, are
to be discussed below at Section 6.4.2.1.
6.3.2. Structural reform
Common to the reforms proposed above to the plenary body, Secretariat, Advisory Group,
open consultation meetings and dynamic coalitions is the need for a new, democratically or
consensually appointed multi-stakeholder body to exercise the following substantive functions:
￿ approving the appointment of the Secretariat;
157
￿ preparing documents for the use of the plenary body (a function currently performed by
the Secretariat), including:
153. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(c)
154. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(i)
155. See Section 6.2.2.3.
156. Indeed, when the concept of the open forum was raised at the February 2007 consultations, it was accom-
panied by the suggestion that the IGF should be able to initiate its own workshops on key issues, rather than
relying on individual stakeholders to do so: IT For Change, Taking Stock and the Way Forward (2007), 2.
157. Though while the IGF remains a UN-aﬃliated body, this will be on the nomination of the UN Secretary-
General.
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￿ background brieﬁng documents to inform discussion and foster the development of con-
sensus at open consultation and plenary meetings; and
￿ synthesis papers and reports summarising the contributions and discussions of stakehold-
ers at such meetings;
￿ preparing the substantive agenda and programme for IGF meetings (that is, assuming the
functions of the existing Advisory Group);
￿ creating multi-stakeholder democratic structures and processes for the IGF that incorpo-
rate any consensus of stakeholders expressed during open consultation meetings, including
processes for:
￿ the approval of workshops and recognition of dynamic coalitions;
￿ the receipt of the output of workshops and dynamic coalitions as inputs to open consul-
tation and plenary meetings;
￿ policy development within the plenary forum; and
￿ coordination with other existing bodies;
￿ appointing members to the panels of plenary sessions and (where necessary) open fora;
￿ assessing the consensus of open consultation and plenary meetings on substantive policy
issues and the appropriate response to those issues; and
￿ preparing formal responses in the appropriate form based on the consensus of the plenary
forum (such as recommendations for input into other organisations).
Such a body would essentially constitute the“eﬀective and cost-eﬃcient bureau”referred to in
the Tunis Agenda and in early contributions from Forum hawks that preceded the formation
of the Advisory Group.
158 Once it had become apparent, following the expiration of its initial
mandate from the Secretary-General, that the Advisory Group possessed neither the capacity
nor the legitimacy to fulﬁl the roles that the Tunis Agenda and the hawks demanded, some
of the hawks began to renew their calls for a multi-stakeholder bureau,
159 and these are calls
that would also be addressed by such a body as outlined above.
158. Such as those of the IGP and MMWG referred to above: IGP, Building an Internet Governance Forum
(2006) and MMWG, Internet Governance Forum Input Statement (2006) .
159. See Section 5.2.4.1.
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6.3.2.1. Consociationalism and the IGF
The establishment of a new multi-stakeholder bureau for the IGF will however have to be
acceptable not only to the Forum hawks, but to the doves also, lest they withdraw from
the governance network altogether.
160 This will require some thought to be given to their
motivations for opposing an IGF with the structural capacity to fulﬁl its mandate to devel-
op public policy recommendations, and to how those objections can be countered without
compromising the democratic principle or the equality of all stakeholders within the network.
There is very little diﬃculty in explaining the doves’ opposition in terms of the realist school of
international relations theory.
161 From that perspective, it is a truism that the ﬁrst priority of
actors in the international system is to preserve their own political and economic power.
162 The
status quo in Internet governance favours the forum doves, in that the United States holds
authority over the global DNS root (with varying degrees of support from its allies), and
has strongly supported the “private, bottom–up coordination”
163 of the Internet technical
community, in which the private sector has heavily invested. Ipso facto, on the realist view,
there is no reason for them to concede any ground to the Forum hawks who seek to disturb
that status quo, particularly since the hawks—developing country governments and civil
society—wield comparatively little political and economic power with which to do so.
Whilst the realist school has been found overall to oﬀer a simplistic account of the status
and motivations of international actors (particularly in understating the signiﬁcance of non-
state actors), it does plausibly explain the doves’ opposition to the development of the IGF’s
capacity to make soft law through a consensus process, since such a process magniﬁes the
power of minorities, as WSIS demonstrated.
164 Although allowing“rough consensus”addresses
this to some extent, governments in particular are likely to be no more comfortable with rough
consensus than they are with full consensus, since it may require them to accept politically
unpopular concessions if they are left in a small minority; quite a far-fetched expectation if
the US government’s position on oversight of the global DNS root is taken as an example.
In designing a multi-stakeholder bureau for the IGF it will therefore be necessary to balance
the need to ensure that the bureau is capable of eﬀectively performing the roles outlined
above, with the risk of overtly challenging the existing political and economic power of the
Forum doves and thereby inducing them to leave or to undermine the IGF. A liberal institu-
160. A prospect made most explicit by Chris Disspain of auDA in May 2007: see Section 5.2.4.1.
161. This may be compared with the stated reasons for their opposition at Section 6.2.1.1.
162. See Section 3.1.2.
163. NTIA, Management of Internet Names and Addresses (1998)
164. See Section 4.4.4.3.
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tionalist gloss upon the realist scholar’s position would allow that even the Forum doves will
have reason to support an empowered IGF if it will contribute towards a more sustainable
international Internet governance regime for the long term, provided also that the soft power
it exercises oﬀers no signiﬁcant threat to their own.
Such support from the doves would not be forthcoming for a multi-stakeholder bureau that
acted by voting or rough consensus, because such a bureau might reach decisions that would
challenge the authority of particular stakeholders or stakeholder groups; most obviously the
sovereignty of governments. To continue the previous example, consider the (admittedly far-
fetched) prospect of the bureau recommending the use of an alternate DNS root, if the only
dissent to this recommendation came from the United States government and ICANN.
There can be nothing wrong with the IGF in plenary session reaching such a position through
a process of democratic deliberation, even if only rough rather than full consensus on it is
achieved in the end. Neither would (or could) the eﬀect of the plenary’s rough consensus be
prevented from carrying its own normative resonance, which might independently inﬂuence
the actions and shape the expectations of participants in the Internet governance regime.
However, there are good reasons why the bureau ought not also in such a case elevate the
plenary’s rough consensus to the level of a formal recommendation of the IGF:
￿ It would not constitute governance by network, as in its pure form this is a process in which
disparate stakeholders maintain their own authority and legitimacy in full measure, simply
dipping into it to contribute towards the fulﬁlment of collaboratively agreed ends. Whilst
governance by network may result in the realignment of power amongst transnational actors
in the long term through processes such as regulatory competition, its purpose is not to
facilitate the circumvention of the underlying authority of its members, which would be
the eﬀect of making a recommendation in deﬁance of the interests of signiﬁcantly aﬀected
stakeholders.
￿ In any case, for the multi-stakeholder bureau to overrule the objections of signiﬁcantly
aﬀected stakeholders or stakeholder groups would be futile, since the IGF is inherently a
consensual body. The soft power that it possesses on its own account is unﬁt to overcome
the political and economic power of its stakeholders; and that of governments least of all.
165
It is better for the structure of the IGF to overtly accommodate the autonomy of these more
165. Examples of this are given by the gTLD-MoU, over which the NTIA rode roughshod, and that of its successor
the IFWP, which similarly at the hands of IANA and NSI “was ultimately bypassed and superseded by more
powerful forces impatient with the transaction costs of an open, democratic process:”Mueller, Milton, Ruling the
Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 5.
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powerful forces in order to co-opt them as partners, than to stand against them, thereby
inducing them to silently undermine its authority whenever its recommendations go against
their interests.
Kenneth Cukier, moderator of two sessions at the Athens meeting, had also earlier written
of the need for new multi-stakeholder structures not to reiterate old power struggles over
Internet governance:
The battle over the institutional design becomes a proxy for a much narrower interest one wants.
In 1996 with the IAHC, this was for new TLDs by Internet entrepreneurs; in 1998 with ICANN it
was for privately operated TLDs by NSI (now VeriSign); in 2005 with WSIS it is for more power
by governments. As in previous cases, any arrangement that leaves other parties unsatisﬁed is
bound not to endure long. Every party employs the term“multi-stakeholder”to mean that they
will enjoy predominant power but leave a few, merely symbolic crumbs for others.
166
The alternative is a structure which institutionalises the distinct but complementary authority
of each of the stakeholder groups. Such a structure has already been described as a conso-
ciation.
167Apart from procedural beneﬁts to be discussed later,
168 the principal beneﬁt of a
consociational bureau which is segmented into stakeholder groups, over a bureau in which the
stakeholders are required to make decisions only as a uniform entity, is that it formally and
publicly institutionalises the equality of the stakeholder groups, thereby acting as a balance
to the political and economic inequality of the stakeholder groups outside the IGF. This in
turn fosters the value of deliberation between equals, which is one of the key requisites of
deliberative democracy, and one of the most diﬃcult to realise.
169
To put this in context, whilst the power of mutual veto would allow governments to formally
block a proposal supported by the other stakeholder groups (thus addressing their inability to
abide the diminishment of their existing political and economic power), this only reﬂects their
eﬀective power to do so through domestic or intergovernmental rules in any case. However
what is unique and valuable about the consociational structure is that this same power of
166. Cukier, Kenneth N, Slouching Towards Geneva: Ten Unappreciated Axioms of Internet Governance (2005),
4
167. See Section 4.4.1.1.
The proposal of ENSTA and EUROLINC put forward in May 2007 for the formation of a “four components
bureau”for the IGF is close to the consociational ideal: see EUROLINC, Thoughts for Rio: a Bureau for the IGF
(2007) (and compare the proposal for three WSIS-style bureaus made by the G77 and China in February 2006:
G77, G77 & China Paper on the Proposed Internet Governance Forum (2006) ). Although the proposed four
components bureau would only have a procedural mandate, it would be necessary for consensus to be reached
not only within, but also between its four components, with much the same eﬀect as granting them a power
of mutual veto: Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007), 20. The
main distinction between these proposals and a consociational bureau is that the division of power between the
stakeholder groups proposed here would not create separate bureaus, which defeats the essential purpose of the
bureau as a forum for multi-stakeholder deliberation.
168. See Section 6.4.1.
169. See Section 4.3.2.2.
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veto is placed in the hands of the civil society and private sector members of the bureau, who
could just as easily formally block a proposal supported by governments. This is a power that
those groups lack within the present Advisory Group, since they sit in that group in their
personal capacities and any balancing of stakeholder interests within it takes place informally
and behind closed doors.
6.3.2.2. Nominating committee
Having concluded that a multi-stakeholder bureau is required, the next question that arises
is how its members should be appointed. There are three basic alternatives. The ﬁrst is for
members to be appointed by the UN Secretary-General. This is the manner in which the
Advisory Group is currently appointed, and is also the method of appointment of GAID’s 60
Strategy Council, and before that the 55 members and Panel of Advisors of UNICTTF.
170
It might be thought that this alternative was strongly ruled out at Section 6.3.1.3, and indeed
it was, except to the extent that it would be possible (and politic) during the term of the
IGF’s initial ﬁve-year mandate, for the bureau to continue to be oﬃcially appointed by the
Secretary-General, but acting on the recommendations of the stakeholders. This however begs
the question of how the stakeholders should make those recommendations.
In GAID’s case, nominations for the private sector representatives were coordinated by the
ICC, and those for the civil society representatives by CONGO through a volunteer nomi-
nating committee.
171 But to rely on external organisations to provide nominees simply shifts
responsibility to them to ensure that the nominations are made in a democratically legitimate
manner. Therefore the other two methods for the multi-stakeholder bureau’s appointment
(whether by the Secretary-General directly or by some peak body on behalf of an entire
stakeholder group) must still be examined.
The second of them is voting. This is the method upon which APNIC, auDA and the GKP rely
to elect their executive committees. However all of these organisations comprise a ﬁxed body of
members, whereas as Nitin Desai succinctly put it at the February 2007 consultation meeting,
in the IGF’s case“there’s nobody who can elect a bureau, because there’s no membership.”A
closer match for the IGF in this respect is ICANN, which of course attempted to hold elections
170. ECOSOC, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Task Force (2002), 6
171. Martens, Jens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of Multilateralism? (2007), 29 and see at 39
some other methods used by other UN-aﬃliated multi-stakeholder networks to nominate civil society and private
sector representatives.
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for the At Large positions on its Board of Directors in 2000, but wrote the experiment oﬀ as
a costly failure.
172
The third possible method for the appointment of the IGF’s multi-stakeholder bureau is to
attempt to reach consensus on the appointments through democratic deliberation. After all,
this is the process that was found to allow the IGF to fulﬁl its policy-setting functions despite
its plenary body lacking a deﬁned membership. However, it is not without reason that none
of the other exemplar organisations utilise this time-consuming method of appointment, since
it presents the risk that consensus might not be able to be reached.
Since none of these three basic alternative methods of appointment is appropriate, the answer
lies in a hybrid approach, which includes elements of the hierarchical, democratic voting
and consensual methods. A model for such a hybrid is found in the IETF’s nominating
committee (the Nomcom), which makes appointments to the IAB and to the IETF’s IESG.
173
The IETF Nomcom is a committee of at least ﬁfteen, comprising a Chair, ten volunteers, three
liaisons representing related organisations and an advisor.
174 The ten volunteers are chosen
by random selection from an open pool of nominees, whose only qualiﬁcation for membership
is that they have attended three of the past ﬁve IETF meetings. The Chair is appointed
by ISOC following a process of consultation with members of the IETF community and the
board of ISOC.
The Nomcom’s deliberations are to be“based on its understanding of the IETF community’s
consensus of the qualiﬁcations required,” as well as being guided by criteria provided by the
bodies to which candidates are to be appointed, though the ﬁnal decision to put a candidate
forward is put to a vote of the ten volunteers.
The Nomcom’s recommendations are not ﬁnal. Through a process described as “advice and
consent,” its recommendations must be ratiﬁed by ISOC’s Board of Trustees in the case of
appointments to the IAB, and by the IAB in the case of appointments to the IESG. When the
conﬁrming body withholds consent to a nomination, the conﬁrming body and the Nomcom
discuss the matter, and the Nomcom makes a new recommendation for any position left
empty.
A similar process could be employed by the IGF for the appointment of its multi-stakeholder
bureau. The main modiﬁcation required to the structure of the nominating committee is
172. See Section 5.4.3.
173. See Section 2.2.1.1.
174. IETF, IAB and IESG Selection, Conﬁrmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall
Committees (2004)
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that there should be an equal number of seats for each stakeholder group, and that whilst
the committee would deliberate as a whole, only members from a given stakeholder group
would select that group’s nominees, in order to preserve its autonomy within the bureau. This
equates to the system of proportional representation within the grand coalition that is one of
the hallmarks of consociational ordering.
A second but related related reform to the IETF model is that each stakeholder group within
the nominating committee should be empowered to employ consensual procedures for the
nomination of its bureau members, rather than being limited to voting. In particular, it is
typical that seats on the executive bodies of intergovernmental organisations (for example
the ISO Council and Presidency of the EU) will be held by member governments in rotation,
typically with one third (initially selected by lot) stepping down every year. There is no
reason in the short term why governments ought not to be able to agree that this also ought
to prevail within the multi-stakeholder bureau of the IGF.
Another consideration is that of diversity: both of the nominating committee itself, and of its
nominees for the bureau. In this regard, there are a number of alternative models to inform
the IGF’s approach. The IETF goes no further than prohibiting more than two members with
the same primary aﬃliation (for example, the same employer) from acting on the Nomcom,
and imposes no requirements on the diversity of the nominees.
Other organisations utilising nominating committees have diﬀerent procedures; ICANN for
example is not concerned with the NomCom’s own diversity, but requires its slate of nominees
to exhibit diversity in geography, culture, skills, experience, and perspective.
175 The FSC
upholds diversity at each level; requiring both its multi-stakeholder nominating committee and
the candidates it nominates to include members from the North and South constituencies,
and for those candidates also to reﬂect regional and gender balance.
176
For the IGF, it is also appropriate that diversity be upheld at both levels, as a measure
of redressing the impediments of disadvantaged groups in participating in the IGF’s demo-
cratic processes on an equal footing, which is a substantive democratic value.
177 However as
to exactly what measures of diversity should be institutionalised in the composition of the
nominating committee and its slate of nominees, there is room for disagreement.
Whilst it is clear enough that the digital divide and its underlying economic divide impede
universal participation in Internet governance, do issues such as gender and disability present
175. ICANN, Bylaws (2006), article VI, section 5.
176. FSC, By-laws (2005), Articles 50–53.
177. See Section 4.3.5.2.
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similar obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve substantive democratic equality
within the IGF? As there is no a priori answer to this question, the criteria to be satisﬁed by
candidates for the nominations committee and the bureau, and the appropriate size for those
bodies to make them suﬃciently diverse, should be determined in the ﬁrst instance through
a process of democratic deliberation in which all those potentially aﬀected can discuss the
issue in the light of relevant background material.
Since this presents a chicken-and-egg scenario (as it would normally be the bureau that would
take a decision on such issues, drawing upon the deliberations at open consultation meetings),
herein lies the place for an hierarchical hand in performing the following “bootstrapping”
functions (which are analogous to, but narrower than, those performed by ISOC and the
IAB for the IETF’s nominating committee):
￿ establishing the initial size, term and selection criteria for the multi-stakeholder nominating
committee;
￿ establishing the initial size, term and selection criteria for the multi-stakeholder bureau;
￿ determining whether any (and if so which) non-voting liaisons or advisors should be ap-
pointed to the ﬁrst nominating committee in order to assist it with its deliberations; and
￿ appointing the ﬁrst chair of the nominating committee.
It is suitable that these tasks fall to the UN Secretary-General, after having solicited recom-
mendations from the IGF in plenary session at an annual or open consultation meeting. In
future, they would fall to the bureau.
Thus in summary, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant structural reform that is required for the IGF is the es-
tablishment of a nominating committee comprising equal numbers from each of the stakehold-
er groups, who would periodically deliberate upon the appropriate composition of a multi-
stakeholder bureau for the IGF, and then separately nominate candidates from their own
stakeholder groups either by voting or through consensual means. This nominating commit-
tee would be chosen by random selection from an open pool of volunteers, subject only to
the fulﬁlment of criteria designed to ensure that the process is also substantively democratic.
The establishment of these criteria, along with similar criteria for the bureau, and the ap-
pointment of the nominating committee’s non-voting chair, liaisons and advisors, would be
performed in the ﬁrst instance by the Secretary-General, and thereafter by the bureau itself,
in both cases acting upon any consensus that may emerge during deliberation by the IGF’s
419Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
plenary body.
6.3.2.3. Multi-stakeholder bureau
The second signiﬁcant reform is the establishment of the multi-stakeholder bureau itself. The
broad parameters for the structure of this body have already been established above, when it
was determined that it should be a hybrid between a standard deliberative democratic organ
and a consociation:
￿ it is to include an equal number from each stakeholder group;
178
￿ it is to pursue its operational programme through deliberation as a unitary body;
179 and
￿ each of the stakeholder groups should possess a power of veto over the bureau’s output,
even if it has already achieved rough consensus within both the bureau at large and the
IGF in plenary session.
This immediately raises the question, how are those stakeholder groups to reach a coordinated
view on when to exercise their right of veto? Whilst a more detailed answer will be given when
considering the bureau’s processes,
180 either consensual or democratic means may be used,
and they may be tailored to the stakeholder group in question. This is another of the main
beneﬁts of the consociational form, which allows for the governmental group, for example, to
require full rather than rough consensus to be reached on a recommendation if its veto is to
be withheld. In fact, “there is no reason why a UN multi-stakeholder process should exclude
an inner intergovernmental process, between governments, using existing UN rules, within
[scil with] a deﬁned membership.”
181
It follows that unlike in the present Advisory Group (but in common with all eight exemplar
organisations, and almost all other UN bodies), members of the bureau will be appointed in
a representative rather than a personal capacity, at least to the extent that the decisions they
make will be for a particular stakeholder group. The importance of this is that stakeholders
are appointed to the bureau not simply because of their personal merit, but because their
178. The exact number should be determined in open consultation, balancing need for diversity against the fact
that deliberation is easier in smaller groups: see Section 4.3.5.1.
179. Including preparing brieﬁng documents, meeting agenda and synthesis papers and reports, and reducing the
consensus of the plenary body on substantive matters into draft recommendations, and on procedural matters
into proposals for reform of the IGF’s structures and processes.
180. See Section 6.4.1.
181. Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007), 19
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participation provides a balanced base of legitimacy for the bureau that is drawn from the
values of each stakeholder group.
182
Two justiﬁcations have been given for the appointment of Advisory Group members in their
personal rather than representative capacities. The ﬁrst, that this allows for “more full and
active participation of all members”(as claimed by ISOC at the February 2007 consultations),
will arise for consideration in the following section on the IGF’s processes. However there is a
second, structural, justiﬁcation which is that appointing members in representative capacities
could risk “enshrining a ﬁxed system of representation.”
183
This risk is minimised by the fact that each new bureau will be appointed by a new, randomly-
appointed nominating committee. It is further reduced by appointing bureau members as
representatives of stakeholder groups rather than of particular stakeholders, so that their
mobility between employers, governments or organisational aﬃliations will not aﬀect their
seats. Appointing members to represent stakeholder groups also allows unaﬃliated individuals
to sit on the bureau within the stakeholder group that they are best qualiﬁed to represent
(most likely civil society).
The next question of structure that has yet to be addressed relates to how the chair of the
bureau should be appointed. Rather than being a policy-setting role, the appropriate role of
the chair is simply to preside over meetings of the bureau, to coordinate its work programme,
and to act as a point of contact for the IGF’s Secretariat and other bodies with which the IGF
is required to coordinate. Even so, it is inevitable that the substantive values of its incumbent
will inﬂuence the manner in which the role is performed, as was found above to have been
the case for the Secretariat and Advisory Group.
For this reason, a number of the earliest submissions on the appropriate structure and com-
position of a bureau for the IGF, even from Forum doves, stressed the importance of ensuring
the diversity and accountability of the chair. ISOC, for example, suggested that rather than
a single chair drawn from a given stakeholder group, there should be a panel of rotating
co-chairs.
184 There is no example of this from amongst the exemplar organisations, but the
appointment of co-chairs from diﬀerent stakeholder groups has long been a practice of consul-
tation panels in the Australian telecommunications regime.
185 Another instructive example is
182. See Section 4.2.3.2.
183. Government of Canada, Canadian Comment on First IGF (2007), 2
184. ISOC, ISOC Statement, Internet Governance Forum Meeting 17 February 2006 (2006), 1. See also Govern-
ment of Australia, Programme Committee—Internet Governance Forum (2006) , 2.
185. Such as Telstra’s Consumer Consultative Council (TCCC) and the former Consumer Advisory Council
(CAC) of what is now Communications Alliance.
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that of the CS-IGC, which although not a multi-stakeholder group, has two Coordinators who
are elected for alternating two-year terms. Whilst, since August 2007, the Advisory Group has
had two co-chairs, neither comes from outside the governmental stakeholder groups.
Three best practices can be drawn out from these suggestions and examples:
￿ Rather than being appointed by the UN Secretary-General, the chair should be selected by
democratic or consensual means by the bureau itself. Although a consensus decision should
be allowed where possible, given that the bureau has a deﬁned membership and therefore
forms a convenient body of electors, it will be much more practical for it to vote for the
chair from a pool of candidates drawn from its own number.
￿ The rotation of the candidates for chair among the stakeholder groups is necessary to ensure
the bureau’s legitimacy as the peak body of a multi-stakeholder governance network.
186
￿ The election of co-chairs, as well as supporting the bureau’s multi-stakeholder legitimacy,
adds a layer of accountability to the bureau that is absent from the Advisory Group.
187
In like manner, the bureau should be entitled to appoint its own advisors and liaisons, who
would provide information to guide the bureau in its deliberations and act as a conduit for
communication between the IGF and other participants in the Internet governance regime.
Amongst the exemplar organisations, similar arrangements exist in ICANN (whose Advisory
Committees each appoint a liaison to its board) and CGI.br (which includes a non-voting
Internet expert), as well as the IETF’s Nomcom (which contains three liaisons and an advisor)
and even the IGF’s Advisory Group (to which the Chairs have appointed their own Special
Advisors).
Despite the fact that these positions would not participate in decision-making, due to their
privileged position of inﬂuence upon the policy-setting process, the principle of subsidiari-
ty indicates that ultimate responsibility for their establishment and appointment should rest
in the bureau at large, though there is no reason why it could not delegate those tasks to the
chair and even institutionalise that arrangement in standing rules that future bureaus could
follow.
The same applies to the case of standing or ad hoc subcommittees that the bureau may wish
to form, such as drafting committees (like those into which WGIG was divided), an appeals
committee (such as that of the CS-IGC), and liaisons for appointment to other organisations.
186. Rotation between geographical regions, although not required as a matter of principle, could also be justiﬁed
on substantive democratic grounds if it were to meet with the consensus of an open consultation meeting.
187. Accountability will be discussed further at Section 6.4.3.2.
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It is unnecessary for present purposes to be prescriptive about these internal structures,
provided that the means by which they are established are themselves the product of multi-
stakeholder democratic deliberation.
So in summary the multi-stakeholder bureau of the IGF is to be a balanced group of indi-
viduals appointed as representatives of their stakeholder groups, who are to deliberate on its
operational programme together, but to exercise a power of veto of its formal recommenda-
tions within the stakeholder groups. Its chair, subcommittees, advisors and liaisons are to be
appointed by the bureau itself. In the case of the chair, who exercises a special coordinat-
ing role, this should be done by voting, subject to the position’s rotation through all of the
stakeholder groups and the appointment of two co-chairs to provide continual stakeholder
balance.
6.4. Processes
Although the establishment of a new multi-stakeholder nominating committee and bureau for
the IGF, in place of the UN Secretary-General and his Advisory Group, would be a signiﬁ-
cant reform, it would not be nearly as revolutionary as the establishment of ICANN was for
the management of critical Internet resources. In this context, it is laudable how much the
Tunis Agenda and the IGF’s Secretariat have gotten right: the open and multi-stakeholder
composition of the plenary forum, the avoidance of inﬂexible representative structures, and
the adherence to cultural values of the Internet such as decentralisation, openness, egalitari-
anism and cosmopolitanism, reﬂected for example in the bottom–up character of its dynamic
coalitions.
Having said this, much of where the IGF falls short lies not in its structure but in its processes.
Unless the theoretical openness of the plenary forum is matched with processes that actually
render it reasonably accessible to all aﬀected stakeholders, this not only defeats the openness of
the structure, but can also obscure the need for reform. Such a gap between theory and
practice has been observed in the case of ICANN,
188 and as a broader phenomenon, for
example by Mathur and Skelcher who note that although an organisation’s structure may
appear democratic on the surface, this may easily be undermined in practice:
For example, members of the public may have a right to attend meetings of the decision-
making body, but notices drawing attention to the time and place of the meeting may be written
188. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, The Idea of ICANN (2001)
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and published in inaccessible ways, and the location of the meeting may constrain attendance
by citizens. Sometimes the implementation gap between formal rules and actual practice will
be a matter of lack of foresight or commitment by the organisation; other times it may be a
deliberate strategy to limit democratic engagement.
189
An obvious example of this implementation gap in the case of the IGF is the holding of
consultation meetings in Geneva, which privileges intergovernmental stakeholders and gov-
ernments with permanent delegations in that city, and to a lesser extent the well-resourced
private sector, over stakeholders from civil society and developing countries. Similarly, for the
IGF’s plenary meetings, the class of venue to which governments are accustomed may not be
adequately accessible to civil society.
Further analysis of the procedural reforms required of the IGF in order for it to fulﬁl its
potential as a democratic multi-stakeholder governance network requires a more thorough
conceptual framework. This can be taken directly from Chapter 4, in which the basic principles
of liberal democratic governance were discussed under the four headings of representation,
consent, transparency and accountability, and inclusion. These will be considered again here
in turn in their application to the IGF’s processes.
6.4.1. Representation
If formal decisions of the IGF are not to be made directly by its plenary body but through
the proposed multi-stakeholder bureau, then the IGF becomes closer to a representative than
a direct democracy. However, the bureau does not represent the plenary in the same sense
that the parliament of a liberal democratic state represents the demos. Speciﬁcally, there is
no need for it to act as a ﬁlter for the plenary’s views, since the plenary is itself to adopt a
deliberative process. Rather, the fact that the bureau’s recommendations are to reﬂect the
plenary’s deliberative consensus means that it acts strictly as a mirror of the plenary.
190 In
fact if anything, the image of the plenary that is reﬂected in the bureau may be slightly
biased towards the interests of the disadvantaged, by reason of the criteria employed by the
nominating committee to ensure that the bureau’s composition is substantively democratic
and diverse.
Exactly what processes should such a multi-stakeholder bureau then employ in making its
formal decisions? There is no close functioning model that conveniently answers this question.
Francis Muguet describes the IGF as a UN multi-stakeholder process that
189. Mathur, Navdeep & Skelcher, Chris, The Democratic Performance of Network Governance: Conceptual and
Methodological Issues (2004), 9
190. See Section 4.3.2.2.
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is completely new at the UN and in International Public Law anywhere. There are no UN rules
concerning a full, equal footing, multi-stakeholder process, only concerning intergovernmental
processes, it is a simple as that ... For example, the very question concerning “observers” is
meaningless because there are no “observers” since all stakeholders are on an equal footing.
... There is no need to bend existing UN rules, but to ﬁnd new ones, when none exist. UN
multi-stakeholder rules of procedures and working methods are to be invented.
191
6.4.1.1. The UN multi-stakeholder process
This does overstate the point slightly, in that the development of a multi-stakeholder process
for the United Nations has been a concern of the organisation since at least the release of the
Cardoso Report on UN–Civil Society relations that was released in 2004, which recommended
that “[s]ince networked governance is clearly emerging as an important aspect of policy-
making, the United Nations must embrace and support it more overtly if it is to remain at
the forefront of global policy-making.”
192 Moreover, there are precedents for the UN multi-
stakeholder process in two of the other organisations addressed in this chapter: UNICTTF,
and its successor GAID.
193
Taking UNICTTF ﬁrst, this was an example of a multi-stakeholder organisation, formed
by intergovernmental agreement, with equal decision-making power distributed among all
its members. Like the IGF, it was directed not “to take over or supersede other important
processes in this area,” being “not envisaged as an operational or executing agency,” yet at
the same time it was required to “submit an annual report to the Secretary-General which
will focus on the major emerging issues, including recommendations thereon.”
194
The main diﬀerence between UNICTTF and the IGF in structural terms is that the former
had a deﬁned membership of 55 who were appointed in representative capacities, along with
a Chair whom the body would elect itself.
195 In this respect therefore UNICTTF can be
viewed as something of a hybrid between the IGF in plenary session and the multi-stakeholder
bureau proposed here.
196
Although the detail of its working processes was not the subject of UN resolution, in practice
decisions of UNICTTF were made by “broad consensus” or “general agreement,” as assessed
191. Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007), 19
192. Cardoso, Fernando H, Cardoso Report on Civil Society (2004), 33
193. Beyond those, see Martens, Jens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of Multilateralism? (2007).
194. ECOSOC, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Task Force (2002), 4–6
195. ECOSOC, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Task Force (2002), 6; Martens, Jens, Mul-
tistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of Multilateralism? (2007) , 28. Originally there were 37, then 40
members.
196. Though UNICTTF additionally had its own bureau of six, as well as a Panel of Advisors of thirty; which
was also known as its Advisory Group and was a precursor to that of the IGF.
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by its Chair.
197
GAID illustrates the evolution of the UN multi-stakeholder structure and process towards a
post-WSIS model that is closer to that of its sister body, the IGF. Thus GAID, like the IGF
and unlike UNICTTF, does not possess a ﬁxed membership; being structured as a decen-
tralised governance network that is open to all interested stakeholders.
With this looser structure has come a restriction of its policy-making capacity. GAID is de-
scribed explicitly as a “channel for multi-stakeholder input to policy debate to be conducted
in intergovernmental organs,”
198 which “will not have an operational, policy-making or ne-
gotiating function” in its own right.
199 Thus unlike the IGF and UNICTTF, the making of
recommendations does not form part of GAID’s formal mandate.
GAID’s decision-making organs are a multi-stakeholder Strategy Council and a Steering Com-
mittee, both of which are appointed by the Secretary-General. The Strategy Council of sixty is
divided into equal numbers of governmental and non-governmental members, and pursuant to
its terms of reference“[p]rovides overall strategic guidance and vision to the Alliance.”
200What
few decisions the GAID Strategy Council has made pursuant to these very general terms of
reference have been made by consensus, as assessed by the Chair of the Steering Committee
and as reduced to writing by its Secretariat.
201
The Steering Committee is a smaller group of twelve led by a Chair, who are appointed by
the Secretary-General to act in their personal capacities. The Steering Committee has a more
detailed terms of reference which includes the approval of applications for the establishment of
Communities of Expertise (GAID’s equivalent of working groups) and stakeholder networks,
the review of progress reports from these bodies, the approval of recommendations from the
Secretariat, and the delivery of “inputs” (not “recommendations”) on ICT for development
issues to the Secretary-General.
202 The Steering Committee’s decisions are also made by
consensus, as assessed by the Chairman and reported by the Secretariat.
203
The evolution of the UN multi-stakeholder process from UNICTTF through to GAID and the
IGF illustrates that as the openness and inclusiveness of the plenary body has been increased,
197. See UNICTTF, Summary of Conclusions and Decisions (2003).
198. UNICTTF, Principles and elements of a Global Alliance for ICT and Development (Multi-stakeholder Fo-
rum) (2006), 2
199. UNICTTF, Principles and elements of a Global Alliance for ICT and Development (Multi-stakeholder Fo-
rum) (2006), 4
200. GAID, Terms of Reference—Strategy Council (2006)
201. GAID, Strategy Council Meeting: Informal Summary (2006)
202. GAID, Terms of Reference—Steering Committee (2006)
203. GAID, Meeting of the Steering Committee of the GAID: Informal Summary (2007)
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so it has been disempowered, with decision-making authority instead being concentrated at
the highest executive level; or in practice, in the organisations’ UN-appointed Chairs and
Secretariats. The UNICTTF’s defence is that“stakeholders involved in the ICT TF sometimes
have competing or even conﬂicting aims. Organizations, including multilateral, bilateral and
civil society groups are often competing for inﬂuence, leadership, support, and attention.”
204
Whilst this is undeniable, to accept it as a justiﬁcation for the relegation of those stake-
holders to a lowly advisory role ﬂies in the face of UN rhetoric about the need for multi-
stakeholder public policy governance, for which the proﬀered alternative of participatory
democratic consultation is a poor substitute. The democratic principle, which speciﬁes that
governments must operate with the consent of the governed, and the principle of subsidiar-
ity which requires that governance should be exercised at the lowest practical level, require
more. So too, for that matter, does the Tunis Agenda.
6.4.1.2. A consociational multi-stakeholder process
How then, should the bureau produce its recommendations or other formal output, given
that in doing so it is to act as a mirror of the plenary body, for which the United Nations
multi-stakeholder process oﬀers an inadequate model?
Referring back to Section 6.3.2, which listed seven substantive functions that it had been
found such a bureau would need to perform, the process of making formal recommendations is
made up of the last two functions: assessing the consensus of the plenary body as to the policy
objectives to be achieved and the appropriate means of achieving them, and preparing any
appropriate formal output for the IGF based on that consensus, such as recommendations for
input into other organisations.
Since it has now been determined that the bureau should be consociational in form, it is
also necessary that once draft recommendations or the like have been prepared, they must be
separately approved by each stakeholder group within the bureau, by giving that group the
opportunity to exercise its right of mutual veto.
These three phases, then—determining the consensus of the plenary body on a particular
issue, drafting any applicable recommendation or statement that may be required in response,
and then seeking the assent of each stakeholder group—form the core of the consociational
multi-stakeholder process by which the bureau represents the views of the plenary body. The
204. UNICTTF, Strategic Plan (2002), 7
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phases may also be iterative. That is, if a stakeholder group determines to exercise its veto,
this may indicate that:
￿ the bureau’s assessment of the consensus of the plenary body was imperfect, and should
be carried out again (which may involve returning the issue to the plenary for further
deliberation in light of the stakeholder group’s veto);
￿ the form in which the recommendation was drafted did not adequately conform to the
consensus that had been assessed, which may require it to be brought back to the bureau
for amendment until the veto can be overcome consistently with the plenary’s consensus;
or
￿ the policy objective upon which rough consensus was reached in the plenary forum is not
capable of reaching full consensus within the multi-stakeholder bureau, in which case the
plenary will be required to ﬁnd another mechanism by which to pursue that objective (such
as through the decentralised collective action of a dynamic coalition).
205
The processes involved in the ﬁrst phase outlined above, assessing the consensus of the plenary
forum, will be considered under the following heading of consent, along with the analogous
processes of assessing the consensus of workshops and dynamic coalitions.
As for the second phase, in which the bureau develops a formal expression of the public policy
upon which the plenary forum has reached a consensus, the processes involved are simply those
required to deliberatively develop an agreed text within a relatively small, multi-stakeholder
group, much as WGIG did when producing its report. These processes will also be dealt with
under the next heading, when considering the use of democratic deliberation within each of
the IGF’s organs. However two distinguishing features of these processes within the context
of the multi-stakeholder bureau should be noted here:
￿ In many cases a proposed recommendation or statement may already have been drafted
by a dynamic coalition (or perhaps by one or more stakeholders within the plenary body)
around which a consensus of the plenary body has grown. In such cases, following the
principle of subsidiarity, the role of the bureau will not be to draft the recommendation,
but to endorse or reject it, much in the same manner as the Executive Council of APNIC is
required to ratify policy proposals emanating from its SIGs.
205. See Section 6.2.
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In other cases it will be necessary for the bureau itself to draft the text of a recommendation,
either because there is no relevant dynamic coalition to do so, or because the dynamic
coalition’s draft does not accord with the consensus of the plenary body.
￿ Because, like the nominating committee, the bureau has a deﬁned membership, the bureau
could have recourse to voting in the event of being unable to reach consensus. For the bureau
to consensually adopt such a voting procedure and to loosely institutionalise this in its
standing rules would be to no stakeholder’s disadvantage, given that any recommendation
the bureau may develop during the second phase in the decision-making process is subject
to the consensus of all stakeholder groups during the third phase. However, for the process
to remain deliberatively democratic, it should always aim towards consensus, even if that
is not ultimately achieved.
The third phase in the bureau’s decision-making process is that which provides each stake-
holder group with the opportunity to veto any decision of the bureau at large that may have
been reached during the second phase. Unlike the second phase which involves deliberation
amongst the bureau’s members as a multi-stakeholder entity, in the third phase of the process,
the stakeholder groups decide whether to exercise their collective powers of veto separately.
Such separation of the stakeholder groups during the third phase carries two advantages,
other than those already noted during the discussion of consociation and in considering the
structural advantages of a consociational bureau.
206
The ﬁrst is that since the form of the consociational bureau is not prescriptive about how
a stakeholder group should decide to exercise its power of veto, this phase allows for the
diﬀerent characteristic working methods of each stakeholder group to be accommodated.
So for example, governments may require a face-to-face meeting between diplomats to decide
upon their exercise of the power of veto, while civil society may be accustomed to making
such decisions by rough consensus using online tools, and the private sector representatives
might even prefer to delegate the decision to a representative association such as the ICC.
The segmentation between stakeholder groups in a consociation brings all of these modes of
decision-making together within the bureau.
207
The second beneﬁt of each stakeholder group within the bureau sharing the power of mu-
tual veto during the third phase of decision-making is that this will inﬂuence the shape of
deliberations during the second phase; not only by reinforcing the equality of each group
206. See Section 4.4.1.1 and Section 6.3.2.1.
207. Compare Muguet, Francis, A Legal Analysis of the Internet Governance Forum Process (2007), 20.
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as previously noted, but also by streamlining the internal politics of the bureau. Avoiding
the unwieldy need for a particular form of recommendation to be negotiated between ﬂuid
networks formed from amongst (say) forty individuals, instead it will be possible to move
forward so long as the three stakeholder groups, who hold ultimate decision-taking power,
are able to reach a rough accord between themselves. Collaboration and compromise between
stakeholder groups then takes priority over power relations between the individuals who hap-
pen to constitute the bureau at any given time. As well as better meeting the deliberative
democratic conditions of freedom and equality,
208 this also assists the bureau to overcome the
concern noted by Kenneth Cukier that
[t]he process of Internet governance fails because so far the notion of collaborative policy-
making is completely missing—there are no ideological camps, no political parties or coalitions
in which groups are forced to sublimate their ideal self-interest for a suitably acceptable com-
promise, in order to attain the beneﬁts of the workable system as a whole.
209
One possible criticism of a divided bureau is that the separation between stakeholder groups
could create conﬂict and induce participants, cloistered in their ﬁxed constituencies, to adopt
entrenched positions. This in turn could limit the range of options and the perspectives
surrounding a given issue from being fully considered, which works against the subsequent
formation of consensus. This problem is an instance of the“silo eﬀect”which produces conﬂict
between separated organisational units,
210 and which in turn results from the phenomenon of
groupthink that exists within such homogeneous units.
211
Without necessarily accepting that the stakeholder groups in the present instance are particu-
larly homogeneous, this potential weakness is overcome here by the fact that the third phase
of decision-making, in which stakeholders deliberate separately upon the exercise of their
right of mutual veto, is preceded by the second phase of full multi-stakeholder deliberation,
which enables all perspectives to be aired at an early stage (not to mention that democratic
deliberation has also already taken place within the plenary body when substantive consensus
was reached).
A related criticism is that not only might the third stage of decision-making within a particular
stakeholder group not be deliberative, it might not even be democratically accountable and
transparent. Indeed if ICANN’s GAC, or even the IGF’s Advisory Group for that matter, is
taken as a likely model upon which for the governmental stakeholder group to structure itself,
208. See Section 4.3.5.1.
209. Cukier, Kenneth N, Slouching Towards Geneva: Ten Unappreciated Axioms of Internet Governance (2005),
5
210. Burke, Wyatt W, Organization Change: Theory and Practice (2002), 163
211. See Section 4.4.4.3.
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this can be taken as a given. For now the same answer can be given to this as to the preceding
criticism—that it is suﬃcient that the multi-stakeholder phase of deliberation within the
bureau is open and transparent—though this criticism will also be further addressed below.
212
A third possible criticism is that, in common with other consociational structures, the bureau
will require a strong set of shared norms that inhibit the use of the power of veto except
where necessary to protect a stakeholder’s core interests,
213 in order to mitigate the risk of
consensus being blocked by a small minority during the third phase.
214
In response to this, it should be noted that any recommendation that has passed the second
phase is one which already carries the support of the majority of the bureau, as determined
either by voting or rough consensus. Except where support for the recommendation falls
strictly along stakeholder group lines (rather than, for example, between Forum hawks and
Forum doves), this support is also likely to extend to some degree into each stakeholder group.
It is therefore more likely that a proposal will fail at an earlier phase than that it will be
vetoed out of hand once it reaches the third phase.
More importantly however, the process of democratic deliberation that resulted in a rec-
ommendation receiving majority support within the bureau will itself tend to induce the
development of the group norms such as trust, cooperation and equality that are necessary
to prevent the power of veto from being misused.
215 These norms will also be reinforced over
time as the IGF’s social capital is developed through its successful operation as a governance
network.
216
6.4.2. Consent
What has yet to be examined are the processes to be employed to ensure that the bureau’s
discussions actually are adequately deliberative, thereby fulﬁlling the democratic principle
of consent which underlies its legitimacy. This is even more important in respect of the
plenary body, for which the principle of consent cannot be fulﬁlled by making it proportionally
representative.
212. See Section 6.4.3.1.
213. Skelcher, Chris, Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance (2005),
105
214. See Section 4.4.4.3.
215. Uphoﬀ, N, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation (1999)
216. See Section 4.3.2.
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A starting point is for the strengths and deﬁciencies of the IGF’s existing processes for de-
liberation to be identiﬁed. Its strengths can be stated in three points, each of which relates
back to earlier discussions of the features of deliberative democracy:
217
￿ its structure is open to all members who wish to participate, and is free of either cost or
coercion;
￿ it is relatively pluralistic in composition, displaying considerable diversity of opinion both
within and across stakeholder groups; and
￿ it is publicly committed to the multi-stakeholder principle that holds that all members
deliberate as equals.
The main deﬁciencies of the IGF as a forum for democratic deliberation can also be stated
in three points:
￿ as noted at the commencement of this section, there is an implementation gap between the
openness of its structure and its actual accessibility to all aﬀected stakeholders, particularly
those who are disadvantaged;
218
￿ its lack of any structures or procedures for decision-making, particularly at the plenary
level, eﬀectively denies the IGF a policy-setting role, reducing it at best to a participato-
ry democratic organ serving to inform external decision-makers, but disempowered from
forming policy positions of its own; and
￿ even were it empowered to make recommendations, these would not be subjected to the
test of public reason that characterises deliberative democratic discourse, because:
￿ the fora within which discussion takes place, such as plenary sessions and workshops, are
conducted in a seminar format that discourages participants from engaging with each
other’s perspectives and working towards a consensus in which all those perspectives are
rationally reconciled; and
￿ similarly, written contributions and submissions are prepared by stakeholders in isolation
from one another, without the opportunity for their reﬁnement through public analysis
and debate to produce a balanced body of background material such as is employed in
most institutional frameworks for democratic deliberation.
219
217. See Section 4.3.2.2.
218. See Section 6.4.
219. See Section 4.3.2.4.
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The ﬁrst two of these deﬁciencies have already arisen for consideration elsewhere. A summary
of the strategies required to address the ﬁrst deﬁciency, as to the IGF’s capacity to capture
the participation of all aﬀected stakeholders, was given at Section 6.3.1.1 and will be revisited
under the heading of inclusion below.
220 As to the second deﬁciency, the importance of the
IGF’s policy-setting role and the structures necessarily to facilitate its performance were
considered in the two preceding sections of this chapter.
221 This leaves the third deﬁciency,
as to the IGF’s incapacity to engage in deliberation towards the end of achieving a rational
multi-stakeholder consensus, to be dealt with here.
6.4.2.1. Democratic deliberation
This last incapacity is illustrated by the fact that when the IGF or its dynamic coalitions have
developed policy positions, these have tended to reﬂect the prevailing views of their dominant
members, rather than emerging from a process of deliberation between equals in which the
preferences of all stakeholders are considered and balanced.
This is evident at several levels, including those of the open consultation meetings, the Ad-
visory Group, the annual plenary meetings and the workshops and dynamic coalitions:
￿ The views expressed by stakeholders in February 2006 as to the priority to be accorded
to development issues became signiﬁcantly stronger in May following the Secretariat’s pro-
nouncement that an emerging consensus on this point had been identiﬁed, although this
was a consensus to which comparatively few had by then contributed;
222
￿ The discussion papers prepared by Everton Lucero for the May 2007 meeting of the Ad-
visory Group were not in fact discussed, and at a subsequent CS-IGC organised workshop
on “Fulﬁlling the Mandate of the IGF” held in Rio, Lucero expressed the view that they
had been deliberately ignored;
￿ Despite the strong statements of certain stakeholders leading up to the Rio meeting that
new governance arrangements for Internet naming and numbering were required,
223 no
voices putting this position were heard during the panel on critical Internet resources; and
￿ Most of the workshops and dynamic coalition meetings in Athens and Rio were dominated
by presentations from panelists selected by the organisers, with little time being allocated
for the presentation of alternative perspectives from the ﬂoor. Few meetings therefore pre-
220. See Section 6.4.4.
221. See Section 6.2 and Section 6.3.
222. See Section 5.2.1.2.
223. Third World Network, Statement for the Preparatory Session for the Internet Governance Forum (2007)
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sented a balanced account of the views of all aﬀected stakeholders. As Milton Mueller put
it at the February 2008 open consultation meeting:
Freedom expression advocates were in one workshop talking to each other. Advocates of
stricter controls on content in the name of child protection were in another panel. Those
people need to talk to each other, not past each other.
Instilling a more deliberative quality into the IGF’s processes is therefore a project to be
undertaken across multiple institutional layers. Furthermore, it is to extend within each of
these layers from the earliest phase of discussion—that of agenda-setting—through to the
ﬁnal phase in which its output passes through to the next layer (or falls back to the previous
one).
As will shortly be seen, the speciﬁc processes best suited for adoption at a given layer of
governance within the IGF, or at a given phase within each layer, will diﬀer. Processes will
also diﬀer markedly between those applicable to participants present in person, and those
participating online.
224 But despite this variance in detail, the underlying features of most
institutionalised frameworks for democratic deliberation, as examined in Chapter 4,
225 are
common and relatively simple:
￿ deliberation takes place against a background of balanced brieﬁng material, designed es-
sentially to constitute the group as an informed public sphere in miniature; this material
may take written form, or be presented in person by subject matter experts, or both;
￿ the group’s discussions are guided by one or more impartial moderators or facilitators, who
are to endeavour to maintain the conditions of democratic deliberation (such as equality
and orientation towards consensus), and in the case where a group is divided into smaller
units, to coordinate between these and the larger group; and
￿ the group, and any smaller units into which it is divided, are to be of pluralistic composition,
in order to ensure that as many diﬀerent perspectives as possible are represented in the
deliberation, each of which is to be debated against the others on an equal footing without
recourse to claims of external authority.
Any of the large-scale structures for democratic deliberation that incorporate these features,
including the 21st Century Town Meeting, citizens’ assembly, consensus conference and speed
dialogue, have the potential to be applied directly to the IGF’s plenary body. Since speed
224. Though for present purposes, processes for online deliberation will be left aside, to be revisited under the
heading of inclusion at Section 6.4.4.
225. See Section 4.3.2.4 and compare Section 4.4.2.1.
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dialogues came close to being trialled for the Rio IGF meeting, and have been successfully
employed by the ITU in an analogous context, these seem the most natural choice of method
to improve the deliberative character of the IGF’s plenary meetings.
As Henry Judy of the American Bar Association explained at the May 2007 open consulta-
tion meeting, the strengths of the speed dialogue format include the following:
First, it introduces a large number of people to one another who might otherwise not have spoken
to one another. It is a great networking tool, and it stimulates networking, and thus it would
strengthen the multiparticipant orientation of the forum. Secondly, it is a great equalizer. The
great and the small are at the same table and must listen to one another. Third, it forces people
to speak crisply. You do not have time for the extended use of diplomatic code, euphemisms,
and circumlocution. Fourth, it is useful for synthesizing the state of opinion and emotion in the
group.
The reference here to“synthesizing the state of opinion”of the group is noteworthy. Ordinarily,
speed dialogues are not used at the ﬁnal stages of decision-making; unlike, for example, the
21st Century Town Meeting in which the closest to a rough consensus position that the groups
achieves is put to a formal vote at the end of the meeting. However for the plenary body of
the IGF, which as Nitin Desai is fond of noting has no deﬁned membership, vote-taking is
out of the question. Instead, it is for the bureau, with the assistance of the facilitators of
the speed dialogue, to assess the state of the group’s progress towards consensus following a
speed dialogue session, as a preliminary stage to the deliberation and more formal decision-
making phase that is to occur within the bureau. More will be said of this process of assessment
under the following heading.
As originally scheduled for Rio, there was to have been an Athens-style moderated panel
presentation and a speed dialogue session for each of the four main themes of the meeting,
taking place one after the other. However, it was the speed dialogue session which was to
have been held ﬁrst, and the panel presentation second. More consistent with deliberative
democratic principles would be for the order to be reversed, so that the panel presentation
could provide the background of balanced brieﬁng material upon which participants in the
speed dialogue would begin their deliberations.
The panel presentations in turn should be built upon the written submissions contributed by
stakeholders and dynamic coalitions in advance of the meeting, which provide a more diverse
base of brieﬁng material than that which can be provided by a necessarily limited group
of panelists (around twelve for Athens, and six for Rio). Whereas the selection of brieﬁng
material is in most deliberative democratic models a matter for the group’s facilitators in
consultation with stakeholders, there is precedent in the case of the consensus conference for
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the partial devolution of this function to the group itself. This would also be so in the case
of the IGF, in that whilst written submissions would be received and published without
moderation (as is the case already), it would fall to the bureau to draft a synthesis paper
summarising all of the contributed perspectives in a factually accurate and balanced manner.
This synthesis paper would then be translated and distributed to those attending the meeting,
both by its advance publication on the IGF’s Web site and by its inclusion in the materials
received by each delegate upon registration. This did not occur for the Athens meeting,
when the synthesis paper was published by the Secretariat only after many participants had
already departed for the meeting, and in neither Athens nor Rio was the paper distributed
to participants or referred to during any of the plenary sessions.
Doubtless, there will be challenges in implementing speed dialogues at the IGF. As Henry
Judy summarised the drawbacks of speed dialogues:
First, it depends on each table having a reporter who can represent the views at the table in
the summary in a skillful and disinterested manner. It is not easy to ﬁnd a Markus Kummer
for each table. Second, it requires a high degree of prior planning and instruction on the part of
the organizers as well as a high degree of compliance on the part of the participants. Otherwise,
it can become a confusing and unproductive exercise in herding cats, if I may use the English
expression. I have heard it said that the likelihood that the technique will be successful is directly
proportional to the tendency of the group to start its meetings on time. Third, it tends to work
less well as the group becomes larger.
To some extent these diﬃculties, which largely accord with those discussed in Chapter 4,
226
may require the IGF to become better resourced so as to enable it to attract a skilled team
of facilitators, along with suﬃcient translators for each of the round-table groups (though
resourcing constraints were not given as a reason for speed dialogues being dropped from the
Rio programme).
However they will also require the inculcation of shared norms such as trust, equality and
cooperation that are necessary for the success of any consensual or deliberative democratic
decision-making process.
227 Whilst these cannot be developed instantaneously, for a core of
IGF participants (including many of the members of civil society’s CS-IGC and the private
sector’s ICC/BASIS) such norms have been in the process of development since the ﬁrst
PrepCom of WSIS in 2002. Whilst this group is only a narrow segment of the present-day
IGF, it could catalyse the development of a broader culture of cooperation.
Beyond this, the development of shared norms to reinforce the deliberative process can only
226. See Section 4.3.5.1, Section 4.4.4.1 and Section 4.4.4.3.
227. See Section 4.4.4.3 and Section 4.3.2.2.
436Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
come from the initiation, repetition and reﬁnement of that process, as stakeholders within
the group learn to understand and trust each other, and the group as a whole builds up its
social capital.
228
The use of speed dialogues as a framework for democratic deliberation has been put forward
above only for the plenary body. For smaller groups within the IGF such as the multi-
stakeholder bureau, dynamic coalitions and open fora, diﬀerent techniques may be required.
(For present purposes, the plenary body in open consultation can also be considered as one
of these smaller groups, since the number of members in attendance is of approximately an
order of magnitude smaller than at the annual plenary meeting.)
Provided that it incorporates at least the three main features of the deliberative democratic
frameworks identiﬁed above—the use of background brieﬁng, the guidance of a moderator or
facilitator, and the pluralism and equality of the group—there is no need to be prescriptive
of the precise method by which democratic deliberation is institutionalised within the IGF’s
smaller subcommittees.
In particular, insights from models of small group democracy such as that of Gastil,
229 those
from the study of deliberative democracy such as the citizens’ jury,
230 and those of consen-
sus in small groups such as the Consensus Workshop,
231 are all potentially applicable. It is
a feature of the latter that deﬁning the process to be followed forms the group’s ﬁrst item
of business; although to bootstrap the group into a form capable of deliberating upon its
own processes (let alone anything else), these must at least initially be speciﬁed by hierarchi-
cal means, such as a constitutional document if one exists, or by its chair, or through standing
rules previously established by the group.
Without detracting from this latitude on matters of detail, some broad guidance for the
processes to be adopted by the open consultation meetings, the workshops and dynamic
coalitions, the open fora and the multi-stakeholder bureau does ﬂow from the ﬁndings already
made, particularly given that the structural relationship between these bodies requires their
deliberative procedures to be coordinated to some degree. Taking these in turn:
￿ The main role of the open consultation meetings is in shaping the structure and processes
of the IGF and the agenda of its meetings, drawing on written submissions contributed by
stakeholders and dynamic coalitions, and summarised in a synthesis paper prepared by the
228. See Section 4.3.2.
229. See Section 4.3.2.5.
230. See Section 4.3.2.4.
231. See Section 4.4.2.1.
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Secretariat. If that synthesis paper is to serve as a suitable input to democratic deliberation
in accordance with the ﬁrst of the three features identiﬁed above, then as in the case of the
annual plenary meetings it should be prepared by the bureau rather than the Secretariat.
This is because substantive judgment is involved in ensuring that a diversity of views is
presented and that obvious factual inaccuracies are corrected, which is a responsibility that
mirrors that of the mass media in the model of deliberation in the public sphere.
232
The second of the three main features of frameworks for deliberative democratic identiﬁed
above—supportive moderation or facilitation—is also lacking in the case of the open con-
sultation meetings, in that they are conducted in a format of round-robin presentations
which is not conducive to engagement between stakeholders. Nitin Desai has acknowledged
this deﬁciency, pleading with stakeholders (though largely in vain) in May 2007:
I would strongly urge people to, if possible, to [sic] comment on suggestions which have come
from others, also, so that I get a sense of where people are. ... because that will help us to
move towards some form of [consensus on] what we will do with this forum.
However scholars of deliberative democracy and consensual decision-making teach that
rather than simply expecting stakeholders to engage with each other spontaneously, it is
the role of the moderator or facilitator to structure the discussion to speciﬁcally encourage
this behaviour. For example, in the Consensus Workshop, an initial brainstorming session
in which all input is welcomed, is followed by a period in which those ideas are grouped
and named, and then ﬁnally discussed in turn with the objective of reaching consensus.
233
The adoption of a similar process for the open consultation meetings would promote the
development of far more considered recommendations from the group at large upon which
for the bureau to draw.
￿ Like considerations apply to the workshops and dynamic coalitions (speciﬁcally those recog-
nised as working groups), which have a similar but more specialised role to play in providing
reasoned, multi-stakeholder input for the plenary body and the bureau in speciﬁc substan-
tive issue areas. It is only if a workshop or dynamic coalition has been able to eﬀectively
deliberate in a democratic and multi-stakeholder fashion that its output should carry any
greater weight with the plenary body or bureau than the submissions of individual stake-
holders.
Criteria are already speciﬁed to ensure that workshops held at plenary meetings are of
multi-stakeholder composition, but beyond that they do not specify that its proceedings
232. See Section 4.3.2.3.
233. See Section 4.4.2.1.
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should be democratic or consensual, and do not extend to dynamic coalitions. Whilst it
would be possible to expand the criteria that workshops must satisfy and to extend them
to dynamic coalitions, it has been seen that there may be quite legitimate reasons for
the formation of workshops and dynamic coalitions that are not deliberatively democratic,
such as networks or BOFs, which unlike working groups are not designed to directly provide
input for the plenary body or bureau.
Instead, whilst it remains necessary for the bureau to develop further criteria by which
dynamic coalitions can be assessed for their compliance with democratic as well as multi-
stakeholder principles,
234 it is quite possible for their compliance with certain of those
criteria to be assessed ex post facto. In other words, rather than requiring them to docu-
ment in advance how their decision-making processes will be deliberatively democratic or
consensual as a condition of their approval by the bureau, a dynamic coalition, or for
that matter a workshop, seeking to formally present its output to the plenary body could
be required to submit to the bureau a report that documents the processes by which its
recommendations were developed, and the extent of the consensus that was reached on
them.
235
￿ As far as open fora are concerned, the only additional consideration worthy of mention
is the importance of the forum not being moderated by the chief executive of the organ-
isation under consideration, but by an independent facilitator who would ensure that the
forum addressed the role, structure and processes of the organisation in question with ref-
erence to the WSIS process criteria, along with the content of any relevant draft or ﬁnal
recommendations that the IGF had considered in plenary session.
￿ The ﬁnal and most important subcommittee of the IGF whose processes fall for consid-
eration is the multi-stakeholder bureau. The reports of workshops and dynamic coalitions
eﬀectively form part of the bureau’s background brieﬁng material as it deliberates on the
IGF’s formal output. So too does the input of any advisors and liaisons appointed to the
bureau, along with the reports of any sub-committees established by the bureau, and in-
deed any consensus the plenary body itself may have reached either in open consultation or
at its annual meeting.
The bureau, then, does not lack for brieﬁng material upon which to deliberate. What it
does lack, or rather what its precursor, the Advisory Group, lacks, is the ability to act
234. See Section 6.3.1.5.
235. This option will be explored further under the following heading.
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upon this input. In its present form, members of the Advisory Group discuss their views,
but take only a very limited range of decisions on their own account.
236 This sits at odds
with the object of democratic deliberation, which is a process not merely for dialogue but
for decision-making.
237
Reconstituted as the multi-stakeholder bureau, the group will have to become no longer
a simple group of advisors to the UN Secretary-General (even though he remains as its
ﬁgurehead), but a democratic executive committee in its own right, akin to the boards
of directors of auDA and ICANN, or APNIC’s Executive Council. The role of facilitat-
ing the group’s adherence to deliberative democratic principles (perhaps following Gastil’s
guidelines for implementing small group democracy)
238 will fall naturally to its chairs.
6.4.2.2. Assessing consensus
One of the roles of the bureau that has received only cursory attention so far is that of
assessing the consensus of the plenary body, along with that of dynamic coalitions or work-
shops submitting reports on their activities. Part of the diﬃculty of this endeavour lies in
the lack of a universally accepted measure of consensus, given that even within the Inter-
net governance regime, working deﬁnitions range from “general agreement” as in the case of
APNIC,
239 to unanimity (though allowing for abstention) in the case of the W3C.
240
For present purposes, the deﬁnition of consensus from Johnson and Crawford that was adopted
in Chapter 4, and that is broadly consistent with deliberative democratic theory, will be
accepted as appropriate for the IGF: that “opposition to a particular policy is limited in
scope and intensity (or is unreasoned), and opposition does not stem from those specially
impacted by the policy.”
241
It is noteworthy that the application of this deﬁnition to the IGF would not require full con-
sensus or unanimity. This limits the capacity of individual stakeholders with limited interests
in an issue to exercise disproportionate power over the decision-making process, whilst still
preserving the rights of stakeholder groups to veto any measure that is against their interests
as a whole, through the institutionalisation of this right within the bureau. At the same time,
236. See Section 5.2.1.4.
237. See Section 4.3.2.2.
238. See Section 4.3.2.5.
239. See Section 4.4.3.2.
240. W3C, Process Document (2005), para 3.3
241. Johnson, David R & Crawford, Susan P, Why Consensus Matters: The Theory Underlying ICANN’s Mandate
to Set Policy Standards for the Domain Name System (2000)
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the deﬁnition looks not only to the number of stakeholders in dissent on a particular issue,
but to the directness of their interest and the strength of the reasons for their position.
Although conceptually sound, the deﬁnition is very much a subjective one, which raises the
prospect that the bureau might ﬁnd consensus where it wishes to ﬁnd it, and fail to ﬁnd it
where it does not. The appropriate response is to build in mechanisms of accountability to
counteract this risk.
242 Some possible ways of doing so can be drawn from the experience of
the use of consensus in other organisations of Internet governance. Two of those examined
in Chapter 4 were ICANN and APNIC, which are also amongst this chapter’s examples, and
which will be revisited again here in turn.
243
It will be recalled that ICANN assesses the consensus of the community upon proposed new
policies by means of a formal Policy Development Process. Taken as a process intended to
facilitate the formation of consensus, the PDP does not provide a successful model for the
IGF to follow. However what it has achieved, by requiring that the level of consensus upon
any proposed new policy be fully documented, is to address criticisms that ICANN’s board
had previously ruled upon the existence of such consensus without any adequate factual basis
for doing so.
244 The principle that may be drawn from ICANN’s example is therefore that
the most transparent and accountable way for the achievement of consensus to be assessed is
through a process that is formally and openly documented.
An alternative and contrasting model is that of APNIC, which is a much more culturally
homogeneous organisation than ICANN with a less tumultuous history. As described above,
its process for establishing the achievement of consensus on a new policy is predicated upon
the subjective judgment of the Chair of the Open Policy Meeting, but this is subject to
various checks and balances: that the proposal ﬁrst have been developed within the relevant
SIG, then tabled four weeks ahead of the meeting, then achieved consensus at that meeting
both amongst SIG members and in plenary session, then survived an eight week comment
period, before ﬁnally receiving the majority approval of APNIC’s Executive Council.
The most appropriate model for the assessment of consensus by the IGF’s multi-stakeholder
bureau is likely to be a hybrid of those of ICANN and APNIC. Like ICANN (only more so) the
IGF is politically and culturally heterogeneous, and therefore the thorough documentation
of any consensus claimed to have been achieved by its plenary body at an annual meeting
or open consultation will avoid the same suggestions of partiality being made of the bureau
242. See also Section 6.4.3.2 below.
243. See Section 4.4.3.
244. See Section 2.1.3.
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that some have made of the Secretariat and Advisory Group.
245 The same applies to dynamic
coalitions, who as noted above, ought in like manner to document the consensus that they
have reached on any recommendations being forwarded to the bureau for presentation to the
plenary body.
Furthermore, as in APNIC’s case, it is also desirable for the achievement of consensus to be
conﬁrmed at more than one level. The procedures already put forward in this chapter ensure
that this is so, as any consensus of the plenary body will be reconﬁrmed by consensus of
the stakeholder groups within the bureau before it becomes a formal recommendation of the
IGF. Similarly any consensus of a dynamic coalition (if accepted as such by the bureau) will
have to be conﬁrmed by the plenary body, before being reconﬁrmed by the bureau if it is to
become part of the IGF’s formal output.
The example of APNIC also teaches that any consensus reached at a plenary meeting should
remain subject for a short period to the input of those who were unable to participate in
that meeting. This practice will be discussed further when considering the ways in which to
accommodate online participation in the IGF’s processes.
246
On this basis, a suitable initial process for the assessment of consensus by the multi-
stakeholder bureau (subject, of course, to reﬁnement through open consultation) would in-
corporate the following elements:
￿ if a proposed recommendation, statement or the like originated in a workshop or dynamic
coalition, it must ﬁrst have achieved the consensus of that body, as recorded in a written
report to the bureau, before being presented to the plenary body for deliberation;
￿ in any case, a proposed recommendation or statement should be tabled in draft on the
IGF’s Web site ahead of the meeting at which it is intended that it be deliberated upon by
the plenary body;
￿ if the bureau considers that consensus was reached by the plenary body, this should be
recorded in its report of the meeting, along with the grounds for its conclusion that any
opposition to the recommendation was limited in scope and intensity, was unreasoned, or
did not stem from those specially impacted by it;
￿ the report of the meeting should be subject to an open comment period; and
245. For example, by the Third World Network at the February and May 2007 consultations.
246. See Section 6.4.4.
442Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
￿ in deliberating upon the appropriate form in which to formalise a proposed recommendation
or statement, the bureau should consider any comments received during the comment period
and respond to them in the minutes of the meeting at which a decision is made.
6.4.3. Transparency and accountability
One example has just been given of a circumstance in which mechanisms of accountability
are needed to guard against the subversion of democratic processes by those in power; in
that case, the bureau’s power to inﬂuence the substantive programme of the IGF through
its subjective assessment of the consensus of its plenary body. But numerous other examples
can be given of circumstances in which transparency and accountability are as important as
structure and process in ensuring that the IGF does not lapse into oligarchy.
6.4.3.1. Transparency
For instance, because the Advisory Group meets behind closed doors and utilises a secret
mailing list, it was possible for one of its members to quietly insinuate that private sec-
tor support for the IGF and its Secretariat would be withdrawn if reforms unacceptable to
that stakeholder group went ahead.
247 But for that communication being leaked, stakeholders
at large might never have had as complete an explanation for the omission of those reforms
from the IGF’s agenda for Rio.
It is diﬃcult to reconcile the Advisory Group’s non-compliance with even the most fundamen-
tal requirements of democratic transparency, such as the publication of minutes of its meet-
ings, with the UN Secretary-General’s promise at the outset that “the Advisory Group will
carry out its work in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, and will seek to make the
best possible use of electronic working methods, including online consultations.”
248
Admittedly, there has been gradual if belated progress towards the rectiﬁcation of this much-
criticised deﬁciency. Since September 2007, notes of meetings of the Advisory Group meetings
have been released.
249 In February 2008, a commitment was made on the front page of the
IGF’s Web site to make“[d]igests of the discussion held within the Advisory Group ... available
on the Forum Section on a regular basis.”Suitably, the ﬁrst two of these digests, published in
247. See Section 5.2.4.1.
248. United Nations Oﬃce of the Secretary-General, Secretary-General Establishes Advisory Group to Assist Him
in Convening Internet Governance Forum (2006)
249. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Meeting Summary Report (2007)
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anonymised form, were a selection of postings considering the topics of the Advisory Group’s
rotation,
250 and how its transparency could be further improved.
251
Even so, the democratic transparency of a number of the other organisations to which the
IGF has been compared in this chapter still far exceeds that of the Advisory Group, including
in the case of ICANN’s GNSO and ALAC, as well as CGI.br, the publication of full audio
recordings of their meetings (omitting only the discussion of commercially or legal sensitive
matters). ICANN also publishes an oﬃcial blog as a less formal counterpart to the minutes
of its board meetings.
252
The Advisory Group’s self-imposed seclusion, whilst incongruous, matches that of one other
notable institution of Internet governance: ICANN’s GAC. This is, of course, no coincidence,
and points to the principal explanation for each body’s lack of transparency: that govern-
mental representatives are reticent about speaking freely and on the record during intergov-
ernmental negotiations.
This is for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is to avoid the potential diplomatic embarrassment
that they might cause in inadvertently speaking against domestic government policy. As one
of the civil society delegates to WSIS put it:
Governments are often well-disposed and willing to cooperate with us, but governmental del-
egates don’t have the same ﬂexibility as we do to propose, negotiate and adopt any proposal.
Most of the time, they have to refer to their capitals for approval, whereas we are able to take
decisions more quickly and defend our points of view.
253
The second reason, which may also apply within other stakeholder groups, is that because
decision-making within the Advisory Group could require stakeholders to compromise their
publicly-stated positions, allowing them to do this privately minimises their potential loss of
face. It is for the same reason that the grand coalition of a consociation normally convenes
in private.
254
Thus the democratic transparency of the Advisory Group has been traded oﬀ against the
concerns of governments (and perhaps other stakeholders) to avoid the risk of diplomatic
embarrassment and loss of face associated with an open democratic process. Whilst this can,
perhaps, be justiﬁed on the pragmatic grounds that only by making such a trade-oﬀ will
those stakeholders be persuaded to participate at all, in the absence of a conceptual justiﬁ-
250. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Discussion 6 December 2007 to 15 January 2008 (2008)
251. IGF Secretariat, Advisory Group Discussion 30 January to 3 February 2008 (2008)
252. See http://blog.icann.org/.
253. Bloem, Renate, Multi-Stakeholderism and Civil Society (2005), 101–102
254. Skelcher, Chris, Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance (2005),
105—though this is, deliberately, not true of the consociational multi-stakeholder bureau proposed here.
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cation, such a trade-oﬀ could only legitimately be agreed by multi-stakeholder, democratic
means—which it has not been.
Having said that, the Secretariat has also attempted, though with limited success, to balance
the concerns of governments with the need for transparency through the following measures:
￿ Following the example of WGIG, its meetings are held subject to the “Chatham
House Rule,”
255 which allows the meeting’s participants to use and disseminate any in-
formation received in the meeting so long as they do not reveal the identity of its source.
256
However whilst in theory this would allow the Advisory Group to open up its meetings
at least to the media and to stakeholders who have agreed to abide by the Rule, in fact
this has not occurred; leaving the group’s eﬀective transparency subject to the whim of the
meeting’s participants (and in practice, almost entirely opaque).
￿ The appointment of members of the Advisory Group in their personal capacities might
also have been thought to allow governmental representatives to speak freely without being
taken to be stating government policy. However again, in practice this appears to have made
no diﬀerence to the transparency of the Advisory Group in comparison to the GAC, whose
members act in a representative capacity. Moreover, as already noted, the appointment of
members as individuals dissociates them from the capacity in which they represent their
stakeholder group, which defeats the purpose of appointing a multi-stakeholder body in the
ﬁrst place.
257
The failure of these measures to be reﬂected in the level of the Advisory Group’s trans-
parency in practice indicates that a more radical approach to the problem of governmental
participation is called for in the case of the proposed multi-stakeholder bureau.
This is provided by the consociational multi-stakeholder process developed above. This pro-
cess, as it will be recalled, is divided into three phases: assessing the consensus of the plenary
body, developing draft recommendations encapsulating that consensus, and then ratifying
such draft recommendations by consensus between the stakeholder groups.
There are no reasonable grounds for contention over the need to maintain transparency during
the ﬁrst phase: whether the plenary body has reached consensus on a particular issue or
not is a question of fact, which bears no necessary relation to the views of the stakeholder
255. IGF Secretariat, Multistakeholder Advisory Group Meeting Summary Report (2008), 2
256. See http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule/.
257. See Section 6.3.2.3.
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representatives within the bureau on that issue, nor calls for any negotiation on or compromise
of those views.
The second phase is more problematic, in that the process of democratic deliberation during
this phase will normally require governmental representatives to state, justify and negotiate
positions. However, because no formal decision-making takes place in the second phase, these
positions are only required to be provisional. This reduces the strength of governmental
arguments against the maintenance of transparency during the second phase. Moreover, to
the extent that those arguments still do carry, they may justify such compromise measures
of transparency as are employed in the existing Advisory Group as outlined above, if agreed
by multi-stakeholder, democratic means.
258
It remains the case that some ﬁnal negotiations (which on the experience of WSIS will most
likely be between governments in private) may be required before recommendations can be
formally agreed. But that is the express purpose of the third phase, in which each of the
stakeholder groups deliberates in isolation (though not necessarily in seclusion) on whether
to exercise its power of veto. Because the second and third stages of the consociational multi-
stakeholder process are designed with the ﬂexibility to be iterative, if the separate deliberation
of a stakeholder group raises new issues not taken into account in the draft under considera-
tion, the power of veto can be exercised and these issues brought back before the bureau as
a whole for further deliberation.
Because each stakeholder group determines its own processes to employ during this ﬁnal phase,
they might not be transparent at all (and in the case of governments, probably will not be).
Whilst this may make that phase of the process less democratic overall, this shortcoming is
limited by the fact that the third phase is in many ways the least important, taking place as
it does after multi-stakeholder deliberation has already resulted in democratic agreement on
a draft recommendation, and provided a background of reasoned and balanced argument for
the stakeholder groups to individually consider. Indeed, the third phase serves only to provide
a mechanism for formal decision-taking that upholds the autonomy of each stakeholder group.
If consensus is reached upon a certain issue at both the plenary level and within the bureau as
258. For example, in open consultation with all stakeholders, the bureau may agree to procedures (which could
be enshrined in standing rules) by which private sessions may be held during the second phase on sensitive issues,
or those issues discussed on a private mailing list, provided that the Chatham House Rule is applied.
It may also agree in like manner to a standing rule providing that the positions taken by governmental mem-
bers are not those of the governments that appointed them, unless or until oﬃcially cleared. Alternatively, it
could agree that only senior diplomats, authorised to make statements of policy in real time, should be eligible
for appointment as governmental representatives; compare ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee, GAC
Operating Principles (2005), Principle 14.
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a whole, this is not nulliﬁed by the failure of one of the stakeholder groups to ratify a formal
recommendation on that issue. Rather, this simply means that the IGF has no formal output
to use in interfacing with other bodies acting in this issue area. The plenary’s consensus
may nonetheless possess normative weight with those other bodies, regardless of the bureau’s
recognition and ratiﬁcation of it, particularly as the IGF consolidates its social capital and
thereby its inﬂuence within the Internet governance regime over time.
Furthermore, the transparency of the processes adopted by a particular stakeholder group
need not be taken as given over the longer term. The transnational democratic programme,
which is reﬂected in the IGF’s mandate to “[p]romote ... WSIS principles in Internet gover-
nance,”
259 seeks to further democratise all layers of governance, in order to preserve democrat-
ic freedoms in a new medieval world in which the authority of pluralistic public and private
actors overlaps.
260
6.4.3.2. Accountability
Chapter 4 discussed the diﬃculty of applying criteria of accountability speciﬁc to other con-
texts, such as liberal democratic states or domestic administrative agencies, to assess the
performance of transnational governance networks such as the IGF.
261 In the absence of an
appropriate general framework of accountability applicable to the IGF, it was concluded that
a balance of bottom–up, top–down and peer-to-peer accountability should be constructed by
reference to best practices observed elsewhere, assessing their overall adequacy by reference to
general democratic principles. This can now be undertaken using the exemplar organisations
as case studies where relevant.
Beginning with bottom–up accountability, this relates to the extent to which the actions of
the IGF’s decision-making organs can be demonstrated to fulﬁl the democratic principle by
deriving from the consent of the stakeholders who make up its membership. In other contexts,
bottom–up accountability may be provided by regular, free and fair democratic elections, or
thorough the design of participatory democratic processes for soliciting public input into
proposed policy-making.
In the case of the IGF, they are provided by the transcription of open consultation meet-
ings and plenary sessions, and the publication of stakeholders’ written contributions. These
currently provide the only basis against which to assess the congruence of the actions and
259. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 72(i)
260. See Section 4.3.1.4.
261. See Section 4.3.3.
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decisions of the Secretariat and Advisory Group with the consensus of the stakeholders at
large.
The limitations of these documents are evident, however. First, as Nitin Desai admitted in
the February 2007 open consultations, it is something of “a labor of love to go through that
record ... we may have to do a little bit more to direct people in the right way, because saying
that there’s 15 hours of transcript is, I’m not sure enough.” On the account given here, the
preparation of a balanced report of the discussions of stakeholders at meetings, along with a
synthesis of written contributions, is another of the responsibilities that properly falls to the
multi-stakeholder bureau.
262
A second limitation is that the Secretariat and Advisory Group have made no reference to
the transcripts or synthesis papers to justify their decisions, but have simply asserted that
“broad agreement” or an “emerging consensus” has existed to support the decisions made.
263
It is for this reason that it was proposed above that the multi-stakeholder bureau should,
following ICANN’s example, document its assessment of the consensus of the plenary body in
much more exacting detail.
264
A third and ﬁnal limitation on the existing mechanisms of bottom–up accountability for the
IGF is that in the event that the decisions of the Secretariat or Advisory Group are found
not to be in accord with the consensus of the plenary body, there is very little that can
be done about it. The introduction of a randomly-selected, multi-stakeholder and democrat-
ic nominating committee, as proposed in this chapter, overcomes this problem, by making
the proposed multi-stakeholder bureau—and through it, the Secretariat—accountable to the
stakeholders on whose behalf they are required to act.
Moving on to top–down mechanisms of accountability, at present the IGF as a whole is subject
to the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is required in turn to
periodically report on the IGF’s aﬀairs to the General Assembly and to recommend whether
it should continue after the fulﬁlment of its initial mandate.
265 As already noted, this is a
conceptual anomaly. The IGF’s status as a transnational governance network precludes its
subjection to top–down supervision, since no other multi-stakeholder, democratic institution
yet exists to which it could legitimately be made accountable.
266
262. See Section 6.3.2.
263. For example IGF Secretariat, The Substantive Agenda of the First Meeting of the Internet Governance
Forum (2006).
264. See Section 6.4.2.2.
265. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 75 and 76
266. But for the future, any multi-stakeholder arrangements that may yet be made for enhanced cooperation in
Internet public policy making will be a likely candidate: see Section 5.1.4.1.
448Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
Therefore whilst the Secretary-General may retain his formal role of oversight at least in
the short term for political reasons, it is desirable that the IGF meanwhile develop an addi-
tional and more legitimate layer of top–down accountability. Even without any appropriate
transnational governance institutions to exercise such oversight, the IGF can design internal
hierarchies (or networks) of its own to provide a structure for accountability,
267 much as the
accountability of a liberal democratic state is furthered by the system of mutual checks and
balances between its legislative, executive and judicial branches.
An example of this principle in practice is given by auDA.
268 One of the objects established
in its constitution is “to develop and establish a policy framework for the development and
administration of the .au ccTLD.”
269 Formal responsibility for this role lies with the Board
of Directors, but in doing so it acts upon the report of a specialised Advisory Panel, which is
convened as required to conduct public consultations and to generate recommendations for
the Board’s consideration. The Chair of the Advisory Panel is appointed by and reports to
the Board, and in turn appoints the panel’s other members.
270
The division within auDA between the site of formal policy-setting authority and the process
of policy development, along with the fact that the Board does not directly appoint the
members of the Advisory Panel, are both characteristic of the separation of legislative and
executive powers that exists to varying degree in most liberal democracies.
Even so, a number of shortcomings in the accountability of auDA’s policy development process
have still been identiﬁed. First, the Advisory Panel is accountable to the Board for its output,
but not for its processes, which are devised at its own discretion. Thus for example, because the
Chair of the Advisory Panel is not accountable for the selection of Advisory Panel members,
the transparency of that process has been criticised,
271 as has the process of building consensus
within the Panel.
272 Leaving aside the merits of these speciﬁc complaints, scholar John Selby
has concluded that
greater transparency, procedural fairness, accountability and an appeals process would improve
the decisions made by auDA’s policy development committees without signiﬁcantly impacting
on ﬂexibility.
273
267. See Section 5.4.4.2.
268. A number of other ccTLD regulators and registries follow a similar model; for example Nominet appoints a
multi-stakeholder Policy Advisory Board (PAB) to advise it on policy matters.
269. auDA, Constitution (2006), clause 3.1(d)
270. auDA, Constitution (2006), clause 24.8
271. Selby, John, Submission to Review of the Structure and Operation of the .au Internet Domain Name (2006),
16
272. Domain Industry Association, Domain Industry Submission to DCITA au Namespace Review (2006), 5
273. Selby, John, Submission to Review of the Structure and Operation of the .au Internet Domain Name (2006),
16
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The second shortcoming is that when the Board of auDA elects to engage in policy devel-
opment on its own account, there is no top–down accountability to constrain the process it
employs. As a result, as former auDA board member Kim Davies writes:
There have been some cases when operational changes or new policies have been implemented
without advance notice to the general public, with no ability for public participation in the
policy’s formulation other than through indirect means such as lobbying auDA directors. As
it has not been practice for board members to explain their deliberations in public, or canvas
speciﬁc opinion on an issue prior to decision-making, this is not an eﬀective mechanism to
channel contributions into the board’s considerations.
274
How then can the IGF’s processes incorporate top–down accountability whilst avoiding the
errors drawn from the lesson of auDA? First, dynamic coalitions should be accountable to the
bureau not only for their output, but also for their processes. As suggested above, this can
be done by requiring them to document the processes by which their recommendations were
reached, to ensure that they are multi-stakeholder and democratic.
275 For dynamic coalitions
that operate online, mechanisms of accountability can also be built into online tools at an
architectural level
276 (for example, by automatically creating public archives of discussions).
Second, there should be a clear separation between the formal decision-taking role of the
bureau and the policy development role of the plenary body. Such a separation is enshrined
in the structure and processes proposed in this chapter, whereby the bureau has no authority
to make recommendations other than in accordance with its assessment of the consensus of
the plenary body as a whole. An additional beneﬁt of the separation of formal authority from
the plenary body is that this is more conducive to free and open deliberation than the fusion
of authority and deliberation, which tends to politicise discussion.
277
A third recommendation for enshrining top–down accountability in the IGF, although only
ﬂeetingly suggested in the discussion of auDA above, is that there should be a power of review,
such as that exercised by the judicial branch of government that balances the legislative and
executive powers of the liberal state. This would allow for the multi-stakeholder bureau to be
made accountable for the misuse of its power with more immediacy than through its ouster
by the next nominating committee.
A better example of this is seen in ICANN. ICANN’s bylaws make provision for the internal
review (“reconsideration”) of a decision of its Board by“any person or entity materially aﬀect-
274. Davies, Kim, Contribution to the DCITA .au Review (2006), 6
275. See Section 6.4.2.2.
276. Rundle, Mary, Beyond Internet Governance: The Emerging International Framework for Governing the
Networked World (2005), 18
277. See Section 4.3.2.3.
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ed” on the grounds that the decision was made in contravention of policy or in disregard of
material information (without fault of the complainant). It also provides for the independent
review of any decisions of the Board that are alleged to have been made unconstitutionally.
278
The grounds of review speciﬁed in the bylaws have been criticised as being quite limited
in comparison to those available for the challenge of executive decisions under domestic ad-
ministrative law,
279 such as denial of natural justice and impropriety of purpose.
280 Further
reducing the grounds of challenge available at the suit of its constituents, ICANN amended
its bylaws in 1999 to ensure that its at large members could not bring a derivative action
against the company under Californian corporations law.
281
Moreover, of the applications for review that have been brought as of 2008, only one in seven
requests for internal reconsideration has been determined in the complainant’s favour,
282
and none of the pending requests for independent review have yet been heard. In fact, an
Independent Review Panel (IRP) to hear such requests was not established until 2004, despite
having been speciﬁed in ICANN’s bylaws since its establishment,
283 creating the impression
of a Board resistant to the imposition of top–down accountability.
The principal lesson for the IGF to be drawn from ICANN’s processes of review, whilst
not particularly novel, is clear: that accountability is best served by an adequate separation
of powers between the IGF’s formal decision-making organ and the body that reviews its
decisions. Whilst it was suggested above in considering the structure of the bureau that it
could form an appeals subcommittee from its own members,
284 this alone would not satisfy
that criterion of independence.
A better model is provided by the CS-IGC, whose Appeals Team is selected by a randomly-
elected Nominations Committee. Since such a committee has already been proposed for the
IGF to appoint the multi-stakeholder bureau, it would be straightforward for it to appoint
an appeals committee for the IGF simultaneously. This is also consonant with the ﬁndings of
a 2002 report on ICANN, which recommended that its reconsideration committee should not
be composed of members of the current Board, though could include former members.
285
278. ICANN, Bylaws (2006), article IV, sections 2 and 3
279. Weinberg, Jonathan, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy (2000), 233
280. FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342; The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Coun-
cil (1981) 151 CLR 170
281. Froomkin, A M, ICANN and Individuals (1999)
282. See http://www.icann.org/committees/reconsideration/. Of forty-two requests listed here dated be-
tween June 1999 and May 2006, six were decided for the complainant.
283. Froomkin, A M, Independent Review Panel Appointed After Years of Delay (2004)
284. See Section 6.3.2.3.
285. Centre for Global Studies, Enhancing Legitimacy in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (1992), 21
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The appeals committee would not have an extensive role. After all, since the IGF is a con-
sensual governance network, the ultimate sanction for the abuse of power would simply be
the withdrawal of stakeholders from that network. Thus the power of the appeals committee,
like that of any constituent body of the IGF, would be to make recommendations only, and
then strictly only on procedural matters involving the disregard of the multi-stakeholder,
democratic processes that underlie the IGF’s legitimacy; for example, that a decision of the
bureau had been made in the absence of any evidence that consensus had been reached upon
it by the plenary body.
286
The addition of such an appeals committee to the already proposed structures of nominating
committee, bureau, plenary body and dynamic coalitions would complete the institutional
framework required to constitute the IGF as a democratically accountable governance net-
work both in bottom–up and top–down terms.
There is, however also a third and ﬁnal level of accountability, which has been described
as peer-to-peer, and which is created by situating the IGF in a network of cooperative (or
competitive) governance institutions.
287 Just as it was explained that part of the IGF’s man-
date is to hold other bodies accountable for their adherence to the WSIS process criteria,
288
so too the IGF will, over the long term, be held accountable for its own eﬀectiveness as a
multi-stakeholder governance network by other actors in the Internet governance regime.
Little more need be said here of this ﬁnal level of accountability, since the IGF has little direct
control over it. However it has been stressed, particularly in Chapter 4,
289 that by reason of
its inherently consensual nature, the power of a governance network is conditioned upon its
ability to serve its stakeholders’ ends. If they can achieve the same ends less expensively
through some other mechanism of governance (or through another governance network), then
there is nothing to prevent them from doing so.
In that sense, the ultimate accountability for the IGF is provided through the pressure of
regulatory competition from other institutions in the market for governance solutions. This
competition gives it cause to hold as closely as possible to multi-stakeholder democratic
principles in order to provide its stakeholders with ever greater reason to commit themselves
to the network, thereby consolidating its social capital and fortifying its authority within the
286. Not coincidentally, this is analogous to one of the grounds upon which the actions of a domestic adminis-
trative agency may be challenged by common law judicial review, as codiﬁed in Australia by the Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), section 5.
287. Mueller, Milton & Klein, Hans, What to Do About ICANN: A Proposal for Structural Reform (2005), 3
288. See Section 6.2.2.3.
289. See Section 4.2.5, Section 4.4.4.3 and Section 4.5.
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regime.
6.4.4. Inclusion
The annual meetings of the IGF have been attended by approximately one person for every
million Internet users.
290 Whilst deliberative democracy does not require all impacted parties
to be represented, so long as all relevant perspectives are,
291 such a low rate of participation
casts doubt on just how diverse and inclusive the IGF really is. Neither is the low level of
attendance at annual IGF meetings—which is easily explained by the cost of global travel—the
only indication of its limited reach. In comparison to ICANN at an equivalent stage of its
development, the IGF is also little known amongst Internet users, rarely the subject of media
attention, and has prompted limited academic interest.
The IGF’s limited mindshare reﬂects its failure to engage with the Internet community in
its native element: that is, online. It is oddly anachronistic that the IGF, whilst seeking to
become a key institution of Internet governance, was conceived from its genesis as an annual
meeting held in person, with online tools as a mere adjunct. This contrasts with many of
the institutions of Internet technical coordination and standards development reviewed in
Chapter 2 (most obviously the IETF) for which online mechanisms are the primary mode of
engagement. Indeed this is typical of decentralised transnational organisations of the Internet
age, including a number of others examined throughout this thesis such as the ASF, APNIC,
Debian and Wikipedia.
In Chapter 4, the use of online mechanisms in the manner employed by these organisations
was highlighted as an important means of redressing the lack of democratic participation
in transnational governance institutions and networks.
292 Indeed, it can be argued that the
Internet is a vital enabling force for the mechanism of transnational governance by network,
just as the printing press was for representative government before it:
This multi-stakeholder governance approach is a major conceptual innovation. But it only be-
came practicable at the global level because of the existence of online tools facilitating: access
to information (Web sites without costs of paper duplication), remote participation (webcasts,
blogs), iterative consultation processes (mailing lists and forums) and soon, collaborative draft-
ing (wikis). Indeed, multi-stakeholder governance requires a combination of physical interactions
and “intersessional” online collaboration that only the Internet itself allows to envisage.
290. Based on the approximate attendance at each meeting of 1300 as a proportion of the 2006 estimate of 1.13
billion global Internet users: ITU, ICT Statistics Database (2005).
291. See Section 4.3.2.2.
292. See Section 4.3.4.3.
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Internet Governance is therefore not only the governance“of”the Internet and“on”the Internet.
It is also, in a certain way, governance “enabled by” the Internet, or in other terms, the embryo
of a“Governance for the Internet Age.”The global network demands a new type of governance;
but it is also the tool that makes this new governance possible and shapes it in its own image:
real-time, participatory and distributed.
293
This subsection of the thesis will therefore focus on the use of online tools in advancing
transnational participation in the processes of the IGF.
294
In Chapter 4, a distinction was drawn between two conceptions of the democratising role
of online processes.
295 The ﬁrst, described (though not canonically) as e-democracy, is very
much that which has informed the approach of the IGF Secretariat. In this conception, online
participation serves essentially as an extension of the physical meeting. That is, it is largely
concerned with providing a channel of communication (generally passive and one-way) be-
tween remote participants and those present in person at IGF meetings. It does not involve
independent online deliberation, save in a form strictly secondary to, and tightly integrated
with, that which takes place face-to-face.
Although the e-democratic model has its limitations, this is not to suggest that its programme
is not important in its own right. On the contrary, given the prohibitive cost of internation-
al travel particularly for disadvantaged stakeholders, streamlining communications between
physical meetings and remote participants is essential if those meetings are to be adequately
inclusive and diverse.
However the second conception of online or digital democracy, termed Internet democracy
in Chapter 4, is equally important in broadening participation in the fulﬁlment of the IGF’s
mandate, yet has been entirely neglected by the IGF’s Secretariat. On this conception, parallel
online processes should supplement rather than merely supporting the physical meetings, in
order that they might redress some of the limitations inherent in the latter.
6.4.4.1. e-democracy
Even granted that its approach has been limited to the former conception, the IGF’s imple-
mentation of e-democratic mechanisms has been as deﬁcient from a deliberative democratic
standpoint as its structure and processes are. The four categories of tools for online democratic
deliberation discussed in Chapter 4 were those for synchronous and asynchronous discussion,
293. de la Chapelle, Bertrand, The Internet Governance Forum: How a United Nations Summit Produced a New
Governance Paradigm for the Internet Age (2007), 25
294. It will not directly address the other democratic uses of online tools, such as the advancement of account-
ability and transparency, which have been already been dealt with above.
295. See Section 4.3.4.
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document preparation and decision-making.
296 However since the IGF has been structured
simply as a discussion forum, without the capacity to fulﬁl its policy-setting role, the only
online mechanisms that have been put in place for the IGF have been those to facilitate
discussion; that is, the ﬁrst two of the above categories.
What passes for synchronous discussion is the transmission of the proceedings of the IGF’s
plenary sessions and workshops to remote participants via webcast, and the selective relaying
of remote participants’ input to the ﬂoor of plenary sessions by a moderator. However, this
does not allow for an adequately interactive exchange; for example, it was typical in Athens
for the input of remote participants to be delayed by as much as half an hour (if it was relayed
to the meeting at all), by which time the face-to-face discussion had long moved on, and the
introduction of the remote input became disruptive and irrelevant. In Rio, perhaps recalling
this experience, fewer remote participants took the trouble to attempt to interject comments
or questions. Others had trouble accessing the webcasts of the plenary meeting.
These problems could have been addressed if a more accessible technology than webcasting
had been selected for use at the meeting, such as Jabber chat as used by APNIC.
297 Since
a real-time transcription of proceedings at the plenary meeting is generated in any case for
projection to the front of the main venue, this could easily also have been copied in real time
to the chat forum to enable all users (including those without the high speed access required
to access the webcast) to follow the meeting’s progress instantaneously.
As a complement to this, comments from that chat forum could have been displayed on a large
projection screen at the venue alongside the English transcription/translation, in near real-
time (perhaps lightly moderated for obscenity and plainly irrelevant content). This would
have aﬀorded online participants a much more equal and interactive voice in the plenary
discussions than they have yet enjoyed, but without interrupting the ﬂow of the proceedings.
Such a facility was in fact developed for the Rio meeting, but the Secretariat did not permit
its use.
Moving on to asynchronous discussion tools, the extent of the IGF’s use of these has largely
been conﬁned to the Secretariat’s SMF Web forum, which is limited by its ﬁxed list of topics
and unthreaded format.
298 There has also been no attempt to integrate its content into the
discussions at plenary meetings, save that general reference was made to the messages posted
296. See Section 4.3.4.3.
297. Or IRC as used by a number of online civil society organisations, such as EFA, for their general meetings.
298. See Section 5.2.2.4.
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in the Web forum in two of the synthesis papers.
299
The risk of such a disconnect between online tools and the oﬄine processes that they are
intended to support was recognised at the outset by a number of stakeholders. At the ﬁrst
open consultation meeting in February 2006, Jovan Kurbalija of DiploFoundation noted,
“there is a considerable diﬀerence between availability of online tools and their integration in
working procedures. There is a gap that should be bridged in order to have proper integration
of those online tools.” During the same meeting, ICANN blogger and lawyer Brett Fausett
put forward a solution:
I would like to recommend that you appoint Internet rapporteurs or list managers to manage
and steer the online discussions so they move forward productively. Unmanaged, open forums
unread by the leadership of the IGF can quickly become black holes for public comment, creating
the illusion of participation while providing no meaningful access to the IGF. These rapporteurs
who would work with the Secretariat would participate in the online forums and help deﬁne
areas of consensus and highlight areas of disagreement for further work or discussion.
Given the limitations of the Secretariat’s oﬃcial forum, the IGF Community Site, along with
a number of independent blogs linked from that site, soon became the dominant fora for
asynchronous online discussion around the Athens meeting. In principle, this distribution
of online discussion is consistent both with deliberative democratic theory—in which the
public sphere is constituted as an “associational network”
300—and also with the value of
decentralisation that is a persistent feature of Internet culture (and which is reﬂected in the
IGP’s proposal for a “Distributed Secretariat” for the IGF).
301
On the other hand, on a practical level, the dispersal of asynchronous discussion across the
Internet greatly complicates the task of integrating those discussions with those of the plenary
body, particularly given the Secretariat’s failure to support those other discussion fora by
promoting them to participants or linking to them from its Web site, let alone by appointing
rapporteurs to participate in and report on those discussions. The multiplication of fora for
discussion, as an example of decentralised collective action, also has the potential to reduce
rather than to increase the transparency of the process.
302
The need to draw distributed online discussion in to the mainstream of the IGF’s processes
has been acknowledged by the IGF’s Secretariat. Nitin Desai remarked during the May 2006
consultations,“I’m sure there are NGOs who are reading this and typing away stuﬀ on some
299. IGF Secretariat, Stock-taking Session Synthesis Paper (2007), 1; IGF Secretariat, IGF Second Meeting
Synthesis Paper (2007) , 3
300. Habermas, J¨ urgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996), 359
301. Mathiason, John, The Distributed Secretariat: Making the Internet Governance Forum Work (2006)
302. See Section 4.1.3.
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blog or the other, commenting on this. But we are not getting that comment here, you see.
So give some thought to ... how do we bring the outside in?”
One possible response is to maintain that just as it is a fundamental responsibility of the
IGF’s Secretariat to provide a venue for an annual plenary meeting at which all interested
stakeholders can attend and collaborate, so too it can be characterised as its responsibility
to provide an equivalent venue online. Thus scholar Mary Rundle has recommended that
intergovernmental organisations involved in Internet governance should provide a “one-stop-
shop web portal that ... oﬀers online discussion tools,” rather than requiring participants to
proactively track numerous online fora in order to participate in online policy discussion.
303
The intent of the original IGF Community Site was to provide such a“one-stop shop”portal.
A weakness of this response is that whilst it recognises the importance of facilitating the
integration of online discussion into the IGF’s plenary processes, it downplays the desirability
(and likely inevitability) that online participation will be decentralised. An alternative ap-
proach that balances the values of integration and decentralisation is the development of a
loose framework for the aggregation of content from diverse sources under a single domain,
through Internet standards such as RSS (Really Simple Syndication)
304 and the utilisation
of metadata to tag related resources so that they can be automatically grouped together.
305
This has also been a project of the Online Collaboration Dynamic Coalition, though only
partially realised in the second incarnation of the IGF Community Site.
Besides synchronous and asynchronous discussion, the other categories of online tools for
democratic deliberation are those for authoring documents and making decisions. Since these
are being considered here only for e-democratic purposes (that is, the support rather than
the replacement of in-person deliberation), their application will be limited to the proposed
multi-stakeholder bureau and to the dynamic coalitions, since it is not suggested that the
plenary body should draft documents or take formal decisions at its annual meeting.
Presently, both the Advisory Group (as the prototype of the proposed multi-stakeholder bu-
reau) and most dynamic coalitions operate electronic mailing lists on which texts and decisions
are discussed, and a number of the dynamic coalitions also operate wiki sites for collabora-
303. Rundle, Mary, Beyond Internet Governance: The Emerging International Framework for Governing the
Networked World (2005), 17
304. Actually Atom, a variation on RSS, is the oﬃcial IETF speciﬁcation for content syndication: IETF, The
Atom Syndication Format (2005).
305. This is a small part of the W3C’s larger semantic Web project; see generally Berners-Lee, Tim & Fischetti,
Mark, Weaving the Web (1999), chapter 13.
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tive document drafting,
306 as previously WGIG also had, though with limited success.
307
Whilst a number of more sophisticated tools were examined in Chapter 4,
308 one of the main
obstacles to the successful implementation of any online tools for democratic deliberation, as
borne out by WGIG’s experience, is the reluctance of governmental representatives to use
them.
309
If the purpose of these tools is only to support rather than to substitute for face-to-face pro-
cesses in which governments do participate, and so long as the two parallel processes are
adequately bridged or integrated by appointed or volunteer rapporteurs, then the disuse of
e-democratic mechanisms by governments is not a problem in itself. Indeed, enabling multi-
modal means of engagement encourages the broadest possible participation from those with
a preference for the use of one mechanism over another.
310
Where it can become a problem is where the disinterest of governments results in the provision
of e-democratic mechanisms being neglected by the Secretariat, to the detriment of other,
less well-resourced stakeholder groups. One strategy to address this, as suggested by Robert
Guerra, now of ICANN’s ALAC, at the May 2006 open consultations, is that “capacity-
building focused towards governments on how to use these technologies could be part of the
capacity-building exercise for the IGF.”
6.4.4.2. Internet democracy
Another reason why governmental representatives should be encouraged in the use of online
tools for democratic deliberation is that there are some purposes for which online tools can
achieve what an annual face-to-face meeting cannot. Examples of circumstances in which
online tools are either a better means, or even the only practical means of realising multi-
stakeholder democratic participation in the activities of the IGF include:
￿ Addressing complex and contentious issues, the resolution of which exceeds the capacity
of the annual meeting but which could be addressed through a more sustained programme
of intersessional activity. Lynn St Amour of ISOC stated in Athens, “I don’t think people
can come together for four days and have a discussion and believe we have addressed the
technological, political, social, cultural ramiﬁcations of something that’s so vast.” Whilst
306. See those of the dynamic coalitions on Privacy and Online Collaboration at http://wiki.igf-online.net/.
307. See Section 5.1.3.1.
308. See Section 4.3.4.3.
309. DiploFoundation, The Malta Discussions on Internet Governance (2006), 3
310. Panganiban, Rik, Top-down, Middle Layer and Bottom-up E-democracy (2006)
458Chapter 6. The IGF’s report card
this is undeniable, there is no such limitation on the scope of the issues upon which the
IGF could deliberate through an ongoing process facilitated by Internet communications.
￿ The drafting of documents, which is at best an impractical undertaking for a large-scale
plenary meeting (the WSIS output documents, for example, had been drafted during a
long sequence of preparatory negotiations before the formal plenary sessions even opened).
However it is a much more manageable undertaking for an extended process of deliberation
managed using online tools.
Although in some cases the drafting of such texts could be left to dynamic coalitions (which
case was dealt with under the previous heading), this might not always be appropriate; for
example, no relevant dynamic coalition might exist. Similarly the bureau itself cannot begin
upon the preparation of a text before the plenary body has reached at least partial consensus
as to what it should contain, and it is diﬃcult to build such consensus without being able
to develop a draft text for discussion. An open, democratically deliberative online process
oﬀers a better alternative in these cases.
￿ Face-to-face meetings tend to perpetuate divisions of status, race, gender and disability
that are anathema to democratic deliberation, and which online discourse more easily and
naturally overcomes. Whilst the dynamic of a face-to-face meeting (incorporating such
subtleties as body language and inﬂection of voice) may be more diﬃcult to convey by
accessible means online, so too there is a dynamic to online discussions that cannot be
replicated in face-to-face meetings. In such discussions, participants, represented by screen
name or avatar, speak with a level of vigor, frankness and equality that is diﬃcult to achieve
in person.
311
￿ Whilst the above observation applies to synchronous online discussion, asynchronous mech-
anisms also possess a unique dynamic of their own. For example, they allow for each re-
spondent to take more time to consider his or her response than would be possible in a
face-to-face meeting, and even easily allow for the pertinent points raised by a thread of
previous messages to be referenced (“quoted”) in the body of the respondent’s contribution;
indeed, this is commonplace in email and newsgroup discussions.
To give another example, wiki software automatically records the history of revisions to
a document, thereby allowing any given revision to be easily placed in a precise temporal
context. No matter how diligent the work of a rapporteur seeking to bridge online and
311. See Section 4.3.4.2.
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oﬄine discussions, it would be impossible for the subtlety of mechanisms such as these to
be adequately represented in the face-to-face context.
In sum, it is a quixotic endeavour to seek to constitute the IGF’s annual plenary meetings
as the principal mode of engagement amongst its stakeholders for every purpose, when there
are some purposes for which that meeting and the e-democratic processes set up to support
it are not, and can never be adequately suited on their own. Rather, independent processes
of Internet democracy are required to supplement (not merely to support) the IGF’s face-to-
face deliberations in order that the IGF’s mandate may be fully and adequately addressed.
Three such processes can be identiﬁed as possessing the highest priority.
The ﬁrst is an analogue of the recommendation made above that the plenary meetings should
be augmented with speed dialogue sessions that follow each of the panel sessions.
312 One way
in which these speed dialogues sessions could beneﬁt from the unique dynamic of online syn-
chronous discussion is for the table groups present in person to be supplemented by“virtual”
table groups. Each virtual group, convening using a synchronous discussion tool such as IRC,
would be of a similar size to a face-to-face table group, and would be staﬀed by a modera-
tor who would guide and focus the deliberation and summarise its output for presentation
to the larger plenary body. The same practice could be applied within workshops seeking to
produce output for introduction to the plenary body.
Second, online asynchronous discussion should be established as a parallel and complemen-
tary process to discussion in person at plenary meetings. Consequently, when preparing its
summaries of the contributions and discussions of stakeholders, and when assessing the con-
sensus of the plenary body, the bureau should be required to take into account the views
emerging from democratic deliberation in the IGF’s online fora on an equal footing with
those expressed by participants deliberating in person.
313
However, before online discussion groups can be taken as deliberative democratic fora in their
own right, they will have to satisfy similar criteria of multi-stakeholder, democratic structure
and process as those that have been put forward for dynamic coalitions.
314 This means that
a much narrower class of such fora will qualify to deliver their output to the bureau for
312. See Section 6.4.2.1.
313. A ﬁne but important distinction exists between this and the narrower e-democratic conception of online
discussion described above, whereby such discussion is taken simply as an input into the deliberations of the
plenary body at annual meetings, rather than being equivalent to and potentially a substitute for face-to-face de-
liberation. On this broader view, it is not necessary for the output of a deliberative online discussion to be
conﬁrmed by the group attending the IGF’s plenary meetings in person, as their deliberation on substantive
issues possesses no greater legitimacy than that of the online participants (perhaps to the contrary, since those
able to attend in person are likely to be a more privileged and less diverse group overall).
314. See Section 6.3.1.5.
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direct consideration, than those which could interface with the plenary body under the e-
democratic conception. In particular, it would be necessary to ensure that:
￿ the group is adequately diverse and of multi-stakeholder composition;
￿ the group’s membership is open and its operation transparent (for example, discussions
should not be silently moderated);
￿ the group’s size may however be limited, and if necessary divided into sub-groups;
315
￿ all relevant perspectives are represented within the group (including the use of the same
background brieﬁng material that is put before the plenary body meeting in person); and
￿ the services of moderators or facilitators are provided to ensure that the group adheres to
a deliberative democratic process (for example, that its members acknowledge each other’s
equal capacity to contribute).
These rather stringent criteria do not necessarily preclude the operation of decentralised
discussion fora organised from the grass-roots, in competition with any oﬃcial fora established
by the Secretariat. As an example of this, the IGP organised a Global Deliberative Dialogue
on Internet Governance as an online analogue to PrepCom 3 of the Tunis phase of WSIS.
Although it was open to all participants, the dialogue was distinguished by the participation
of panelists from the Internet governance community, a facilitator who“encourages everyone
to join in the conversation, ensures that all aspects of the topics are considered and keeps
the conversation focused,”
316 and a summarizer who would draw together highlights of the
discussion from each day.
But equally, there is no reason why a single forum that fulﬁlls the above criteria could not
meet the IGF’s need for asynchronous online discussion, just as there is presently only one
such forum for face-to-face discussion at the IGF’s annual plenary meeting.
317
A third new online process for the IGF, that is independent of and supplementary to those
that can be realised oﬄine, is a mechanism for collaborative drafting, such as a wiki or one
of the other tools for collaborative authoring described at Section 4.3.4.3. This facility could
be employed in at least two circumstances:
315. See Section 4.3.4.3.
316. See http://www.webdialogues.net/cs/dialogue-wgig-guidelines/view/di/70?x-t=guidelines.view.
317. Such a forum may still of course need to be sub-divided into groups of manageable size, as the speed
dialogue sessions are to be subdivided into table groups.
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￿ where there is consensus within the plenary body that a statement, declaration, policy or
other soft law document is called for, but not yet suﬃcient consensus as to its content for
the bureau to begin to draft the document; and
￿ to enable diverse stakeholders to develop written contributions and submissions for the IGF
collaboratively, rather than, as at present, doing so in isolation.
ICANN provides an example of such an online process in action, with its grass-roots developed
ICANN Wiki, which hosts an experimental online Consensus Poll to develop an ICANN policy
on gTLDs.
318 There is no reason why the Secretariat—or, as in ICANN’s case, the community
itself—could not provide similar facilities, as an adjunct to online deliberative discussion fora,
for the development of texts at a grass-roots level within the IGF.
6.5. A new IGF
The Tunis Agenda indicates that the purpose of the IGF is to address the“many cross-cutting
international public policy issues that require attention and are not adequately addressed by
the current mechanisms.”
319 It is notable that this does not imply that the public policy issues
in question were not being addressed at all, because in many cases they were; however they
were addressed either relatively ineﬀectively, illegitimately, or (most often) both.
Speciﬁcally, prior to the IGF’s establishment, as described in Chapter 2, issues of Internet re-
lated public policy tended to be addressed only by the private sector and/or civil society (usu-
ally by their preferred mechanisms—markets, norms and architecture) to the exclusion of
governments, or to be addressed by governments (generally through domestic regulation) to
the exclusion of the other stakeholder groups. Even where governance did take place through
networks, these were not multi-stakeholder but were dominated by one stakeholder group.
320
The unilateral policy decisions of these stakeholders have been undemocratic in that they have
failed to consider the perspectives of all aﬀected parties. For example, when governments have
prohibited or restricted the use of Internet services within their borders (for example, many
developing nations have outlawed the use of VoIP telephony),
321 there has been no represen-
318. See Section 4.4.2.2.
319. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 68
320. For example, by the private sector in the case of the Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce
(GBDe), and governments in the case of the OECD. (As to the GBDe see http://www.gbd-e.org/ and Klein-
w¨ achter, Wolfgang, Global Governance in the Information Age: GBDe and ICANN as “Pilot Projects” for Co-
regulation and a New Trilateral Policy? (2001), 17–21.)
321. Biggs, Phillippa, The Status of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Worldwide, 2006 (2007), 22–41
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tation for the interests of those aﬀected by the transnational impacts of that decision.
322 But
by the same token, civil society and the private sector have also exhibited a tendency to act
unilaterally on matters of policy, without inviting the participation of governments; as seen for
example in the case of the W3C’s PICS initiative and the IETF’s policy on wire-tapping.
323
There are limited exceptions, in which governments have sought to involve certain private
stakeholders in the policy development process. For example, Australia has by and large
adopted a “light-touch” approach to Internet regulation, relying predominantly on industry
self-regulation in the issue areas of spam, DNS management and content regulation. Even so,
in this process civil society (let alone transnational civil society) has not been engaged as an
equal stakeholder, but only as an interest group to be consulted in accordance with principles
of participatory democracy.
324
Since the establishment of the IGF, which provides an institutionalised framework for multi-
stakeholder public policy development within the Internet governance regime, there is no
longer any excuse for Internet-related public policy to be developed in such an unaccountable,
parochial fashion as it has been to date. A good indication of the IGF’s success might therefore
be gauged by determining the extent to which actors in the Internet governance regime have
begun to look to the multi-stakeholder process of the IGF to lubricate and legitimise their
own policy processes.
There is scant evidence of this to date. Arguably the Council of Europe’s 2007 Recommenda-
tion on promoting freedom of expression in the new information and communications envi-
ronment, which emphasises the “importance that member states, the private sector and civil
society develop various forms of multi-stakeholder co-operation and partnerships”to this end,
is one of the early fruits of the IGF at an intergovernmental level.
325 However this did not
represent the outcome of a multi-stakeholder consensus, judging by the strong opposition to
the Recommendation that has emerged from civil society.
326
On this basis, the IGF can not yet be judged a success, as all stakeholder groups have largely
continued to act unilaterally in their activities in the Internet governance regime, even where
322. This does not simply mean the interests of those outside the country’s borders, because the transnational
social entities that are aﬀected by the decision may be partially located within the country.
323. See Section 2.2.2.
324. See also Biegel, Stuart, Beyond Our Control?: Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of
Cyberspace (2001), 217.
325. Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Promoting Freedom
of Expression and Information in the New Information and Communications Environment (2007). A subsequent
recommendation falling into the same category is Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on Measures to Promote the Public Service Value of the Internet (2007) .
326. European Digital Rights, New Council of Europe Recommendation Fails to Uphold Online Freedom of Ex-
pression (2007)
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public policy issues of transnational and cross-stakeholder impact are clearly engaged. For
example:
￿ in 2005 governments intervened to prevent the addition of the xxx gTLD into the DNS root
following its provisional approval by the ICANN board,
327 and have drafted a policy that
asserts the right for any GAC member government to do the same for any other proposed
new gTLD;
328
￿ as for the private sector, in March 2007 industry body Music Industry Piracy Investigations
(MIPI) wrote to Australian ISPs suggesting that they should voluntarily disconnect their
users’ Internet accounts if accused by MIPI of trading copyright music;
329 and
￿ even civil society has bypassed the IGF and the input of governments in working with the
private sector towards the development of a code of practice on private sector involvement
in national Internet regulation.
330
Since the IGF exists to provide a forum for policy development in just such cases as these,
why is it not being employed for that purpose? Whilst an obvious part of the explanation
is that the IGF is yet in its early days, two further possible answers will be suggested here.
The ﬁrst is that the IGF is not yet equipped to fulﬁl its appointed role, and unless signiﬁcant
reforms are made, it will never be. Instead, it has been fashioned by its Secretariat principally
as a forum for the discussion of Internet issues, with a bias towards development. In other
words it is not, at present, an Internet governance forum at all, but simply an Internet issues
forum.
The required characteristics of a new IGF capable of fulﬁlling its policy-setting role, rather
than just its operational role for the promotion of capacity building and ICT development,
has been described in some detail in this chapter. This new IGF will need to comprise:
￿ a Secretariat that is accountable to the IGF through its multi-stakeholder bureau, rather
than merely to the UN Secretary-General, and which is no longer to carry out substantive
327. McCullagh, Declan, Bush Administration Objects to .xxx Domains (2005)
328. GAC, GAC Principles Regarding New gTLDs (2007)
329. Sunday Mail, Music Pirates to be Cut Oﬀ (2007). A similar scheme has already been adopted in France and
is likely to be adopted in the United Kingdom, in each case in the shadow of the threat of regulation: Computer
Business Review, Illegal Downloaders Could Lose Web Access (2008) .
330. CDT, Companies, Human Rights Groups, Investors, Academics and Technology Leaders to Address Inter-
national Free Expression and Privacy Challenges (2007). Compare calls for a similar code of conduct for bloggers
(see BBC News, Call for Blogging Code of Conduct (2007) ) and for a bill of rights for the Social Web (see Smarr,
Joseph, A Bill of Rights for Users of the Social Web (2007)).
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functions such as the preparation of documents or the design of the IGF’s structures and
processes;
￿ a multi-stakeholder nominating committee, containing equal numbers of randomly-selected
volunteers from each stakeholder group, to appoint members from that same stakeholder
group to the IGF’s multi-stakeholder bureau, as well as appointing an appeals committee
for the IGF, in each case pursuant to criteria developed in open consultation with the IGF
at large;
￿ a multi-stakeholder bureau which:
￿ contains equal members from each stakeholder group acting as representatives of that
group, and which although deliberating as a unitary body, ultimately gives each stake-
holder group within the bureau a separate power of veto over its decisions;
￿ appoints its own co-chairs (from diﬀerent stakeholder groups on a rotating basis), and a
chair for the nominating committee, along with any liaisons and advisors for either body;
￿ also appoints moderators and panelists for plenary sessions and open fora, taking into
account the IGF’s mandate and the need for balanced representation of all stakeholder
groups;
￿ is to assume the other functions of the existing Advisory Group and those taken from
the Secretariat, in addition to functions that have yet been unassigned, such as assessing
the consensus of the plenary body and preparing any soft law instruments required to
give eﬀect to that consensus; and
￿ is to conduct these functions independently of the UN Secretary-General, except in a
strictly formal sense;
331
￿ dynamic coalitions which satisfy criteria of multi-stakeholder composition and democrat-
ic process developed in open consultation with the IGF at large, and which may deliver
recommendations that have demonstrably been made by consensus to the bureau for con-
sideration by the plenary body; and
￿ a plenary body which:
￿ at open consultation meetings instructs the bureau on the agenda to be set for plenary
meetings and on the development of the structure and processes of the IGF according to
multi-stakeholder, democratic principles;
331. However after the ﬁve year initial mandate of the IGF expires, the IGF could be reconstituted as an
international organisation in its own right, without even formal UN oversight.
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￿ at annual plenary meetings is empowered to engage in democratic deliberation towards
the end of achieving a rational multi-stakeholder consensus, through mechanisms such
as the speed dialogue; and
￿ continues its work intersessionally through online mechanisms, particularly in respect of
matters that are too complex or otherwise unsuited for resolution at an annual meeting.
Whilst these reforms are signiﬁcant, they are both consistent with the Tunis Agenda, and also
practically achievable; particularly in comparison to other proposals for the democratisation
of Internet governance such as ICANN’s 2000 At-Large elections.
332
There is however more doubt as to whether they are yet politically achievable, and this
constitutes the second reason why other actors in the Internet governance regime are not
having recourse to the processes of the IGF: that the transaction costs of moving to an open,
democratic and multi-stakeholder process are greater than those of bypassing the IGF and
continuing to act unilaterally or in narrower, less accountable governance networks.
333
The transaction costs of acting through the IGF rather than in narrower private networks
are likely to be highest for the regime’s most powerful actors, the Forum doves; and to
that extent this second reason for the failure of the IGF largely underlies the ﬁrst, since it
is at the behest of the Forum doves that the IGF has been structurally and procedurally
disempowered since its formation was ﬁrst proposed by WGIG and subsequently agreed at
WSIS. Whereas the Tunis Agenda establishes a broad mandate for the IGF that unequivocally
involves it in making substantive policy recommendations, the Forum doves have been resolute
in downplaying the IGF’s policy-setting role, as their submissions outlined in Chapter 5
demonstrate time and again.
This has been justiﬁed by some by pointing to the division between the IGF as a venue for
multi-stakeholder discussion, and the government-led “enhanced cooperation” process as the
locus of policy-setting authority.
334 But in fact there is no clear division between the role of
the IGF and the process of enhanced cooperation in the Tunis Agenda; rather the former is
treated as an integral component of the latter.
335 What can be taken from this is that whilst
governments will continue to maintain sovereignty over the authoritative statement of public
332. See Section 5.4.3.
333. Mueller describes the experience of the IFWP in much the same way: Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root:
Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (2002), 5.
334. Mueller, Milton,“A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum...”: Multistakeholderism, International
Institutions and Global Governance of the Internet (2006), 10
335. See WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), paras 67–72, in which the middle paragraphs
on enhanced cooperation are sandwiched by those calling for the establishment of the IGF.
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policy principles in international and domestic law, those principles are to be developed in a
multi-stakeholder forum, the IGF (from where they may equally ﬁnd implementation through
other, non-legal mechanisms of governance).
Regardless of the terms of the Tunis Agenda however, the role of civil society in the enhanced
cooperation process (and hence the role of the IGF) has been played down by governmental
actors in Tunis’ wake; for example in EU Commissioner Viviane Reding’s description of it as a
“process of enhanced cooperation between governments.”
336 In any case, the disunity of states
following WSIS on exactly what the content of a new model of enhanced cooperation should
be seems eﬀectively to have ground that broader process to a halt.
337 Thus the momentum
of the programme of multi-stakeholder democratisation of Internet governance that began at
WSIS has since been lost (or perhaps unmasked as expedient politics), leaving the IGF as its
only extant remnant.
This makes it all the more important that the role of the IGF in multi-stakeholder policy
development is not forsaken. This in turn can only ultimately be assured through change
at a political level. It must, in short, become more politically expensive for intransigent
governments and other Forum doves to continue to bypass the IGF than for them to embrace
it. This is, doubtless, quite a hope. As one commentator observed ahead of the Athens meeting,
“There is no indication that rulers of China, Tunisia or Iran will take any notice of what is
said in Athens, and no real hope that the Western governments will step back from their own
campaigns to control, regulate and censor the net.”
338
Yet there are cases in which, as liberal institutionalism predicts, governments have been will-
ing to restrain their authority in the interests of making longer term absolute gains through
cooperation with other stakeholder groups. For example, governments have for the most part
been content to leave ccTLD administration to private, bottom–up coordination, as in the
cases of auDA, Nominet and SIDN amongst others. With slightly less universal contentment,
they have also acquiesced in ICANN’s administration of the global DNS root and IP address-
ing system.
WGIG is another prominent example of governments sharing responsibility for policy devel-
opment with other stakeholder groups. Although this occurred in a somewhat more controlled
environment than the IGF, it well illustrates the signiﬁcant eﬀect that a body without formal
336. European Commission, Internet Governance: Commission Welcomes Move Towards Full Private-Sector
Management by 2009 (2006)
337. See Section 5.1.4.1.
338. Thompson, Bill, Everyone Talks, But No-One Listens (2006)
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decision-making authority can nevertheless have on policy development at a higher, more au-
thoritative level; after all, there would certainly be no IGF were it not for WGIG. Outside the
Internet governance regime, a number of similar examples have already been given, including
the processes by which the Mine Ban Treaty and Disability Convention were developed with
the integral involvement of civil society.
339
So whilst political change is required in order for the IGF to be allowed to take its place as the
multi-stakeholder forum for policy development that the Tunis Agenda describes, provided
that a good case can be made for such change, there is no cause to rule it out as utopian,
particularly given the progress that has already been made towards the realisation of multi-
stakeholder democratic Internet governance through WSIS, WGIG and the establishment of
the IGF (for now) as a venue for freeform discussion.
This thesis has endeavoured to make that case, by demonstrating that performing public
policy governance of the Internet through the mechanism of a democratic multi-stakeholder
network (generally compatible with the model proposed for the IGF in the Tunis Agenda):
￿ is more legitimate than the use of hierarchical mechanisms of governance, because states do
not even conceptually possess sole authority over public policy issues that have substantially
transnational rather than domestic eﬀects;
￿ is also likely to be more eﬀective than the use of rules, which is at odds with the ar-
chitectural values of the Internet such as decentralisation, openness, egalitarianism and
cosmopolitanism that continue to permeate its culture;
￿ does not however threaten the existing political and economic power of governments or
other stakeholders, because of its inherently non-binding, consensual form, and even less so
given the consociational structure for the bureau that has been devised in this thesis; and
￿ does not even detract from the need for states to exercise an independent policy-setting role,
since when consensus cannot be achieved on a particular issue, it will fall through to be
dealt with on a decentralised basis by other mechanisms, including rules.
340
As strong as the case for reform of the IGF may be, its implications will not be self-executing.
In none of the other cases referred to above in which international public policy-setting has
been opened up to other stakeholders (the WSIS process and the Mine Ban and Disability
339. See Section 6.2.2.3.
340. Similarly, when only a limited or partial consensus can be reached, this can narrow down the issues that
would otherwise be at large for the policy maker: Mathiason, John, The Road to Rio and Beyond: Results-based
Management of the UN Internet Governance Forum (2006), 2.
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treaties), did this occur without sustained pressure from civil society. Therefore it will be
incumbent upon democracy activists and academics to catalyse the political change required
for the IGF to undergo the reforms that this chapter has shown necessary, and for that new
IGF to be accepted as legitimately ﬁlling the policy void referred to in the Tunis Agenda.
341
Part of what this involves is refusing to accept the curtailment of the IGF’s mandate by
stealth. If the Forum doves are no longer willing to share their responsibility for policy devel-
opment with other stakeholders through an empowered and eﬀective IGF, this agenda should
be unmasked and debated transparently rather than being quietly eﬀected through the inac-
tion of its Secretariat and Advisory Group and their imposition of inappropriate institutional
strictures on the IGF.
This is not to downplay the signiﬁcant achievement that has been made already, in attracting
all stakeholder groups to share their perspectives on issues of Internet governance in an open
and egalitarian discussion forum. This is an important foundation for the fuller implementa-
tion of multi-stakeholder governance in the future. Given time, the IGF might even evolve
naturally into the body envisaged by the Tunis Agenda, as trust between stakeholders is
earned and the social capital of the governance network develops. However, as the IGF has
only ﬁve years to establish itself before its existence is reviewed, it does not have the luxury
of time. Further, structural inertia will make change more diﬃcult the longer it is left.
If, on the other hand, the IGF does come to fulﬁl its potential, the implications of its success
should resonate throughout the Internet governance regime, perhaps leading other Internet
governance fora such as ICANN and the ITU to progressively develop their own structures and
processes along similar multi-stakeholder lines.
342 In fact, there is no reason why the example
of the IGF should not extend far beyond the regime of Internet governance. Conceptually,
multi-stakeholder governance calls for application to many other issue areas of transnational
public policy development, such as the environment, intellectual property, trade, peacekeeping
and human rights. The IGF may therefore represent not only an innovation for Internet
governance, but the vanguard of a new paradigm for the post-Westphalian age of international
relations.
341. WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005), para 60
342. de la Chapelle, Bertrand, The Internet Governance Forum: How a United Nations Summit Produced a New
Governance Paradigm for the Internet Age (2007), 26
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Licence
B.1. GNU Free Documentation Licence
Version 1.1, March 2000
Copyright (C) 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA
02111-1307 USA Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license
document, but changing it is not allowed.
B.1.1. Preamble
The purpose of this License is to make a manual, textbook, or other written document ”free”
in the sense of freedom: to assure everyone the eﬀective freedom to copy and redistribute
it, with or without modifying it, either commercially or noncommercially. Secondarily, this
License preserves for the author and publisher a way to get credit for their work, while not
being considered responsible for modiﬁcations made by others.
This License is a kind of ”copyleft”, which means that derivative works of the document must
themselves be free in the same sense. It complements the GNU General Public License, which
is a copyleft license designed for free software.
We have designed this License in order to use it for manuals for free software, because free
software needs free documentation: a free program should come with manuals providing the
same freedoms that the software does. But this License is not limited to software manuals; it
can be used for any textual work, regardless of subject matter or whether it is published as a
printed book. We recommend this License principally for works whose purpose is instruction
or reference.
B.1.2. Applicablility and deﬁnitions
This License applies to any manual or other work that contains a notice placed by the copy-
right holder saying it can be distributed under the terms of this License. The ”Document”,
below, refers to any such manual or work. Any member of the public is a licensee, and is
addressed as ”you”.
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A ”Modiﬁed Version”of the Document means any work containing the Document or a portion
of it, either copied verbatim, or with modiﬁcations and/or translated into another language.
A ”Secondary Section” is a named appendix or a front-matter section of the Document that
deals exclusively with the relationship of the publishers or authors of the Document to the
Document’s overall subject (or to related matters) and contains nothing that could fall directly
within that overall subject. (For example, if the Document is in part a textbook of math-
ematics, a Secondary Section may not explain any mathematics.) The relationship could
be a matter of historical connection with the subject or with related matters, or of legal,
commercial, philosophical, ethical or political position regarding them.
The ”Invariant Sections”are certain Secondary Sections whose titles are designated, as being
those of Invariant Sections, in the notice that says that the Document is released under this
License.
The ”Cover Texts” are certain short passages of text that are listed, as Front-Cover Texts or
Back-Cover Texts, in the notice that says that the Document is released under this License.
A ”Transparent” copy of the Document means a machine-readable copy, represented in a
format whose speciﬁcation is available to the general public, whose contents can be viewed
and edited directly and straightforwardly with generic text editors or (for images composed
of pixels) generic paint programs or (for drawings) some widely available drawing editor, and
that is suitable for input to text formatters or for automatic translation to a variety of formats
suitable for input to text formatters. A copy made in an otherwise Transparent ﬁle format
whose markup has been designed to thwart or discourage subsequent modiﬁcation by readers
is not Transparent. A copy that is not ”Transparent” is called ”Opaque”.
Examples of suitable formats for Transparent copies include plain ASCII without markup,
Texinfo input format, LaTeX input format, SGML or XML using a publicly available DTD,
and standard-conforming simple HTML designed for human modiﬁcation. Opaque formats
include PostScript, PDF, proprietary formats that can be read and edited only by proprietary
word processors, SGML or XML for which the DTD and/or processing tools are not generally
available, and the machine-generated HTML produced by some word processors for output
purposes only.
The ”Title Page”means, for a printed book, the title page itself, plus such following pages as
are needed to hold, legibly, the material this License requires to appear in the title page. For
works in formats which do not have any title page as such, ”Title Page” means the text near
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the most prominent appearance of the work’s title, preceding the beginning of the body of
the text.
B.1.3. Verbatim copying
You may copy and distribute the Document in any medium, either commercially or noncom-
mercially, provided that this License, the copyright notices, and the license notice saying this
License applies to the Document are reproduced in all copies, and that you add no other con-
ditions whatsoever to those of this License. You may not use technical measures to obstruct
or control the reading or further copying of the copies you make or distribute. However, you
may accept compensation in exchange for copies. If you distribute a large enough number of
copies you must also follow the conditions in section 3.
You may also lend copies, under the same conditions stated above, and you may publicly
display copies.
B.1.4. Copying in quantity
If you publish printed copies of the Document numbering more than 100, and the Document’s
license notice requires Cover Texts, you must enclose the copies in covers that carry, clearly
and legibly, all these Cover Texts: Front-Cover Texts on the front cover, and Back-Cover Texts
on the back cover. Both covers must also clearly and legibly identify you as the publisher of
these copies. The front cover must present the full title with all words of the title equally
prominent and visible. You may add other material on the covers in addition. Copying with
changes limited to the covers, as long as they preserve the title of the Document and satisfy
these conditions, can be treated as verbatim copying in other respects.
If the required texts for either cover are too voluminous to ﬁt legibly, you should put the
ﬁrst ones listed (as many as ﬁt reasonably) on the actual cover, and continue the rest onto
adjacent pages.
If you publish or distribute Opaque copies of the Document numbering more than 100, you
must either include a machine-readable Transparent copy along with each Opaque copy, or
state in or with each Opaque copy a publicly-accessible computer-network location containing
a complete Transparent copy of the Document, free of added material, which the general
network-using public has access to download anonymously at no charge using public-standard
network protocols. If you use the latter option, you must take reasonably prudent steps, when
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you begin distribution of Opaque copies in quantity, to ensure that this Transparent copy will
remain thus accessible at the stated location until at least one year after the last time you
distribute an Opaque copy (directly or through your agents or retailers) of that edition to the
public.
It is requested, but not required, that you contact the authors of the Document well before
redistributing any large number of copies, to give them a chance to provide you with an
updated version of the Document.
B.1.5. Modiﬁcations
You may copy and distribute a Modiﬁed Version of the Document under the conditions of
sections 2 and 3 above, provided that you release the Modiﬁed Version under precisely this
License, with the Modiﬁed Version ﬁlling the role of the Document, thus licensing distribution
and modiﬁcation of the Modiﬁed Version to whoever possesses a copy of it. In addition, you
must do these things in the Modiﬁed Version:
A. Use in the Title Page (and on the covers, if any) a title distinct from that of the Document,
and from those of previous versions (which should, if there were any, be listed in the History
section of the Document). You may use the same title as a previous version if the original
publisher of that version gives permission.
B. List on the Title Page, as authors, one or more persons or entities responsible for authorship
of the modiﬁcations in the Modiﬁed Version, together with at least ﬁve of the principal authors
of the Document (all of its principal authors, if it has less than ﬁve).
C. State on the Title page the name of the publisher of the Modiﬁed Version, as the publisher.
D. Preserve all the copyright notices of the Document.
E. Add an appropriate copyright notice for your modiﬁcations adjacent to the other copyright
notices.
F. Include, immediately after the copyright notices, a license notice giving the public permis-
sion to use the Modiﬁed Version under the terms of this License, in the form shown in the
Addendum below.
G. Preserve in that license notice the full lists of Invariant Sections and required Cover Texts
given in the Document’s license notice.
H. Include an unaltered copy of this License.
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I. Preserve the section entitled ”History”, and its title, and add to it an item stating at least
the title, year, new authors, and publisher of the Modiﬁed Version as given on the Title
Page. If there is no section entitled ”History” in the Document, create one stating the title,
year, authors, and publisher of the Document as given on its Title Page, then add an item
describing the Modiﬁed Version as stated in the previous sentence.
J. Preserve the network location, if any, given in the Document for public access to a Trans-
parent copy of the Document, and likewise the network locations given in the Document for
previous versions it was based on. These may be placed in the ”History” section. You may
omit a network location for a work that was published at least four years before the Document
itself, or if the original publisher of the version it refers to gives permission.
K. In any section entitled ”Acknowledgements” or ”Dedications”, preserve the section’s title,
and preserve in the section all the substance and tone of each of the contributor acknowl-
edgements and/or dedications given therein.
L. Preserve all the Invariant Sections of the Document, unaltered in their text and in their
titles. Section numbers or the equivalent are not considered part of the section titles.
M. Delete any section entitled ”Endorsements”. Such a section may not be included in the
Modiﬁed Version.
N. Do not retitle any existing section as ”Endorsements” or to conﬂict in title with any
Invariant Section.
If the Modiﬁed Version includes new front-matter sections or appendices that qualify as
Secondary Sections and contain no material copied from the Document, you may at your
option designate some or all of these sections as invariant. To do this, add their titles to the
list of Invariant Sections in the Modiﬁed Version’s license notice. These titles must be distinct
from any other section titles.
You may add a section entitled ”Endorsements”, provided it contains nothing but endorse-
ments of your Modiﬁed Version by various parties–for example, statements of peer review
or that the text has been approved by an organization as the authoritative deﬁnition of a
standard.
You may add a passage of up to ﬁve words as a Front-Cover Text, and a passage of up to 25
words as a Back-Cover Text, to the end of the list of Cover Texts in the Modiﬁed Version.
Only one passage of Front-Cover Text and one of Back-Cover Text may be added by (or
through arrangements made by) any one entity. If the Document already includes a cover
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text for the same cover, previously added by you or by arrangement made by the same entity
you are acting on behalf of, you may not add another; but you may replace the old one, on
explicit permission from the previous publisher that added the old one.
The author(s) and publisher(s) of the Document do not by this License give permission to
use their names for publicity for or to assert or imply endorsement of any Modiﬁed Version.
B.1.6. Combining documents
You may combine the Document with other documents released under this License, under
the terms deﬁned in section 4 above for modiﬁed versions, provided that you include in the
combination all of the Invariant Sections of all of the original documents, unmodiﬁed, and
list them all as Invariant Sections of your combined work in its license notice.
The combined work need only contain one copy of this License, and multiple identical Invari-
ant Sections may be replaced with a single copy. If there are multiple Invariant Sections with
the same name but diﬀerent contents, make the title of each such section unique by adding
at the end of it, in parentheses, the name of the original author or publisher of that section
if known, or else a unique number. Make the same adjustment to the section titles in the list
of Invariant Sections in the license notice of the combined work.
In the combination, you must combine any sections entitled ”History” in the various original
documents, forming one section entitled ”History”; likewise combine any sections entitled
”Acknowledgements”, and any sections entitled ”Dedications”. You must delete all sections
entitled ”Endorsements.”
B.1.7. Collections of documents
You may make a collection consisting of the Document and other documents released under
this License, and replace the individual copies of this License in the various documents with a
single copy that is included in the collection, provided that you follow the rules of this License
for verbatim copying of each of the documents in all other respects.
You may extract a single document from such a collection, and distribute it individually
under this License, provided you insert a copy of this License into the extracted document,
and follow this License in all other respects regarding verbatim copying of that document.
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B.1.8. Aggregation with independent works
A compilation of the Document or its derivatives with other separate and independent doc-
uments or works, in or on a volume of a storage or distribution medium, does not as a whole
count as a Modiﬁed Version of the Document, provided no compilation copyright is claimed
for the compilation. Such a compilation is called an ”aggregate”, and this License does not
apply to the other self-contained works thus compiled with the Document, on account of their
being thus compiled, if they are not themselves derivative works of the Document.
If the Cover Text requirement of section 3 is applicable to these copies of the Document, then
if the Document is less than one quarter of the entire aggregate, the Document’s Cover Texts
may be placed on covers that surround only the Document within the aggregate. Otherwise
they must appear on covers around the whole aggregate.
B.1.9. Translation
Translation is considered a kind of modiﬁcation, so you may distribute translations of the
Document under the terms of section 4. Replacing Invariant Sections with translations re-
quires special permission from their copyright holders, but you may include translations of
some or all Invariant Sections in addition to the original versions of these Invariant Sections.
You may include a translation of this License provided that you also include the original
English version of this License. In case of a disagreement between the translation and the
original English version of this License, the original English version will prevail.
B.1.10. Termination
You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Document except as expressly pro-
vided for under this License. Any other attempt to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the
Document is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License. However,
parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under this License will not have their
licenses terminated so long as such parties remain in full compliance.
B.1.11. Future revisions of this license
The Free Software Foundation may publish new, revised versions of the GNU Free Doc-
umentation License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the
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present version, but may diﬀer in detail to address new problems or concerns. See Copyleft.
(http://www.gnu.org/copyleft)
Each version of the License is given a distinguishing version number. If the Document speciﬁes
that a particular numbered version of this License ”or any later version” applies to it, you
have the option of following the terms and conditions either of that speciﬁed version or of
any later version that has been published (not as a draft) by the Free Software Foundation. If
the Document does not specify a version number of this License, you may choose any version
ever published (not as a draft) by the Free Software Foundation.
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